



PEACE BUILDING AND NATIONALISM

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DEDICATION

This volume is dedicated to the Almighty God for His inspiration, wisdom and strength.

EDITORS' NOTE

We believe that this book will continuously address the needs of the following audiences: students of social sciences and humanities at various levels, policy-makers, socio-political leadership, practitioners of peace and conflict resolution, security and legal experts.

This volume is an extension (however divergent) of the series of successes we have so far had with different volumes of NOUN International Journal of Peace Studies and conflict Resolution (www.nijpcr.noun.edu.ng). We hope it is just the start of many such scholarly volumes.

We are grateful to our colleagues and other professionals who took time in spite of their various engagements and schedule to contribute to knowledge and the never-ending debates on nationalism, conflict, peace and security. It is our hope that this volume will stimulate more debate and expand scholarship on the various subject treated here.

We also hope that in line with this year's World Peace Day Celebration with the theme: END RACISM, BUILD PEACE, we would have contributed, however little, to peace education and the eradication of racial discrimination. Also important to us is the need for this volume to address remote and broader issues of nationalism in Nigeria, Africa and the world at large.

Samuel O. Iroye

Basil O. Ibebunjo

Abuja, Nigeria. 2022

FOREWORD

In postcolonial Africa, a lot of challenges that arose were not envisaged. The departing colonialists did not teach, train nor mentor the emergent African leaders about postcolonial reality of governance and administration. On the part of African nationalists that took over governance, the reality of day-to-day administration became clearer in the midst of nationalism, different ideologies and perspectives.

Nigeria, cannot be absolved from the reality of development, governance and efforts to detach itself from the former British colonialists. The first decade of its existence led to a civil war that challenged its corporate existence as a nation. From the 70s until 1999 (with interlude between 1979 and 1983), the military dominated its affairs and ideological orientation and nationalism of being truly agents of development.

The development, democracy, peace, etc. became buzz words. In reality, peace necessary for developmental efforts and execution of developmental plans was not pursued with zeal expected of nationalists in “Khaki” and “agbada”. The return to civilian administration in 1999 was ushered in with lots of fanfare. However, the reality is that peace making, peace keeping and the avoidance of conflicts remained a major challenge. The mix of differentiated nationalism, ideology and the pursuit of peace continued to be the major plague confronted by the government at all levels of governance.

The chapters in this volume have addressed these challenges and proffer solutions moving forward. The authors are experts in the field. The chapters are rich in methodology, sources and analyses. I therefore commend the efforts of the editors for putting together the differentiated, yet converging, topics and analyses of issues confronting the nation.

The book is commendable and recommended to students, teachers, public servants, business men and women. It will enrich knowledge about Nigeria’s trajectory with peace, nationalism, development and its future in the comity of nations.

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CHAPTER ONE

PEACE BUILDING AS A VERITABLE INSTRUMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC SUSTAINABILITY IN NIGERIA: CONTENDING ISSUES AND OPTIONS

Dawood Omolumen EGBEFO, PhD* and Samuel Opeyemi IROYE, PhD†

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's democracy process can only benefit the nation and its citizens when its sustainability can be guaranteed. There are therefore important reasons why democracy is a preferable alternative to other forms of government. In the first place, democracy enables people to participate in the political process and also extend the frontiers of national unity. Political freedom and opportunity to participate in the decision-making process that shapes one's life is regarded as fundamental human right. This may sound quite theoretical in the context of Nigeria's nascent democracy.

For example, one may be compelled to pose this question, does my vote count in Nigeria's democracy? This is problematic. Nevertheless, whether symbolic or ritualistic, when you cannot vote and when your vote does not count, no matter how wealthy you may be your choice in life is highly restricted, it means you cannot decide who governs you. You cannot contribute meaningfully to development process or to national unity. And this is why the struggle for democracy, national unity in Nigeria is always intense. Even those in political leadership or the elites, in spite of their anti-democratic tendencies, still clamour for democracy and for national unity. Therefore, the fact that democracy enables us to participate in decision making process, it is considered vital to human development and national unity.

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Sustenance as in consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioural and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, enhancement of national integrative instruments and other functions that civil society performs. However, most of all, and most urgently, it requires political institutionalization. A democracy can best be sustained when we have good reason to believe that it is capable of withstanding pressure or shocks without abandoning the electoral process or the political freedom on which it depends, including those of dissent and opposition. Moreover, this will require a depth of institutionalization reaching beyond the electoral process itself. Lay Diamond (1995).

From these, however, a variety of different criteria has been proposed in the literature in order to identify a sustained democracy when we see one. Democracy is consolidated when a government that has itself been elected in a free and fair contest is defeated in a subsequent election and accepts the result. The point of this criterion is that, it is not winning office that matters, but losing it and accepting the verdict, because this demonstrates that powerful players, and their social backers, are prepared to put respect for the rules of the game above the continuation of their power. On the other hand, the second option favours a simple longevity or generation test. Twenty years say, of regular competitive elections are sufficient to judge a democracy consolidated, even without a change of ruling party, since habituation to the electoral process would make any alternative method for appointing rulers unthinkable. Apart from these two criteria, democracies emerge and become sustained, not out of any principled commitment to democratic norms, but when the major political players recognize sufficient common interest in establishing electoral procedures and subsequently see that their interest in keeping to the rules of the game outweighs the costs to them of their being undermined. The foregoing has demonstrated that the sustainability of democracy is a product

of many factors or conditions operating together. No one condition on its own will be either necessary or sufficient but an accumulation of facilitating conditions can be expected to enhance the prospects for the survival of electoral democracy. The project is clearly more difficult in some circumstances than others, and faces much more formidable obstacles in some countries than others. It is a task in the social sciences to identify these circumstances and subject them to comparative analysis.

It is unequivocally glaring to discern the fact that the concept of democratic sustenance has the problems of homonymity (one word meaning many things). Though, inimical to theory building and the accumulation of knowledge, it even frustrates such elementary operations as case classification. As flatters now stand, the concept's classificatory utility' is close to zero, its boundaries are fuzzy and fluid. For the purpose of this paper however, democratic sustenance means the capacity of the polity to nurture and consolidate democracy over a very long-time spell with little or no threat to the abortion of democratic experiment and disintegrative elements in whatever form and pretence (Linz, 1990: 166).

Understanding Peacebuilding

Peace building can be categorized into two: Pre-conflict peace building and post conflict peace building. Thus, what is peace building? According to the British army (1997:2), peace building usually involves:

Actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlement in order to redress the causes of conflict. These mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

Boutros-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace* categorised peace building into two: Pre-conflict and post conflict peace building. According to him, pre-conflict peace building includes such measures like (de) militarisation, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development. Similarly, Rechler (1997:61: sees pre-conflict peace building as:

Preventive measures that aim to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor; to promote and implement human rights and the rights of the minorities and to promote durable development and the realization of a just and fair social order in which there is no discrimination based on race or sex.

Pre-conflict peace-building is a kind of early warning mechanism to monitor conflict triggers or catalysts and address the underlying root sources of conflict, which may be considered as latent or a conflict situation that is still in ‘sleeping phase’. According to the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), pre-conflict peace building is:

...a proactive process that requires identification of conflict incidences; analysis of conflict structure, actors, and trends; adoption of relevant responses and management mechanism; and restoration of trust and confidence of conflict parties in each other. (IDASA 2004:29-30).

According to Albert (2001:130), Peace building is an art of:

“Repairing” relationships, institutions and social facilities and putting in place schemes that can help the disputing communities to be united once again.

Here, it is quite important to distinguish the interrelated concepts of peace-making, peacekeeping and peace building to stimulate our better understanding of this article.

Distinguishing Peacemaking, Peace Keeping and Peacebuilding

Peace can be generated through various means, which may include peace workshops, negotiation or through a choice of conflict handling styles. If two parties are in conflict, for instance in an organization where there is conflict between two or more employees, the employer may use confrontation to settle the conflict if he or she considers joint problem-solving approach as time consuming or less productive. Such an intervention may achieve peace but such peace is negative. It is quite imperative for peace practitioners or interveners to always adopt a shift from a negative peace to positive peace in order to address the causes of conflict for genuine reconciliation rather than encouraging hot peace or ‘sweep under the carpet’ peace philosophy. Sustainable peace is characterized by a notion, which denounces any attempt or action that operates within the confines of physical and structural violence, eliminating discrimination, and promotes friendly interdependent behaviour among various parties (Reychler, 2001: 12).

Peacebuilding consists of a wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation, and societal transformation. Peacebuilding is a long-term process, which occurs after violent conflict has subsided or ended. It is that peace process that follows exhaustion of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Several international agencies and organizations including local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as community-based organizations (CBOs) partake in peacebuilding activities, understanding that it is an umbrella concept, which plays some critical roles in the aftermath of peacemaking and peacekeeping through delivery of long-term transformative efforts. Peacekeeping is only a pro-active response to imposing some order and enforcement actions in the separation of the parties in armed conflict. On other hand, peacemaking is the process of bringing the disputing parties or combatants to some agreement. Peacemaking is thus:

The process of forging a settlement between the disputing parties. While this can be done in direct negotiation with just the two disputants, it is often also done with a third-party mediator, who assists with process and communication problems, and helps the parties work effectively together to draft a workable peace accord. Usually the negotiators are official diplomats, although citizens are getting in the peacemaking process more and more. While they do not negotiate the final accords, citizen diplomacy is becoming an increasingly common way to start the peacemaking process, which is then finalized with official diplomatic efforts (www.coorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/acon7268.htm).

Peacemaking is a diplomatic initiative aimed at bringing to an end any violent attitude that may be dominating the conflict relationship between parties. This is with the hope of making the parties in conflict to see reasons on why they should seek for diplomatic means and nonviolent dialogue in the resolution of their conflict resulting ultimately into signing of a peace agreement. An example of peacemaking process was the Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978, which was facilitated by former American President, President Jimmy Carter. The Accord was a conflict transformation effort by Mr. Jimmy Carter to commit Mr. Menachem Begin, the then Prime Minister of Israel and Mr. Anwar Sadat, the then Egyptian President to the path of enduring peace. But Mr. Begin shown less commitment to the peace

process. Mr. Carter however employed some psychological strategies to make the leaders to reason in choosing the path of peace rather than armed conflict. Through Carter's diplomatic artistry, personal and emotional elements of the parties, a peace deal was signed.

The concept of peacekeeping became fully entrenched in the global peace processes and institutions when it was developed in 1940s by the United Nations but the concept predates the establishment of the UN. Peacekeeping is a third-party intervention to help the parties in changing their violent attitude in the prosecution of the conflict to a less violent or peaceful one by separating them and keeping them apart. Peacekeeping according to Alan James, involves a:

Traditional-looking military force, composed of a number of battalions and the authority of a commander. The battalions will have been detached from or supplied by various national armies, and the commander is appointed by, and is responsible to, the international authority which has arranged the operation. (James, 1990: 1).

Peacekeeping, in classical terms was built on some basic assumptions, which according to Brian Urquhart include:

The consent of the parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operations, to its composition and to its appointed commanding officer; the continuing and strong support of the operations by the mandatory authority, the Security Council;

A clear and practicable mandate;

- i. The non-use of force except in the resort in self-defence. Self-defence, however, including resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peace-keepers from discharging their duties;
- ii. The willingness of the member states, and especially the permanent member of the Security Council, to make available the necessary financial and logical support. (Urquhart, 1990).

Traditional Peacekeeping activities have been undergoing a series of review in recent time. For instance, the conduct of peacekeeping operations is (was) exclusively the responsibility of the UN but now a number of regional bodies have been engaging in peacekeeping initiatives, and ECOMOG is a good example. Peacekeeping is very essential for conflict de-escalation. It is worth knowing that not all peacekeeping operations are carried out by military forces

because some are civilian in nature. Peacekeeping operations do not only provide security, but also involve some other non-military initiatives. (See SAIS on <http://cmtoolkit.sais-jhu.edu/>). Peacebuilding goes beyond separating the disputants or settle their dispute but also builds opportunities –base that heals the wounds. It promotes more friendly relationship among old combatants. It also creates institutions and socio-facilities aimed at assisting the former disputants to respect their mutual needs and interests for peaceful society where meaningful development sustenance of Democracy and address some of the contending issues.

Peacebuilding plays very important roles in the promotion of peace and conflict resolution by focusing more on the ways through which the agreement will be implemented. It also builds opportunity networks in the reconstruction of social, economic, and political structures to allow for creation of sustainable capacity for peace and long-term conflict transformation decorum between the parties. As a matter of fact, peacebuilding includes early warning and response efforts, violence prevention, conflict resolution, peace advocacy, civilian and military peacekeeping, military/civil intervention and humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, and the establishment of peace or buffer zones. Fig. 1.1 Source: Review of the UK Government Approach to Peacebuilding and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from UK Government Funded Peacebuilding Projects (1997-2001) Available on www.dfid.gov.uk There is a difference between post-conflict peacebuilding and long-term peacebuilding. Post-conflict peacebuilding is more associated with peacekeeping while (often) focusing more on demobilization and reintegration programs, and immediate reconstruction needs (Doyle and Sambanis, 2005). Meeting immediate needs and handling crises is no doubt crucial. But while peacemaking and peacekeeping processes are an important part of peace transitions, they are not enough in and of themselves to meet longer-term needs and build a lasting peace.

Long-term peacebuilding is aimed at providing opportunities to meet the long term needs of the decorates by primarily focusing on ways to address the underlying factors or root causes of challenges that in the first instance fertilized the conflict. Several conflict transformation energies are to be channelled to move parties away from contending issues,

confrontations and violence, and towards political and economic participation, peaceful relationships, and social harmony.

Nigerian Democracy: The Destabilizing Factor

At independence in 1960, Nigeria adopted parliamentary democracy anchored on elections, multi-partism, freedom of press and constitutionalism. Elections were held and representative government instituted. However, the nature of the politics and democracy conducted in Nigeria neither was such that it could not be sustained nor promote national integration. The process was marred by violence, thuggery and intimidation, and in some instances brutal political assassinations.

The politics of election in Nigeria is fundamentally volatile. In their (politicians) attempt to capture state power all kinds of sentiments are invoked, such as regional, ethnic, tribal and religious. State power is not only crucial but lucrative. Accordingly, the struggle for power became so absorbing that everything else including national integration was compromised. Those who were out of power constantly worried about their exposure to every kind of assault by a state that was hardly subject to any constitutional or institutional restraints. (Ake 1996). Therefore, they have to remain perpetually in politics in spite of the outrage which accompanied the 2003 electoral summersaults is yet to be calmed, politicians of diverse colours then put in place a framework of organization to mobilize support for subsequent elections. Some of these only promote ethnicity and dysfunctional national unity. In Nigeria, politics is looked upon as a business venture and also a racket, the control of state power is the quickest and fastest means of amassing wealth. While the politicians invested heavily putting in almost everything to gain access to power, including for example political assassination, thuggery and real money to gain access to state power, with neglect of national unity the military on the other hand stakes everything including the damnation of their career and ruination of military professionalism!

These are some of the factors through which we can comprehend the volatile nature of Nigerian electoral politics. State power is used to block every democratic tendency that

could affect the power holders and those out of power continue to use all kinds of means to capture state power in order to protect themselves against the vagaries of politics. In the first republic for example elections were won before it was conducted, and where it was conducted at all, it was brazenly rigged. The same pattern emerged in the second republic and this also reared its ugly head under the current dispensation putting issues or quest of national unity at stake.

In short, due to the centrality of state power in the process of primitive accumulation, electoral politics has remained volatile in Nigeria. Indeed, the political class can go to the extent of subverting the entire system or even risk the stability of the federation when their interests are threatened or blocked. It is this type of bad politics and voodoo democracy and the dangers it posed to national integration, stability and survival which provoked military intervention.

These tendencies provoked military coups and counter coups in 1966, 1975, 1983, 1990 and 1993. In spite of prolonged military rule and the confusion generated through civilian administration, Nigerians continue to demand for democratic governance for national unity. Having being able to midwife a transition to civil rule, the challenges for the sustenance of democracy and national unity has become pertinent.

The Attributes of Democracy and the Need for Consolidation and Dimensions of Peace-building Mechanism

In its simplest form democracy is rule by the people. As such it is both a form of rule and a model of political organization channel towards national/ethnic integration and economic development. As a form of rule, it consists of mechanisms and procedures for exercising and limiting the exercise of power in historically determined contexts. As a model of political organization, it contains a number of core principles that place value on human life and dignity and in many cases sets mechanisms for their realization as a united group (Kuna, 2005). As such, democracy represents a form of power and a model of politics that in narrow terms confers on citizens the right to directly take political decisions by majority rule. In broad terms,

democracy constitutionally retains the powers of the majority in a framework designed to guarantee basic liberties and rights.

Contemporary notions of democratic government were shaped largely by ideas and institutions across the world that sought to define the limits of public power and the relationship between rulers and the ruled. In Medieval Europe, evolving concepts of natural and customary law served as restraints on the exercise of power. Similarly in the non-Western world like in our country, notions of the rights and privileges of rulers as well as mechanisms of admonishing or removing rulers from power are well documented. In recent times, the development of liberal democracy was influenced by the expansion of capitalism as well as by the Industrial, French, American Revolutions in the West and the anti-colonial revolutions across the non-Western world. These had a profound impact on the emergence of the concepts of natural rights, political equality, sovereignty, adult and later female suffrage, freedom of speech and the press, the limits of state power, notions of accountability and united participation as well as the ideas of the rule of law. Over the years and in response to various socio-historical circumstances across the world, various peoples and societies have evolved a variety of democratic forms achievable only when there is national unity.

As democracy evolved and spread worldwide as the dominant system of political organization in modern nation- states, attempts to conceptualize and theorize on it have become too amorphous and imprecise with the result that democracy is now a heavily contested albeit over flogged concept. Not only are there numerous often contradictory definitions of the concept, it also seems to mean different things to different people as we have references made to terms like ‘guided democracy’, ‘military democracy’, ‘peoples’ ‘integrative democracy’ etc. There is however a consensus to what it means even if we are not agreed on its forms. It is not personal rule and it is different from authoritarian/dictatorial rule. Also, it can be said that democracy is based on some form of participation and/or representation. It is also assumed that in a democratic system, government derives legitimacy from the people and for the integration of them all. Government also exercises authority within

the framework of a body of supreme laws called the Constitution. Citizens have equal political rights to vote and be voted for. Democracy can therefore be formal and substantive. Formal democracy exists where the following features that are considered to be the minimal requirements exist and blended with peacebuilding mechanism or instruments as demonstrated in this paper:

- Basic freedoms are guaranteed
- Universal suffrage exists
- Multiparty or two-party system exists
- Periodic free and fair elections are held
- Governance is based on the rule of law
- Promotion of policies for national unity and integrative development

Democracy can also exist substantively if it goes beyond the formal trappings of democratic political systems such as multi-partism and elections do include such elements as accountability and genuine popular participation as a result of national unity in the nation's political and economic decision-making processes at whatever level. In this conception, a political system can be considered to be substantively democratic if it ensures socio-economic empowerment of the masses, if it is unity inclined; if it is popularly driven, if the leaders have a mass popular support and electoral base and if it properly invests power with popular legitimacy in addition to having formal procedural attributes. In modern day parlance we would add that the governments so popularly elected should provide good governance.

Making allusion to the existence of democracy in a country would imply the prevalence of the above-named features of democracy. In the specific case of Nigeria, the long history of military dictatorship has had far-reaching implications for these features in the country. Most of them were completely eroded or constantly trampled upon with ruthless abandon by the military (Ogbu, 2001). It was for this reason that the struggle for democracy was fierce and protracted but was finally won as by its trappings in 1999. Indeed, as Hauss (2008) has stated, democratization takes time because it requires the development of new

institutions, unity of the people and widespread trust in them, which almost never happens quickly. Infact Adedoyin (2019) added that Democratic process should entail Peace Building for full followership and leadership.

Dimensions to Peacebuilding

a) The Structural Dimension The structural dimension of peacebuilding centers its focus on the social conditions, which promote violent conflict. It is widely acknowledged that sustainable peace is a product of social, economic, and political opportunities on equal terms, which take care of the needs of the entire people or parties. However, most of the armed conflict situations are hinged on systemic roots. These root causes are somehow complex, which may include skewed land distribution, environmental degradation, and unequal political representation

Meanwhile, there can never be sustainable or positive peace, if the root causes of conflict are not attended to by the parties or the third-party mediator(s). Considerable energy should be geared toward analyzing the structural causes of the conflict and set off social structural change. The promotion of substantive and procedural justice through structural means is consequent upon institution building and the strengthening of civil society.

The transformation process includes designing strategies to address social-economic and political injustice and inequality that pervaded the landscape of the conflict state, and reconstruction programs and activities should be embarked upon to help in addressing some of the developmental variables that can cause regeneration of conflict. Effective restorative justice systems should also support the reconstruction. Viable democratic structures, independent judiciary, and good governance should be encouraged and respect for human rights and peace-enduring attitudes be promoted.

b) The Relational Dimension The second integral part of building peace is to limit the effects of war related hostility through the repair and transformation of damaged relationships. The relational dimension of peacebuilding focuses mainly on reconciliation, forgiveness, trust building, and future imagining. It strives to play down poorly functioning communication and

optimally increase mutual understanding between the electorates, leaders and followers including party programmes and manifestoes among others.

Reconciliation enables the parties to exhibit their pains, agonies as well as guilt resulting from the conflicting social, economic and political system. Parties should demonstrate a sense maturity in the way that they make known their experience to each other, and should take responsibility for their roles and actions. The parties should also engage each other in restorative dialogues with basic principles of validation, accountability and healing. The parties should also improve their communication relationship and perception about each other with the aim of achieving positive and enduring peace and harmony, which must guarantee the respect for mutual needs of the nation-state.

c) **The Personal Dimension** The personal dimension of peacebuilding focuses on desired changes at the individual level. If individuals don't enjoy any healing process, it may result in greater political and economic consequences. Peacebuilding efforts must also be geared towards treating mental, psychological and spiritual health problems that may follow the end of any contending issues. Integration, rehabilitation and re-entry measures must be proactive enough to take care of the psychological needs of all those in anyway affected due to undemocratic manipulations and wickedness.

These trauma healing techniques should assist the citizens to put behind their experience about the social conflict. Through healing these victims can start to live a better life again. Thus, undemocratic pains arising from the conflict may make them (victims) powerless and become more vulnerable. Traumatic situations make person not only powerless but he is likely to experience the threat of death and injury. Building of peace should also include appreciation of the psychological and emotional aspects of the undemocratic evil. The social fabric that has been destroyed by these actions must be repaired, and trauma must be dealt with at the national, community, and individual levels. Pains and suffering must be addressed adequately. Strong family units that can rebuild community structures democratic norms, expectations and moral environments are also crucial.

The Contending Issues in Contemporary Nigeria's Democracy

Nigeria still very much requires strong democratic institutions with formidable integrative structures and democrats with the appropriate and structures democratic value orientations, commitment, patience and resilience to make these institutions work on a sustainable basis. The efforts to build these pillars are daily being confronted and challenged with substantial threats which manifest themselves in reckless misrule by elected officials, corrupt practices by public officials, insensitivity to and intolerance of opposing views and perspectives communal and ethno-religious conflicts and generalized insecurity to lives and properties all of which create apprehension about the possibility of authoritarian reversals. Other substantial threats to our newfound democratic culture lie in the failure to conduct credible elections, the absence of internal democracy and the lack of a clear articulation of positions by the political parties, the existence of the phenomenon of godfatherism in Nigerian politics and their resultant effects of disintegration tendencies.

The present crop of Nigeria's political elite has continually demonstrated that it is not interested in building democracy that would promote, build peaceful structure and sustained the nation's quest for national integration/unity for maximum human development. It is merely interested in primitive accumulation of power and wealth. It lacks the rudiments, capacity and discipline to rule without acrimony. To them, politics is warfare and about anarchy. Besides this social deficit, they also suffer a deficit of ideas. Because they are preoccupied with warfare, they have no time nor space nor tolerance for ideas and the culture of debate for harmonious unity of the Nigerian state. How many of our political leaders understand that peacebuilding is an important instrument for enhancing sustainability of Nigeria Democracy and the pleural of contending ethnic issues? This deficit makes them incapable of thinking about ideas that will bring about development (Ake, 1996). As Jinadu (2007) has noted, the dominant political culture in Nigeria today is one that depoliticizes politics, reducing it to a lawless vocation, taking morality out of it and disempowering the generality of the country by

violating their constitutionally entrenched sovereignty as provided by chapter 11, Section 14(1-2) of the 1999 Constitution.

Nigeria's brand of democratic governance is like what Diamond (2002) refers to as electoral authoritarianism, i.e. a 'pseudo democracy' in which political pluralism has not been completely closed off, rather, multiple parties are allowed to contest elections that are held at regular constitutional intervals but in which opposition parties and candidates are not allowed full freedom to campaign and given a fair chance to win. Formal democratic institutions like multiparty elections and parliament exists precisely to obscure and sometimes soften the reality of authoritarian domination (Diamond, 2002). Rather than a true form of rule, they are a legitimizing façade with which to purchase some acceptance from the international community and the domestic constituency and internal division of the ethnic groups.

A number of generic problems obstruct the consolidation of democracy and national unity in Nigeria. The most urgent and pervasive problem is the weakness and frequency in the decay of the rule of law. No greater problem alienates citizens from their political leaders and institutions that supposed to encourage national integration and undermines political stability, national unity and economic development than gross endemic corruption on the part of government and political party leaders, judges and officials up and down the bureaucratic hierarchy. The more endemic the problem of corruption, the more likely it is to be accompanied by other serious deficiencies in the rule of law like smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal violence, personalization of power human rights abuses etc.

The Challenges of Consolidating Democracy through Good Governance and Peace Building in Nigeria

We have already agreed that democracy is more than just a political procedure. It is a political framework from which public policies emerge and are administered for society. These policies are propelled through articulation and aggregation by members of a political class-a class ideally opens to recruitment, existing and assumed to possess the confidence of the entire citizens in the political system. Modern Democracy therefore depends upon the masses holding certain attitudes and beliefs about who should govern and how government should be

conducted. Under democracy, the wellbeing of society is conceived as depending not only upon the correctness and rationality of government policies but also on public confidence that previously settled methods, procedures and rules of politics and government will not be violated or arbitrarily changed but in fact preserved. Our present form of government manifests itself in this framework. It therefore behoves on the political leadership to observe these norms.

Previous democratic experiments in Nigeria failed because they were crisis ridden neglectful of peacebuilding instruments thus unstable. Among other reasons, they lacked the capacity to address the economic frustrations of the people that accumulated over the years- the rising expectations of the masses for welfare and employment opportunities; corruption of the political class resulting in misallocation of scarce resources, stymied economic growth; unhealthy competition for power and status by individuals and by groups leading to inefficiency in government and administration, excessive politics of allocation, private profit making and skewing of the national integration. A related factor has been the lack or inadequate existence in Nigeria of certain beliefs or attitudes among, on the one hand, members of the political class and on the other, and the citizens interested in national unity. Our democracy must also deliver 'dividends' promote 'national integration' 'peacebuilding mechanisms' for it to be consolidated and sustained. The ultimate aim of democracy is to facilitate the development of the society through meeting the needs of the citizens. This means that a democratic government must deliver in the form of social welfare provisioning. It must provide or create the conditions for the provision of shelter, food, amenities such as electricity, rural infrastructure, nationalistic tendencies energy etc. In other words, the people in Nigeria must be at the centre of development.

For our democracy to be consolidated and sustained, governments at all levels should deal with issues of mass poverty and unemployment, insecurity of lives and property, discriminative and disintegrative activities. As long as people remain poor and lack access to basic means of livelihood, they will remain susceptible to all kinds of manipulations, including

being used to foment violence before and during elections. In other words, an increase in political awareness without addressing the problem of poverty will not change the situation. Democracy survives only if redistribution of income remains within bounds that make it sufficient for the poor and not excessive for the rich. Our democracy must incorporate equity, human rights and security for all members of the nation irrespective of ethnic, religious or other group identification; it must meet our basic human needs and provide an enabling environment for us to develop our productive ability. Thus, we will go a long way towards managing our conflicts with in-built peace-building appliances and the similar divergences within our nation.

Based on this basic understanding of what democracy entails we must also move fast to address lingering national problems. 'The national question needs to address so that we can continue to build a nation in which no one or group is oppressed and one in which all groups have a sense of belonging. The fourteen years of democratic rule have been characterized by centrifugal tendencies engendered by deeply divisive ethno-communal discords and religious schisms. The politics of entitlements and ethnic based contestations over indigenoussness and homeland questions have in fact triggered a great measure of communal violence and the proliferation of ethnic militias and sectarian fundamentalist insurgencies etc. indeed those are some of the major threats of authoritarian reversal and issues of national unity that we face.

The 1999 Constitution also needs to be reviewed to address the flaws that have been identified by various groups so as to remove suspicion and build confidence among the different groups in the country. A review of the 1999 Constitution should be accompanied by a reform of our laws most of which were carried over from the colonial days and used to enthrone authoritarianism and disintegrative acts. The laws, especially the Penal code, need to be radically reformed in line with the present times. In the same vein the military needs to be given a new orientation which makes it subordinated to civil authority instead of continually seeing itself as an alternative source of governance.

Effective Monitoring of the Peace Agreement (Duties and Responsibilities of the State)

Because most of the poverty ridden citizens may decide to renege or disregard the peace contract of peaceful co-existence, it is quite important for the peace manager or political leaders to assist the parties to respect all clauses contained in the constitution through monitoring. Sometimes, the signed peace agreement may no longer prove as effective post conflict peacebuilding tool due to some intervening variables or emergent factors. For instance, the successive solutions or strategies adopted to address religious conflicts in Nigeria have achieved very little because most of the strategies failed to address some underlying root causes of the conflicts – poverty, hopelessness, frustration and corruption of leaders.

The political/policy makers have forgotten that the so-called religious conflicts are articulated by the elites and prosecuted by the down-trodden or the poor whose basic aim is not always to demonstrate their religions imperatives but to kill and loot for economic survival. Research has shown that as many of these dissidents accumulate wealth and improved standards of living, they don't engage physically in religious skirmishes. So therefore, religious crises are basically fought by the poor in Nigeria. Here one of the ex-disputing parties may see the need to include some certain clauses into the Peace Accord like economic empowerment of the marginalized party. An example was the Yelwa crisis in Plateau State of Nigeria where a conflict that was resource-based was presented as a religious one (Adekanye, 2003).

Additionally, it is also important to build effective early warning system to monitor the triggers of conflict. Relevant initiatives must be considered in the transformation of conflict through collaboration-based and coordination-oriented mechanisms.

Good Governance and Rule of Law

This is another task of peace building, geared towards addressing structural imbalance and social disenchantment. Marginalization, exclusion and poverty as well as injustice usually attract conflict. The theorists of democratic peace are of the opinion that a society with strong

democratic norms and values usually experiences less conflict because of the participatory nature and responsive leadership that the system presents.

One of the tasks of post conflict reconstruction is to facilitate an effective political transition that has mass participation for short term and long-term objectives. People should be allowed to choose their leaders through electoral processes considered as free and fair. A number of institutional reforms should be carried out by the new government that will promote equity, justice, and rule of law, respect of fundamental rights and poverty reduction or elimination. Here the activities of the government must be monitored in-order to discourage idiosyncrasy and non-respect of the peace accords. The new government, peace managers and post conflict reconstruction donor agencies should make sure that there is a viable constitution that addresses all the proximate and root causes of the conflict in order to prevent any resurgence of conflict.

Building Trust

Mutual trust is a big task, which allows high level of sincerity in the mode and conduct of post conflict relations of the aggrieved and frustrated citizens. Until suspicion filters away in the relationship and attitude of the disputing parties that trust can be achieved. Here, the political leaders should make the “old disputants” see reasons why they should discuss and forget their past and develop a friendship network based on respect of mutual interests and needs. Through reconciliation, the old adversaries would discuss their pains, agony and injustice that were melted on each other as well as the need to improve their communication and relationships. An example of this was the reconciliation commission set up by Obasanjo administration fondly called ‘Oputa Panel’.

It is also imperative for the peace manager to develop some leadership transformation strategy, to change jingoistic posture of the disputing parties’ leadership from zero sum philosophy to win-win diplomacy. This, he can do through mature and professional facilitation of a peace workshop where the leaders of the disputing configurations or parties will express the needs and fears of their respective groups or associations, as they will always be reminded

to adopt a joint-problem solving approach to address their differences. At the end of the day, the parties will be made to know and admire the beauty of peace embedded in ‘give and take’ philosophy, and the need to forgive and forget. Through this, there can be building of trust for genuine post conflict reconstruction.

Proposing Liberal Democracy

Without these in place, a government which does not enjoy the support and acceptance of the people is illegitimate and the possibility of consolidation a mirage. Going to the specific, however, the resultant effect of the incompatibility of the Western democracy and the indigenous political governance in Nigeria is a deficient state-societal relation. For example, the factor of ill-gotten financial wealth and the illegal use of fire arms as instruments of decisive advantage in political contestations that is dominant in Nigeria’s electoral competition arise as a result of greed, avarice and selfishness. It is a situation that depicts a practice of plutocracy in place of democracy. In a plutocracy, we are informed that the common man, who constitutes the majority of the electorate, is literally consumed by the combination of fire power and the influence of illicit money to determine election results.

A good instance of this is the case of money politics and prebendaries that was flagrantly exhibited in the previous democratic regimes of the first to the fourth and present republics. For instance, it is important to consider the fact that the process for recruiting our public office holders is highly defective. The only practical qualification for being in public office today seems to be the ability to spend huge amounts of money. The money is spent to bribe party officials to offer the aspirants the party’s ticket irrespective of what the majority of the party members think. Next, money is spent in compromising electoral officials and other gate-keepers in the electoral process to declare a candidate as duly elected, even if the person did not contest the election in the first place. For this reason, those who eventually capture public offices see themselves as custodians of the spoils of war, and make the best opportunity to squander the loot, having previously invested so much money to get there, while the society looks in helpless manner.

Similarly, as Egbefo (2014) has again argued, in the face of high returns on the democratic investment in an environment that democracy has become the norm, losers accept electoral defeat even when they have no chance to win in the future simply because even permanent losers have too much at stake to risk turning against democracy. To this end, there is also a need to deal with the mindset of people which explains the lack of tolerance for the opposition and the absence of democratic temperament in our politicians. This is possible through massive civic education and education about national unity. The electoral bodies must also be allowed to perform their functions without interference from any quarters in order to instil confidence in the process.

The various organs of government must respect constitutional provisions on the separation of powers. The legislature must concern itself with law making and its oversight functions while the executive must also appreciate its limits even though it is more visible in view of its day-to-day performance of functions. The judiciary has a very important role to play in democratic governance as it ensures the observance of the rule of law which is a critical factor in ensuring and promoting accountability and democratic governance. It provides checks and balances against the two other arms of government. It also provides mechanisms for settling institutional disputes and conflicts. Beyond these, the extent to which citizens can go to the judiciary to seek redress is very crucial to the survival and consolidation of democracy and national integration. Human rights violations are only compensated through legal pronouncements of the judiciary. The judiciary must be commended for helping to stabilize our democracy through very courageous judicial pronouncements in the recent past. Related to this is the effort of the President in reforming the nation's electoral law. This is a right step in the right direction and at the right time.

A courageous implementation of the recommendations of the Electoral Reform Committee will help to build more confidence in the electoral system and ensure that our democracy does not collapse or that the nation does not slide into chaos and disintegration in future. The failure to conduct credible elections in 2003 and again in 2007 and the slow

strangling of democratic pluralism and competition by an overbearing president from 1999-2007 did immeasurable damage to our supposedly evolving democratic culture.

Equally relevant is the important role that the economy and its management play in ensuring the stability and integration of a nation. The extent to which the government delivers on the responsibilities is also dependent on the strength of the economy and how well the available resources are managed. Our dependence on the mono-cultural economy of oil appears to be turning from a blessing into a curse. While the federal and state authorities address the quarrels arising from the issue of the control of the oil resource, there is also the need for the federal government to pay more attention to other resources which can be made into major foreign exchange earners. These will also create more employment opportunities for the population and reduce the level of unrest disintegrative activities in most parts of the country. A diversified source of revenue will also enable the government to make more provisions and address the various social needs of the people in their various places. The establishment of democratic institutions and an equal amount of democracy in the economic sphere will augur well for the consolidation and sustenance of democracy and demand for national unity in the country.

During the military regime, the poverty, uncertainty, frustration and hunger which accompanied Nigeria's economic decline and the implementation of an adjustment programme particularly during the Babangida years without any protection for vulnerable groups created an environment which directly challenged possibilities for stability, integration and sustainable democracy. As Ihonvbere (1996) has noted, with over 45% of foreign exchange earnings going into debt servicing, run-away inflation and with increasing bankruptcies among indigenous investors, the economy sank deeper into crises and the social fabric of the nation deteriorated to unprecedented levels. Crime, child abuse, marital violence, disease, institutional decay, fear, rebellious actions, urban dislocation and frustration came to characterize the society.

It is a fact that, despite their impressive capacity to survive years of social strife, economic instability and decline, many democracies in the less developed world will probably break down in the medium to long run unless they can reduce their often-appalling levels of poverty, inequality, and social injustice and lay the basis for sustainable growth (Diamond, 2002). While democracy is valuable in its own right, it is also instrumentally valuable because it provides a politically enabling atmosphere for economic development.

Conclusion

It is evident that a fundamental challenge to Nigerian democracy is the imperative of divesting the democracy from the antecedents of a prolonged military incursion into politics and the non-acceptance of peace building tools for sustainability of democracy. The type of democracy bequeathed to Nigerian people by the military is neither development nor human right friendly. It is a democracy loaded with a heavy dose of military despotism with minimal accommodation for civility. A democracy built around the dispositions and exigencies of personalities, individuals and groups, instead of institutions and structures would continue to reflect the tensions and conflicts of such individuals, personalities and groups. This explains why the rule of law has been very difficult to sustain in Nigeria.

Therefore, all the critical issues affecting the Nigerian democracy as discussed in this paper require urgent attention from the stakeholders. Electoral malpractices, hunger, violence, intimidation and brutal assassinations of political opponents are antithetical of the democratic order expected by Nigerians. Widespread corruption, poverty and insensitivity on the part of the leadership to the plight of the electorates can rubbish the so-called democratic dividends which the political class some time ago has popularised.

Nigerian democracy is still very fragile coming on the heel of a prolonged military rule; therefore, it requires nurturing with proper ingredients to survive the murky waters of Nigerian politics. The quality and commitment of the political leadership that Nigeria parades remain the single catalyst for the economic and political transformation of the country. Without

economic and political transformation, garnished with peacebuilding tools, it would be difficult to guarantee the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria.

Peacebuilding education should be organized as form of workshops, training skills, seminars and conferences for all political leaders, and those that intend to contest elections to any political offices in Nigeria. Additionally, for the attainment of national peace, Peacebuilding and conflict resolution should be made a core subject in Secondary Schools, Polytechnics, College of Education and the Universities. It must also be pointed out that without the tackling the challenges associated with corruption and mismanagement of resources at all levels both in the public and private sectors, peace will continue to allude any country. Ultimately, citizens' right to protest and demand for good governance should be respected and protected, along with their fundamental human rights.

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CHAPTER TWO

SECESSION AND THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM: ANALYSES FROM IDEOLOGICAL POSTULATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

In almost everyday discourse, certain political ideas and concepts are used to express our opinions or speak our mind. The reality is political ideas are more than mere passive reflection of vested interests or personal ambition of a person's opinion or expression. Rather, it has the capacity to inspire and guide political action itself and so can shape material life. However, political ideas do not emerge in a vacuum: they are moulded by the social and historical circumstances in which they develop and by the political ambitions they serve. Simply put, political theory and political practice are inseparably intertwined. Any balanced and persuasive account of political life must therefore acknowledge the constant interplay between ideas and ideologies on the one hand, and historical and material forces on the other.

Thus, ideas and ideologies influence political life in a number of ways. First, these two provide us with a perspective, lens or prism through which we view the world, attempts to understand and explain it. In many cases, our perception of the world is not usually as it is, but only as we expect it to be. Put differently, we perceive the world through a veil of ingrained beliefs, opinions and assumptions. Whether consciously or unconsciously, we tend to subscribe to a set of political beliefs and values that guide our behaviour and influence our social conducts in life. Thus, political ideas and ideologies set goals that inspire political

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activity in such a way that we seldom seek power simply for its own sake. We do have beliefs, values and convictions about what to do with power when it is achieved.

Similarly, political ideas do play a major role in shaping the nature of our political systems. Political systems do vary considerably throughout the world and are always associated with particular values or principles or political ideas. Absolute monarchies are based upon deeply established religious ideas, notably the divine right of kings. The political systems in most contemporary Western countries are founded upon a set of liberal-democratic principles. Western states typically respect the ideas of limited and constitutional government, and also believe that government should be representative, based upon regular and competitive elections. In the same way, traditional communist political systems conformed to the principles of Marxism–Leninism. Communist states were dominated by a single party, a ruling Communist Party, whose authority rested upon Lenin's belief that the Communist Party alone represents the interests of the working class. Even the fact that the world is divided into a collection of nation-states and that government power is usually located at the national level reflects the impact of political ideas, in this case of nationalism and, more specifically, the principle of national self-determination.

Political ideas and ideologies can act as a form of social cement, providing social groups, and indeed entire societies, with a set of unifying beliefs and values. Particular political ideologies have commonly been associated with specific social classes – for instance, liberalism has usually been associated with the middle class, conservatism with the feudal and landed aristocracy, while socialism has been with the working class. Thus, specific ideologies and ideas reflect the life experiences, interests and aspirations of a social class, and therefore help to foster a sense of belonging and solidarity. Thus, ideas and ideologies can also succeed in binding together divergent groups and classes within a society. For instance, there is a unifying bedrock of liberal-democratic values and ideas that cement together most Western states, while in Muslim countries Islam has established a common set of moral principles and beliefs. In providing society with a unified political culture, political ideas help to promote

order and social stability. The ruling elites have also been known to make use of political ideas to contain and suppress opposition thereby restricting debate through a process of ideological manipulation. This is common among such countries with 'official' ideologies such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In such cases, the official ideology dominates all political life and indeed all social institutions, art, culture, education, the media and so on. Opposing views and beliefs are simply censored or suppressed.

There is however the dearth of scholarly discourse on the relationship that involves the use of ideology to drive secession and the limits it has or should have on the quest for nationalism. This is dealt with adequately in this chapter, using various empirical examples from various nationalities and countries.

Conceptualising Ideology within the context of Society

Ideology as a set of ideas is propounded in order to justify or denounce a particular or an accepted way of life and belief of a social, economic or political organization. Viewed this way, ideology becomes a matter of faith with no scientific basis and is not subject to any verification. Its adherents are satisfied to accept it and order their way of life according to its tenets and principles while others may disagree and attempt to prove its falsehood. Thus, ideology leads to the development of a love-hate relationship. In other words, as Bell (1960: 371) had equally noted, what gives ideology its force is its passion. Ideology taps emotion and fuses its energies and channels them into politics. This passion is then channelled into political issues and hence its connection with revolution becomes rather natural.

Karl Marx in many of his writings espoused his own perception of ideology as a manifestation of false conscious. He argued that in the process of social development, the material needs of the people advance faster than their social consciousness. This leads to distortion of consciousness, hence false consciousness, and this is reflected in the underpinning ideology. In every society, the dominant class makes use of ideology to maintain and perpetuate its authority on the rest of the classes in the society. Joined by Engels, they both held that ideology could be turned into an instrument for protecting the interests of the

dominant class. Thus, the bourgeoisie needs and uses ideology to maintain itself in power. On the contrary, the working class, that is, the proletariat does need an ideology to gain power and to maintain itself in power as it smashes the bourgeois order preceding the socialist revolution.

In the efforts of the proletariat to eventually create a classless society, with the state withering away, the role of ideology becomes persuasive and educational rather than in holding down one class to be dominated by another. Lenin enriched this Marxist discourse by holding that ideology is not necessarily a distortion of truth to conceal the prevailing contradictions but it has become a neutral concept which refers to the political consciousness of different classes, including the proletarian class. He argued that the class struggle may continue for a very long time and so the proletariat also needs an ideology to maintain the struggle – the ideology of scientific socialism for their guidance less they are overpowered by the bourgeois ideology (Lenin).

Georg Lukacs, a Hungarian Marxist, expressed his view of ideology in a seminal work (Lukacs, 1971 [1923]) that consciousness was always class consciousness. Thus, ideology refers to both bourgeois and proletarian consciousness without necessarily implying any negative connotation. He argued that Marxism is the ideology of the proletariat. Bourgeois ideology is false not because ideology itself is false consciousness but because the capitalist class cannot stand on its own but must exploit the proletariat in order to maintain and perpetuate itself. He submits that bourgeois ideology is deplorable because it dominates and contaminates the psychological consciousness of the proletariat.

Karl Mannheim, a German Sociologist, rejects Marx conception of ideology on three grounds. The first is that there is no direct relationship between what he called the “style of thought” of any group to its interests. In other words, there is no direct correlation between a group’s consciousness and its economic interests. The second area of disagreement is that all thought is shaped by its social background; hence Marxism itself is an ideology of a class. Finally, he argued that it was not only classes that shape or has an influence upon

consciousness; that other social groups, like different generations, also have a significant influence on consciousness (Mannheim, 2013 [1929]).

Based on this submission, Mannheim argued that false consciousness can be manifested in two forms: ideology and utopia. According to him, ideology represents the tendency of conservation. While ideology relies on false consciousness to muster support for the maintenance of status quo, utopia represents the impetus for change. Utopia equally relies on false consciousness by projecting unrealizable principles to muster support for the forces of change. Thus, while a ruling class may make use of ideology to maintain its rule, the opposition project a utopia in order to bring about change in the ideology. He submits that the Marxist vision of a classless society is utopia and it makes use of false consciousness to achieve this vision.

From the foregoing, it is safe to make the preliminary deduction that basically, ideologies perform at least three basic functions. The first is that they amplify, clarify or enlarge our view of the world and the events that take place in it. The second is that they instigate action either for or against a proposed course of change. And third, they attempt to justify a course of action taken by an individual or a group of individuals or by the government. So, ideologies that are political are those that bother on the administration of the state or the institutions of a certain form of political order. A political idea seeks to offer us an understanding of the state, the source of its power, and the location of, as well as power relations within the state. In essence, the state is organized around specific political ideologies of which there are so many and this had prompted Kramnick and Walkins (2006 [1979]) to call our millennium the Age of Ideology.

It can be further deduced that for an ideology to be effective or persuasive, it need not meet with the measurement of rationality or the logic of consistency, but like religion which often serves as the basis for ideology, it must have the power to facilitate the reconciliation of the individual with its act, or with those acts he desires or supports. In other words, for an ideology to be effective, it must reconcile and act as the basis for justifying actions and policies

made on its behalf. Thus, for the revolutionaries, an ideology provides the basis for actions and at the same time justifies the violent overthrow of legitimacy. Ideology supplies the revolutionaries the needed justification for their actions, the ‘why’ and ‘ought’ for revolutionary action. In the final analysis, ideology, therefore, becomes a mass of doctrine that enables a variety of men to espouse a simple cause and to reduce their apprehensions for jeopardizing the stability of an old regime.

Ideology has been dubbed as “the most elusive concept in all of social science” (McLellan 1986: 1). A rather simple definition has been offered by Erikson and Tedin (2003), that it is a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved.” Similarly, but highlighting the role of social groups. Denzau and North (1994/2000: 24) have suggested that:

ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess; that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured”.

Thus, if we accept Denzau and North’s definition; that ideology is shared, that it helps to interpret the social world, and that it normatively specifies (or provides) good and proper ways of addressing life’s problems, then it is easy to see how ideology reflects and reinforces what psychologists might refer to as relational, epistemic, and existential needs or motives (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling, 2008).

Given this fact then, it will be reasonable to accept that specific ideologies crystallize and communicate the widely (but not unanimously accepted) shared beliefs, opinions, and values of an identifiable group, class, constituency, or society (Freedman 2001, Knight 2006). Ideologies also describe or interpret the world as it is simply by making assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities and specifying acceptable means of attaining social, economic, and political ends.

In spite of the semantic confusion about the concept of ideology, the literature is replete with attempts to explain it. For instance, Bell (1960: 370) has stated that ideology is “the conversion of ideas into social lever. It “simplifies ideas, establishes a claim to truth and,

in the union of the two demand a commitment to action” (372). According to Apter (1964: 16), ideology acts as the lynchpin that “links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings and, by doing so, lends a more honourable and dignified complexion to social conduct.” Some other liberal scholars have tended to see ideology as a rather loosely organized folk philosophy encompassing the totality of ideals and aspirations of a people (Ingersoll and Matthew, 1991: 4). Thus, the term ideology can be applied in two ways; first as a set of ideas which are accepted to be true by a particular group of people or nation or society without further examination or inquiry as to their validity. Secondly, it could be applied as the science of ideas which examines how different ideas are formed, how truth is distorted and how we can overcome this distortion to come to the truth.

Theoretical Framework

Quite a number of theoretical frameworks are relevant to the trajectory which we intend to follow. These are Azar’s (1986, 1990, 1991) Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) (Agara et. al. 2021), Social Movements (Dwyer and Zeilig 2012, Gurney and Tierney 1982, Hannigan 1991), and Contentious Politics and Violence (Tarrow 1999), although, any discussion of Contentious Politics and Violence must also involve some other related concepts such as social movement, contentious collective challenge and contentious collective behaviour. Tarrow (1999: 2) has explained that “contentious politics occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents”. History is replete of these, the not often spontaneous but sometimes planned eruption of ordinary people’s revolt against authoritarianism, some perceived grievances or failure on the part of the government or state and resulting in demands for change or redress. These revolts or uprising sometimes succeed but even where they failed, they usually succeed in bringing local and international attention to bear on the issues of contention.

In spite the fact that not all form of civil disobedience and strikes qualify to be contentious politics even if they are aimed at redressing perceived grievances, contentious politics attempts to exert power and bring about change and are often mounted, coordinated

and sustained against powerful opponents. For contentious politics to be so mounted, maintained, coordinated and sustained, it needs the backing of a dense social network and galvanized by culturally resonant and action-oriented symbols. It is only in this respect that contentious politics needs an organized social movement for its sustenance. Tarrow (1999: 2) has defined the term “social movement” as “those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents”. Thus, when birthed within a social movement, contentious politics transforms into contentious collective action. The agitation and ensuing struggle for a separate state of Biafra among the Ibos in the South-East of Nigeria has assumed a contentious collective action character.

Tarrow (1999: 3) has equally pointed out that although collective action can take many forms, from brief to sustained struggle or revolt, from institutionalized to disruptive and from humdrum to dramatic, it however become contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to official means of airing their grievances, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge the state’s authority or elites. Contentious collective action therefore forms the basis of social movements basically because it is the only means by which the oppressed can draw an unresponsive state’s elites’ attention to their plight, or better articulate their grievances and confront the better-equipped opponents or the state. Contentious collective action brings ordinary people together under the same umbrella, for the same purpose and to confront opponents, elites or authorities.

In Nigeria, ethnic militias, as social movements, have been known to mount contentious challenges through disruptive actions aimed and directed at the Nigerian state. Disruption is always public in nature and can take the form of resistance, collective affirmation of new values or outright violence leading to a revolution (Melucci, 1996). Thus, collective contentious behaviour is linked to a functional view of society in which societal dysfunctions have produced different forms of collective challenge and movements some of which can take the form of political or interest groups (Smelser, 1962, Turner and Killian, 1972). These

societal dysfunctions can be likened to Durkheim's "anomie" in which individuals come together to form collective identities and be identify as belonging to specific group or movement (Durkheim, 1951; Hoffer, 1951). Scholars have been interested in identifying how such societal dysfunctions assume such a dimension that they become transform into concrete grievances and emotional-laden "packages" (Gamson, 1992) or put in 'frames' that are capable of convincing ordinary citizens that their cause is just and important that they are willing to risk everything for (Snow et. al, 1986).

In particular, the present agitations for a separate state of Biafra and the form which the struggle and agitations have taken today can also be explain by the fact that although people do not simply act collectively, but common identification with specific grievance lead to collective contentions and challenge of the status quo which presents protest as a resource. Shared or common grievance therefore provides collective incentive to mobilization and a challenge to opponents. The form which the struggle takes is a function of history. As Tarrow (1999: 21) puts it, "particular groups have a particular history – and memory – of contentious forms. Workers know how to strike because generations of workers struck before them". Hill and Rothchild (1992: 192) have earlier expressed this opinion also that "based on past periods of conflict with a particular group(s) or the government, individuals construct a prototype of a protest or riot that describes what to do in particular circumstances as well as explaining a rationale for this action".

Nationalism as an Ideology for Secession?

As the Catalanian poet, Salvador Espriu, has eloquently expressed in his book *La Pell de Brau* (The Bull-Hide, 1968), "...men cannot exist if they are not free," meaning by extension, that freedom is the ability to choose the course of one's own life without interference from others, be it other people or government. On another level, politically, this desire for freedom is what is regarded as 'self-determination.' Historically, this notion of 'self-determination' was first introduced as a fundamental human right by Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points Speech, where he expressed his belief that every nationality should have the right to choose who

governs them. The right to self-determination became an official human right with the signing of the Atlantic Charter by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in 1941. Inter-alia, The Charter states that “they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” (NATO 2019). This gave an official recognition to the principle of self-determination and with this official recognition as a human right, self-determination became the international standard for any people seeking for freedom or to be free from their current situation. Thus, under the banner of self-determination, the urge to assert ones’ freedom through revolutions, separatist movements, decolonisation, dissolutions, and secessions was birthed across the globe and throughout history.

Nationalism as an ideology therefore, gives justification and impetus to self-determination under which banner secessionist movements are now mushrooming, The collapse of former USSR is justified under the guise of nationalism and today, there are now more than a dozen independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, while many of its more than 100 different ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups are still striving to gain independence. Nationalism has equally been the justificatory basis while Yugoslavia has dissolved into various national components. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia now exist as independent states. On the basis of nationalism, Czechs and the Slovaks have split and formed independent countries. There are Germans in Poland, Hungarians in Slovakia, Hungarians, Macedonians, and Albanians in Serbia, Germans and Hungarians in Romania, and Turks and Macedonians in Bulgaria who all desire independence. Nationalism has given new strength to secessionist movements in Western Europe: to the Scots and Irish in Great Britain, the Basques and Catalonians in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium, and the South Tyrolians and the Lega Nord in Italy.

A look at history reveals yet another perspective. Nationalism has also led to the constriction of states. At the beginning of this millennium, Europe consisted of thousands of

independent territorial units. Now, only a few dozen such units remain. For instance, there was the progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century until after World War I and the establishment of modern Turkey. The discontinuous Habsburg Empire was gradually dismembered from the time of its greatest expansion under Charles V until it disappeared and modern Austria was founded in 1918. Furthermore, during the second half of the 17th century, Germany consisted of some 234 countries, 51 free cities, and 1,500 independent knightly manors. By the early 19th century, the total number of all three had fallen below 50, and by 1871 unification had been achieved. The scenario in Italy was no different. Switzerland which began in 1291 as a confederation of three independent cantonal states has by 1848 become a single (federal) state with some two dozen cantonal provinces.

Why then is nationalism as an ideology so powerful as to instigate such strong decentralizing and centralizing forces? Viewed from a broad perspective, nationalism is the belief that the nation is the central principle of political organization. As such, it is based on two core assumptions; first is that mankind is naturally divided into distinct nations based on certain factors of homogeneity/similarities; and second, the nation is the ideal political community in the sense that it is the most appropriate and perhaps, the only legitimate, unit of political rule. Notwithstanding the controversy of whether nationalism is a doctrine or an ideology, the fact remains that even as a doctrine, nationalism rests on the firm belief that all nations are entitled to independent statehood, implying that the political world should be made up of a collection of nation-states (Heywood 2011). As an ideology, social movements agitating for secession have been founded on its doctrine and belief.

However, as an ideology, nationalism is believed to encompass a whole range of forms which are derived from it; political, cultural and ethnic. For instance, political nationalism includes every attempt to use the nation ideal to further specific or any political ends such as secession. Cultural nationalism emphasizes the perspective of a nation as a distinctive civilization made up of certain fundamental aspects of such civilization that needs to be defended. These may include language, religion, or a way of life unique to a group of

people. Cultural nationalism interlaces with ethnic nationalism, which views ethnic groups, either correctly or otherwise, to have descended from a common ancestry root, thus adding to it, a more intense sense of distinctiveness and exclusivity, which energise that collective sense of secession whenever that decision is taken.

It is also interesting to note that factors responsible for the growth and promotion of nationalism are very similar to the unifying factors that promote, inspire and engender secession. Mahajan (2012) has identified 12 factors, which include; common territory, historical background, interests, race, language, religion, culture, subjection and suffering, political aspirations, government, symbols and actual feeling of nationalism. A sense and existence of a commonality and homogeneity constitutes a strong factor needed for nationalism and also secessionism. The presence of these factors can ignite secession.

Justifications for Secession Movements

We agree with Buchanan and Faith (1987) that the common economic interest of the minority of a rich population, most often, functions as the vital ingredient in identity politics, that is, political communities will inevitably invent themselves when part of the population perceives secession to be economically advantageous (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). Secession is by definition spatial. This means that the exiting group bent on seceding must inhabit contiguous territories that can form a unity distinct from the existing political entity. In the normal case in which the richer part of the national population is geographically dispersed and not contiguous, secession is not the appropriate political response. Hence, if economic advantage drives secession, it can only do so where economic advantage is spatially concentrated. For instance, where locality 'X' is significantly better off than locality 'Y', then inhabitants of locality 'X' may come to identify themselves politically with a political agenda of separation. Generally, however, overt greed tends to be understated and concealed as the main basis for political mobilization and the reason for the agenda for secession. Rather, a recourse to a viable political discourse of a common identity is more likely to conjure up some

past shared roots of X-inhabitants or some perceived injustice perpetrated upon them, currently or in the past.

To understand the dynamics of secessionist movements, it is critical to distinguish between the motivation of the leadership of a secessionist movement and that of its supporters. History has shown that there are thousands of minor political movements, whose passionately committed leaders are of no consequence and slid into oblivion because they cannot muster sufficient support for the cause. This occurs mostly where the movement is a political party rather than an armed insurrection group. Natural resources are not the only way by which a contiguous part of the national population can come to imagine itself as a political community. After all, based on experience, the reality of natural resource discoveries has usually been quite disappointing – revenues are seldom used well and resource-dependent economies have actually substantially underperformed (Auty, 2001).

Natural resources are usually geographically concentrated in particular areas of a country, so countries that are heavily dependent upon natural resource exports and earnings are likely to be prone to secessionist movements. In this regard, the most important reasons for secession are typically the belief on the part of the secessionists that they and their territory are being exploited by others. On the other hand, where, instead of forced integration there is voluntary separation, this could lead to social harmony and peace. Voluntary association promotes a regime of "separate but equal," but where the group bent on seceding opt to maintain a position of antagonistic competition, it must imitate, assimilate, and, if possible, improve upon the skills, traits, practices, and rules characteristic of more advanced cultures, and it must avoid those characteristics of less advanced societies. Rather than promote a downward levelling of cultures as under forced integration, secession stimulates a cooperative process of cultural selection and advancement. Secessionism, separatist and regionalist movements, anywhere do not represent an anachronism but potentially the most progressive historical forces. Secession increases ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity as against centuries of centralization where hundreds of distinct cultures have been stamped out.

Secessionism will certainly end forced integration brought about as a result of centralization. Rather than stimulating social strife and cultural levelling, it will promote the peaceful, cooperative competition of different, territorially separate cultures.

Analysis Secession and Nationalism using the Three Mobilisation Frames of Reference

When a group intends to secede from a larger political unit, they naturally use rhetoric to try to mobilize supporters behind the cause, although, this technique of rhetoric can be used for other purposes that may not necessarily be secessionist. This is because the seceding group need to recruit people to their movement for autonomy. Hence, their choice of which rhetorical frames or kinds of discourse to use can make the difference between success and failure. History has given us several examples. For instance, the experience of the dissolution of former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia showed that various mobilization frames of references were very differently used by political leaders seeking support for their struggle to separate. On the other hand, Slovenia was about the only country that claimed to seek independence using economic mobilization frame. In Croatia, historical and ethno-nationalist arguments dominated the discourse on independence whereas, in Vojvodina's autonomy movement, economic arguments played a prominent role and were also used during mobilization in Montenegro. These areas were notable for their richness in oil which was the mainstay of the country's economy. Kosovo presented us with another mobilisation frame of reference which emphasized on self-determination. The Albanians of Kosovo who were seeking independence hardly put forward claims based on economic reasons, but rather, advanced their demands for separation in terms of repression from Serbia, national identity, legal status and constitutional issues.

Moreover, not only did various movements appeal to different kinds of reasoning, a closer look at them makes it apparent that none of them relied solely on one type of discourse to justify their secessionist movements. For instance, during the Slovenian campaign, the discourse was initially dominated by rhetoric of economic interests, yet throughout the course of the movement there were moments when a discourse highlighting the uniqueness of

Slovenian language and culture became equally salient. At other stages of the struggle, a rhetoric arguing in the name of democracy and human rights also held sway. A similar situation could also be seen in Montenegro, during the whole 10-year course of mobilization, economic arguments acquired primacy only during certain periods, while at other times they were hardly mentioned.

Deriving from the examples cited above, it is apparent that most often independence or secession was framed as the necessary condition for democratic development, economic reforms, respect for human and minority rights and ‘rejoining Europe’. So, rather than the struggle for secession or independence being rooted in a single type of discourse, mobilization rhetoric most often emerges from an ever-changing discursive field densely populated by competing discourses. As a result, frames on sovereignty keep shifting over time; and actors during different periods employ different kind of arguments. The question then becomes: why are some movements framed by certain types of arguments and not by others? Why do elites opt for one type of discourse and not for another, and how do discourses affect ethnical relations internally during secessionist mobilization?

The ethnic security discourse frame: A major characteristic of ethnic security frame is that a nation is defined in ethnic rather than civic terms, with the emphasis on what separates rather than on what unites the people such as distinct cultural and historical traditions, and/or language. Rhetoric like this most often divides the population into antagonistic majorities and minorities or immigrants, portraying one group as threats to the preservation of what is deemed as the national culture, which consequently needs to be defended. The need for greater sovereignty is usually presented by this frame as a means to preserve national identity and/or to restore control over a territory regarded as the historical homeland. It often draws parallels between past and present and interprets contemporary events in light of history, thus invoking national myths and symbols. The end result of this is ethnic intolerance and distrust of each other, which if not nipped in the bud will degenerate to identity war.

Furley (1995) has asserted that, “ethnicity in fact has often been a major cause of African conflicts and it continues to be so,” fomenting and leading to seceding from the larger political body. History has shown that the option open for such tribe/ethnic is to secede. Entire communities have been exterminated simply for the fact that they belong to certain tribes and ethnic groups. Most appalling were the Tivs and Junkuns in Taraba State of Nigeria, Tutsi in Rwanda, the Khran, Gio, Mandingo in Liberia among many instances. In such frenzy and killing sprees, ethnicity more than any other bounds such as language or even religion, may be the only banner of protection or ‘safe haven’ as people are killed or spared simply for belonging to a particular ethnic group, irrespective of political or ideological views. In Nigeria, the initial agitation and war for secession by the Igbos was caused by the mass killing of the tribe in the north. The prevalence of this type of killings and genocide has led to the notion of ethnicity been used to explain conflict and genocide. Ethnic conflict is therefore at the centre of politics and ethnic conflicts have strained the bonds that sustain civility and is often at the root cause of most attempts at secession.

But some crucial questions that need valid and critical answers and worth exploring a little in this work, are; ‘Is ethnicity the root cause of secessionist conflict in Africa?’ ‘Does ethnicity kill?’ Why do some multi-ethnic states disintegrate into civil war and others, despite ethnic pluralism, does not? Are all conflicts about identity or the contestations over identities? The problematic concerning ethnicity as a tool of analysis itself has led to arguments being generated that it is more than just the composition of language, culture and history, but also about perception of identity by groups, family and community or attribution by outsiders.

According to Fowler (1991) and Staub (1989), ethnicity results from mere categorisation of people by others and it is assigned “according to the requirements of the classifiers” (Eriksen, 1996: 8). Thus, “ethnic boundaries are between whoever people think they are between” (Fardon, 1987: 176). However, among radical scholars, it is agreed and argued that the ethnic and identity-based interpretation of conflict in Africa is not only simplistic, but also problematic because the factors of identity are not just strong enough. For

instance, a more touted factor is language, and in fact, this is a poor guide to ethnic or tribal identity because in the deliberate effort to promote good 'neighbourliness' among Africans has led to the speaking of several tribal languages in many regions of Africa. Equally, dress mode and skin-colour do not provide objective criteria as to ethnic origin. Eltringham (2004) explains that decades of Tutsi migration at different times from Rwanda and Burundi to neighbouring countries has led to the emergence of a new 'mixed ethnic group,' the Banyanwanda, in both Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo.

The multi-ethnic character of most African states creates the right environment and circumstances for violent politicisation of ethnicity. Rival communities, with the perception of threat to their survival (real or imagined) see the control of the state and its resources as the only means of survival. However, it is important to point out here that the politicisation, exploitation and mobilisation of ethnicity to serve particular interests is not a unique phenomenon in Africa, although it is more prevalent than any other part of the globe. To buttress this point are the examples of genocide in the Balkans in the 1990s, the ethno-religious violence in the Indonesian province of Aceh, Nazi pogroms from 1938–44, and the extermination of Armenians by the young Turks in 1915.

Consequently, three competing schools of thought have dominated the interpretations of the link between ethnic solidarity and the propensity of conflict. Firstly, the primordialists see ethnicity as historically rooted and embedded in peoples' way of life and culture, and reinforced by social institutions, collective myths and memories - developed from early socialisation, and hence likely to persist over time. Secondly, instrumentalists perceive ethnicity as a front for the pursuit, mobilisation, exploitation and manipulation to secure self-serving or vested interests by individuals or groups. Thirdly, social constructionists perceive ethnicity as an invention of the human imagination, an intellectual construct devoid of objective reality.

In the case of Croatia's bid for secession, constant references were made to history to legitimize present demands for statehood. A central discourse was that Croatian ethno-national

consciousness was alive throughout history, and this was one of the reasons why a Croatian state became a legitimate aspiration. As Connor (1994) has noted, recourse to ethno-nationalism feeling musters a high level of emotional commitment and powerful allegiance, going beyond patriotism. Ethno-nationalist language usually evokes a sense of shared blood and kinship among members of the nation and portrays them as one big family bound together by common ancestry heritage. Ethno-nationalist speeches, therefore, tend to have a strong emotional appeal suitable for mobilizing people for great sacrifices. Such rhetoric can arouse the great loyalty needed to forge a strong sense of unity and solidarity. At the same time, it is an ideal tool to incite hatred against other ethnic groups. By defining the nation in ethnic terms, thus ‘based upon belief in common descent’, it ‘ultimately bifurcates humanity into “us” and “them” (Connor 1994). By setting up political battle lines on the basis of presumed primordial differences between groups, it is relatively easy to provoke conflict. In Montenegro, the opposition parties which favoured retaining a joint state with Serbia instead of seceding, argued along ethno-nationalist lines and denied that a Montenegrin identity existed separate from the Serbian identity. By this reference to a shared ethnic identity between Serbs and Montenegrins, the authenticity and legitimacy of Montenegrin aspirations separation was questioned. According to them, since the two republics were ‘connected by one people and one flesh and blood’, unity between Serbia and Montenegro was unbreakable.

The ethnic security discourse frame played a great role and exerted an emotive influence in the quest for a Biafran state. The genocide on the Igbo ethnic group in the North which was a vengeful act by the North on what they thought was a spiteful elimination of their military elites in the coup led and sponsored by Igbos in 1966, raised the issue of the security of the Igbo within the Nigerian federation. Of equal importance and as scholars of Nigerian politics have also highlighted was the added issue of ethnicity and inter-ethnic competition for federal power. These two frames have been used to explain why agitation for Biafra occurred ‘then’ and ‘now’ recur (Agara, 2014, 2019). As enunciated by Ibrahim (2015), the reoccurrence of the agitation for separatism was led by the Igbo masses who felt disappointed

by the failure of their elite to capture power at the federal level. Thus, the current agitation for Biafra “represents a complete fracture between the Igbo elite and their masses” due to the inability of the former to capture the Nigerian presidency, and suggests that “the fact of the matter is that the Igbo elite has a strong empirical basis to read Nigerian political history as one of failure and frustration for them...With this failure of the elite, the Igbo lumpen have seized the initiative of following the path of disintegration” (Ibrahim 2015).

On the other hand, Adetula (2015) and Owen (2016) have interpreted the renewal of agitations for secession as an elite driven rather than representing the general wish of the masses. Adetula’s opinion is that the present upsurge in Biafran separatism is a function of the local elites negotiating for power specifically because “many groups in the country have never felt represented by the central power. Local elites play on these emotions for their own personal gain...this is how local elites try to create greater political space for themselves.” Owen (2016) claims that the recent agitations for Biafra represent “a bid for re-inclusion by political actors excluded from power” and thus seeking for federal accommodation within the present federal configuration which they believed had excluded them (Agara 2011). The recent upsurge in the agitation for a separate Biafran state is now located in the political elites’ response to the realignment of power at the federal level following the defeat of President Goodluck Jonathan of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) whom the South East offered vast support.

As Owen (2016) opined, the change in government resulted in many career politicians from that region being exempted from juicy federal positions in Abuja, hence the recourse to use ethnicity and the instability this perpetuates as a form of political leverage and channel of engagement with the federal government. While this strategy may be possible, it is very certain that some political actors may have seen in the Biafra agitation a route to political inclusion in the aftermath of the defeat of President Jonathan, although these arguments cannot explain the widespread agitations for Biafra even under the Jonathan administration, as well as their systematic repression. In his own explanation, Okonta (2012) has offered a constructivist

version of the ethnic competition argument which linked the upsurge in the agitation for a Biafra separatist state to the interaction between history, institutions and political actors. His main argument is that although Nigeria can be seen as democratizing, the country's political institutions have remained largely authoritarian, constraining political actors, while at the same time, offering them no other options but to mobilize along ethnic, as opposed to civic lines. These actors, according to him, are forced underground into armed dissent because of obstacles to their ethnic project and their inability to utilize civic strategies to build a winning electoral coalition due to election-rigging by the dominant ruling party and elite.

The democracy discourse frame: The democracy frame draws upon the historical dichotomy of an oppressive state against society. Initially, this frame was composed of three interrelated claims: (1) that the Marxist-Leninist regimes were violating human rights (hence a claim of injustice), (2) which is held in common by citizens across classes (hence a definition of national identity), and (3) one that supports non-violent action designed to pressure the regime to reform itself by legal means (which constitutes the agenda for action) (Glenn 2001). In Montenegro, for instance, where this democracy frame was used by the elites during mobilization for secession, the argument was based on the fact that independence was needed in order to ensure democratization and to join the European community. Thus, secession became a precondition for achieving these ideals, which may not be possible while still with Serbia. The logic here is that democratization represented the highest aspiration, and independent statehood was only a means of reaching this.

The democracy frame therefore conveys an image which suggests that democratic and human rights struggles are higher aims which can be achieved in no other way except through independence. Moreover, such rhetoric implies that all people living in the territory of a secessionist entity are accepted as co-nationals, thus defining the nation in inclusive terms. This is what the Biafran advocates have done by laying claim to and incorporating the entire south-east region of Nigeria into the secessionist bid which is being led exclusively by the Igbos. This region, of course, has within it other ethnics which have not professed that they

were in agreement with the Igbos' aspirations and agenda of secession. Although according to Glenn's (2001) definition, the democracy frame which he termed as the "civil society master frame," was targeted against communist regimes in Eastern Europe, its usage and meaning has been expanded slightly to incorporate mobilizational frames which are used against various types of autocratic regime and not only against communist states. Moreover, the democracy frame calls for independence, while the civil society master frame does not. This same civil society master frame was also the dominant discourse used during certain periods in Slovenia's struggle for secession. Although, it was not really used to justify demands for sovereignty, it was, nevertheless, employed the most by the various social movements fighting for different human rights issues and not much concerned with Slovenian statehood. Still, since this frame mobilized Slovenian society on a mass scale, it ended up defining Slovenian national identity in the late 1980s.

In spite of the fact that it has become a well-documented fact that democracies rarely if not at all, go to war with each other, the fact has not been proven that they are more peaceful or peace prone than nondemocratic states (Doyle 1986, Maoz and Abdolali 1989, Maoz and Russett 1991, 1992, Rummel 1983, 1985, Russett 1989, 1990, Agara & Ibebunjo 2021). As a matter of fact, several scholars have contended that "the closest thing we have to a law in international politics" is that of democratic peace (Maoz and Russett 1991, Ray 1992, and Levy 1988). Quite a large number of scholars have equally engaged themselves in trying to explain "what is there about democratic governments that so inhibits their people from fighting one another?" (Russett 1990: 124). However, Minz and Geva (1993) have suggested that "any explanation of the democratic peace result needs to explain simultaneously, both (a) the fact that democratic states have rarely clashed with one another – the democratic peace phenomenon, and (b) the fact that democracies are about as war prone as non-democracies." However, the democratic peace theory does not seem to be applicable to internal wars as most of the states experiencing secessionist movements professed to be democratic states. Nor, does

it have an answer as to why democracies implode internally into secessionism (Agara and Ibebunjo, 2021).

Onuoha (2011) has attributed the re-emergence of Biafra separatism to the opening up of Nigeria's political space following the country's transition to democracy in 1999. His argument hinges on the fact that since 1999, Nigeria's political space has been diversified following the entrance of new non-state actors, such as ethno-nationalist movements (ethnic militias groups), into that space. According to him, the post-1999 political space is characterized by "confrontation between state-led nationalism and state-seeking nationalism (led by non-state actors)," such as MASSOB and IPOB. In the contest, the state-seeking nationalists appear to be losing out to the hegemonic state led nationalist project, prompting a change of strategy by ethno-nationalist groups and intensification of the demands for alternative spaces and parallel structures of power. The result of these developments is increase in separatist agitation.

The prosperity frame: This frame justifies aspirations for secession by referring to economic reasons. The arguments contained within this frame is usually based on claims of injustice based on exploitation by or inequality relative to the center (Herrera 2005). Instances of this type of discourse on economic injustices characterized the argument for separation both in Slovenia and Montenegro. Part of the persuasive argument raised to justify the clamour for secession by both republics was that economic crisis and bad policies at the political centre were holding back their economic development. Consequently, as the argument concludes, without Belgrade, the republics would realize their economic potential much more effectively. The two republics even went further to concretise their arguments by producing documents containing detailed calculations about the costs and benefits of independence. These estimates were meant to demonstrate the desirability of the secessionist agenda from an economic point of view. Frequent reports were published by well- respected local economists, who calculated the costs of separation while projecting the expected gains in numerical terms.

No matter how well ‘padded’ these ‘estimates’ would have been, they were actually designed to convince the population that the republics would be economically viable on their own. Of equal importance is that this kind of reasoning gives the impression that independence is being sought on a rational basis, that is, if secession is being sought on the basis of the expected absolute economic gains that would be derived from independence, then it follows that every citizen stands to benefit from independence, and these potential gains will not flow to just one ethnic group within the population. Therefore, economic arguments automatically create inclusive identities which, in the case of Biafra, includes the other ethnics within the south-east region. Moreover, the prosperity frame portrays a non-nationalistic, pragmatic image, as it alludes to pure material interests and not to any kind of ideology, national ideals, collective belongings or emotions. By emphasizing economic arguments instead of talking about identity, movement leaders demonstrate their non-nationalist orientation. It should also be noted that the prosperity frame most often contains ‘prospective arguments’, meaning arguments that refer to future rewards. They rest on the premise that, freed from the federation, the seceding republic would easily realize its full economic capacity. The prosperity mobilization frame argument therefore, not only contain justifications for secession, but also construct movement identities.

Economic frustration and the possibilities of a ‘better life’ if natural resources located within a region could be exclusively ‘owned’ or controlled by that region was another incentive for the agitation for separatist movement (Ukaogo 2007) In another respect, the persistence of the Biafra agitation has also been explained as a struggle by young people expressing resentment over their material condition - a condition which they face because of broader contradictions of the Nigerian political economy, but which they perceive as ethnic exclusion (Connor 1994). The main argument of this perspective is that Biafra separatism is a political expression of economic frustrations of the young people of that region. These frustrations have been explained as resulting from the marginalization of the south-east in national economic life. Contracting economic opportunities in the region, which has seen a

very high level of unemployment even among highly educated youths, account for the proneness of the area to separatist agitations and insecurity. This is deepened by a perception that other parts of the country are unduly privileged by the federal government.

Conclusion

The important position ideology plays in the quest to secede or not cannot be overemphasized. This is because it shapes the nature of our political and social systems. Thus, a group intends to secede from a larger political unit, they naturally use rhetoric to try to mobilize supporters behind the cause. Rhetoric and other such technique may not necessarily be obviously secessionist in appearance.

In the first framework, ethnic security is projected than civic ideology. Here the emphasis is on what separates the groups rather than on what unites them. In spite of distinct cultural and historical traditions, and/or language, there must be a conscious effort to unite along whatever lines than can be conceived. In the democracy frame, there is the suggestion that democratic and human rights struggles are higher aims and that cannot be achieved in any other way than independence. The rhetoric of course implies that all people living in the territory of a secessionist entity are accepted as co-nationals, thus defining the nation in inclusive terms. Also, political elites may renew or fuel agitations for secession as drivers for their political gains than representing the general wish of the masses. Similarly, there have been sensible arguments for both secession and the limits of nationalism, however, political and economic considerations are high on the list of factors. It is for this reason that resource rich countries have some of the loudest voices with regards to the call for secession. In this case, the most important reasons for secession becomes the belief that there is exploitation along ethnic and/or nationalist lines. economic arguments automatically create inclusive identities. Interestingly, such agitations are usually quelled when issues of contention are resolved. This key therefore is the resolution of issues of conflict.

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CHAPTER THREE

THREATS TO GLOBAL PEACE AND HARMONY: A FOCUS ON RACISM

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INTRODUCTION

For centuries, the idea of segmenting people based on their physical traits, such as skin colour, has further led to diversity and as a result, diminish the idea of global peace. In countries with multi-raced people, some races often express superiority over other races, thereby denying them certain rights and resources. This racial disparity has made some people, especially of the black race, believe they are from different background and thus should be careful when dealing with people of other races, especially the whites.

Peace, as relative as it may seem, is nothing short of tranquillity and living without fear. Over the centuries, the concept of peace has been altered and refined to suit a particular idea and promote certain premonitions. Despite the alteration, the global definition of peace as living in harmony and societal friendship continues to maintain its course. To capture it in a succinct manner, peace is essentially the absence of violence and living in perfect harmony. From a global perspective, the concept remains the same: the eradication of wars between nations, states, and societies. In essence, it is the connectiveness of nations, living in an ever-connected world. United Nations (2004) expressed that many of the security challenges that state will face in the twenty-first century are interconnected. According to the argument presented, preventing mass casualty, and combating terrorism, with the goal of obtaining global peace, requires deep engagement from individual nation.

Despite how significant and priceless peace has become, as odd as it may sound, not everybody desires it. In many instances, the breach to the golden thread of peace is done

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unconsciously. The major factor responsible for this is largely the fact that everyone is, first of all, looking out for himself. This is a subtle act of regarding oneself over another, which consequently, leads to racial marginalization. Over the past years, racism has been a subtle means of categorizing a certain group of people over another, thereby assigning different levels of power and opportunity to certain groups. The effects of this idea are numerous, and mostly results in negative consequences in the society.

This study evaluates the effect of racism and its consequences on global peace. In order to achieve this, this paper has been divided into five outlines. The first outline is a general introduction that captured the overview of global peace and how racism is posing as a threat to its propagation. The second outline focuses on the conceptual discussion of the theme of the study. The third outline digs deep into the advent of racism while the fourth outline carefully analyses the effect of racism on global peace. In the fifth outline, strategies on how to restrain racial segregation and continue promoting the idea of global peace is discussed. And lastly, tangible suggestions on dealing with racism were provided.

Conceptual Discourse

Discourse on the subject of racism often draws from the understanding of certain terms such as race, discrimination, ethnicity and supremacy. Each of these entities has a distinct meaning and, in many ways, inter-relate with the others, thereby compounding the understanding of the effect of racism. According to William and Mohammed (2013), racism can be understood as an organised system based on the categorisation and ranking of racial/ethnic groups into social hierarchies whereby ethnic groups are assigned differential value and have differential access to power, opportunities and resources, resulting in disadvantage for some groups and advantage for others. The idea of exalting a particular group of people over another has been in existence for many centuries. Based on the difference in a number of factors, such as skin colour, ethnic group, and geographical location, some group of people may be marginalized and deprived of certain values.

Anderson (1989) defined racism as “a stressor that contributes to racial/ethnic disparities in mental and physical health and to variations in these outcomes within racial and ethnic minority groups.” This is because in categorizing people into distinct groups, specifically for the purpose of academic analysis, the term *race* is used as a social construct to differentiate people and classify them based on certain characteristics such as skin colour, hair texture, or even ancestry. These characteristics are mostly based on physical qualities of people while the behavioural differences are mostly less considered. Giddens (cited in van Dijk, 1993) states that "racism means falsely attributing inherited characteristics of personality or behaviour to individuals of a particular physical appearance. Furthermore, a racist is someone who believes that a biological explanation can be given for characteristics of superiority or inferiority supposedly possessed by people of a given physical stock" (van Dijk, 1993: 170). According to Butts "racism consists in the predication of decisions, policies, and behaviour on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group. Racism can be both overt and covert" (cited in Brantley, 1983: 1605).

The term *racism* is commonly associated with other words such as stereotype and prejudice. Lippmann (cited in McCauley, Stitt, and Segal, 1980: 195) broadly defined stereotype as "an oversimplified picture of the world, one that satisfies a need to see the world as more understandable and manageable than it really is". In defining prejudice, Ridley (1995) demonstrates how prejudice itself is not racist, but how it can lead to racist behaviours. According to the argument he presented, racism is the outcome of prejudice. As Ponterotto (1991: 216) furthered the discuss:

examined several definitions of prejudice and concluded that prejudice is often negative in nature and can be individually or group focused. It can be maintained as an internal attitude or belief or expressed overtly, it is based on faulty or substantiated data; and furthermore, it is rooted in an inflexible generalization.

In the western world, where the subject of race is taken for debate almost on a daily basis, the categorization of people often has profound effect on the people based on the

categories their physical traits fall them into. With this in mind, the identity of people is subtly formed as a result of this grouping. This concept, as innocent as it may seem, is a very powerful social force. There have been numerous reports of a certain group of people being denied certain social values such as access to good jobs, health care, and good school as a result of the race-group they fall into. While the segmentation is done based on physical characteristics, its effect often breeds a behavioural change that often leads to violence. As a result, a particular race may be labelled as being violent and thus be stereotyped. As Clark et al. (1999: 805) put it, racism is “the beliefs, attitudes, institutional arrangements, and acts that tend to denigrate individuals or groups because of phenotypic characteristics or ethnic group affiliation”.

In 1945, when the United Nations (UN) was formed, it was largely influenced by the craving of a world where peace would thrive and justice and equality measured to every individual. This is with the intention of reaffirming faith in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained; and to promote social progress and better standard of life in larger freedom, with the aim of achieving world peace (United Nations Charter, 2000). One of the factors of achieving the status quo was the development of an educational system referred to as Peace Education. This educational system was intended to address and promote human rights as well as human freedom. With the curriculum developed, there is a provision for tolerance, respect, freedom, and friendship among individuals, racial groups, religious groups, and nations, which as a result, foster the activities of the United Nations for maintaining peace (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2000).

It has been generally agreed that global peace is not merely the absence of war. In fact, it seems juxtaposed that the word “war” can be included in the definition of peace. According to Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), one of the famous philosophers in second half of 17th century, peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for

benevolence, confidence and justice. This state of mind, which has been interpreted by many scholars as the ultimate peace, is the grand destination that global peace intends to arrive at.

Galtung (1996) also opined that peace comes in two variations: Positive Peace and Negative Peace. He further went ahead to explain that negative peace is merely the absence of war while positive peace is the implementation of justice and equity among individuals, irrespective of their age, race or gender. While this is widely accepted, it should be viewed that the end-goal of a positive peace can only thrive when, and only when, there is absence of war. Despite the numerous social and economic benefit of peace and living in harmony, it is faced by a number of factors that are constantly diminishing the very essence of peace. One obvious factor is war, of course. The presence of war is automatically the absence of peace. While war between either two or more people, states, or nations is a factor besetting the propagation of peace, it is also an effect. In instances where other factors, such as racism, are involved, the drastic effect of such usually results in war and division.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts the Critical Race Theory (CRT). This theory, according to Delgado and Stefancic (2001), focuses on the experiential knowledge of ethnic minorities and their communities of origin with respect to race and race relations. It is centred on the idea that racism is systemic, and not just demonstrated by individual people with prejudice. Critical Race Theory is concerned with racial subordination, prejudice, and inequity and it accentuates the socially constructed and discursive nature of race. According to Parker and Lynn (2002), “Critical Race Theory has three primary objectives: (1) to present stories about discrimination from the viewpoint of people of colour; (2) to argue for the eradication of racial subjugation while simultaneously acknowledging that race is a social construct; and (3) to deal with other matters of dissimilarity, such as sexuality and class, and any injustices experienced by communities.”

Critical Race Theory can be used to scrutinize the ways in which race and racism directly and indirectly affect ethnic minorities (Yosso 2005). Graham et. al. (2011) observed

that “the degree to which ethnic minorities subscribe to particular ways of considering race issues and the extent to which these considerations affect how ethnic minorities move through racial topography may be associated with psychosocial health outcomes, through the positive or negative mediation of stressors and/or mental disorder triggers. Essentially, it examines racism as both a group and individual phenomenon that functions on many levels, and it offers a means by which to identify the functions of racism as an institutional and systematic phenomenon (Stovall, 2005).

Critical Race Theory was first focused on in legal studies. As Harris (1993) put it this way, CRT grew partially out of critical legal studies since racism has directly shaped the US legal system and the ways people think about the law, racial categories, and privilege. These days, it has been incorporated into other fields of study such as sociology and psychology. It can thus be said that:

Race is not a set notion, but instead is fluid and constantly formed and reformed by political considerations and is informed by collective lived experiences. Therefore, the implementation of the Critical Race Theory tenets will improve the quality and robustness of investigations and ultimately serve to more effectively protect and assure the health of ethnic minorities. (Graham et. al., 2011).

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Advent of Racism

The idea of exalting a particular group of people over another has been in existence for many centuries. Based on the difference in a number of factors, such as skin colour, ethnic group, and geographical location, some group of people may be marginalized and deprived of certain values. While the idea of segmenting people comes with lots of justifications, there are obvious sentiments induced with this concept. For instance, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when European scientists and scholars began the categorisation of race, they assign certain characteristics to each race. It is these characteristics that would be used to measure

the status within the emerging racial hierarchy. Among those scholars was physician and zoologist Carl Linnaeus, who categorised humans into four races which have been adopted today: Africanus, Americanus, Asiaticus, and Europeanus. According to this segregation and the characteristics assigned to each, the Europeanus was the all-powerful, as they were said to be white, sanguine, muscular and inventive. In a stark contrast, the “Americanus was described as obstinate, Asiaticus as haughty and Africanus as negligent” (Golash-Boza, 2016: 131). With this segmentation and the quality bestowed on each, it is easy to conclude that the Europeans were demonstrating sense of superiority, thereby laying the foundation for the idea of racism.

It is unimaginable though, how this classification of humans has persisted over the centuries. And like every other thing that has moulded the society, the physical traits of segmenting people into a particular group, too, has changed significantly. For example, over the years, the number, names, and types of racial segmentation that existed centuries ago have now metamorphosed and even split into smaller categories. A notable example would be the transformation of the race called “white”. While it was originally attributed to the Europeans, it has, over time, been agreed to include the Americans. Many fair-skinned European immigrants in the United States weren’t even as white during the nineteenth century (Roediger, 1991).

Despite the cacophony of misunderstanding caused by racial segregation, within-group racialization, too, sprang up, basing a sub-group on a number of factors such as skin colour, biracial or multiracial lineage, which further complicate categorization (Monk, 2014). The further division of groups by within-group racial segregation added, in significant measures, to the already racial stereotype. The complexity of the status quo may be somewhat difficult to understand. For instance, among a particular race, there may be different ethnicity, which is a major factor in further breaking down of the group. The subject of whether race is influenced by ethnicity or it goes the other way round will continue to be debated. Because a particular group of people belong to the same race does not ascertain that they share the same culture and see the world with the same lenses. Ethnicity, according to Olivier, et. al. (2019),

is based on shared culture and heritage among people. In a sense, it is possible for two or more people to belong to different race but share the same ethnic heritage. In this case, could they be grouped into a particular category?

Dealing with this kind of ideologies is sometime difficult to understand. Elizabeth et al. (2009) postulates that there are no population-based epidemiological data on the strategies most commonly used to cope with episodes of ethnicity-related maltreatment. In a population-based sample of over 4,000 Black and White men and women, participants were asked about the ways they handled episodes of racial discrimination, most individuals (86–97%) indicated that they would talk to others whether they took action in response to racism or accepted the racist behaviour (Krieger and Sidney 1996). In contrast to the tendency of Black and White Americans to indicate that they would try to do something about racism, other research suggests that Asian immigrants in Canada would prefer to “regard it as a fact of life, avoid it or ignore it” (Noh et. al. 1999).

Effect of Racism on Global Peace

The way the concept of racism is broad and mostly difficult to understand, so too are its numerous effects, especially when it comes relatively to the subject of peace. As has been stated above, peace is an encapsulation of various elements that, either independently or collectively, results in living in harmony. It will be helpful to understand how, since the formulation of its idea, the segregation of race, and by extension racism, has had adverse effect on the world. with this, when measured considerably, it would be easier to see, in measurable terms, the magnitude of threats that this concept imposes.

According to Barkley and Drew (2018), “racism is structural violence and it should be noted that racism has negative effects on individuals’ self-concept and life trajectories.” This is a big threat to global peace. Mousseau (2009) elucidated that “world peace or peace on earth has an ideal state of freedom, peace and happiness among and within all nations and peoples.” With the level at which racism further splits people, the goal of achieving world peace continue to seem like mere wish. One of the major obvious effects of racism is prolonged

slavery. To this day, the sound of the word “slavery deposit a default mental picture in our mind: a white master and black slave” dichotomy. Changing this default mental picture has taken efforts that have gone futile. At some point, the debate of whether the fight to eradicate this default mental picture was worth it. The implications of this mental picture are severe. To the unborn generation, when history of slavery is told, they are often made to understand that black people suffered mercilessly under the white. The idea of slavery was originally born from the idea of a particular race wanting to exercise supremacy over others. Delving into the example of Carl Linnaeus (Golash-Boza, 2016), who proposed that the Europeans are superior, the British, in truth, have at one point in time, subjected every race to slavery - The Chinese, The Americans, The Africans and The Indians. The ingrained idea that they are superior drove them to territories uncharted and led to them exploiting the people.

During the sixteenth century, European colonizers in North America took over indigenous people’s lands and resources, made significant attempt to alter their ways of life, and even intentionally exposed them to diseases, all in a bid to demonstrate their superiority (Olivier, et al. 2019). This was around the period that some native Americans were captured and sold into slavery. Simultaneously in several places all over, indigenous people were being infiltrated by these colonizers and having their lives practically seized from them. “It was during the seventeenth century that the Europeans first brought enslaved Africans to North America” (Olivier, et al. 2019). The idea that the blacks were even more inferior was born and they were laid open to physical and symbolic violence at the hands of their white masters. Perhaps there was little or no difference in the attributed features of a black man and an animal in the eyes of the colonizers. As a result, the ideology of the inferiority of black compared to white grew, even among white slaves.

While majority of the world’s population have had a taste of slavery, the accumulated experience of the black is nothing to be compared to. The more reason it would be difficult to combat and defeat the default picture that is painted in the mind at the sound of the word “slavery” (Olivier, et al. 2019). The lingering effect of the concept of claiming superiority over


other races has led to the rise of several vices in the society. In the US for instance, the black neighbourhood is associated with crime, prostitutions, gambling, etc while the white community is viewed as decent. Again, this is one of the major implications of the worldview that racism has engineered.

For example, De La Cancela and Sotomayor (1993) define institutional racism as "organizational processes, behaviour, policies, or procedures that produce negative outcomes for people of colour while maintaining the status or economic advantages of Caucasians i.e., where administrators maintain dominance over African Americans." It isn't logical, not even justified, to have a default mental image of people because of their skin colour or ethnicity. While physical slavery is completely shunned in the society today, mental slavery is still in full operation, subtly being introduced between races.

Another obvious effect of racism is economic marginalization. The dynamics of the white/black slavery idealism may take a century to be completely eradicated. In the late nineteenth century, "the abolition of slavery in the United States" was initiated (Olivier, et al. 2019). The vast majority of the beneficiary of the emancipation were blacks. The coming decades would witness several black countries receiving their sovereignty and reclaiming their lands from the European colonizers. Several decades into freedom, however, several countries who were colonized by the British still adopt the British English as the official language. The French colonized countries still spend the French currency. These are subtle effects of the physical slavery. At the top of countries with extreme poverty are black countries, despite the fact that their lands are rich in mineral resources.

A report on poverty in 2018 from the World Bank revealed that the five nations with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty are India, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Bangladesh (Roy and Divyanshi, 2019).

Projections to 2030 for the five countries with the most extreme poor in 2015



Source: PovcalNet (2015)

Underlying behaviour of a dominance race could take forever to erase. The imposition of culture, system, and lifestyle from a seemingly supreme race on the seemingly least race is, in fact, the introduction of mental slavery. In view of this, Olivier, et. al. (2019) noted:

Around the mid-twentieth century, scholars began to examine racism directed at non-white people more systematically. Sociologists examined overt forms of racism that manifest in individual attitudes and behaviours. Some social scientists exposed the empirically unsupported and destructive nature of pseudoscientific theories of race and racial hierarchy. They criticized imperialist, fascist, and ethnonationalist ideologies and began to study the social and psychological conditions underlying these ideologies.

The obvious implication of this is total dependence on the dominance race. To a large extent, it explains why lots of black countries still employ some of the cultures and lifestyle of their white colonizers. With this said, though the countries under consideration are considered sovereign, they nevertheless are grossly marginalized as majority of their economic decisions are being, either directly or indirectly, influenced by the lingering effect of their colonization.

One other adverse effect of racism and its relation to global peace is stigmatization. In the western world, the United States to be precise, the criminal justice system is filled with

daily reports of stigmatization. Every day, the non-whites continue to struggle at different levels to survive in divergent social world (Peterson and Krivo, 2012). The system has somewhat created a system whereby people are termed guilty just by their looks, and especially their race. For example, the police department has been getting a lot of heat for their overlooking at white police officers unjustly killing unarmed citizens on video simply because their colours are different. The justice system is even more biased. For example, when a white person, and a black person commit the same degree of crime but get different punishment in terms of prison time. According to a study conducted by Michigan Law School in 2014, the findings reveal that prosecutor's initial charging were concluded upon as a main drive of racial discrepancies in sentencing. The black arrestees were seventy-five percent more probable to face a charge with the minimum sentence than their white counterparts even though it was for the same crime. The level of stigmatization is subtly embedded in the system and is, oddly, gaining public acceptance.

Much like the white/black default mental picture of slavery, a typical looking criminal, according to the US Department of Justice, is a black guy that looks as though he has low income. For years, it has been hotly countered, and re-counterred, as to whether this mental image of a typical criminal should be created in the first place. Statistically though, in the US, African Americans have a lower income than their Caucasian neighbours. This seems to be the single major justification for such stigma. As a result, ordinary white citizens are very conscious when they see a black guy with a hoodie or a baggy jean, when perhaps the black man is simply innocently going to the store to get grocery for his children. But because he fits the perfect description of what a typical criminal look like, alarm may be raised (Papersowl, 2020). The irony of these trend is the fact that being of a certain race doesn't mean that someone is ingrained a disease or deficiency; the only supposed crime of that person is being born in a society with diverse colours, yet refusing to accommodate it. Racism is currently in its advanced stage, with multiple subtle ways of segregating people and offering them more or less resources, or showing favouritism as a result of their skin colour.

Millner (cited in van Dijk, 1993) has also identified how minorities are often depicted in negative terms in textbooks, while the white culture is portrayed as positive or neutral. The psychological downside of stigmatization is in multiple fold. The stigmatized is often left with thoughts of a degraded system. In some cases, the victim is forced to accept the stigma and made to understand that being racially bullied is a part of the deal, living in a society with diverse race.

In many African and Asian countries, the rate of stigmatization is significantly less when compared to the western world. Either there have not been sufficient researches to prove this otherwise or it can simply be concluded that being of the same race helps to look after one another (Olivier, et al. 2019). If the latter was to be the case, then the minority group in a multi-raced society would be constantly on their toes. The understanding and level of this phenomenon is still considerably low, constantly being explored in order for it to be curbed. However, overlooking someone, or intentionally withholding resources from a qualified person because of his or her skin colour, is the height of it. If conscious efforts aren't made, and quickly made, it may transcend to something bigger than we could have imagined.

Restraining Racism and Promoting Global Peace

The goal of building a world devoid of hatred and prejudice is achievable, albeit not with the presence of racism. Race segmentation is vital to successfully building a peaceful world, absolutely. Just as in the initial intention, it will enable easy access to data of people based on several factors, which can be used in evaluating the progress of global peace. The idea of putting a particular race, however, somewhere above the ladder will definitely pose a challenge. Attaining global peace is far more than just conquering war; in fact, the absence of war is just one of the many things that are required. Prayoon (1989) argued that positive peace means a state of tranquillity, calm, repose, quietness, harmony, friendship, amity, concord, peaceful or friendly relation, public order, pacification, spiritual content, reconciliation, serenity, security, social justice and bliss.

United Nations (2000) stated that a culture of peace will be achieved when citizens of the world understand global problems, have the skills to resolve conflicts and struggle for justice non-violently, live by international standards of human rights and equity, appreciate cultural diversity, and respect the Earth and each other. This can only be achieved in a world where everyone is treated equally and given shared treatment. Sanderson (1982) opined that the purpose of world peace cannot be far fetch from the following: to awaken the inner peace that dwells in the heart of all beings; to create the consciousness of world peace, foster friendship and harmony among all people; to promote and protect human rights of all people, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, as delineated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations.

From the mental perspective, peace is a state of absolute inner calmness and serenity of the mind. This translates to immense productivity and enhance social life in tremendous ways. When this kind of peace is exponential and becomes global, the effect of it is a world filled with tranquillity and harmony. With this, the conclusion that peace carries with it a surpassing of personality or abandonment of the feeling of expressing superiority over others can be agreed upon. One singular thing that is often overlooked is the importance of religiously advocating for human rights. Of course, human rights cannot be preached where one group of people is constantly suppressing the other. When the violation of human rights is eradicated, irrespective of the race that each person belongs to, then peaceful co-existence can thrive and the dream of living in a world of peace can be actualized. In the study of human rights, right to peace is one of human rights (Charles and Johan, 2007). What this means is that people, irrespective of their skin colour or behavioural traits, have right to peace without the fear of being harmed, wherever they are and go. By all means, the fear of being seen as inferior needs to be eliminated if peace must thrive.

In this fast moving and technologically driven world, personal peace seems to be lacking. As has been earlier mentioned, attaining global peace begins with the acquisition of

personal peace, which can then gradually transcend itself into the global world. The paradoxical import of the status quo is what Prof. D. N. Pathak (1999) aptly throws light on by elucidating that "there is poverty amidst plenty, over production vs. undernourishment, affluence and wistful life in contrast to bare survival, over-development vs. under-development, economic growth vs. ecological crisis, consumerism for a few as against denial of basic need for many, explosion of knowledge vs illiteracy, globalization vs. intense nationalism.

The subject of intentionally segregating people and exploiting their resources cannot in anyway effect peace. According to the United Nations experts, "the struggle against racism must be intensified and given higher priority by all States and at all levels as a key human rights objective and a means to prevent conflict and maintain peace." They went further to elucidate that "racism continues to be a major obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among peoples and nations. Similarly, the absence of democratic structures, the weakness of the rule of law, and political institutions which are not representative of the entire population, may in the long run contribute to triggering conflicts along group lines, if not handled in an adequate and comprehensive manner." Kawakami et. al. (2007) suggested that the literature on coping with racism must be closely integrated with the empirical literature on the perceptions of targeted individuals by members of other racial or ethnic groups.

On a daily basis, with the advent of new means of segregation, the goal of attaining world peace continue to seem like mere illusion. If this threat must be illuminated, or at least reduced, then the words of Mutuma Ruteere, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, "All relevant actors should pay attention to early warning signs, including the marginalization and social exclusion of specific groups of individuals; discriminatory legislation and policies; the persistence of racial prejudice and negative stereotypes; hate speech by public officials and the media; and violent attacks and harassment targeting ethnic groups," must be adhered to.

Conclusion

After carefully considering and lingering on such disturbing scenarios as outlined, no intelligent person can deny the inseparability of different dimensions of peace, and also that today's ultimate ideal goal is global peace. The introduction of racial segmentation, however, with good intentions, has slowly engineered different avenues which further diminishes the goal of attaining a united world of peaceful co-existence. Racism has, for a long time now, been a cataclysmic ingredient that has threatened global peace and made it seem like only a dream. It has to be dealt with, else the idea of living in a united world will continue to be just an idea. This is a collective responsibility of everyone, irrespective of race, background, ethnicity or geographical location. The ideal world of global peace is a world where everyone has access to equal rights and opportunities. Attaining such world is achievable. Eliminating racism is achievable. And of course, living in global harmony is absolutely achievable.

For world peace, one of our global goals should be the elimination of racism and promoting global peace and living in harmony can truly be achieved. The United Nations should invest more in educational areas that promote the idea of living in harmony in a multi-ethnic world. With this, the next generation will be properly guided, right from their basic level of learning, that no one is inferior, and that diversity is actually supposed to be a unifying force. Similarly in countries where the subject of racism is hotly contested, government should enforce policies that provide equal rights and resources for everyone, irrespective of their skin colour or background. This will, in the long run, create a top-down approach to dealing with the vice. In other words, the effect of such policies would eventually be ingrained in every citizen. In some other countries, ethnicity, rather than race, is the cause of division, equal efforts and policies should be enacted to help to foster unity. The advocacy of equality of people, especially at the family and community level should be strongly encouraged.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF FREE SPEECH AS AN INDISPENSABLE MECHANISM FOR PEACE BUILDING

Adakole E. ODIKE, PhD.*

INTRODUCTION

Free speech or freedom of speech is alternatively called freedom of expression and the press. This particular freedom or right is anchor on the universal understanding that an individual or groups of individuals have the inherent right to freely express their ideas, thoughts, beliefs and emotion about different social issues devoid of censorship or interference. The freedom to speak freely on any social issue of interest makes free speech a vital source of free flow of information or communication that is necessary for social cohesion, peace and progress. The free flow of information and communication in any political system that accommodates ethnic or cultural differences is an indispensable building block of peace or its sustainability.

The idea therefore that there should be a legal rule that guarantees freedom of speech of an individual or groups in a national constitution date back to the First Amendment to the United States' Constitution. That amendment is part of the Bill of Rights that protects free speech. Since then, the understanding that free speech is an inherent right of all human being has become a universal doctrine that has acquired notable feature in national and international legal instrument. Presently, there are several international and national legal instruments that embodies the principle of free speech. This includes but not limited to the following.

1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Article 19 of that Declaration states that:

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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through media regardless of frontiers.

i. The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Article 19 of this United Nation's Convention states that: i. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions with or without interference: ii. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, prints in form of art, or through any media of his choice.

2. The United Nations Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005. Article 2 of that international legal instrument states that: The principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedom and cultural diversity can be promoted, if human rights and fundamental freedom such as freedom of expressions, information and communication, as well as, the abilities of individual to choose cultural expression are guaranteed.

It was the basis of the above provision that the United Nations Human Rights Committee on Freedom of Speech held in *Mukong v. Cameroon* that under Article 21 paragraph 3 (a) of the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Production of the Diversity of Cultural Expression, the Republic of Cameroon is under an international legal obligation to provide Mr. Mukong with effective remedy to freely express his ideas, belief, thought and emotion (UN Human Rights Committee: 1994).

3. The African Charter on Human and People's Rights, 1986. Article 9 of that regional charter states that:

i. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinion within the law.

Consequent on that, the African Commission on Human and People's Right in its 32nd Session, held in Banjul-Gambia between 17th – 23rd October, 2002 affirmed – in a declaration – the provisions of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.

African Charter on Value and Principles of Public Services and Administration. This is another regional legal instrument that recognizes freedom of information or speech. Article of that rule of law affirms the right of access of individual or groups to public service locally known in Nigeria as a “federal character principle” (App. No 0004/2013. Judgment delivered on 15th December, 2014). That charter specifically provides in Article I that:

State parties shall entrench in their national law and regulation the principle of equal access to adequate service. No doubt, providing an individual or groups within a society equal access to adequate service breeds unity and through that ensure peace or its sustainability.

4. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007.

This rule of law or legal obligation promotes good governance on the African Continent as an enabler of peaceful co-existence in a plural society. Article 13 of that Charter enjoins state parties to take appropriate measures that will ensure and maintain policies and social dialogue.

No doubt, dialogue, as an aspect of free speech is a veritable instrument of peace building in any society.

5. The Model Law on Access to Information for Africa adopted by African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. Article I of that Model Law states that: “the right to information shall be guaranteed by law”.

In *Loh’e Konate v. Burkina Faso*, the applicant, Mr. Loh’e Issa Konate was an editor working for the L’Ouragan Newsletter Publishing Company based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004: 738). He published a number of reports in August 2012 pertaining to the apparent corruption of a certain prosecutor named Placide Nkieme. The report noted among other things that Mr. Nkieme had been unlawfully implicated in money laundry, counterfeiting and unlawful trading in second hand or fairly used cars known locally in Nigeria as “Tokubo cars”. A High Court and a Court of Appeal sitting in Ouagadougou held that Mr. Konate was guilty of defamation, public insult and insult of a magistrate. Mr. konate and the Newsletter’s Editor – in – Chief, Mr. Roland

Ouedraogo was sentenced to 12 months in prison and were directed to pay a fine of 2, 900 US Dollars and 7, 800 US Dollars to Mr. Nkieme. The Court also directed that L'Ouragan Newsletter Publishing Company be suspended.

However, the African Court of Human Rights while discussing the applicant's appeal based on free speech held its communication that the government of Burkina Faso has infringed Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and Article 66 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. The Court further held that the sentences of the High Court and the Court of Appeal that sat at Ouagadougou were "disappropriate to the aim pursued by the relevant provisions of the information code and the penal code of Burkina Faso". Thus, it asked the government of Burkina Faso to amend its national laws in order to be in conformity with the international laws cited in the judgement.

6. The Nigerian Constitution. Section 39 (1) of the extant Constitution of Nigeria 1999, as amended, guarantees freedom of expression and the press as a fundamental human right in the following words.

Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinion and to receive and impart ideas, information without interference. Though, national and international legal instruments guarantee freedom of speech, as well as that of the press, known commonly as "free press" (Nigeria, 1999).

However, the freedom of press guaranteed by positive law is less significant than the interpretation of it by the Court. Thus, the freedom of the press guaranteed by law plays a minor role in the protection of press freedom notwithstanding the occasional emittance of rhetoric's by the court of such importance ((2002) UK H2 571: (2001) 2 AC 272).

The Meaning of Free Speech

To start with "freedom" means a state of not being a prisoner or enslaved on the other hand "free speech", connotes a situation of being free of any encumbrance that hinders the enjoyment of one's liberty to sate one's opinion, idea, belief, thoughts or emotion and the right

to engage to form an opinion or exchange of information and communication. In other words, free speech means the liberty to speak freely and openly discuss without fear or restrictions. In *Mcartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers*, Lord Steyn defined the freedom of expression nay, freedom of speech as “the primary right in a democracy ... without it an effective rule of law is not possible”. Hence, the court ruled that it is necessary in a modern democracy to restrict, as limited as possible, free speech and press (Odike, 2005).

Freedom of speech is a principle of fundamental nature that supports the freedom of an individual or a group to articulate their opinions and ideas without fear and retaliation, censorship or legal sanction. This particular freedom invests on an individual or groups of individuals the right to speak, write, print, publish or do anything in order to express an opinion, thought, belief, idea, feeling or emotion without restriction. On the other hand, freedom of the press is an aspect of freedom of speech that connotes absence of previous restraint or restriction on publication, and not necessary liberty from censure when an untrue or seditions material is published.

On the whole, freedom of speech guarantees the following rights:

- i. The right to freedom of expression without interference:
- ii. The right to hold opinions or views without interference:
- iii. The right to receive ideas and information without interference:
- iv. The right to impart ideas and information without interference.

Opinion, idea, thought, emotion or feeling express in form of demonstration is an indispensable variable in any democratic or plural society. This was judicially affirmed by a Nigerian Court in *IGP v. ANPP & Ors*. In that case the court held that:

The right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression are the bone of any democratic form of government. Besides their embodiments in the supreme law of the land, the 1999 Constitution, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights adopted as Ratification and Enforcement Act Capio, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, a Plethora of decisions of Nigerian Courts has endorsed the same (AHRIR, 2000: 179).

In *AMORC v. Awoniyi*, the Court was of the opinion that, “the right to free speech is one which; it is for the public interest that individuals should possess and indeed that they should exercise it without impediments, so long as no wrongful act is done.

However, the right of freedom of speech, should be exercise with special duties and responsibilities. This is because, freedoms of free speech are subjected to limitations as provided by law and are necessary, that is:

- i. For respect of the rights or reputation of others; and
- ii. For the protection of national security and for public interest or of public health and morals.

Freedom of speech is a vital mechanism for building of peace in a plural society because, it situates a democratic government under a critical examination of the public and the press. Freedom of speech acts as a mechanism against oppressive rule. Being a menace to hate and oppressive rule, it helps peace building in a plural society by dispelling rumour, hate, stereotypes and prejudices with better and fuller facts. Thomas Jefferson noted this solemn fact in one of his treatises thus:

The basis of our government, being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right and were it left to one to decide whether we should have a government without Newspapers or Newspapers without government, I should not hesitate to for a moment to prefer the later (Jefferson, 2002).

Christopher Hitchens sang the same hymns though, in different tune, thus:

My opinion is enough for me and I claim the right to have it defended against consensus, any majority, anywhere, any place, anytime, and anyone who disagree with this can pick a number, get in line and kiss my ass (Hitchens, 2002).

Free Speech as a Mechanism for Building Peace

According to Aristotle, man is a political being and as such, man’s ultimate desire is the creation of order and social cohesion in his society. Peace or order in a human society connotes a state of tranquillity. On the other hand, peace building denotes the implementation of measures which creates or sustains peace in a society. Nigeria is a plural society that

recognizes the ethnic, cultural or traditional diversities of its component parts. Thus, the basic law of Nigeria, the 1999 constitution, provides for vertical and horizontal allocation of powers between arms and tiers of government. This is to accommodate different ethnic or cultural composition of the Nigerian federation. To institutionalize peace building mechanism, the constitution and other laws, national and international, enshrined freedom of speech as a fundamental right.

Freedom of expression and the press is a vital and valuable right in any human society. This is because, without that exercise of that right in any human society peace or peace building will be elusive. No doubt, a person or individual in a society will be elusive and a person or persons would not be able to ventilate their views or vision of how the society they live in is to be govern. Neither can a person speak out or write his thought or even associate with other in order to build a desire society devoid of lawlessness.

In making an assessment on freedom of speech in a plural society, the British House of Lords held in *R v. Secretary of State. For the House Department, ex parte Brind* (1998) 3 ALL E.R 852), that court enjoined all other courts to presume that any interference with freedom of speech is unlawful. Similarly, in *Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers (No 2)*, an English court held unequivocally that any law that unjustly interferes with the freedom of speech will be struck down by the court. The underpinning of the above judicial opinion is the understanding that for the sake of enabling societal peace, enablement every person has individual right to lay whatever sentiment he or she pleases before the public. To forbid that is to destroy the inherent right of an individual to express his opinion, thought, belief, idea and feeling.

Upholding the freedom of speech for the betterment of the society means allowing the publication of even dangerous or offensive writings provided it is fair and impartial, although adjudged dangerous and offensive. Nevertheless, that is necessary for preservation of peace, good order of government, religious freedom and the right to assembly. Therefore, free speech is one of the solid foundations of social order.

In the *People v. Cross well*, Justice Cardozo held explicitly that:

The right to publish with impunity, truth with good motives justifies the end though it reflects on government magistracy or individual good for the preservation of peace or social order (Odike, 2005: 249).

The endemic fear of domination of one ethnic group by another, which is still prevalent in Nigeria, informed the framers of our constitution to include a freedom of speech clause in our constitution. No doubt, freedom of speech is one of the critical peace building blocks in any human society. This was why Justice Cardozo judicially reasoned in *Whitney V. California*, that:

The freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth: that without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile: that with them affords ordinary adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine: that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people: that public discussion is a political duty and that this should be a fundamental principle (Cardozo, 1927).

Freedom of speech limits the power of government in restricting dissemination of ideas, beliefs, thoughts and emotions of individuals and groups or the ability of the citizenry to freely speak on social matter(s) of interest. This is why Justice Cardozo, in *Whitney v. California (supra)* regarded free speech as: “The matrix, the indispensable condition nearly every other form of freedom”.

The rule of law that provides for free speech aids good governance. And good governance breeds peace, prosperity, progress and unity. The chain of good govern that free speech roll out is a certainty that Prof. Nwabueze recognized when he said that:

So long as he lives (man), he cannot be prevented from speaking if he wants to do so. You can punish him for what he says but is after he said it. Gagging apart; it is physically impossible to prevent a living person from speaking what he pleases. His audience may be restricted by government regulations banning assemblages of person in public places, but he remains free to speak his mind privately if he has the courage to damn the consequences (Nwabueze, 1986).

The above comment reflects the importance individuals attached to freedom of speech and its potential as a peace building block. Thus, a shutdown of an individual’s right to

freedom of speech denies the individual or person the appropriate avenue to channel his idea, thought, belief, emotion or feeling in his or her society.

In that regard, freedom of speech is not only an important tool of communication and information dissemination in a society but it is also an indispensable tool for human development. According to the President of the International Court of Human Right:

Freedom of expression is a cornerstone which the very existence of a democratic society rests. It presents, in short, the means that enables the community, when expressing its opinion, to be sufficiently informed. It is the condition of social life that allows members of the society to reach the highest level of personal development and the optimum achievement of democratic values (Loveland, 1998).

Clearly, freedom of speech builds peace in a plural society by sustaining democratic values and helps blur misunderstanding. Brandies L. (1927, cited in Skover and Collins, 2005) stated the indispensability of free speech when he splendidly said that:

Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties. They believed that the freedom to think, as you will and speak as you think means it is indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth. They recognized the risk to which all human institution is subject but they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment. That it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination. That fear breeds hate. That hates menace stable government and that the fluting remedy to evil counsels is good counsel (Skover and Collins, 2005).

Indeed, the discovery and spread of political truth or fruitful social discussion would be futile without freedom of speech and assembly. Everyone knows that free speech dispels noxious doctrine that undermines peaceful coexistence. No doubt, inert people denied freedom to disseminate ideas, thoughts, beliefs or emotions cannot effectively engage in public discussion. Public discussion is a political duty that can ultimately lead to orderly and secured society. Thus, freedom of speech exists as a fundamental right and then as a mechanism that gives practical meaning to peace building in any society particularly a plural society. Apart from that, freedom of speech supplies fresh and blood to other rights such as freedom of association, assembly, thought, conscience and religion.

This is why Nwabueze (1982) opined that:

Only in the context of free speech does freedom of thoughts and conscience have practical meaning. It is not much use for a man to be free to think, feel and believe that he is not able to express his thought, feeling and belief.

Therefore, if peace and harmony are to be achieved in a society free speech among other things is a *sine qua non*. In the case of *State v. Trupet Publishing Co. Ltd*, (1948) a Nigerian Court held that:

Freedom of press is a bulwark of democracy ... The Nigerian Constitution has in fact, obligated the press to uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government to the people (5 N.C.L.R, 1948).

Holding government to account ensure peace in a society, hence, the court has held in number of cases the indispensability of freedom of speech as an effective mechanism for peace building in a plural society. This was the opinion of the court in *Omega bank Plc v. Government of Ekiti State* ((2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 386) 658) that, the right to establish educational institution as a medium to disseminate knowledge base on free speech guarantee is a critical peace building mechanism. In *Okogie (Arch. Bishop) v. A.G Lagos State*, and *Adewole v. Jakande* (1 NWLR 262, 1948). The trial courts were of the opinion that freedom of speech is an indispensable mechanism for peace building because free speech dispel hate and build understanding that is necessary for peaceful coexistence in any human society.

Conclusion

Dichotomy occasioned by religious, regional, cultural or racial differences breeds hate, stereotypes and prejudices which are menace to the society. Freedom of speech dispels societal menaces created by hate, stereotypes and prejudices. Hence, its indispensability to peace building in any society. Therefore, freedom of speech is as vital to the existence of a society the way air is to the existence of man. No wonder, it is commonly believed that peace and freedom of speech are as related – as identical twins are to each other.

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CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENT OF NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR NATIONHOOD AND PEACE

Hashimu SHEHU*

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's challenges are more less connected to some challenges comprising from lack of patriotism, nationalistic feeling, oneness, unity as well as one nation in all ramifications. This occurred as a result of lack of proper understanding of our various historical background and to some large extend the history of our dear nation. Although, it says "the labour of our heroes shall never be in vain". But the slogan did not translate the reality on the ground. Nationalistic feeling means one nation bound in freedom, peace and unity at large. The past heroes had demonstrated a resilient and determination by confronting imperialist at all cost just to ensure that colonialism did not destroy cultural heritage and tradition of excellent of Nigeria's diversity in all ramifications. Although, the coming together as a nation was by the destiny destined to colonialism factor.

Their strategies of nation building were done out of selfish interest but because the state of the nation was in their hearts. They did not look at their tribal marks neither their religious difference or language barrier, but instate they forge ahead to give a sound and solid foundation to the unborn generation to rift the benefit of nationalism as a whole. No one could argue that they did not confront with unprecedented challenges during the struggle but that is normal. They built this nation with anticipation that it will be free from nepotism, corruption, bad governance, insecurity as well as socio-economic challenges in contemporary Nigeria. The role of History in the development of a nation is indispensable. Any people that misplace

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their past in the task of nation-building shall find it difficult to attain nationhood. Neglecting our history implies ignorance of our collective past as a people. It makes us oblivious of relations that had existed amongst us in the past. Such relations may be cordial or otherwise. These relations in the Nigerian context were promoted by trade, religious and socio-cultural institutions, migration, diplomacy and war (Stephen, 2021). The products of the obvious relegation of history are among others, the numerous inter-ethnic/communal clashes that have erupted in various parts of the country. It is on this note these study attempts to examine the roles of nationalist in the task of nation building and the challenges associated with nation building after independent of contemporary society Nigeria.

Conceptualising Nationalism

In a relative term, there is academic struggle between historian and social science scholars on conceptualizing the term “Nationalism”. From historical point of view claimed that nationalism has to do with resistance against “domination” or struggle against “racism” or “apartheid”. Other multidisciplinary approach connects the concept with patriotism or citizenship as academic discourse. In practical, the concept came into being during the colonial era in 1800 century where African showed solid resistance and fight against colonial imperialism, not only that, but also expression of African culture and traditional heritage which European attempted to destroyed the prestige (Onwubiko, 1985; Shehu, 2022). In another opinion, nationalism has also examined as the patriotic sentiment or activity on the part of groups of Africans held together by the bonds of common language and common historic experience to assert their right to live under a government of their own making for the preservation of their political, economic and social interests.

The point being made here is that, there is connectedness between nationalism and a nation, which is perceptively defined with internationally recognised borders. A nation in the ethnological sense is commonly stated as a group of people who form a distinct community by inhabiting a definite territory and recognized themselves as possessing a relatively homogeneous set of culture traits. These include a common or related blood, a common

language, religion, historical tradition as well as common customs and habits in essential (Isiaq, 2007; Rudolf, 2019). On the side of social science perceptivity, “nationalism” has been a disturbing matter for social scientist traditionally. The fact that the forecast of “the ending of the age of nationalism” which become predominant for a long time in the social sciences literatures on nationalism did not come through the nationalist and racist discourse.

The Concept of Nation Building

For clearly perspective, the idea of nation-building, explain the meaning of a nation becomes imperative. Initially, the concept of nation conceived as ‘a group or race of people who share history, traditions, and culture, sometimes religion, and usually language’ (Carolyn, 2005). In this regard, the people of a nation generally share a common national identity. Part of nation-building, therefore, becomes building of a common identity. Accordingly, distinction can be drawn between ethnic nations based in race or ethnicity and civic nation based in common identity and loyalty to sets of political ideas and institutions as well as the linkage of citizenship to nationality (Carolyn, 2005).

However, the contemporary understanding and usage of the term nation is fast corroding the older and is now synonyms with the state only that a state is more properly the governmental apparatus by which a nation governs itself. In that regard, a nation may be likened to an umbilical cord that joins the foetus with its mother thereby creating and everlasting bond that is sustained after delivery through breastfeeding. A state, on the other hand, is like an apparatus that makes or mar this bond. Nationhood would give the state the legitimacy to operate. Once a nation is built to an enviable standard, state failure becomes difficult and security guaranteed (Carolyn, 2005; Mevayerore, 2020).

Peacebuilding in Perspective

The concept is an emerging in the field of academic discourse due to the least attention by conflict researchers, and has been the least operationalized in part because of its wide range of activities that receive less publicity, focuses on the social, psychological, and economic environment at the grassroots level. In historical epoch, peacebuilding is one of the United

Nations principal models of peace process in particular. The concept become acceptable globally as a result of Boutros-Ghali's defining moment in his speech agenda for peace delivered in 1992. Peacebuilding has been classified into three distinctive categories by the former UN Boss Boutros-Ghali. According to him there is pre-conflict peacebuilding which has to with such measures that include demilitarization, control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development. In summary peacebuilding implied early warning mechanism to monitor conflict triggers.

The post conflict characterizes process of reintegration, reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in post conflict dimensional. The main objective of peacebuilding is widening in its scope, as such, is to streamline non-violence structure of peace that is based on justice, equity and by and large cementing cooperation with the view to address the underlying causes of violence conflict so as to become less effective in the future (Michelle, 2021; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Reuchler, 2001).

The First Phase of Nationalist Movement in Nigeria

The Nineteenth Century

Historically, the origin of nationalism had a divergent view, as so far that the nationalist movement had its roots firmly in the 19th century even though it was not until the 20th century that it plays actively. The state nature of nationalism struggle came under various phases. The phase one came inform of resistance from traditional constituted authority, then followed by religious nationalism, phase three was a cultural nationalism while the last phase took another dimensional approach on political sphere. In the first place, there was an impression given by scrupulous European writers that African did not resist or react violently during colonial period against their domination in particular. This is completely erroneous in the face of Pan-Africanism perceptively. The records of the early African missionaries and educated African elite discovered that opposition and resistance to foreign rule was an old as colonialism itself. Though rudimentary, local or remote, it was coordinated under traditional authority.

Traditional Nationalist in Nigeria

In regard to Nigerian traditional leadership emphasis was made with the nationalist movement in the 20th century. It is only fair to draw attention briefly to what had happened to the previous century. As has been recalled there were many Nigerian leaders who fought against the improvising of colonial rule. Among these first set of pioneers who attempted to truncate the European subjugation were King Kosoko of Lagos, Jaja of Opobe, Nana of Ebrohimi, Ovorawen of Benin, the people of Brase, the Eukumelau movement of Asaba, leaders of the Sokoto caliphate and the Tiv Kingdom, all of these leaders did their best to stop becoming part of the British empire and they were over powered by the mighty of British guns. (Olusanya, 2001; Shehu, 2022). The nationalists of the 20th century fought against the consequences of colonial penetration in the first place, so as to avoid direct contact with people in the hinterland. (Olusanya, 2001; 'Yandaki, 2015; Bello, 2017; Shehu, 2022).

Cultural Nationalist in Nigeria

In Nigeria, mission education tended to regard everything African as evil and barbaric. Even our names with their deep meanings were unacceptable to the missionaries. Every Nigerians Christian had to take what was called a Christian name (meaning an English or Hebrew name) to become an educated. As the 19th century moved on, educated Africans like James Johnson, Mojola Agbebi, John Jacks Payne, William Bright Davie, Tejumade, Mojola Agbebi, John Jackson Payne, William Bright Davie, Tejumade Osholake Johnson rejected this aspect of missionary education. They began to preach that it was possible to be Christian and yet remain African in name, customs, and way of life. Hence David Vincent changed his name to Mojolis Agbebi, the Revd. S.H. Samuel to Adeboyega Edun, George William Johnson to Osholaka Tejumade Johnson. They showed pride of being Africans especially when some of them like Vincent, along with others, changed their dress from the foreign to the indigenous one.

The Second Phase of Nationalist Movement in Nigeria

Colonial policies in Nigeria

Constitutional development was part of the nationalist movement. Each new constitution increased Nigerian participation in law-making. The 1951 and 1957 constitutions made it possible for Nigerians to begin take over the actual work of governing their own peoples. This aspect of the nationalist movement was the struggle to make Nigerians participate more fully both in the making of their laws and in actual government. This was because it was part of colonial rule that all power legislative and executive belonged to the colonial authorities. Nigerian nationalists fought against this and through various constitutional changes, achieved their aim by 1959 when Northern Nigeria became self-governing. It was a struggle emanated from the colonial subjugation on Africans. They rejected everything on British and European values. They were indirectly fighting against the colonial situation, since missionaries were consciously and unconsciously great agents of colonial rule. These men were, therefore, also helping to lay the foundation of the 20th century nationalist movement (Shehu, 2022; Mansur I. M., 2014; Mansur I. , 2013). The following were among colonial policies rejected in Nigeria.

1. Taxation

The British introduced capitation tax at different times throughout Nigeria. By 1928 the entire country was paying this tax. The payment of tax of his nature was unknown in most Nigerian traditions. Consequently, everybody-educated and non-educated hated it. In some area's riots were originated against it. Hatred of taxation was increased by the fact that revenue derived from taxation was spent largely on paying the salaries of British officials and building beautiful houses for them to live in. Those who paid the tax little or nothing to gain out of it. This made the British unpopular, and gave the nationalists one more ground for attacking colonial rule and this policy of exorbitant taxation imposed on traders and business activities led to emergence of several riots in Nigeria include the following: (Mansur I. M., 2014; Shehu, 2022).

i. The Famous Aba Women's Riot of 1929

Aba women riot was a child of necessity of political activism by the women in order to address the issue of Lugardian policy of exorbitant taxation. The exclusion of educated women elite coupled with other marginalization triggered agitation against conduct of British rule in many parts of the region. This agitation reached the culminating climax where in 1927/28 Anti-Tax broke out in Warri providing a precedent for the Aba Riot of Eastern Nigeria. This development constituted the Lugardian system in the area of present day Bendel state in the 1930s (Afigbo, 2001).

ii. Lago Market Women Association (LMWA)

In similar event, the period of 1940 shaped another land mark in Lagos. This time around it was the Market Women Association (LMWA) under the able leadership of madam Alimotu Pelewura (Iyaloja of Lagos) confronted the British official and demand explanation on high tax exploitation. Mrs. Pelewura together with over market women strongly opposed the hiked of price and the establishment of control plan commission by the British captain Pullen. (Bawa, 2019; Afigbo, 2001).

iii. Abeokuta Women Union (AWU)

The unprecedented attitudes of hike price and control plan executed by the British triggered wind of resistance in many places in Nigeria. The episode of Market Women Association of Lagos provides another impetus and wind of change towards women worsening condition in the market mainstream in Abeokuta. The result led to the anger from all quarters and consequences was the formation of Abeokuta Women Union (AWU) under the leadership of Funmilayo Ransome Kuti in 1946. The AWU was an elite group of women who joined in solidarity with the market women of Egbaland to work together to challenge the excessive and unnecessary taxation of the colonial administration in the area. This action of AWU liberate the women from colonial shackle and subjugation on socioeconomic in the land space of western region (Bawa, 2019; Afigbo, 2001; Titilola, 1994).

2. Land Appropriations and Owner Right

In spite of the fact that Nigeria can be said to be lucky that the British did not seize all of the land from the people, but there was some discontent over how much the colonial government paid for the land it took from the people for the building offices, especially the case in Lagos. It was felt that unless the government was carefully watched in this regard, the people would lose their lands. Again, there was the issue of land owner right which came on board during the colonial era. The colonial office appointed a west African land commission to determine the possibility of applying the Northern Nigeria system of land tenure to Southern region. According to the proposal, all rights over land were to be “under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor”.

The proposal was regarded by the elite in Lagos as a move to deprive the people of Southern Nigeria of their heritage land. It was because of this ugly development and in order to see it was not succeeded in the region that was why the Anti-slavery and Aborigines protection society was formed in Lagos in 1912. This was the reason behind bringing in chief from various towns, villages in Yorubaland into its fold. To prepare solid foundation with peaceful atmosphere that in 1913, a young vibrant Lagosian and well educated elite and higher-ranking chiefs from the hinterland were dispatched to London to protest against the British government proposal on land owner right. (Yandaki, 2015; Bello, 2017; Shehu, 2022).

3. Discrimination Against Nigerians in Business Sphere

Perhaps, the only area where the British colonial rule was most oppressive was that of discrimination against the Nigerians in the economic sphere. The colonial government itself did little to promote economic growth directly. The economy of Nigeria was controlled by British firms led by the United African Company (U.A.C). It was these companies that bought up all the product of Nigeria-palm produce such as cotton, cocoa, timber, groundnut, tin, coal, etc. this meant that the producers had really little bargaining power. They had to accept the prices fixed by these big, mostly British firms. At the same time the firms controlled the prices for European goods brought into Nigeria. Any effort made by Nigerians to form co-operative

that could negotiate prices, or even seek to export directly from Europe was discouraged. In the 20th century up to the 1940s, it became increasingly difficult for many Nigerians to go into big business. This was because they could not raise the capital since the banking system was monopolized by the British (the Barclays Bank and Bank of British West Africa Limited). While these banks gave credit to Europeans, Syrians, Lebanese and Indians, they denied Nigerians loans. This discrimination against people in the economic development of their own country was a major source of grievances which the nationalist used in their fight for freedom from colonial rule ('Yandaki, 2015; Mansur I. M., 2014; Onwubiko, 1985; Shehu H. , 2022).

4. Exclusion from the Government Affairs

As was made clear earlier, educated Nigerians were excluded from the main stream of colonial government from the onset. This meant that Nigerians had little say in the way they were ruled. In fact, contrary to what was often claimed for the British, that they prepared their colonies for independence, but that preparation did not actualize, till after 1950. Until that time, the British monopolized most of the important positions in the government sectors. This was in addition to the fact that until the 1950s, Nigerian had little effective say in the Legislative or Executive Councils. Even at the level of local government, the educated Nigerians were not given any role until the late 1930s. Those who did get jobs at local level found that they were paid less than Europeans employees with the same or even lesser qualifications. The colour of the skin, not qualifications, determined pay in the colonial civil service. Only the traditional rulers and the non-educated “chiefs” were allowed to participate in local government matters (Mansur, 2014; Shehu, 2022).

The Third Phase of Nationalist Movement in Nigeria

The was the era of political struggle that led to the independence of Nigeria. It was an era when a few political parties were formed in order to campaign for independence and among the leading party including the National Congress and the National Democratic Party, but their success was slight during the election because they were managed to secured only one seat in the assembly. In 1937 the growing movement was given a voice by Nnamdi Azikwe, an Igbo

nationalist, supported mostly by Igbo and other easterners, who founded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), and the newspaper *West African pilot*. From the Western region there was The Action Group, led by the early 1950s, other parties had emerged, notably the Northern People Congress. Pressure for independence from within Nigeria was complemented by pressure from other nations, and from reformers in Britain and in other colonies. In 1947 the British responded by introducing a new constitution that divided Nigeria into three regions namely:

The Northern region which was mainly Hausa-Fulani and Muslim; the eastern region comprises Igbo and Catholic; and the western region dominated by Yoruba and mixed Muslim and Anglican. Each region had their own legislative assemblies who were appointed members instead of elected and were to be overseen by a weak federal government. Although short-lived, the constitution had serious long-term impact through its encouragement of regional, ethnic-based politics (Shehu, 2022). The constitution failed on several counts and was abrogated in 1949, thereby, followed by other constitutions in 1951 and 1954, each which had to contend with powerful ethnic forces.

The constitution also gave the right to seek self-government, which the western and eastern regions achieved in 1956. The northern region, however, fearing that self-government (and thus British withdrawal) would leave it at the mercy of southerners, delayed the imposition until 1959. In December 1959, elections were held for a federal parliament. None of the three main parties won a majority, but the NPC, thanks to the size of the northern region, won the largest plurality. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, head of the NPC, entered a coalition government with the eastern NCNC as prime minister. The new parliament was seated in January 1960; however, Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960 (Shehu, 2022).

The Phase Four: The Challenges of Nation-Building in Post-Independence Nigeria

The numerous crises and agitations in Nigeria today are indications that the country is still crawling and struggling to gain its feet in the task of nation-building 62 years after independence. Issues ranging from the Niger-Delta militancy in the South-South, secessionist

agitations in the South-East, Herdsmen/farmers clashes in the North-Central coupled with the Boko- Haram insurgency in the North-East and pockets of ethno-religious crises across the country are testaments of impaired national cohesion. There are several factors that have been impediments to the task of nation-building in Nigeria. They are quite inexhaustible. But it suffices to state that these factors are hinged on colonial legacy, religious and ethnic polarity, leadership dearth and mono-commodity economy (Stephen, 2021).

a. **The Constitutional challenge**

Since its independence, the country has been facing the challenge of drafting a constitutional arrangement that has the backing of an overwhelming majority of Nigerians. In the 1940s and 1950s, our founding fathers battled with this problem. In the end, they arrived at the principle of federalism as a foundation for our nation. But federalism has faced stiff challenges over the years from those wanting a unitary form of government on the one hand, and from those wanting a confederal arrangement, on the other. Related to the problem of federalism is the question of fiscal federalism. What is the appropriate and just basis for sharing revenue? Should the federal government have the right to deduct monies due to states without their permission? Should state governments continue to control local government allocations? These are all fundamental principles on which they have no clear consensus.

b. **Leadership and followership challenges**

Many scholars examined leadership in the various perspectives. According to W.T. Edward viewed a leader as member of a given group who has the influence over the behaviours of other members and whose position is usually the first to emerge as group becomes structured.’ But to Goldman standpoint refers to leaders as the exercise of authority, as controllers of others. However, another authors, Parry sates that leadership is an observable element in all human collectively. For every leadership to be effective and efficient there is the need for those in leadership positions to present certain sterling qualities like honesty, integrity, courage, creativity innovativeness, etc. to be able to carry everyone along. Good leadership no doubt encourages good followership. Every leader is expected to possessed these qualities

such as honest and integrity in dealing with his subject. A leader must be persuasiveness. This is the ability to personal which involve a sense of understanding of the point of view, the interest and the conditions of those to be persuaded. Leader must be fair in dealing with people e.g., first to come, first to serve no nepotism and no biasness. A leader should be inquisitive and new ideas should always interest him. Leadership is not about local, state or federal governments business affairs but also cuts across all strata of the society.

c. Followership problems

Followership simply means to give support to somebody or something. For example, giving support to a leader or ideology. Nation building is not about leadership affairs but also a collective responsibility for sun and sundry. From labourer, messenger, hawkers, beggars, roadside mechanic named all are part of the process of leadership and political making of their own affairs. Above all, followers are expected to possessed some qualities such as absolute loyalty to the leadership. That he/she must be discipline enough and must be punctual and perform his/her duties with interest. Followers are not expected to support corrupt leaders, but rather to shun away from any act of corrupt practice. In no amount, at what so ever, followers are required to show loyalty, solidarity and allegiance to the constituted authority. These qualities are lacking to some extend among citizens in Nigeria.

d. Code of Conduct for Public Officers

For any effective nation building there must be regulation of morale principles. This refers to a set of moral principles or rules and regulations which publics officers are expected to follow. The constitution of Nigeria clearly outlines this code of conduct and a Bureau or a tribunal is given the responsibility of implementing them. Moreover, codes of conduct for Nigeria public officer are as follows: A public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest conflict his duties and responsibilities. He/she should not pay emolument (salary) more than one public office or engages in any private business or lives above his legitimate income. Members of the constituted authority shall not maintain or operate bank accounts in any country outside Nigeria. Members of the constituted authority shall not during their tenure

in office, acquire or taken any property of the state under their case sell such property, or exchange it with any property belonging to them. A pensioner should not receive any other remuneration from public funds in addition to his pension.

e. National ethics problems

For any nation to progress effectively, there should be ethical behaviour inculcate to every citizen for good moral conduct so that the nation will achieve sustainability at large. The word ethic has been defined in different ways, ordinary the word refers to a system or code of moral principle or rules of behaviours by which people live. Philosophically is a field of study which deals with moral principles particulars concerned with the question such as how men ought to have medical ethics, traders' ethic, religion ethic etc, each referring to a code which regulates and guide the people in that profession or belief. For instance, teachers' ethic refers to the code and guideline which defined the behaviour of teachers. National ethics therefore, is code or regulations that government guide behaviour of citizens in the country. National ethics usually originated from everyday life of people. Of course, it is internalized in any society through the socialization process whose main agents are family educational institutions, religious institutions, peer groups, and mass media. This is what Nigeria lack in term of national ethics. Every profession contributes his own quarter towards national challenges. The school teacher, lecturers, civil servant, medical practitioners, lawyer, religious leaders, community leaders have element of corrupt practices in one way or the other (Shehu H. &., 2020).

f. Challenges of insecurity in Nigeria

i. Political violence

Political violence has been examined considerable forces against person or things, a use of force Prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, personal or system of government, and hence also directed to changes in the existence of individuals in the Society perhaps other Society (Honderich, 1989). Politics in the current civil dispensation since the Previous Republic have displayed politics of anxiety which has played down on dialogue, negation and consensus. The ideal situation is as a result of perceived or real loss of power by an elite

stratum. Put different, the quest for political power is among those elites won it before, those that lost it and those who want it back (Eme, 2011). It has become obvious that, politicians had strategized themselves in order to control and retention of power in past elections. This is because, inter and intra-political party squabbles have become rife in which politician are deploying large resources to out-do-each other, changing the rules and legislations of the Political game, distort laws and employing violence and political assassination to settle political scores.

ii. Persistence of Sectarian Uprising and Ethno-Religious Conflict

An ethnic and religious affiliation has been examined a major source of insecurity in Nigeria. The socio- Political history of Nigeria is filled with inter-ethnic's rivalries and religious parochialism and bigotry. This problem is more pronounced among the ethnics' tribes the Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa-Fulani, and among the devotees of the predominant religious: Islam and Christianity (Gabriel, 2009; Alozie, 2018). This ethno-religious conflict exists when there were social relations between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi ethnic and multi-religious society as such, is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontations to settle grievances (Omede, 2011). Without controversy, the current spate of ethno-religious conflicts was born by the British Colonial government throughout its policy of divide and rule (Gabriel, 2009). This is because British government were severally accused on showing interest on one group then another. This highly situation of ethnic and religious violence which engulfed Nigeria since returned to civil rule in 1999 confronted with ample lineage for multiplicity of ethno-religious conflicts. Indeed, there have been many cases of violent ethnic conflict like the Tiv-Jukun, Chamba Kutep-Jukun, and other ethno- religious conflict include the Tingo-wudugus (1989), Tafawa Balewa (1991 and 1995), Zangon Kataf 1992), Jos (2001, 2004, 2007, 2010-2012), Kano and Kaduna (a number of times), some of the issues in contention include indigene/Settler dichotomy in reference to Jos and Kaduna (Suleiman, 2008). The 21st

century Nigeria has continued to witness rising and persistent cases of ethnic militia and sectarian groups across the geo-political zones in Nigeria.

ii. **Economic base violence**

In a popular view, this notion is also referred as “Political economic of violence. “This Proposition is behind the ideal of cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and advocate. The Niger Delta Conflict which started in the 1990’s and gradually escalated into a multidimensional resistance in 2005 to 2014 and since has got environmental political, economic, developmental and even strategic dimensions. The new dimension saw huge destruction of oil installations, kidnapping of foreign (and later) indigenous oil workers disruption of oil production and illegal oil trade or bunkering. As a country that depends on crude oil earnings as a major source of foreign exchange, disruption of oil production resulted in huge national budgetary deficits (Mevayerore, 2020; Declan, 2011; Imobighe, 2002). The grievances of the Niger Delta Communities have given expression to different shades of youth restiveness and violent protest. Considering the fact that there were intra-ethnic factors in most cases, but the oil companies are at the centre stage of youth restiveness. Most of the communities have come to realize that the only way to extract settlement from Multinational Corporation by engaging them in running battles (Orji 2012). It is beyond doubt that, the security situation in nascent democracy in Nigeria has been deteriorated since 2010.

The Challenge of Peacebuilding in Nigeria

a. Post-Civil War Era

Nigeria since independence, previous government has made some concerted efforts aimed at peace-building. Some of these efforts came after the civil war which understandably was an ample time to engineer peace-building to enhance proper integration and rehabilitation of the warring elements. Among the efforts are: the institution of the policy of ‘No Victor, No Vanquished’ so as to established *win-win* mechanism. The ‘no victor’, no vanquished’ policy which gave rise of Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation was initiated to

demobilize the Biafrans and reintegrate them into the national life. While the objectives of this policy were laudable, actual implementation was deceitful. However, the policy remained a peace-building effort in Nigeria whether or not it yielded meaningful result(s).

National Conferences and Panels

In order to find peaceful coexistence in the country, the previous governments have constituted panels like Oputa panel during Obasanjo Regime. The aim of the panel is to heal wounds and to make national reconciliation. Another one was during the Goodluck Jonathan as well as during the Abdulsalami Abubakar. But equally importantly, the convocation of national political reform conferences over the years in Nigeria has remained an attempt at peacebuilding, these conferences were often mandated to draw the way forward for Nigeria but each time, failures have continued to be recorded; either as a result of the character of the delegates or the convocation and selection processes of members. And where the delegates succeeded at reaching a genuine and feasible conclusion, their recommendations are often not binding and are therefore confined to the dustbin of history (Mevayerore, 2020).

b. The Amnesty Programme for The Niger-Delta Militant

In order for government to holistically address the pending challenging of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region and to avert constant oil spillage, therefore, on assumption of office in May 2007, former Nigeria's President Umaru Musa Yar'adua included the Niger-Delta as part of his administration seven-point agenda. The government set up the Niger-Delta Technical Committee, which was mandated to collate and review all previous reports and recommendations on ways of resolving the conflict. Consequently, "all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger-Delta" were to surrender and hand over "all equipment, weapons, arms and ammunition" including "execution of the renunciation of Militancy Forms specified in the schedule." The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process were followed by a monthly stipend for the ex-militants (Oscar, 2016). There is ongoing cleaning Ogoni-Land by

current administration of president Buhari and the progress of the has so far reach sixty percentage. The work received accoladed support from the region and has douse the tension.

c. Amnesty for Boko-Haram Repentance and Bandits

Since 2016, the Nigerian government has also operated Operation Safe Corridor, a small intergovernmental programme aimed at rehabilitating low-risk, “repentant” Boko Haram fighters. This program is currently the only sanctioned mechanism for combatants to exit the group. Men who are deemed eligible undergo several weeks of religious reeducation, psychosocial support, and vocational training at a military-run facility in Gombe State. In Maiduguri, the government has also set up a rehabilitation center for low-risk women, children, and elderly individuals associated with Boko Haram including both former Boko Haram members. Individual and group at all level have become negotiator, mediator as in the case of Banditry activities in Northwest Nigeria. Sheikh Gumi is among religious negotiator who for several occasions mediate and negotiate with various groups of Bandits in the country for them to surrender and embrace peace for the sake of humanity. At the various degree Niger, Zamfara and Sokoto states also conducted similar approach for peace to rain. Although a light success has been achieved so far.

Conclusion

Nationalism is a patriotic feeling and it should be built, inculcate in our spirit and soul. Nation building is a collective responsibility and requires solidarity from all perspectives. The fact that, communal service which is the need for mutual coexistence with other members of society including one’s brother’s keeper, respect for norm, law and orders. Effective nation building understanding awareness on various diversity and share common feeling with others and respect their feeling. Without knowing its history, a people cannot move forward. It is therefore necessary for the history of the country to be given much emphasis at our educational institutions, not just that but also should be subject of discussion in our homes for young shall growth. This should be coupled with the intensification of national integration to enhance spirit of patriotism, tolerance, social justice and coexistence among Nigerians.

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CHAPTER SIX

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS OF RESOURCES AND ITS LINKAGES TO ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

Anthony Ikhide OSAWE, PhD*

INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics studies the common relation between geography, power, politics, and reactions caused by their combination (Hafeznia, 1385 [2006 A.D.]). Put differently, it comprises a field of political geography addressing the shared relation between geography and politics in connection with power (Hafeznia and Kaviani Rad, 1393 [2014 A.D.]). Geopolitical research can yield valuable results on global, regional, national and local scales. Conflict arises from a disagreement on essential interests from micro to macro scales and from personal to state levels, and is developed due to continuation and unsettlement, resulting in causalities and economic damages. It also refers to any disagreement with any degree of severity, namely war (Tabar, Hafeznia, Safavi and Azami, 2021).

Subsequent events in Nigeria 'have been disappointingly bloody, but do not alter the basis of the argument. This is the idea that relations between different ethnic, religious and socioeconomic group cannot be managed separately from, and by different external criteria to, those which prevail in the supposed regions. Geopolitical analysis shows that political behaviour in the region is driven by intentions expressed in socio-economic, culture and religion. Actors are motivated by interests in 'Globalisation' and exploitative western or regime stability, not by conflicts. This is not to utter the truism that the only real peace will be a 'comprehensive peace'. Indeed solution.

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'Separate peace' and: comprehensive peace' are equally and mutually unintelligible. Peace can be defined only by fundamental values. Stability is a precondition for peace only if informed by such values. Hence, new norms and strategies are necessary, which must commence with the self-images of peoples and their leaders. Regions are part of an international system, with potential to destabilise which therefore, require strategies for stability and peace that ought to be shaped accordingly.

This chapter majorly deals with conflicts that often characterise the exploitation of natural resources, religion and politics. The focus is on the poor victims, mainly rural, people and their great efforts to maintain access to the resources on which they depend for a living, such as land, agriculture, water, fisheries and minerals. It is about the dilemmas that prevail and the ways in which people cooperate to resolve them, for better or worse. While poverty remains a universal phenomenon, not limited to specific parts of the world (CIESIN 2006), it is an important feature of the region known as the Global South, which are mostly located in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and a large part of their populations live in rural areas and is engaged in the primary sector of production. That is to say, their livelihood depends directly on the natural environment.

The effects of human development on the natural environment have been analysed globally in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005). The report points to the human dependence on manifold ecosystem services. The present volume concentrates on a particular kind of services, known as provisioning: services that provide people with goods essential for their livelihoods. The MEA notes that many of these services are degrading globally and therefore becoming increasingly scarce. This not only puts pressure on present but also on future generations and their opportunities for wellbeing.

Bennabi (2005) notes that the religious idea contributed deeply to raising societies and civilizations across history as religions had been used sensibly by politicians to serve their interests by playing on the arpeggio of the religious passion of adherents. Efforts by governments and sections of society to harness the social power of religion in world politics

are nothing new. As rightly observed by Mandaville and Hamid (2018) they note that religion continued to function as part of the backdrop of Cold War geopolitics.

To determining a fixed configuration of Nigeria socio-political classification would have very little shelf life. The overlapping subdivisions do not lend themselves to easy categorization. Political, Ethnic, Sectarian, Economic classes; the list can stretch easily. The up-and-coming picture is not stable either. A mere touch produces a constantly changing new configuration. Where a single actor assumes and acts out multiple identities at the same time. To pin a particular identity on an actor and then following him around the socio-political setting would be a difficult scholarly venture. Through this maze therefore, one is forced to pick and choose a configuration for analysis; analysis which could help explain the forces pulling at the socio-political fabric to different directions.

Geographical factors can indeed cause tensions in internal relations between countries in the form of a hypothetical landlocked country with no access to open water, called “The Hypothetica”. In this model, Haggett mentions twelve geographic factors causing tension in relations between countries (Haggett, 2001). Referring to the phrase “Geopolitical Friction” Collins (1998) introduces the five factors of conflict, namely friction over territorial limits, strategic friction, economic friction, cultural friction, and environmental friction (Collins, 1998). Without doubt, these factors are replete with in Nigeria and cause severe conflicts when mixed with other internal dynamics that play out in internal ethnic relations. It is thus necessary to investigate these factors to determine how they are linked with internal Geopolitical considerations.

Natural Resources and Conflict

The last two decades have seen a rise in debates about the connection between natural resources, conflict and peace-building in the fields of conflict studies, development studies, political science, political ecology/geography, environment and climate change. In the late 1990s, the nexus between natural resources and conflict centred on the issue of resource scarcity, and was three-fold: a neo-Malthusian approach linking resource scarcity directly with

social breakdown and conflict; a neoclassical economist approach focusing on institutions and innovation to conserve natural resources and thus preventing conflict; and a distributionist approach that highlights the maldistribution of resources and wealth as key factors for conflict, such as the ownership of oil wells, the use of revenue that accrue from the oil resource external of the area of extraction and that perceives conflict and poverty as causes of resource depletion rather than consequences (Homer-Dixon 1995; 1999). Contrary to the focus on resource scarcity, the idea of resource abundance as a conflict factor emerged in the form of the so-called ‘resource curse’ – a concept that evolved from an economic interpretation connecting negative economic growth with natural resource wealth (Auty 1993; 1995) and extending it towards an idea that approaches resource abundance and dependency as central factors to the economics of conflict and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 1999)

Drawing largely on the experiences from Nigeria and the of Sahelian and West Africa states as well as work by scholars who have studied a wider set of cases and identified relevant mechanisms (notably, Le Billon 2001, Snyder 2002, Ross 2002, 2003, 2004a) there are series of mechanisms that may link natural resources to conflict onset and conflict duration. Reasonably, natural resource financing prolongs wars by enabling rebel groups to keep fighting. The more general statement is Napoleon’s: an army marches on its belly. In terms of military feasibility, it might not matter much whether what’s in the belly comes from trade in natural resources, local abundance of food supplies, extortion, subscriptions, overseas aid or production by the troops. In any case the marginal effect of local natural resource endowments may be to increase duration.

The duration of the conflict in Angola was in part due to the fact that both sides had access to natural resource that provided financing support to the combatants. Transversely, among the Sahelian states, there is evidence for the idea. The wars in Senegal and Sudan were long in duration due to the direct benefit rebel groups deriving from the resources (in both commodities and non-traded foodstuffs) around them. On the other hand, conflicts in Niger and Mali have been more difficult to sustain because the regions occupied by insurgents in

these countries have not been wealthy enough to support a protracted struggle (Humphreys, 2005).

The earlier positions, however, no longer dominate the debate. The present position is the recognition that natural resource degradation and scarcity may play a role in the rise of conflicts, but that conflicts can rarely be characterised as purely resource-driven. Where tensions about access and use of natural resources do exist, these depend on a variety of factors – the outcomes of which may sometimes cascade from tension into violent conflict, but certainly not always: they may also lead to cooperative solutions (Noorduyn 2005) as was the case with the Nigerian Niger Delta Situation through the amnesty programme. More often than not, natural resource degradation is a result of conflict rather than a cause.

Religion

Nigeria today, remains the most populous nation in Africa and the most populous black nation in the world. With her population of about 200 million people, and a population forecast of 401.30 million people by the end of 2050, Nigeria is set to become the third most populated country in the world, after India and China (UN, 2019). Besides these population figures, Nigeria is also a multi-cultural nation of diverse ethnic groups and religious practices. Although on the surface, it appears that Nigeria is ethnically and religiously cohesive, but deep down, it is a nation that is grossly divided along ethnic and religious lines, due to several reasons.

There are no accurate data to adequately validate the number of ethnic groups that makes up Nigeria. The figures there today at best, from certain research efforts pegged the numbers at over 250 ethnic groups (Ogunkuade, 2020). However, there is a common knowledge that these ethnic groups are broadly spread among the Hausa, Fulani of the North, the Yoruba speaking people of the Southwest, and the Igbo of the Southeast (Mustapha, 2000). Code named “WaZoBia”. The minority ethnic groups on the other hand, are people of different ethnic backgrounds found in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria (Galadima, 2010). The diversity of religion and ethnicity in Nigeria, coupled with the “complex web of politically

salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability” qualifies Nigeria as one of the “most deeply divided states in Africa” (Blanco-Mancilla, 2002). Okpanachi (2009) notes that the religious demography in Nigeria is evenly divided between Christians and Muslims with the latter are having a slight edge in terms of numbers and political representation. Muslims constitute 50.5 percent of the population while Christians constitute 48.2 percent of the total population. Other animistic religious groups make up the residual 1.4 percent. In the daily affairs of Nigerians, religion takes pre-eminence. It is therefore, barely surprising that in February 2004, Nigerians were ranked “the most religious people in the world with 90 percent of the population believing in God, praying regularly and affirming their readiness to die on behalf of their belief” (Adoba, 2004).

One major existential problem in Nigeria, both in the past and present, is entrenched on how to adequately reduce or minimize the agitations of all her ethnic groups and make sure each group is adequately represented in the scheme of things. At the bottom of the nation's challenges is the problem of national integration. National integration is defined as "the awareness of a common identity amongst the citizens of a country" (Akah, 2018). The bane of Nigeria's progress and development today no doubt, can be linked to lack of cooperation and oneness among its numerous ethnic groups. What seems to pervade the Nigeria space is the problem of marginalization; ethnic rivalries, practice of nepotism, failed social contract, corruption and inordinate ambition.

Nigeria unlike the USA and Switzerland who bargained to come together was forced nationhood. Even after more than six decades of its independence, Nigeria has not got it right in terms of national cohesion and integration; socio-economic as well as political development. Nigeria continues to remain a ‘devolutionary federations’ established by British imperialism to ‘hold together’ the diverse ethnicities and nationalities that had been forcibly and arbitrarily incorporated into a one-time Federation but tacitly, through military coup turned into a Unitary State.

The need for peace-building in Nigeria could further be understood by the astounding disclosure made by Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto, and Northern Nigeria while delivering a lecture at Harvard University in the United State of America. According to him, many people consider Nigeria as a theatre of absurd conflicts and interminable crises...with the Jos crises festering for years, with post-election violence and suicide –bombings; it is difficult to think otherwise. When we consider Nigeria's population of 150 million, half the population of West Africa, it's over 250 ethnic and language groups, its regional and geo-political configurations, its landmass and its diversity in religion and culture; we may be constrained to reach a different conclusion (Abubakar, 2011).

The political leadership in Nigeria has failed over time at incorporating the diverse nature of Nigeria's ethnic and religious groups into national consciousness, and this has had some negative effect. The conflicts in Nigeria are deliberately created. Nigeria is recognized as a secular State with a State religion. But however, the controversial 1999 constitution has deliberately mentioned Islam and Koran and other Islamic related matters without considering the interest of other religion, thereby bringing the fragmented vast Nigeria population of Christians and Moslems into conflict. The Christian side of the Nigerian religious group is seen in five main groups: Roman Catholic, Mainstream Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and syncretistic groups that blend Christianity with indigenous religions. The Muslim side is evidenced in the Sufi brotherhoods, comprising the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya1 (Paden, 2015). Nigeria's traditional religion, which had been in existence long before the advent of Islam and Christianity, forms the third leg of the major religious tripod in the country. It has however taken a back seat since colonization and aggressive westernization of the country.

In Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the formal introduction and implementation of the criminal aspects of the Muslim sharia legal code in some states in the northern part of Nigeria, in October 1999 sparked off conflict. The northern Muslim political and religious leaders established the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN) to further promote sharia to other parts of the nation. The Christian groups in the southern and Middle Belt of the country

reacted against this. The Christians alleged that the step was a calculated attempt by the Muslim, and the northern agenda to Islamize the nation. Ahmed Sani Yerima who was then a Governor of Zamfara State was reputed to have first introduced and applied the sharia code into Zamfara State as means of adjudging and adjudicates the law. His decision was applauded and supported by the local population most of who were Muslim adherents. The introduction of sharia generated tension and mutual mistrust with a further division of the nation along the Muslim-Christian pole (Adegbami, 2020). Similar to the above is the presence of other variations of local Muslim groups or sects in Nigeria which include Sunni, Shia, Ahmadiyya, Salafi, Sufi, as well as Boko Haram extremists. These different sects have always had different arguments that have resulted to serious conflict.

Many protagonists of religion today hold the view that religion is what connects humanity to its creator. The protagonists further argued that religion is mans' believe and relationship with God. It is opined that religion remains one subject area difficult to argue, including attempts at its definition and conceptualization (Neo, 2018). Making religion a tool in pursuit of political struggle and geopolitical competition has led to the spread of all kinds of extremism, to the further polarization of local conflicts in countries like Syria, Yemen and in Nigeria eventually has put in jeopardy the very existence and future of religious minorities. To sum up, this report sheds light on the three main dynamics that are reshaping the relations between religion and politics in the region today: first, the pluralization of forms of religiosity that has created a diversification within the religious sphere and a resultant need to renegotiate state–religion relations. Second, the transformation of the landscape of political Islam that has been represented by different trajectories taken by Islamist movements, balancing between moderation and radicalization in the case of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements, political participation and apolitical positioning in the case of Salafists and global versus local in the case of the jihadi movements. And last, the impact of the geopolitical landscape on reshaping the relations between religion and politics within the second branch of Islam, Shiism, and within the Christian communities that represent the most important minority in

Muslim-majority societies, as well as within the Jewish-majority society in the region, Israel, as major prospects for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Ethno-religious and Political Conflicts

In Nigeria, the diverse ethnic groups do not have an impossible to tell apart class composition. Nor do they have an equal or even relative representation in the higher echelons of military and bureaucracy. Consequently, the venous elements of Nigerian's ruling class have a disproportionate representation of the various ethnic groups in our society. This situation represents a case, not of cross cutting cleavages, but of overlapping of class and ethnicity to a large extent.

Ethnicity and the conflicts defined by it are not for the self-denying. The birth attitude 'associated with it makes it particularly unpalatable to some. To the considerable extent that ethnic ties reflect the birth principle, they fall within the cartilage of those disagreeable phenomena disfavored by our ideals and therefore capable of securing only the reluctant attention reserved for distasteful subjects. (Horowitz 1985)

It is interesting to note the communists, the socialists, (and the Americans) dislike the idea alike. Only a grudging attention is paid to it after it is no longer ignorable. Those who study and theorize about ethno-political conflicts almost enjoy this unease of those who do not (or who will not). If the social scientist is him/her self from an ethnic minority, the label of parochialism 'is swift to follow in a country not much used to open discussions on sensitive subjects. Too often scholars associated with a particular school try to fit these conflicts into their favourite paradigms; Ethno-political conflict was often treated as if it were a manifestation of something else: the persistence of traditionalism, the stresses of modernization, or class conflict masquerading in the guise of ethnic identity. (Horowitz 1985)

This reluctance has left us with many shortcomings in our understanding of ethno-political conflict. Horowitz (1985) thinks it is also due to the episodic character of these conflicts. Its sudden coming and going shatters the periods of tranquillity and since the scholarship is reactive, the spilling of ink awaits the spilling of blood. Ethnic conflict is, of

course a recurrent phenomenon. Horowitz (1985) gives a bird eye view of the ethnopolitical conflicts in different parts of the world.

A number of countries have passed through this trauma, Pakistan, Rwanda, Aceh, East Timor, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Burma, Kosovo, Kashmir, Somalia, Balochistan and Nigeria have something in common; ethnopolitical conflict. Gurr notes that only 27 of the 233 communal groups in his study have no record of political organization, protest, rebellion or intercommunal conflict since 1945 (Gurr 1993).

The international situation also plays a role in the emergence and then hibernation of these phenomena. After the Second World War the decolonization brought new issues and contexts for the ethnopolitical struggles. It now became more a question of possession of the state as against that of self-movements tried to copy from each other. The anti-colonial movements had created an appearance of unity that was slow to dissipate even after independence was won. Yet in a large number of ex-colonial states, the successful achievement of independence from colonial yoke was swiftly followed by ethnic conflict. It is not unusual to find routine administrative issues assume defining roles in ethnopolitics and result in protracted conflicts in these countries and region.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Researchers within the field of conflict have always had debates on the primacy of factors that help explain conflict. Different groups hold their views and the group that advocates of 'motivational' factors hold that it is the gap between expectations and achievements that motivates parties to enter into conflict. On the other hand, the proponents of the political process model of conflict stress the primacy of power resources in the explanation of conflict (Korpi 1974) noted that it is the gaps in expectations and achievements and their impact on generating grievances that then lead to conflict.

Here and there, the link between grievances and conflict is now well researched and established. However, Gurr's (1997) did a classification of group grievances into those related to political autonomy, those related to political rights other than autonomy, economic rights

and social and cultural rights. These four dimensions of grievance were then correlated, by Gurr(1997), to indicators of cultural differences and political and economic disadvantages that grievances are a result of perceptions, perceptions of unjust treatment, of artificial barriers to better life conditions or a renegeing on a contract which had created rights in favour of the aggrieved. Parties enter social contracts by assuming some responsibilities and giving away some rights. All this is done in the rational expectation that there would be a corresponding quid pro quo. A weakening or a failure of these contracts means the non-fulfillment of the promises made to some parties. This gives rise to perceptions of unjust treatment and resultantly grievances (Abdulallah, 2010). The mechanisms of these perceptions are three theoretical responses found in the conflict studies literature. The Relative Deprivation (RD) approach, the Social Exclusion (SE) approach and the more recent Horizontal Inequalities (HI) approach.

This chapter briefly discusses the comparative merits of using one of these frameworks and then apply the same to the of ethno-political conflict in Nigeria. The three concepts of RD, SE and HI will be followed by the application of the concept of Horizontal Inequality to ethno-political conflict in Nigeria and the reasons for choosing the HI approach. These regional disparities show different types of HIs in Nigeria. The grievances generated by these will be linked to the various issues in ethno-political conflict. The concept of Horizontal Inequalities (HI) is used for this analysis of grievances and their impact on ethno-political conflict; though this will not be taken up in isolation as the concept draws on the theoretical base provided by the other two concepts of Relative Deprivation (RD) and Social Exclusion (SE). These two concepts are necessary to delineate the way the concept of HI has borrowed and then built on them.

While sometimes used synonymously with relative deprivation, the concept of horizontal inequalities draws on both Relative Deprivation and Social Exclusion and is distinguishable by its application by analysts. This preference is informed by the ease with which it can be applied to readily available regional situation. We also observe that

theoretically, it contains the dimensions of RD and SE as all three are concerned with conditions in which groups get unequal treatment and lead them to conflict.

Root Causes of Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria

Isiani and Obi-Ani; Ona, Diara and Uroko amongst many others have argued that, the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 to become Nigeria, is the foundation of many of the country's problems. However, this notion is debatable because, there are other multi-cultural entities in the world today whose experiences as a nation of multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religion, have fostered social cohesion and unity, rather than incessant conflicts. Examples are the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Nigeria's case may be argued to be peculiar, simply because the colonial imperialist did not carry along the diverse ethnic groups before the creation of the Nigerian state. In other words, Nigerians at the time were not consulted as to whether they want to live together as one entity or whether each component at the time (North and South), would love to remain separate and individual entities.

There are as well the political undertones to some of these violent ethno-religious conflicts. On many occasions, politicians have been seen promoting their religious belief at the utmost level of the country's governance (Ogunkuade, 2020). At a huge cost, former Military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida led Nigeria to have joined the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1986 purely for political and not economic reasons. In 2001, Former President Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo who was the first democratically elected president of Nigeria when the nation returned to democratic rule in 1999-2007 after a protracted period of military rule. Noted that "as human beings, we will always have friction when we live together, but it should not lead to violence or the urge to take life" (Obasanjo 2001). This position was informed by the needless destruction of innocent lives and properties, which is deeply rooted in religion, ethnicity, politics and nepotism; is aggravated by few people who want to protect their own interests at the expense of the entire nation.

The recent upsurge in the clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers has been linked to environmental issues; the scourge of deforestation and desertification that is being associated with the North over the years and has pushed the Fulani herdsmen to migrate to the central and further south in search of pasture for their cattle. The failure on the part of the government to provide adequate grazing areas for the Fulani herders along the plateau, has over the years given rise to these incessant conflicts between the Fulani herdsmen and the indigenous farming communities along the central region (Abdulkadir, 2012), no longer hold but a is a political smoke screen aimed land grabbing in lie with the Fulani's agenda.

At the start of 2019 alone, Benue's State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) reported that there were more than 480,000 internally displaced persons in Benue State alone. An attempt by the government to force Ruga settlement initiative (the Fulani's word for 'human settlement') on locals without proper consultation with the people truncated the initiative. "You don't just come and put in place Ruga settlements without the stakeholders being involved," Emmanuel Shior, Head of SEMA remarked in one of his interviews. Much has been documented in literature about the role religion plays in many of these conflicts. The politicization of one's religion is a major factor in ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Ethno-Religious and Political Conflicts in Nigeria: The Linkages

At independence, Nigeria had a federal constitution and regional constitutions that delineated the roles of the central government and the regional government. The problem with Nigeria escalated in 1966 when some crop of military officers overthrew the government and with the counter-coup later, the suspension of the constitution and fundamental rights and the unjust imposition of martial law disregard of constitution and political ethics was the beginning of ethno-political conflicts. It had mostly to do with the fact that a single institution (military) was calling the shots and the others had to tow whatever line thrown at them, especially after the second coup. The regional autonomy was lost to suspension of the constitution and relegated to the fringes of political debate in the absence of freely functioning institutions of conflict management. The same institutional ethnopolitical conflict registered a marked

increase in intensity with the onset of democracy in 1999. Issues like the distribution of resources, political marginalization, ethnic and religious dominance, restructuring and need to revert to regional autonomy resurfaced. The country has continued to experience sore points from the lopsided state creation of the various Northern led military governments and the eventual imposition of a deliberately doctored 1999 constitution that given rise to ethno-politicians with no regard for the national interest.

Since 1980, different and more violent conflict has beset the North where the most recorded ethno-religious conflicts have taken place, from the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s, to the need to entrench Sharia in the North that started from Zamfara which remains one of the fundamental ideological elements of the current Boko Haram sect (Ogunkuade, 2020). Boko Haram rode on the crest of religion (Islamic fundamentalism), including Fulani herdsmen, the issue of marginalization, poverty, illiteracy and other vices known to have been the trigger for ethno-religious/ethno-political occasioned by radical militants pitted against the state and society. These conflicts have at every point draws its recruits from those motivated by a religious identity and using their ethnic identity as a tactic. The issues of bread and butter may not figure prominently in the debate but remain important. Similarly, the issues of history, geostrategic and external influence and the institutional structure and its weakness have its effect on these same conflicts.

Today, the failure of political elite to evolve a social contract was compounded by the military dictatorships which alienated a section of the country exacerbated the conflict over resources. In the absence of more robust institutions of conflict management, these conflicts are being amplified by the refusal of the ruling Northern cabals to agree but instead resort to the use of violence and intimidations to rebuff the agreements from a number of conferences and committees called and recommended the revert to a social contract which was entered into with hopes, fears, expectations and compromises at independence are fundamental to the Nigerian conflicts. The resulting conflict had ethnopolitical vibes with fiscal Federalism and Institutions being subjected to manipulations. When does a formal social contract or the

constitution become federal? William Riker's classic answer remains valid today; A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere. (Riker,1964). Federalism then is about the division of power between federal and regional governments (Wachendorfer-Schmidt and Wachendorfer, 2000) therefore there cannot be a single method for this division.

Federalism therefore comes in more than one flavor and gives rise to a variety of institutions depending upon the context and need. Jennings (2007) asks the question that given that good institutional arrangements result in low conflict, then why we do not see more constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. Linking it with reducing conflict, McGarry and O'Leary (2009) point out that in order to be successful, federations not only need to evolve institutions of self-rule but also those of shared rule 'an agreed regime for managing resources.

The nature of federation in Nigeria changed from that of coming together 'federation in 1960 to holding together 'federation in 1966. Such holding needed bonds which could only be supplied through the consociationalism means. Adeney (2009) argues that better representation of groups in the core institutions of state through consociationalism mechanisms would have alleviated many of the tensions and conflicts within Nigerian federation, whether or not it was a democracy. Her argument does not agree with Talbot (1998) and A. Khan (2005) who argue that since the absence of democracy necessarily meant the centralization of power, which has not changed in the Nigerian case of unitary in a federation even under a democratic institution and this has intensified ethnic tensions. Adeney's analysis questions this assumption, recognizing the argument that many of the conflicts took place after prolonged periods of autocratic rule. She then posits that the relationship between the nature of polity and ethnic conflict is more complicated than it is generally portrayed. Therefore, analyzing the two institutions of military and bureaucracy, it could be posited that the

proportionality (inclusiveness) element of consociational-ism has a direct relationship with the ethnic conflict in Nigeria.

Salawu (2010) defined ethno-religious conflict as a situation in which the relationship that exist between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural religious society like Nigeria, is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and which usually tends to lead to violent confrontation. The basis of social cohesion is trust which brings about peaceful coexistence, especially, in the Northern part of Nigeria is literally non-existent any more. Between 1976 and 2009 alone, over 100,000 people were reported to have lost their lives and property worth billions of Naira³² to more than fifty recorded ethno-religious conflicts in the Northern part of Nigeria (Eliagwu, 2004). Nearly all recorded ethno-religious conflicts have taken place in the North. The mere idea that the Northern Nigeria is predominantly Islam and their urge to entrench Sharia in the North is one of the fundamental ideological elements of the current Boko Haram sect.

Similarly, there was the Potiskum (1994, 2009) conflict, the Kaduna (Rigasa, 1982, 1992, 2000). Other ethno-religious conflicts include: the Moon-Eclipse conflict in Borno (1996); the Tiv conflict and others in Nassarawa (2001); the Jos (1994, 2000, 2001-2003, 2008, 2009, 2010) ethno-religious conflict; the Ikulu-Bajju (2001) conflict; the Yelwa-Shandam (2002, 2004) conflict, the Mangu-Bokkos (1992-1995) conflict, the Bukuru-Gyero (1997) conflict; the Maiduguri (2006, 2009) conflict, the Iggah-Oyikwa (2002) conflict; the Kano (2004) and Numan (2004) conflicts; the Azare (2001) conflict; the Bauchi (2010) conflict and finally on this note, the Wukari (2010) conflict.

All the above are a largely ethno-religious conflict that have taken place and as the paper is being put together, Kajuru Local Government Area of Kaduna State was attacked by armed Fulani-herdsmen. More than 22 people were said to have lost their lives in that attack³⁹. At almost the same time, Gonar Rogo community was also attacked by another set of Fulani herdsmen militia. This attack is one of many that have befallen Southern Kaduna, a

predominantly Christian part of Kaduna state in recent times where dozens of persons have been reportedly killed, is snowballing across the country and certain group are taking responsibilities for the killing but with no one being prosecuted for such crimes against humanity.

Conclusion

The country's peace and conflict resolution rest squarely on three fundamental problems identified as socio-economic factors (unemployment, inequality, corruption, poverty, lack of access to basic needs of life); socio-cultural factors (Nigeria being a heterogeneous society and the undue amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates without proper consultation with the people as to whether they will remain an homogenous unit) and political factors (the use of religion and ethnic divides by the political elites for political gains), and environmental factors (grazing land and grazing routes) as drivers of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria.

So, internal geopolitics of resources, religion and ethno-political conflicts in Nigeria arose as a result of a faulty constitution that have been imposed on the rest of the country by a select few and their bluntly refusal to listen to the call to revert to the negotiated and agreed social contract entered into at independence remains basis for the Nigerian conflicts. When this is addressed, it will douse a number of tensions across the land and can as well address the issue of better management of the various extraction processes and better usage of resource revenues that are controlled by states.

Religion reinforces ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. This can be adjudged from Maitasines riots to Sharia law enactment in some Northern States, Boko Haram with other insurgency group that are in association with them, the Fulani herdsmen and with their wanton killings. All these are tacitly supported by the weak State apparatus which through their inactions have given tacit approval their operations. It is time for the government and religious leaders to look inward and address the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in the Northern part of country. The leadership of this country need to abhor deceit, lies, the canker of untruth,

and imbibe honesty, commitment to come out of their shell, peek at the beautiful kaleidoscope and understand that diversity of ethnicities, languages, nationalities and races is a gift, not to be feared but to be celebrated.

It is time for the government and religious leaders to look inward and address the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in the Northern part of Nigeria. If there are parts of the Holy Book (Quran) breeding Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic leaders –with support from the government –have the right to educate people by putting the texts in the right context. Nigeria will continue remain a religious diverse and multiethnic society. However, there are significant roles that state and civil society groups must play in order to care for Nigeria's diversity and thereby promote a religious harmony in the society. Government needs to make laws or perhaps enforce the existing ones that would make public institutions more religiously harmonised and tolerant.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

MILITANT ETHNIC NATIONALISM: ITS RATIONALE AND IMPACT FOR POST-AMNESTY PEACE IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA

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INTRODUCTION

The security situation in the Niger Delta has remained tense and fragile since the late 1990s when ethnic militias emerged on the scene as major stake-holders in the oil related agitations and conflicts that have pitched the Nigerian state and the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) on one hand against the Niger Delta communities on the other hand. It should be recalled that due to what Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010: 5) referred to as “pervasive underdevelopment occasioned by blatant environmental pollution and despoliation, political marginalization and outright neglect by the Nigerian state and the MNOCs”, oil related agitations commenced in the region in 1966 in an attempt to compel the state and MNOCs to remedy the injustices meted to the Niger Deltans since the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri in 1956.

Unfortunately, successive Nigerian governments in collaboration with the MNOCs, have been unable to handle the crisis with tact and diplomacy. Rather, the Federal Government of Nigeria has made series of failed attempts to militarily repress and crush legitimate protests of the Niger Delta peoples to dissuade them from constituting a hindrance to the continuous flow of its rents from oil exploration, exploitation and appropriation (Epelle (2005:17). The outrageous and obnoxious futile exploits of the numerous special police/military units deployed by government for the invasion, occupation, harassment, torment, suppression and outright destruction of some Niger Delta communities over the years are well documented in

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the literature (Onyeagucha, 1997: 6; Epelle, 2004:170; Ikelegbe, 2005; ICG, 2006: 6-7; Folarin, 2007: 38-54).

It was probably in reaction to the persistent repressive militarization of the Delta region, and the need to elevate the plight of the delta minorities to a prime position in both internal and international discourse that several ethnic militia and armed non-state youth organizations emerged in the Niger Delta region after the gruesome murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the leadership of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP) by the Sanni Abacha military junta on 10 November, 1995. The list of Niger Delta militant groups is endless but the most important groups include: the Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities (FNDIC), the Membutu Boys, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), the Martyrs Brigade, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Ojakorotu and Gilbert, 2010: 6).The security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2005 as the various armed militant groups are willing to kill as part of their campaign for a greater share of the region's oil wealth. (Ibeanu and Luckham 2006; Ejibunu, 2007: 9; Joab-Peterside, 2007:2). Niger Delta militia groups have employed two major methods of agitations to achieve their objectives. These are illegal oil bunkering activities and kidnapping and hostage taking.

This chapter would have been unnecessary if the relative peace the Amnesty programme brought that the Musa Y'adua led government have not been threatened by militancy in the Niger Delta. One of such was the new pipeline surveillance contract given by the NNPC to Chief Government Ekpemupolo (a.k.a Tompolo, the former commander of the defunct Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Some Ijaw youths are agitating for a slice of the cake (Nwakamma, 2022: Amaize, 2022). This therefore means that discuss on militancy in the Niger Delta will continue to be in the front burners for Nigeria's national peace and cohesion.

Origin, Aims and Objectives of Ethnic Militia Groups in the Niger Delta Region

According to Ikelegbe (2006: 104-109), the Niger Delta struggle for environmental, social and political equity and justice started before independence as an agitation for special developmental attention because of the unique ecological challenges in the region and minority agitation for special protection and development guarantees. The agitation in part resulted in the establishment of the Willinks Commission of 1958. Its recommendation led to the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) in 1962.

In 1966, Isaac Adaka Boro from Kaiama town in present Bayelsa State successfully established the first ethnic militia in the Niger Delta, the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS). Boro engaged the armed forces of Nigeria in bloody guerilla battles and declared the Ijaw-speaking areas of Nigeria's then 'Eastern Region' an independent 'Niger Delta Republic' on 23 February 1966 (Agbese, 1990:31; Boro, 1982; Joab-Peterside,2007:3; Tebekaemi,1982:12; Nwajiaku,2005). Isaac Adaka Boro and his two associates, Sam Owonaro and Nottingham Dick were later convicted for treason but later granted amnesty by the military government of Yakubu Gowon (Okonta, 2006).

In 1995, after a seemingly kangaroo trial between 1994 and 1995, nine leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) including its leader, Ken Saro Wiwa were hanged. This terrible repression of the Ogoni indeed radicalized and intensified the struggle as it led to a massive mobilization of the communities and people by communal, ethnic, pan-ethnic and regional groups, the activism and concern of civil, human and environmental rights groups and the political class, youth militancy and ethnic militias, massive disruptions of oil production and violent confrontations (Ikelegbe, 2001). This brings us to the latest dimension in the Niger Delta conflict dynamics which is the emergence of ethnic militias (Langer and Ukiwo,2009:4).

Aims and objectives of ethnic militia groups in the Niger Delta

It is apt to note that the Niger Delta militias pursue diverse goals aimed at restructuring of the Nigerian state and it's federalism in such ways that guarantee a broad based development

programme to transform the region; a political autonomy that guarantees political participation, representation and community participation in resource management; implementation of a minimum of 50% derivation formula; a halt to the development of new oil and gas pending the complete clean-up of the environment (Oderemi 2007: 15 ;Ikelegbe,2006:96); and the achievement of self-determination and resource control to be addressed through a sovereign National Conference of ethnic nationalities.

Besides these altruistic goals such as resource control and true federalism, development, equitable, fair and just treatment and respect for the collective rights of the ethnic groups, the pursuit of selfish interests and individual aggrandizement have also been suggested by Osaghae et. al. (2007:51). According to them, ethnic militias in the Niger Delta could be categorized into three based on the genuine nature of their motives. There are the genuine militias which pursue the pure objectives of the Niger Delta struggle. There are those that combine regional objectives and selfish struggles while there are those that pursue selfish interests and survival and take the struggle as the struggle for livelihood. They insinuated further that the latter two groups are said to have “derailed, by “kidnapping to make money”, pirating and creating havoc in the water ways, and bunkering oil”. It was further observed that even the genuine militias may digress from time to time to meet economic and arms needs of the struggle (Osaghae et. al., 2007:51).

Factors that Promoted Ethnic Militancy

A number of interconnected factors have led to the emergence and growth of militant ethnic nationalism in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria since the 1990's. Some of these factors are discussed in this section.

State failure and collapse

Youth militias have emerged in the Niger Delta as a result of state failure and collapse in the country (Thomas, 2008:275-279). It is indeed a paradox that having all the oil that oils the wheels of the Nigerian economy, the Niger Delta is still looking helpless in the face of ramifying impoverishment. There is no significant infrastructural development. Youths have

revolted against this neglect. This probably aligns with the Lockean political philosophy of Social Contract in which he advocated a justification for government by consent and a right to revolution where the government fails. In his treatise, Locke had insisted on the citizens' right to resist tyrannical governments (Sabine and Thompson, 1973:483), for according to him, if government is established basically to protect and enhance the life, liberty and wellbeing of citizens, then any government that does not fulfil this obligation must be resisted. One may therefore support Epelle (2010:21) view that "the intransigent attitude of the OMNCs to genuine demands of their host communities and the complicity of the Nigerian state in the unwholesome practices of the oil producing giants ignited the restiveness in the youths".

Relative deprivation theory

Militant nationalism in the Niger Delta may also be explained by the relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation refers to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to those of similar groups and feel that they have fewer opportunities than their peers. It is a condition that is measured by comparing one group's situation to the situations of those who are more advantaged (Bayert, 1999). The concept of relative deprivation has important consequences for both behaviour and attitudes. Hence social scientists have cited 'relative deprivation' as a potential cause of social movements and deviance, leading to extreme situations of political violence such as rioting, terrorism and civil wars and crime (Gurr, 1970). This is where Runciman's study (1966) becomes very relevant to understanding the militant nature of the Niger Delta crisis.

Applying Runciman's 1966 model to the Nigerian scenario, it is apt to note that the peoples of Niger Delta lack basic amenities of life, are afflicted with hunger and poverty and die from preventable diseases while their land accounts for over 70% of Nigeria's GDP; they know other regions enjoy the basic good things of life and live a life of opulence; the Niger Delta peoples want to enjoy facilities that other regions of Nigeria enjoy consequent upon the Niger Delta's huge contributions to the GDP. The Niger Delta believes that obtaining the basic

good things of life is realistic. This may largely explain the increasingly militant demands of the Niger Delta peoples of Nigeria.

Frustration-Aggression Theory

This may also explain the militant and dimension of the Niger Delta crisis. The frustration-aggression theory states that aggression is caused by frustration. When someone is prevented from reaching his target, he becomes frustrated. This frustration then can turn into aggression when something triggers it (Berkowitz, 1980). Aggression is usually directed towards the cause of the frustration, but if this is not possible, the aggression may be displaced to another person or object. Applying this to the region of study, the Niger Deltans have for so long craved to enjoy the proceeds of the oil deposit in their lands. Unfortunately, what they get in return is pollution and environmental damage caused by the activities of oil companies. The frustrations emanating from the insensitivity of the state and oil companies eventually turned the region into a complex conflict- operating environment, characterized by intra and inter - ethnic conflict, conflict between the communities and the oil companies and conflict between armed groups and the oil companies and Nigerian security forces.

Perceived state violence and brutality in response to the plight and agitations of Niger Delta

It may be observed that the State's approach to security is dominated by the character of deterrence exhibited by unrestrained willingness to show maximum force at the slightest hint of insecurity (Douglas 2004). State response against these popular pressures assumed the forms of deployment of military forces that operate more like an army of occupation to demobilize the people, arrest, detain and prosecute activists on trump charges and execution in order to silence opposition voices. Unfortunately, military might dramatically escalated violence as militant groups emerge resorting to the use of arms ostensibly in self-defense provoking bloody clashes with federal troops deployed to contain violence. They have since resisted perceived state violence and brutality, giving militant muscle to their demand for resource control.

Human rights violations

Violation of the human rights of the local populace is another factor responsible for militancy in the Niger Delta region. Oil companies have largely been very unkind to the people of the region as the human rights of the people are constantly violated by security forces, at the behest of the companies. Perhaps, few examples of military and security activities carried out in the past might help to buttress this assertion. In an attempt to suppress the Isaac Boro rebellion in 1966; Nigerian troops terrorised entire communities, including raping of innocent women. In 1987, the Iko Community in Akwa Ibom State was extensively brutalized by a team of Nigerian Mobile Police Force, at the request of Shell (ICE Case Study).

In 1992, some youths were killed in Bonny during a peaceful demonstration against the activities of the oil company (Brisibe, 2001:5). In January 1993, the crisis over environmental pollution and economic marginalization from the oil industry reached its peak when 300,000 Ogoni protested against Shell Oil. This organized protest was followed by repeated harassment, arrests, and killing of Ogonis by the Federal government troops (International Herald Tribune). On January 11, 1999, Ijaw women who were engaged in a peaceful demonstration and marginalization of their people in Port Harcourt were violently tear-gassed, beaten, stripped, and detained by a combined team of policemen and soldiers. The people of the region viewed all these as assaults and marginalization because they belonged to minority ethnic groups in the Nigerian Federation.

Failure of non-violent methods to win concessions from government and oil companies

It should be recalled that initially, the people of the Niger Delta region demonstrated their resentment to the rapacious tendencies of the State, inadequacy of infrastructure, preponderance of unskilled youths, high unemployment and perception of past marginalization through non-violent methods that yielded little or no fruits. These earliest community protests according to Ukeje (2001:346) involved petitions and sending of community delegations to present complaints to MNOCs and to the State, and occasional demonstrations, boycotts and picketing of government and MNOCs locations.

Having failed to win concessions through peaceful means, the youths have been inexorably excited to militantly protest marginalization, unemployment, inequality, and development deficit as various militant groups have sprung up to undermine the activities of the oil companies using different methods and tactics, thereby daring the Nigerian state. This probably lends credence to John F. Kennedy's dictum that 'those who make peaceful revolution impossible, make violent revolution inevitable' (Nwonwu, 2010:106). In essence, one is tempted to agree with Akanji (2009:58) that it was ultimately the Nigerian state's failure to initiate constructive dialogue and measures that addressed the plight of the Niger Delta peoples that drove opposition groups to resort to militancy against an unresponsive government.

Zero-sum nature of Nigerian politics

A major factor that constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for youth restiveness in the Niger Delta is the zero-sum nature of Nigerian politics. The pattern of politics since independence in 1960 has remained essentially unchanged: intense contestation for power, brute force, electoral robbery, and winner-takes-all elections. In this bizarre struggle for political power, our leaders employ every available means to get into elective positions (Ake, 1985:10; 2000:61-62). Youths are employed as political thugs to maim, abduct, threaten and harass political opponents. They are also under instruction to kill recalcitrant and principled opponents and voters, rig elections and produce fake but facsimile election results. And to effectively do this, they are armed and trained on light and heavy weapons handling. Expectedly at the end of the elections, not all the weapons are returned to the politician's armoury; some find their ways into the streets where they are put to ex-post facto use by the youths.

The Greedy Rebels' mechanism

Another explanation for the emergence of ethnic militia groups in the Niger Delta region is what Ezirim (2011: 63) refers to as 'the greedy rebels' mechanism'. Here, the booty character of natural resources motivates rebels to take up arms and/or continue fighting. According to

him, this mechanism has three variants. In the first variant, domestic groups may engage in quasi-criminal activities to benefit from resources independent of the state as exemplified by piracy, oil bunkering and kidnappings going on in the Niger Delta region. In the second variant, natural resources increase the prize value of capturing the state. This refers to an attempt to weaken the State in order to make its capture possible. The third variant states that if natural resources are concentrated in a particular region of the country, it makes for the possibility of that region thinking it could secede from the rest of the country, and that it would be possible to withstand the pressure and become prosperous. This conforms to Richard's (1966) (cited in Ikelegbe, 2006:91) submission that the opportunity for illegal exploitation and quick enrichment were attractions for and conditioning environment for youth agitation and violence.

Impact of Ethnic Militia on Niger Delta Crisis

The activities of militant groups operating in the Niger Delta region have brought about some negative impacts on oil and economic activities, and on governance in general. Some of these discussed below.

Threat to sustainable democratic concepts of federalism that may dovetail into violent clamours for secession

According to Ikpat and Scott (2001), the most potentially devastating effect of conflict in the Niger Delta is arguably the threat to democratic concept of federalism that may dovetail into violent clamours for secession, if not handled properly. They submitted that as a result of conflicts in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria directly fits into a profile created by the US National Intelligence Council in *Global Trends 2015 Index (NIC 2000-02 document)* for Sub-Saharan Africa. The NIC argues that "as sub-Saharan Africa's multiple and interconnected problems are compounded, ethnic and communal tensions will intensify, periodically escalating into open conflicts, often spreading across borders and sometimes spawning secessionist states". The tripartite clamours for "true federalism", a "Sovereign National Conference" and "100% resource control" by most indigenes of the region represent a leading

precursor to realities of the NIC report and are borne by frustrations at failure to secure equity and lasting resolutions of regional conflict.

Vandalization of oil installations and facilities and the resultant dwindling oil production and revenue

The MNOCs operating joint ventures with the State have been severely hit as vandalism of oil facilities, objection to construction of new facilities, rig blockade, and shut down of facilities are regularly carried out. The crisis which began since December 2005 has at times forced oil production shutdowns of up to 800,000 barrels per day (ICG,2006). The campaign of the foremost militant group, MEND, has heightened tension in the area and is threatening to cripple Nigeria's crude oil export. In an attempt to paralyze the ability of the Nigerian state to export crude oil, MEND embarked on the strategic destruction of some of the petroleum facilities jointly owned by MNOCs and the Nigerian State with a high level of unprecedented regularity, precision and intensity (Gilbert, 2010:54). As Asuni (2009:1) has rightly asserted, "this conflict has cost the Nigerian government dearly. As much as one million barrels' worth of daily oil production has been shut in due to violence. This has severely reduced government revenue. The crisis is said to have cost the country an annual loss of 4.4 billion dollars (Yahoo News, 2006), implying a huge loss of earnings to the government. (Akinbobola, 2010:158).

Escalation of Inter and Intra Ethnic Contests for Oil Benefits

Inter-ethnic violence in the Niger Delta has become aggravated as a result of proliferation of ethnic militias in the region as communities clash over ownership of oil fields, farmlands and waterways (Efemini, 2004). In response, many communities develop collective responses to insecurity as wealthy and politically influential indigenes invest in procurement of arms to fortify their communities against external attacks. These private policing initiatives however, are often times counterproductive as small arms provided for collective security resurfaced in intra community disagreements ultimately exacerbating violence. The Eleme-Okrika incessant boundary dispute is a major example. The main bone of contention between these two neighbouring communities has been the location of two refineries, one petro-chemical plant, a fertilizer plant and an ocean terminal in Eleme. The site of the refineries has been a cause of

disagreement between the two communities. Okrika persistently lays claim to the land hosting some of these facilities, a claim that Eleme repeatedly debunked. This has led to waves of clashes between the two communities since the 1990s with the two communities mobilizing their respective armed youths to prosecute the seeming endless war.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

It is logical to suggest that the incessant military clampdown on the Niger Delta youths by government forces probably imbued in the youths a militant consciousness which has necessitated self-defensive mechanism to the extent that militant youths have resorted to acquiring arms in anticipation of future repression from state's security agencies. (Ebiri, 2004). Militia groups have been able to withstand the military in several clashes because of their access to sophisticated weapons which they use in attacking oil platforms and facilities (Tuschl and Ejibunu, 2007:23). Without mincing words, the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons has helped sustain incessant conflict and unrest in the region and have undermined stability, social peace and security with grave consequences on Nigeria's socio-political and economic fortunes (Aderinwale, 2005:111, Yacubu (2005:55).

Insecure Environment for Investment

Nowhere in the Niger Delta is sacred, safe or impenetrable to militant youths in search of hapless victims to be harried away as hostages, even churches have been desecrated and priests taken away until ransom is paid. Insecurity itself breeds divestment as nobody will be prepared to risk his life-saving in ventures which he is not sure to be alive to reap the fruits of his labour. As a corollary, the once bubbling local economy built on oil and gas is almost crumbling as genuine investors have all fled the region for a safer environment. Daniel (2006:32) quoting Pastor Billy Harry, Vice President of the Port Harcourt Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture, captured succinctly the problem under review:

Businesses are being shut and fear has taken over the entire investing community and this portends a great danger for the economy. Hostage taking is in bad taste; it makes the Niger Delta region look like a criminal axis replete with terror tactics.

Concluding Remarks

The Niger Delta region stands out as the treasure base of the Nigerian state. Through the oil and gas industry, it provides over 30% of GDP, 85% of Government revenues and over 90% of foreign exchange earnings (This Day, May 29, 2009:4). It was also noted that although the Niger Delta problem has been around for several decades, the emergence of organized and militant pressure groups in the 1990s added a new dimension to the crisis in the region. The paper established that ethnic militancy among Niger Delta youths was a direct response to the impunity, human rights violations, and perceived neglect of the region by the Nigerian state on one hand and sustained environmental hazards imposed on local Niger Delta communities as a result of the oil production activities of multinational oil companies on the other. Thus, in the Niger Delta, youths began an armed campaign and demand for greater control of the oil resources from their land. Since then, the militants have dared the Nigerian State through ceaseless attacks on persons, facilities and institutions, with grave consequences for the socio-political and economic wellbeing of the country up till early 2009.

Fortunately, however, the heightened insecurity hitherto precipitated by youth militancy in the region has reduced significantly since late 2009 as virtually all known delta militant youths have accepted the amnesty and surrendered their weapons by the expiration date on 4th October 2009. Interestingly, Nigeria's oil production capacity which was about 1.2 million bpd at the height of militancy rose to 2.4 million bpd (more than the 1.7 million bpd OPEC Quota) due to cessation of hostilities by youths in the region and several MNOCs and construction companies have returned to the region. This probably underscores the fact that there are no outstanding net benefits for any stakeholder in the sustenance of the conflict. It is expedient therefore that the current positive security development should be sustained and possibly improved upon. However, a major challenge facing the Nigerian state is the absence of strong institutions capable of addressing the phenomenon of ethnic militant nationalism through political and economic empowerment, social justice, development, creative institutional designs and capacity building. If these values could be instituted in earnest, they

would no doubt undermine the root causes of militancy and guarantee stability and security in the long term.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

EMERGING ISSUES IN PEACEBUILDING AND NATIONAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHT VIOLATION IN NIGERIA

Elisha Mallam DUCHI*

INTRODUCTION

Education been a fundamental human right and central to peacebuilding and national security. Dator (2018) posited that, emerging issues are potential problems or opportunities in their earliest stages of development. This could be emerging threats that poses danger or creating opportunities, reflecting the conceptualization of conflict from the Chinese viewpoint. The idea of threat implying imminent danger takes the trajectory of destructive conflict as could be viewed in contemporary threats to national security from the angle of banditry, kidnappings, unknown gunmen, militancy, cultism, terrorism financing and insurgency. Critical Muslim (2022) stated that, emerging issues are items that exist just below the horizon of tomorrow with the potentials of becoming fully fledged trends; the bits you gather from headlines, usually dwelling deep down beneath the home page of your favourite news outlet.

Children without school access in Nigeria constitute a potential problem which could turn real in the nearest future that could undermine national security based on their inability to read, write, communicate and understood what they are communicating, and to decipher meanings and intentions of persons during the communication process. The communication process allowed their recruitment for bad behavioural attitude takes place (Ndanusa, Abayomi, and Harada; 2021). Dearth of school access facing 10.2 million children nationwide is adjudged to have forced the victims into a state of educational insecurity and therefore

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threatened national security, when they are manipulated to commit crime without knowing the consequence thereof (Duchi, 2020, Premium Times, 2021). Illiteracy is conceived to mean a given individual lack of capacity to read, write, communicate and effectively understand the content which could have enhanced that individual conformity to societal acceptable norms and values (Akpan, 2015).

United Nations International Children Education Fund (UNICEF, 2009) averred that, research suggested that, urban young people with some education but few job prospects and no opportunity to express dissent or participate constructively in political processes are seen as a pool of potential recruits to instigate others to violence. Even the educational access that provide learners with just how to read, write and communicate without understanding, does not translate to learning (UNICEF, n.d). Akpan (2015) stated that, youth's unemployment and illiteracy, had become a burden to Nigerian State, because their productive had not been put into effect. Youths been the future of the nation have a huge number behind the education line which could become wasted when disgruntled elements manipulate to perpetrate violence due to lack of capacity to interpret accurately the intentions in statements. Education could have been employed by the global community in maintaining international peace and security by educating the potential terrorist recruits from perpetrating terror (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization: UNESCO, 2011; UNICEF, 2013)

The notion of peacebuilding entails the presence of violent conflict that could or had destroyed relationships, then needs restoration not necessarily to where the relationships was; but to where it should be, and in this, peacebuilding contains a little idea of justice (Agbu and Anike-Nweze, 2006). Peacebuilding is geared towards transformation of conflict and constructively, through the instrumentalities of conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Galtung, 1969). Taylor and Bahr (2022) believed that, youths who lacked this education that leads to learning, could be used to advance quality peace, which is the attitude, institutions and structures that enable security. Peace education is also central to the culture of peace. Aderibigbe (2013) posited that, culture of peace is built from values,

attitudes, behaviors and ways of life based on nonviolence, human right, equality of sexes, appreciation of cultural diversity and respect for others. Quality peace could be established firmly in any society if the culture supports the institutions and structures with constructive attitudes like organized actions through policy statements of actions and social mobilization to end inequality, poverty and discrimination which more than often, threatened peaceful co-existence.

While structural violence had forced millions of school age children behind the education line, due to long years of public education neglect: the consequence of manipulating their lack of capacity development could be monumental in the face of widespread acts of insecurity emanating from banditry, kidnappings, insurgency, militancy and separatist agitations, could be catastrophic in the face of not having those predispositions for peaceful and tranquil coexistence. Culture of peace sought purposefully develop those attitudes, behavior and ways of life that favors amicable resolution of dispute among people in interaction through the construction in the human mind the defenses and fencing off the tendencies for the perpetration of violence. And this could only be achieved through the enlightened obtained about peace in the home, class, and society from education (UNESCO, 1998, 2008, 2020 and 2022; Boulding, 2008).

From the perspective of quality peace, security is perceived to be a product of peace based on the attitudes people display in their daily interaction which is relational. The societal institutions too, are creation of the individual's citizens of a state for the purpose of governance to regulate conflict and structural violence such as discrimination, injustice, oppression and suppression of the poor and minority groups. Peace being a condition for security, and peace education developing the culture of peace: then a peacebuilding strategy needs the inculcation of peace education that establish peaceful interrelations between people, youths inclusive. Youth peacebuilding had been argued to be applicable in all phases of conflict either pre-conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding with the capacity to strengthen quality peace (Lund, 2009; Davenport et. al., 2018, Taylor and Bahr, 2022).

Knowledge acquisition accompanied with effective learning developed the skills in an individual which converts imagination to reality, skills to wealth, eliminate poverty and brings some levels of human advancement, while the lack of knowledge resulting from inaccessibility to education worsened ignorance, poverty, disease and unhappiness thereby leading to crime commission (Is'haq, Musa, and Abdulhafiz, 2019; Danbazzau, 2014). Illiteracy is considered here a threat to security, since it leads to economic insecurity, health insecurity, psychological insecurity and others. Psychological insecurity is a function of the human mind having unstable reasoning, thereby affecting individual mental health stability leading to destructive decision making either suicide or homicide commission. National security is geared towards protecting the citizens from threats to their lives and properties (Ekpo, and Is'haq, 2014). Is'haq et. al., (2019) conceived education to be a powerful weapon for reducing crime, high rate of illiteracy and inequality, and the provide solutions to unemployment curb the menace of insecurity.

The centrality of education to national security and peacebuilding cannot be taken for granted; millions of children cannot be allowed to roam the streets instead of being in class: of course, that is the situation of the out of school children in Nigeria, whose educational right had been violated without legal remedy, but political which is at the mercy of the elites whose children do not attend public schools in Nigeria. For this reason, the schools and facilities are grossly inadequate, forcing many kids to be behind learning and educational opportunities. To address this critical need, government and international organizations like the United Nations through various specialized agencies like UNICEF and UNESCO had championed the cause of education globally. The 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) neutralize the effects of the socio-economic and cultural convention that sought to promote and protect the educational right of the vulnerable children considered as fundamental right, globally.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responsible for maintaining international peace and security, often carried out intervention action in the event of gross human rights violation, through peacekeeping and peace enforcement action. The notion of

human rights violation included fundamental human right; but had been divided generationally. UNSC paid more attention to the first generational right comprising civil and political rights than the second, consisting social, economic and cultural rights. The latter contains the educational rights provisions of these out of school children. But UNICEF and UNESCO both specialized agencies in the global effort to combat illiteracy conceptualized education to mean human right, which is also seen as an instrument to fight illiteracy, poverty and insecurity (Is'haq et. al., 2019).

Article 2 section 4 of the UN Charter posited that, all members shall refrain in their international relation from the threat of or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN. This provision does not impede the purpose of UNSC in chapter IV but no response had been initiated in line with the protection of the educational right violation considered a fundamental human right. The study investigates the legal constraints against the enforcement of education recognized as human right by UN and it was established that, UN Charter Article 2 S. 1 &7 and ICESCR Article 2 in conjunction with S. 6(6c) of 1999 CFRN, constitute an impediment based on sovereignty and non-justiciability.

While illiteracy had been fingered in the high-level insecurity bedeviling the nation, millions are thrown into it annually. Akpan (2015) posited that, national insecurity is caused by the failure of national government to address the special needs such as hunger, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, inequality, injustice among others of its people, which are interwoven. It is an established fact that, wars and conflicts are products of human reasoning. The solution to problems too, often drew from its origin, in this case, the human mind. These children violation of their right to education, of course have no legal implications on the perpetrators, but the society. The effect of them roaming the streets had reduced their mental developmental capability to be critical with words and deeds that sieved out destructive conflicting issues and integrating constructive ones.

UNESCO 1945 article 1 paragraph sought to Contribute to peace and security by collaboration through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms affirmed by the UN. Finding solutions to the problems of wars start with the little child roaming the streets. Children in the Democratic Republic of (DR) Congo had fought wars that aged and outlived them as children and later adults. Here in Nigeria, children born ten (10) years ago, are school age children now without access to education. Developing a tabula rasa mind with the culture of peace is almost a mission impossible when their capacity development had been ranged by lack of education. Is'haq et. al., (2019) investigation ranked the causes of insecurity as follows: ineffective education, unemployment, corruption, poverty, poor security infrastructures, mismanagement of national resources, selfishness/un-patriotism, high-rate illiteracy, poor information and communication technology, inadequate database and underfunding of security agencies. The study also uncovers the relationship between education and security and posited that, education is ill-equipped in Nigeria, alarming rate of illiteracy is alarming is attributed to government commitment to education; it has also worsened unemployment and poverty. Poverty had been fingered as precursor for crime and education determines poverty level. Kidnapping too was pointed out to be associated with poverty, illiteracy and lack of moral education; and insurgency is a product of high-level illiteracy (Is'haq, 2019).

However, while the budget for security though without having corresponding number of employees as in the education sector, gulped national budget more. The totality of security forces comprising, the military and paramilitary agencies do not sum up to a million heads; but the out of school children consist of 10.2 million children as at 2021 (Premium times, 2022). While education is considered to be a powerful tool for the reduction of crime, illiteracy, inequality eradication; and the effective therapy to insecurity in relation to kidnappings, banditry and insurgency: millions are on the streets. Education policy intervention like the National Policy on Education (NPE) led to the establishment of the Universal Basic Education with a commission with the objectives of providing free and

compulsory basic education. Even with this policy, the passage of the Child Right Act (CRA, 2003) and the provision of education in Chapter II Section 18 subsections 1, 2, 3 paragraph A-D 1999 CFRN, the country is still faced with the challenge of 10.2 million children facing the danger of not having the ability to know how to read, write and communicate, nor to understand what is been read.

UNESCO Constitution (1945) declared that, since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. Catching them young is slogan often adopted to explain the idea that, to get something right, it had to start from the earliest stage of formation. Establishing the foundation having the needed attitudes and behaviours that is replete with tranquillity and harmonious relationship, must be impressed in the young minds of the future generations from their youthful and innocent phase of human development. Building the foundation for peace entails occupying the body, mind and souls of the children and saturating their blank slate mind with the principles, values and believes of peace and conflict. Education is like a vaccination against the deadly virus of illiteracy in the little child's mind and purged it away from society. UNESCO as part of its global educational campaign to enhance education, had recommended for budgeting of 15-20% of the national budget to education. This recommendation, without any enforcement mechanism, had remained a dream that find no reality. According to Duchi (2020), UNESCO can only recommend but to enforce. Arguments on the lack of determinacy and minimum standard to measure social rights generally and educational right particularly had been advanced by antagonist of fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy.

The study sought to assess the available remedy for the enforcement of this educational right violations; implications of this threat of educational insecurity on contemporary threats to national security and future peacebuilding prospects amongst them. Answers to questions of what are the probable solutions to the enforcement of these children right to education; what are the consequences of illiteracy to national security; what are the future prospects for building societal peace with these children, were equally provided.

Secondary analysis of diverse data with respect to educational right enforcement, implications of illiteracy on national security and peacebuilding formed the basis for drawing conclusions and recommendations.

Educational Rights Enforcement

Human Right Watch (HRW, 2016) pointed out that, many countries are not doing enough to ensure that school age children are treated fairly and allowed to go to school through the enactment of good laws, that ensure that children can go from primary to secondary school. The monitoring of the educational progress of a child is as important as sending the child to school. The absence of it, led to loss of the educational developmental trajectory for a child. While the Child Right Act (CRA, 2003) a replica of AU Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (AUCRWC) and United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child (UNCRC, 1991) provide punishment for any parent or guardian who failed to make his/her child available for school, there were no institutional mechanism to check recalcitrant behaviours that had persisted and prevalent today, leading to leaving behind 10.2 million children not in class in Nigeria. International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law which further established education as human right placed the duty for its protection and promotion on the state parties to international governmental organization like UNESCO, UNICEF and other conventions like ICESCR, UNCRC, ACHPR (Murcia, 2020).

CRA 2003 Section 15 subsections 2 provide punishment for parents who failed to adhere to the Act in subsections 6 paragraphs A-C. In the face of the presence of 10.2 million out of school children in Nigeria, nobody had neither been arrested nor charged to court for violating an Act of the National Assembly. Who is responsible for monitoring and the enforcement of the compliance and the original jurisdiction for initiation of proceedings in the face of violations? While the rights provided in Chapter IV had original jurisdiction in the High Court, can CRA generally and section 15 subsections 2, 4 and 6 in particular be enforced and at what jurisdiction. When there is neither original or appellate jurisdiction with respect to the enforcement of a giving right lawfully provided for in an Act, it exposed the political

intent of the drafters of 1999 CFRN, to excused the political class who are the political leaders, the legal obligations of justiciability of rights provided for as fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policies with the counteracting effect of Section 6 subsections 6 paragraph C of the Constitution.

Linus (2017) perception of the fundamental objective and directive principle of state policy from the viewpoint of positivity in the human right spectrum, which involves the political leaders' commitment to economic prioritization and allocation of funds create a huge financial burden they are not willing to incur expenses on, which is far below the financial weight security and defense sectors brought to bear on the national budget. A close survey of the annual estimates of the Federal and State Governments indicates that, they have not met the 26% UNESCO benchmark for education as reflected in the period 2016-2020 that witnessed in 2016 (4%), 2017 (7.4%), 2018 (7.04%), 2019 (7.05%) and 2020 (6.7%). The above is meant to take care of 28 parastatals, 37 Federal Universities, 25 Federal Polytechnics, 21 Federal Colleges of Education, and 104 Federal Unity Schools. More funds are allocated to defense and national security at the expense of human security. Resulting from the above, the terrorist groups and warlords have more moral ground and recruit from among these children to destabilized the polity, that government would spend more to curtail. At the national and state levels, the enforcement of education is at discretion of various ministries of education through the Basic Education Commissions (BEC). No legal obligation attached, and so no punishment for the violation of millions of out of schools' children right to education.

Illiteracy and National Security

While contemporary threats to national security like kidnapping of school children threatened education security which is a component of national security. This, had reduced children access to education, leading to illiteracy; and the latter had provided the perpetrators of insecurity, with the needed manpower for recruitment into activities that threatened national security (Victor, 2021). Akpan (2015) stated that, issues of poverty, hunger, illiteracy, unemployment are interwoven because one aspect may be responsible for the manifestation

of another. This is because, national insecurity is a product of governmental failure to provide the above basic needs. Illiteracy often transformed to skills deficiency resulting from vocational ineffectiveness, which worsened job insecurity and compound the national insecurity problem.

Illiteracy is adjudged to have undermined affected individual's self-esteem, and reduced them to pawns in the Nigerian political chess board, as in the case of the Al-majiri children who had been fingered to have exacerbated the spate of violence going on in the northern parts of the country. Educated individuals have hope for a better future and will not want to tragically end their lives for nothing, therefore question anyone.

Okon (2018) stated that, an illiterate earning measly may end up going into robbery, kidnapping, rituals, and other social vices to augment his/her low income resulting from their lack of skills development that brought about unemployment, which led to job national insecurity. Their inability to read, write, communicate and to understand things kept them uninformed making them to be vulnerable to breaking the laws unknowingly. Thinking alternatively to situational challenges to find solutions is dysfunctional by reason of lack of effective and constructive reasoning. Duchi (2020) in a study revealed possibility of illiterate children committing crimes without knowing the implications of such to themselves and the society by reasons of their lack of capacities to understand the intentions of their handlers who recruited them to snatch ballot boxes, kidnapped people for ransom, and carry out widespread violence against their fellow citizens either as bandits or unknown gunmen.

Governors Early Literacy Foundation (2022) in drawing the linkage between illiteracy and crime cited American Department of Justice which stated that, 70% of prisons inmates comprises those who could not surpassed the fourth-grade level. Abu Dhabi Police Center for Research and Studies stated that, there is a strong link between illiteracy and criminal behaviors with the illiterate persons nearly double the criminal populations. Incarceration is a form punitive justice requiring the restrained of a person for infringing the law. Pythagoras said "educate the children, and it would not be necessary to punish the men": impliedly, an

educated child would have become an informed man, knowing what to do and doing the right thing. Low and Miranda (2021) stated that, low level literacy persons have limited ability to make important informed decisions in everyday life; and are prone to welfare dependency, low self-esteem and higher susceptibility to committing crime. World Literacy Foundation (WLF, 2018) stated that, there is a significant link between crime and illiteracy with 85% juvenile delinquent in United Kingdom (UK) prisons being functionally illiterates. To prove the connection a pilot study of 50 inmates out of 150, were re-educated. The first two years witnessed only 10% of the study population who re-committed an offence; 26% went back to college; and 8% found work.

Educational Right and Peacebuilding

UNESCO Constitution (1945) believed that, since war began in the hearts of men, it is in the hearts of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed. Constructing the defenses of peace had a connection with establishing the ways and means, attitudes and behaviors that are favorably predisposed to peaceful values and beliefs, within the purview of a culture of peace. Faleti (2014) stated that, education is the pivot around which the multi-track approach to peacebuilding rotates. Education developed the right attitude for peaceful coexistence, and amicable dispute resolution amongst people in interaction.

Shahab, Ullah and Akhter (2022) posited that education belongs to the group of basic rights that are fundamental to the human, and is legally guaranteed for all from global to municipal legal jurisdictions. Education is the oxygen for human development and emancipation, fundamental for the attainment of a nation's sustainable development drive; and lasting peace and security. Peter Obi, former Anambra State Governor stated that, education and health are the most important sectors to invest in; but had seen only 2.893 trillion naira for a five-year period. While defence received 2.41 trillion amounting to 15% of the 2022 national budget, education got 1.45 trillion made up of 7.9% out of it (Elebeke and Esiedesa, 2021). Obi added that, the more you invest in education the better your economy. Even the huge allocation to defence, national insecurity had been on the increase, due to the presence

of illiterates been recruited as bandits and terrorist to execute kidnappers plans and terrorist acts.

Omojola (n.d) Education is the process that supports learning; encourages acquisition of knowledge and boost understanding of values; and it must possess the ability of leading one from ignorance to better understanding of views. Conflict which is the antithesis of peace in particular and peacebuilding in general result from misunderstanding of views, incompatibility of interest, and differences in values: when not properly managed could turn violent.

Education expands the thinking of individuals in interaction with the necessary critical and constructive understanding of other people's views through the acquisition and retention of knowledge that changes behaviours, attitudes for the individuals in relationships. Education is conceptualized to mean the aggregation of the processes that transformed a given individual ability, attitudes and behaviours into a machine for economic, social, and political and development of a nation (Fafunwa, 2003). Constructive transformation in the economic, social, and political sphere of any society entails development which is connected to peacebuilding, from the viewpoint of reconstruction of destroyed infrastructures, rehabilitation and reintegration of communities and people side by side reconciliation. Education helps in skills development that creates jobs and neutralizes job insecurities that exposes people vulnerability to the survival instinct where every man takes any means necessary to survive.

Building a way of life that require people to live in harmony, required the ability of the interacting parties to see things from other peoples' views. This will reduce the tendencies for misconception, miscommunication and misapplication of individuals' opinions about others. Education provides the information through developing individuals skills in trying to find out about others to have an adequate understanding of others. Berkowitz (1994) cited in Aderibigbe (2013) conceived peacebuilding from the micro level to mean peace through creating the conditions that are necessary for peace: such as attitudes, disposition and non-

violent interpersonal communication. Emergence of conflict flow from the communication process, whereby the interest/wants, needs and values of contradict each other.

Bhat (2021) conceived nation building to be a process of formation of a nation having common territory, common race, common religion, common language, common history, common culture and common political and yet none of these is an essential element. The elements, which go to build a nation, keep on changing. Kymalicka's Multi-culturist and Liberal Minority Right, a nation-building theory explained the absence of the minority groups right from the classical bill of right, whose presence could have been consistent the liberal principles.

The 1999 CFRN in building a strong democratic nation provided for fundamental rights enforceable in chapter IV but excluded chapter II containing educational right. The constitution embodies nation-building legal framework but like the classical bill of right, preclude educational right which is the foundation to the understanding and enjoyment of fundamental human right, when S.6(6C) introduced, thereafter undermined the efficacy of all chapter II provisions. This study conceived nation-building theory to *mean total development of the individual citizens, the national unity and progress mindset in all areas of national life, to establish a strong and unshaken foundation of nationhood*. Educational right enforcement will provide opportunity for educational access which will eliminate national insecurity and reinforced peacebuilding measures through development of nationhood ideology that strength progress from individuals in families from homes, to the schools, and the nation at large.

Education is thus as a right as provided in UDHR, UNESCO Constitution, UNCRC, AUCRWC and CRA cannot be enforced in any Nigerian court by reason of S.6(6C) of 1999 CFRN. While CRA prescribed punishment for parents who failed to make their children available for enrolment, no legal obligation holding government responsible for failing to provide available schools; and there was neither an original nor appellate jurisdiction for the enforcement of CRA, like chapter IV provisions whose original jurisdiction started with the High Court.

Illiteracy and national insecurity operate in a vicious cycle: from limiting the individual skill development, to poverty, hunger and starvation which exacerbate human need for survival. Poverty affects citizens funding of education by themselves and in the face of lack of good governance, illiteracy then set in. The illiterate is prone to manipulation and consequent recruitment to commit crime. illiterate persons lacked adequate information to informed decision due to their inability to read, write, communicate and understand issues within and around their environment. This made them commit crime unknowingly, like the bandits and unknown gunmen, most of whom are illiterates.

Studies have shown that, constructing the defences of peace began with changing attitudinal behaviours from the heart made possible through educating the mind to imbibe the ways and values of peaceful co-existence. Nigeria budgeted 15% of 2022 annual estimate on defence only beside other security agencies, and gave 7.9% to education. Education enhanced learning other people's views that brings understanding that enable peacebuilding; but is denied to millions of children, which may undermine peaceful co-existence in the future: a prelude to conflict conflagration.

Conclusion

The study concluded that, building a nation requires the development of the individual citizens' capacity, through educating their minds on what is right and wrong for the individual and the nation; teaching them to think of the nation from their inner minds and manifest same in their private and public life through an ideology developed by the ideas generally acceptable and pro-humanity generally and the nation in particular. Spending more on defence in the face of increasing insecurity and leaving paltry sum for education is akin to treating disease symptoms and allowing the causes to be strongly establish. Education as a component of national security has the potentials of reducing the terrorist, bandits and militant manpower recruitment reservoir through skills development that provide gainful employment. Lack of justifiability of educational right will definitely make the enjoyment of fundamental untenable in the near future by reason of national insecurity.

For these reasons, a constitutional amendment that relocate education to fundamental right be made. Education be treated as a national security priority with the allocation at least 15% of the national budget for the five years, and additional 2% annual increment to reach 25% in another five-year period.

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CHAPTER NINE

MORALITY PRACTICES AMONG BUREAUCRATS: A CATALYST FOR PEACE AND NATION BUILDING

Marvellous Igbelokoto OAIKHENA, PhD*

INTRODUCTION

The concept of morality has been described as a yardstick for measuring good and evil. Moral is the opposite of the term “immoral”. Moral thus means “good”, or “praiseworthy”. That is why people of high moral standard have no need for law, nor is law a problem to them since they observe from personal conviction what the law demands. In order to uphold this concept, significant means must be put in place to accommodate peaceful coexistence and shown all forms of racism and discrimination. Racial bias manifest when inequality exist among individuals; denial of equal power and access to broader societal perspectives; and, denial of access to justice especially in the concept of deep polarization. This has also led to intentional or obvious harmful attitudes or behaviour towards a party because of their identity (such as race, religion, sexual orientation, and so on). In other words, over bias can manifest in direct prejudice, hostility, or clear negative feelings.

Bureaucrats must ensure they avoid speeches or behaviours that demonstrate negative racial attitudes in the society, in order to encourage peace building and peaceful coexistence. According to Glen (2019), while making decisions public, bureaucracy consistently faces two conflicting situations, such as, between serving the personal or group interest, and, serving public interest. Therefore, in order to keep the behaviour of public officials consistent with public interest, the question of morality practice in administration becomes a principal concern in modern administrative process along with various institutional checks, which subsequently

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promote the peace building process. Peace building addresses economic, social and political root causes of violence and fosters reconciliation to prevent the return of structural and direct violence, thereby denying individuals the freedom to coexist. The study further examines how peace building has been turned into a series of management processes and the implications this has for the state. Meanwhile, the character of these violent conflicts is beginning to take a new dimension as some conflicts of the 1990s and early 2000s were organised contestations for power at the level of the central state by groups with clear political objectives, and decisive outcomes with wide legitimacy. These contestations had made the challenge of reaching sustainable peace building an ambitious undertaking, devoid of tolerance and freedom.

Promoting tolerance in the society

In a society where there is freedom of belief, freedom of religion, the freedom to hold any opinion and to belong to any association of one's choice, there has to be tolerance. Tolerance is a mark of respect for the freedom and dignity of other people. Anybody who has respect for human freedom and dignity must be prepared to tolerate beliefs, views or opinions that are different from theirs. Tolerance means allowing people to hold their own views, beliefs and opinions (provided of course that such beliefs, views or opinions are not harmful to the society). **Tolerance is not simply an attitude it is an essential element for peace, unity and economic well-being of a nation or society.**

When an individual is treated equally and given equal opportunity to express himself, he is able to effectively utilize the talents and resources to improve the living standard of himself and those around. This results in a bigger middle class and reduction of poverty. The greater spending power contributes to greater growth in the society or economy and a bigger consumer base. In countries where certain groups are discriminated against, not only are they less able to contribute to the development of the economy, but also this leads to the build-up of ghettos, shanties, and vulnerable communities. Nations that practice discrimination are at a disadvantage, as they risk losing enterprising and innovative individuals from victimized groups who tend to move elsewhere. Where discrimination exists, there can be no peace. Peace

can only come when people become free from hatred, acrimony, suspicion and are willing to understand one another.

These differences occur when people are unable to tolerate each other, as they become angry and frustrated. In a society or community filled with hatred, people begin to feel suffocated and depressed, as discrimination makes miserable lives for not just those discriminated against, but everyone in the society. Being able to accept one another's differences can have positive effect on nation building. Being tolerant removes one's self-imposed barriers and allows one to think more broadly and enjoy greater inner peace. Tolerance leads to less stress and greater happiness in the overall community.

Tolerance is a mark of broad mindedness and civility. An uncivilized man is intolerant of other people's tribes, religions, ideologies, opinions, etc, if they are different from his own. If peace must be attained, people must behave in a civilized fashion and should be broad minded and be prepared to be tolerant. Peace and intolerance do not go together. When there is intolerance there can be no peace. Thus, civil society with all its complexity is a mirror reflecting human nature with its multiple needs. Human nature is therefore, the foundation of civil society. But it is also the foundation of human knowledge with all its ramifications, including social equality. Social and political institutions in many parts of the world, where glaring inequality amongst the component groups prevails, it adopts different methods aimed at attaining the goal of social equality. Fourier (2011) described social equality as a status hierarchy, which occurs when a behaviour, social practice or policy expresses a particular kind of unequal relationship between a person or group of people, and others. More specifically, it is a relationship between inferiors and superiors. According to Omoregbe (2008), the development of a country is nothing else other than the process of catering for the multiple needs of man's complex nature. Probably, the most common feature around which a nation is united is ethnic in nature, as nationality is often expressed in terms of ethnic background rather than citizenship.

Intolerance on the other hand, leads to infighting, violence, crimes and instability, as different people resort to force and aggression against each other or the state. Events in recent history across many countries have made us witness just how damaging intolerance can be to peace and nation building, as people destroy each other's places of worship, properties, partaking in ethnic cleansing, or entire nations becoming engulfed in civil wars or crises. Thus, unfairness and prejudice have existed in humanity even before the dawn of civilization and it has led to wars, injustice, discrimination and cruelty. Nothing good has ever come out of intolerance, yet even in these enlightened times of the twentieth century, it is still present. If, in a nation, instead of acceptance there is discrimination, that nation cannot flourish. No true progress can ever be achieved until, in a society filled with rancour, disrespect, antagonism and bigotry. With fifty-three (53) nations, hundreds of religions and thousands of different languages, tolerance is not a moral choice but a moral necessity for the Commonwealth of Nations, if we are to advance successfully into the 21st century

However, the most important aspect of development of any country is indisputably the development of human personality. It is in other words, the moral development of the citizens that constitute the country. In this case bureaucracy is practiced of which the primary aspects correspond to the human dimension, while the secondary aspects correspond to the infra-human dimension. These latter include the land, the natural resources, the roads, machines, buildings, technologies, etc. All these are important in a country and need to be developed along the lines of peaceful coexistence. But they are of secondary importance. Of primary importance is the human dimension. This implies that the development of a country towards peaceful coexistence is the development of human persons towards nation building.

Practice of Bureaucrats towards Peace building

In the practice of bureaucrats, some people claim that morality is relative, that different cultures have different moral practices. What is morally right in one society may be morally wrong in another society. The proponents of this view are mostly anthropologists and those who rely on the work and findings of anthropologists. They pointed out that different people

in different parts of the world have different moral practices. This could be the reason why Gowans (2021) said that, in 1947, on the occasion of the United Nations debate about universal human rights, the American Anthropological Association issued a statement declaring that moral values are relative to cultures and that there is no way of showing that the values of one culture are better than those of another. He buttressed this point when he made an example that, some morally accepted practices in Black Africa (polygamy for example) are morally unacceptable in Western Europe or America. The positive principles of the moral law spell out more specifically the good which public administrators are expected to put into practice, by the moral law to aid peace building.

Bureaucrats are expected to uphold these principles which obliged them to be kind, to be generous, to be honest, to be just, to be hospitable, to have respect for human life, to perform their duties creditably, to be faithful to their establishment, to be altruistic or, in other words, to love one another, and most especially to be neutral. Which means it is expected that public administrators should be less affected by party political pressures than their elected superiors. For a country to develop bureaucrats plays significant roles in the fields of every aspect such as, economic, political, socially, and culturally, as these are needed to help every citizen. According to Richard (1993) he asserted that, it should be noted that the political neutrality of public administrators is not part of the constitution of every democratic state. He observed that, in Britain and in Canada, this is the case, but not in the United States, and in France, as Ministers gather around themselves, a small cabinet of officials who give advice on political matters. Therefore, the notion of neutrality is better viewed as a continuum between two poles of separation from and identification with the political party constituting the current government, along which are arranged at different points, different national traditions of administration, and indeed often different elements of one nation's civil service.

Thus, the negative moral principles that could face the progression of an establishment or an organisation towards peace building are the principles that sell out more specifically, the evil to be avoided. These may include, committing adultery, telling of lies, stealing, cheating,

committing or attempt to commit suicide, incest, embezzlement of public funds, take or giving of bribes, cruelty, being callous, rape, violence, murder etc. These principles are however universal, they are in our environment and in our working relationship with people.

The fact that organisations are made up of different kinds of people implies that there must be various problems that could negate peace and nation building. The difference is that, one can choose to take part in doing the right thing or to take part in the wrong. According to Omoregbe (2008), he asserted that “efforts to cure the symptoms of a disease are futile so long as the disease itself which is the cause of the symptoms remains untouched”. Thus, our effort in trying to practice morality towards peace building in our environment, establishment or organisation must be accompanied and supported by a moral consciousness or self-discipline. Consciousness, according to Omoregbe, is an innate felling, a strong natural impulse which urges man towards good actions and sways him away from evil actions. Therefore, to achieve this, motivation, cordial relationship, tolerance, fairness, etc, are keys in any environment or society to promote peaceful coexistence.

Morality and Nation Building

Morality is the health of a society. A society plagued with immorality is a sick society. According to Cristina, Spencer, Adriana, and Critina (2020) they remarked that, people in these communities have low level of quality of life, regardless of intense poverty alleviation efforts, improvement is less present. Nigeria for example is morally sick, and its social political and economic problems are symptoms of the nation’s disease. It is a waste of time and effort trying to cure the symptoms of a disease without curing the disease itself, which cause the symptoms. Hence the only lasting cure for Nigeria’s ailment is a moral regeneration. *Moral regression* refers to the process of declining from a higher to a lower level of *morality*. Many Nigerian’s however, refuse to take the way of morality in nature. They refuse to go through the long process of patience and hard work laid down by nature, and want to get rich and famous in a day through fraudulent practices, like, embezzlement, dishonesty,

involvement in rituals, armed robbery, kidnapping, etc. They therefore go against the moral order, the hard way, the laborious way, the patient and painful way.

Today, in the Nigeria society the values placed on the people and the sense of responsibility to perform the tasks for which one gets paid, and the respect for the values are greatly shaken and misplaced. The younger generation has been introduced to all kinds of relations underlying material interest, they benefit by all means, by ignoring everything else associated with “human being” and the “human morality”. People often forget the quality of their acts or conduct. From the observations of the performance of public administrators in this current dispensation, it is not difficult to understand that local, state or federal government of Nigerian administration, leave much to be desired with its image to the public; with low quality in the implementation of tasks imposed by the law; with high level of corruption; thereby going against the moral order, in administrative duties, and negating efforts towards nation building.

Arjeta, Elez, and Elidiana (2014), posited that it is already proven that the quality of the public services and the role of public administration in their implementation have a direct impact on the life of the citizens. Thus, the moral order unveils law of course and effect that ensures good actions or good behaviour, which produce good or bad effects. Just like the physical world, orange trees produce orange fruits, mango trees produce mango fruits. It is this same universal law of cause and effect which, ensured that if you sow corn, you will reap corn, if you plant yam, you shall harvest yam. You cannot sow corn and come back to reap yam, for that would be contrary to the universal law of cause and effect on which the order of the universe is structured. This is what the author of *psalm 14* meant, when he calls the immoral man a fool. “*The fool says in his heart that there is no God above*”, that he can therefore do whatever he likes and nothing will happen. Thus, if a person thinks that he can embezzle money to enrich himself, use dishonesty and fraudulent means to acquire money, kidnap people for ransom, create confusion, mayhem, violence, disrupt public peace, and nothing will happen, he is a fool, a short-sighted fool who cannot see beyond his nose. For

sooner or later in public or in private, internally or externally, in one form or the other, the effect will follow the cause and he will sure reap what he has sown.

The practice of public administrators towards peace and nation building need to be guided by moral and natural laws in the discharge of their duties thereby promoting peace, tolerance and nation building. This means that an administrator or persons who persist in doing evil actions is either ignorant of these laws of nemesis or he is short-sighted and foolish.

Moral Principles and Peace Building

Moral principles protect and foster certain values, such as, the fundamental human values, the values to human life, the value of justice, the value of honesty, fidelity, human freedom, and all the fundamental human rights. According to Arjeta, Elez, and Elidiana (2014), they observed that, misappropriation of funds and monetary values, affecting impartiality, equality and other requirements for the participation in tenders and auctions that are held, preferential management of funds that aim to increase the life-standard of the community, have become daily news and people are no more impressed by them, as happiness and satisfaction had been jettisoned. It was in line with this thought that Sardaryan (2021), quoted Max Weber that legitimacy-based rational domination embodied in an authority relying upon a law or norm would be increasingly prevailing in society, thus leading to the formation of a bureaucracy.

A lot of bureaucrats erroneously equate happiness with pleasure in peace building. They think the more pleasure one enjoys, the happier he/she becomes and therefore seek happiness through excessively engaging in immoral social vices. Bureaucrats are individuals who are not elected to serve in the public service, but are working for public authorities. As a result, the function of a state power is characterized by strict hierarchy, which suggests a highly structured administrative system, with superior and subordinate units, a vertical organisation of staff and the need for a lower level to approach a higher one in relation to peace and nation building.

Thus, when a society is peaceful, some people tend to misinterpret it as a life where they can easily practice excessive immoral vices, which they believe is a life of happiness.

This has also brought about immoral behaviour, thinking there is happiness and pleasure. According to Omoregbe (2008), happiness is very elusive, unlike pleasure which can be directly sought and obtained immediately, because it does not come with the performance of any particular single actions as it is the case with pleasure. As a result, happiness is not associated with any particular object or any particular activity, neither money nor sex and drinking necessarily brings happiness. A person can indulge in these things and still be unhappy, he can live in affluence and go from pleasure to pleasure and still be very unhappy. Pleasure then is not happiness and happiness is not pleasure. Self-perception and self-concept determine our behaviour towards peace and nation building. This could be the reason why Sardaryan (2021) rightly observed that inefficient regulation can, on the contrary, slow down business development, divert resources away from investments, hamper entry into international markets, and reduce jobs etc. However, if the people's thinking is negative and unpleasant, they feel unhappy and uncomfortable and this is also reflected in their behaviour, in individual places of work, at homes, and in the society in general. This invariably means that, to achieve peace and nation building, the existence of effective and pro-active institutions with capacity to create the enabling environment for growth, especially respect for the law is necessary.

Human conduct is necessary in peace building. The support and reinforcement of peace building and the enhancement of, coordination and consolidation of these mechanisms require a multi-dimensional coordinated approach. In addition, in light of the necessary role of the security agencies in peace maintenance and disaster situations, the need for a better framework also seeks to enhance humanitarian coordination, including civil-military relationship and bureaucratic humanitarian coordination. As a result, naked greed, dishonesty and corruption become "virtues" in societies that worked against peace building. The situation has degenerated to such an extent that most persons who finds themselves in position of authority, would choose to enrich himself/herself through fraudulent means and corrupt practices, but refuse to do so is regarded as a fool and scorned by friends and especially

relatives and community members. For instance, many Nigerian ambassadors, believe that there is nothing wrong in stealing government money or the money belonging to an organisation or establishment, if one is lucky to find oneself in a position to do so without being caught.

In the light of this deplorable situation in the country, it is not at all surprising that the economy of Nigeria and some other African countries eventually plummeted, resulting in recessions and unprecedented suffering for the people, which unfortunately, is the failure of imagination towards nation and peace building. Hence the core aims of peace building is to preserve, protect and save lives, alleviate suffering and enhance physical and human security and dignity of affected people, avoiding segregation and crises. The thrust of this study therefore, is to strengthen peace building process by enhancing the leadership role and bureaucratic mandate through providing strategic approaches and guidelines for administrators, as they conform with shared values, norms and standards for peaceful coexistence in the society. This ultimately amounts to full respect of both national and international laws, on the strength that primary responsibilities of the leaders are predictive, preventive, responsive and adaptive with the desired capabilities

Need for the Peace Process through adequate leadership

According to Omoregbe (2008) quoting Machiavelli, he posits that “he is being down to earth and not interested in abstract speculation about human nature, about what men ought to be or how they ought to act”. Perhaps this reference by Omoregbe was because, were there have been gross violations of human rights and where perpetrators have not been brought to book, the failure to effect transitional justice hangs like a cloud over the affected societies or community. Building peace in a society is varied and asymmetric threats that peace operations must continue to respond to, even as peace building work must proceed. Taking into consideration that peace building often involves multiple international stakeholders that, sometimes fails to properly co-ordinate their efforts in addressing human suffering nor at least become interested in the development of the state.

Peace building processes are heavily dependent on external sources of funding, and post-conflict countries seeking to conduct a peace building process are confronted with a multitude of global actors and benefactors that seek to shape their peace building programmes and policies. This could be the reason why Oaikhena (2021: 19), asserted that “the provision of relieve materials and assistance to displaced persons, through an act of will and commitment by various agencies, cannot be overemphasized”. The reality is that actors at the grassroots level often find innovative and more sustainable ways of peace building. There is no gainsaying the fact that institution-building provides the substance and structure to peace process. Leaders therefore should imbibe the use of additional perspectives through which, modalities changes from conflict to sustainable peace-building, while the centrality is the long-term approach to social and political changes through institutional peace building mechanism. This is because the goals of peace building cannot be easily achieved in a short time span, international assistance has to pay more serious attention to programs and policies designed to support long-term mechanism of social change, with a focus on development of institution, for a better society and peaceful co-existence.

Emphasis must therefore be placed on the role of organizational change in consolidating peace settlements and rebuilding civil society, through the practice of good governance, economic and judicial reforms, although these are insufficient for sustainable peace, they are at least a good starting point. The good governance approach to peace building processes is overwhelmingly desirable in its emphasis on reforms. This also brings about reconciliation and social rehabilitation, which are essential to sustaining peace in pursuing truth and managing the contradictions that lead to conflict.

Failures of Imagination

Policy inconsistency constitutes a veritable hindrance to growth and development in a society. When something seemingly predictable, with significant negative impact is being contemplated like inconsistencies or hatred, it thus led to failure of imagination and distortion of societal peace. According to Machiavelli (1999: 13), he observed that “when a Prince is

campaigning with his soldiers and is in command, of a large army then he need not worry about having a reputation for cruelty, because, without such a reputation, no army shall be kept united and disciplined”. Most people accept the humiliation of being conned with a sense of resignation, as they learn their lessons, recognizing that there is no such thing as a free lunch, and that they have usually been brought down by their own greed for easy money. Some, however, refuse to take their destiny in their own hands. Instead of reflecting on their own gullibility and avarice, they see themselves as totally innocent victims, thereby putting society in jeopardy. In the absence of security and peace, growth can neither be achievable nor sustainable. To this end, the elimination of subsisting threats to national security will be an area of immediate focus to ensure that the polity is stable and peaceful enough to support the aspiration of peace and nation building.

Not using one's imagination towards peace and nation building in the realm of practicing morality is wrong. That is why the idea of division of labour in the society is fundamental to the concept of duty. Since every man needs the services of other people, who in turn also need their own services, everybody becomes important in the society and every profession is also important. The promotion of dialogue to create an enabling space for coordinated peace building action, including the exchange of good ideas is necessary.

Importantly, a targeted approach to resolving the root cause of strife will be the philosophical principle underpinning efforts at eliminating existing security threats. The inner development of people towards peace building does not depend upon the state; it is the sole concern of the individual himself. This is what is meant by the saying that, “man is a social animal”. No man is an island, no man is self-sufficient, no man can provide for himself all what he needs for his survival and self-development, as he needs others to help him succeed. So also, states need each other to promote peaceful coexistence.

Leaders might think it is a gargantuan task to create imagination, but in fact it is fairly simple. As humans, we have a desperate need to believe in something, anything. This makes us eminently gullible. We simply cannot endure long period of doubt, or of the emptiness that

comes from a lack of something to believe in. Challenges are bound in Africa, as these are exacerbated by the erosion of respect for the core humanitarian principles, which exist in conflict situations, in implementation of development projects, and in natural and human-induced disasters. Thus, once people began to gather around a situation, two damages will present themselves: boredom and scepticism. Boredom will make people go elsewhere; scepticism will allow them the distance to think rationally about whatever it is you are offering, blowing away the mist you have artfully created and revealing your idea for what they are. Leaders need to amuse the bored, then, and ward off the cynicisms, in order to achieve the mark of successfully building a society that is rancour free.

Bureaucratic Ego

The responsibilities, obligations, privileges, authorities and mandates of bureaucrats, entails solemn principles which, guide international best practices, including but not limited to international obligations towards the developmental growth of the society. Sometimes certain decision-making powers are delegated to entities that are outside the normal bureaucratic framework and only indirectly controlled by the government, such as regional/state development corporations and semi-autonomous agencies.

It is therefore important that an efficient leadership and management team exists at local level that employs the limited resources at its disposal to meet the prioritized development needs of people in the local areas (Sardaryan, 2021: 7). In view of this, at the local level, competition for resources can lead to conflict, for example, conflict between pastoralists and farmers in Nigeria and the Sahel regions which is a source of ongoing tensions. These challenges trickle-down the theory of economics, as it is assumed that growth in national income and resources will invariably lead to peace, along with social, economic and political advancement.

Bureaucrats must therefore not be egocentric in the discharge of their duties, as the development and growth of the society is squarely on their shoulders. According to Wikipedia, egocentrism is the inability to differentiate between self and other. More specifically, it is the

inability to accurately assume or understand any perspective other than one's own. Egocentrism is found across the life span including adulthood. According to Gromova and Alimbekov (2015), egocentrism is the position of the personality which is characterized by concentration on own feelings, experiences, and interests. The egocentrism can also appear as the inability to understand and consider information from other individuals contradicting own experience. The basis of egocentrism is misunderstanding by bureaucrats, that existence of other points or ideas is possible, and also confidence that the psychological organization of other people is identical to their own as transparency is encouraged for peace and national development.

Transparency, respect for the rule of law and accountability must apply in all human endeavour if nation building is to be achieved. The commitment of bureaucrats to adhere strictly to established norms and standards, including guidelines and codes of conduct is sacrosanct, as decision making based on risk assessment is increasingly used in managing environmental problems and exploitation of natural resources. According to Moller (2020: 17 - 18), he asserted that, in management the meaning of transparency denotes openness of information about the activities of the institution and their leaders. Thus, bureaucrats are able to adopt strategies to their respective circumstances, constituencies and developmental challenges instead of discriminating.

The strategy for promoting equality will be systematic, mainstreaming in all policies, programmes and organizational culture. This is premised on the fact that there is equality in the society, and in this circumstance, the most moral course of action is not to do anything that will worsen the already bad condition among the citizens. In fact, no action, social arrangement or change should be allowed to take place unless it is going to improve the lot of the people. This is the standard by which all actions, arrangements and changes in bureaucratic settings are to be judged. Anything that will improve the fortune of the people to build adequate peace and national development must be improved upon by bureaucrats. If it will negate or worsen peaceful coexistence of the people, it is unjust and morally unacceptable,

and should not be allowed to take place. The already deplorable and miserable condition of the people because of lack of peaceful living is already made worse by bureaucrats who are egocentric, as their actions leads to more miserable living of the people. Thus, where state legitimacy, authority and capability are weak, there is likely to be difficulty in the implementation of peace building programmes and policies.

Conclusion

Peacebuilding and nation building are a necessity for economic, political and social development of a society or state. The development of peace and nation building, continues to incorporates humanitarian indicators, which should be appropriate to facilitate early actions towards growth and development. These efforts rely on various mechanisms at all levels of government and non-governmental organisations in order to maintain political, economic and social impacts as well as the administrative performance and results of peaceful co-existence.

These measures include institutional mechanisms that serve as tools to predict and where possible prevent conflict and mitigate their impact on the vulnerable populations. It also includes quick and adequate responses mechanisms and building immeasurable resilience for communities to avoid conflict. The study also alludes to the fact that, protection of life and properties in the broadest sense, aims at ensuring that authorities and other actors respect their obligations and the rights of individuals in order to preserve the lives, human dignity, security, physical and moral integrity and dignity of those affected by armed conflicts and/or other relevant situations of violence as well as discrimination. Protection includes efforts that strive to prevent or stop actual or potential violations of armed groups and other criminal elements. Above all, protection aims to eradicate the causes of violations, or the circumstances that lead to them, by addressing the perpetrators of the violations.

It must be reaffirmed that the primary responsibility of States for protecting and assisting people affected by conflict, violence, discrimination, taking into account the specific needs of the most vulnerable (women and children). Bureaucrats must therefore ensure that displaced people are entitled to the protection of their human rights and assistance accorded

to them by relevant laws, bearing in mind the special protection and assistance needed by particular groups within displaced populations, including women and children, single heads of household, unaccompanied minors, persons living with disabilities and special needs, and the elderly persons, and youths. Special protection needs of these categories of displaced persons include, but are not limited to protection against, sexual and gender-based violence especially against women and children in all forms, statelessness, slavery, recruitment of children and forced conscription in hostilities, forced labour, human trafficking and smuggling. Thus, civil society with all its complexity is a mirror reflecting human nature with its multiple needs. Human nature thus becomes the foundation of the society with all its ramifications.

Finally, for peace to be properly established the people, honesty and public accountability is necessary in governance by bureaucrats, in other to avoid gangs of thieves and treasury looters. Any government made up of dishonest and fraudulent people whose main purpose of coming to government is to enrich themselves is not a government that can promote peaceful coexistence. In other words, once morality is taken away from government there will be no government, but a gang of criminals or a gang of thieves with the key to the national treasury in their hands.

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CHAPTER TEN

THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND PEACEBUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA

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INTRODUCTION

After nearly a decade of violent militancy by aggrieved Niger Delta youths that threatened to cripple the Nigerian state economically, the Nigerian government in 2009 introduced the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) aimed at disarming, rehabilitating and reintegrating the militants who accepted the pardon offer. The PAP package included placating inhabitants of the region by promoting socioeconomic development, and addressing the root causes of grievances, conflict and instability in the region. Following its introduction, a total of 30,000 militants—across the three phases of the programme—surrendered their weapons and embraced the amnesty offer (NEXTIER, 2020). Also, crude oil production—which had dropped to about 700, 000 barrels per day before the amnesty— increased to 2.2 million barrels per day after the PAP was established (Oluwaniyi, 2011). With reduced militancy, it appeared relative peace had returned to the region.

Nevertheless, over a decade since the introduction of PAP, the Niger Delta region remains unstable, and permeated by both old and emergent security challenges. Since 2015, there has been noticeable uptick in oil-induced youth grievance and ethno-community-based tensions in the region. Illicit oil refining and crude oil theft have spiked in the area (TFFP/PIND/NDPI, 2016; Ebiede, Langer and Tosun, 2020). New militant groups—such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF)—have also emerged. Militancy and insurgency remain key drivers of fatalities linked with insecurity

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in the region (Ebiede, Bassey and Asuni, 2021), thus indicating an ineffective handling of the situation by the Nigerian State.

The continued security problems in the Niger Delta point to the inability of the PAP to placate the restive Niger Delta youths, stabilise the security situation, drive socioeconomic development, and promote sustainable peace in the area. Omokhoa (2015), Albert (2019), and Ebiede, Langer and Tosun (2020) have all highlighted some of the challenges that have inhibited the PAP's peacebuilding potentials since inception, including a weak conceptual and implementation framework, absence of an inclusionary focus, and a reduction of the initiative to a narrow, self-serving patron-client system. In most post-conflict environments, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes often do not exceed three years (Banholzer, 2014). However, in post-Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the amnesty programme has spanned over a decade with no discernible termination date in sight.

The foregoing raises the need for a re-examination of the presidential amnesty initiative as a peacebuilding tool in promoting peace, security and development in the Niger Delta area. The amnesty programme remains an essential part of the Nigerian government's effort to manage the Niger Delta crises. Given its limitations, it is important to critically re-examine the policy, its impacts and challenges in order to identify options to enhance its capacity to contribute to sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region. Following the introduction, the chapter conceptualises amnesty and peacebuilding, and then briefly examines conflict and instability in the Niger Delta. This is followed by an appraisal of the PAP and then the concluding remarks.

Conceptualising Amnesty

Amnesty denotes a formal pardon or forgiveness, granted by a government to an individual or group who have committed an offence—usually of a political or military nature—against the state. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary described the term as “the act of an authority (such as a government) by which pardon is granted to a large group of individuals”. Though viewed as pardon, amnesty could be distinguished from pardon: while a pardon generally sets aside

or reduces a punishment for an offense, amnesty frees the offender from both the offense and the punishment. In other words, it is an act of forgiveness granted even before a prosecution, conviction and penance is proclaimed. Additionally, pardon often relates to clemency for individuals convicted of (mostly) common violations against the peace and security of the state. Meanwhile, amnesty deals with state crimes, such as offenses committed by guerrillas, militias or terrorist groups, and other political offenders.

Amnesty could be initiated to terminate a conflict, facilitate settlement, reconciliation and peace. Amnesty offers an opportunity to violent groups to disarm, and be reintegrated into the society through various DDR programmes, which the government is expected to be highly committed to, and execute effectively. In the context of insurgencies and political hostilities, amnesty could be effective in mitigating conflict, and facilitating conflict resolution. As a political settlement, it could be used to end an insurgency, enable reconciliation, and promote peace and stability. In 1974, former President George Washington applied the tool in resolving the Whiskey Rebellion by promising to pardon the offenders who pledged to renounce violence and obey the law (Ebel, 1974). The UN and many other international organisations encourage the granting of amnesty as long as they are not accorded to individuals implicated in war crimes.

Furthermore, a government may exploit the amnesty initiative to improve its image. In this connection, Thom-Otuya and Eremie (2011) described the Niger Delta amnesty policy of the Nigerian government as a desperate effort at restoring government's credibility and legitimacy in the area. Nonetheless, a successfully implemented amnesty programme may yield multiple security, political and economic benefits for the government. Nigeria's amnesty programme could be viewed in this context: to end militancy, save lives, halt attacks against oil installation and ensure uninterrupted production of crude oil in the region. However, while amnesty can potentially end a conflict and promote peace, it is not resistant to collapse. Hence, the design and application of amnesty as a conflict mitigation and peacebuilding tool should

be undertaken in a manner that reduces the risk of the policy inhibiting, rather than promoting, sustainable peace and security.

Peacebuilding

The concept of peacebuilding first emerged through the work of Johan Galtung (1976) who called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. The concept has since become one of the United Nations’ cardinal models of peace process, and made globally popular through Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali (1992: 12) defined peacebuilding as the totality of actions to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict. Another UN report described peacebuilding as involving “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (United Nations, 2010: 5). It therefore entails addressing both the proximate and root causes of conflict in order to bring about transformation in the form of sustainable reconciliation and peaceful co-existence.

Peacebuilding involves cessation of hostilities, settlement, reconciliation, capacity building, reconstruction, rehabilitation, demilitarisation, and social transformation. It is a long-term process that involves early warning and early response effort, prevention of violence, crises management, ceasefire agreements, peacekeeping, peacemaking, establishment and nurturing of peace. The processes help to facilitate the establishment of sustainable peace and try to prevent a recurrence of violence by dealing with the underlying causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution-building as well as political and economic transformations. The main goal of peacebuilding is to create positive peace, characterised by equity, justice and functional conflict management mechanisms.

Peacebuilding will be more effective where the parties have a high confidence in the process. The offer of amnesty can help in building confidence in a peacebuilding process. As

a measure that seeks to eliminate offence and retribution, it forms an important component of a negotiated peace agreement that helps to reduce violence and contribute to durable peace. The question of criminal liability and punishment is often a major stumbling block to a peace settlement. Armed insurgent groups may be unwilling to commit to a peace process without guarantees that they would not be punished for the crimes they might have committed in the past. Thus, amnesty could be a prerequisite for opening a peace negotiation or arriving at a peace settlement. It helps to lubricate the conflict environment, build confidence in a peace process, and enables conflict parties to find creative solutions for advancing a peace process.

Conflict and Instability in the Niger Delta Region

The Niger Delta region is Nigeria's oil belt. It comprises the oil-bearing states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. Since the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in Oloibiri, Bayelsa State in 1956, the resources have been uninterruptedly exploited by the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies in a manner that have altered the pre-existing mode of production and degraded the environment. Extraction of crude oil resources from the Niger Delta has sustained the Nigerian economy for over six decades. The resource accounted for 86% of Nigeria's export earnings in 2021 (*The Guardian*, August 9, 2021). The precarious dependence on crude oil revenue for Nigeria's economic sustenance since the 1970s has resulted in inconsistent economic growth, poor industrialisation and other forms of volatility and insecurity associated with the country (Emediegwu and Okeke, 2017).

There is a consensus in the literature that mindless exploitation of crude oil has left a significant part of the Niger Delta despoiled, desolated and uninhabitable (Ibeanu, 2000; Ikelegbe and Umukoro, 2016a; Babatunde, 2020). Environmental degradation, immiseration, deprivation, inequitable distribution of oil benefits, oppressive and repressive response to local grievances, and other negative footprints of oil exploitation have combined to trigger and exacerbate conflict and violence in the Niger Delta. At the turn of the 21st century, local agitation for greater benefits and inclusive crude oil resource management entered a violent

phase, manifesting in the form of militancy. Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016a) observed that the emergent armed militancy in the Niger Delta was about resistance, redress, and survival of the region's inhabitants. Violence became a tool for negotiating, bargaining, and extracting compensation from both the state and the oil companies in the region.

Militancy, in particular, was the direct consequence of unaddressed collective grievances in the Niger Delta, over perceived exclusion, inequity and injustice in the distribution of oil benefits. It symbolises the struggle for environmental and socioeconomic justice. However, over the years, the Niger Delta conflict has become a complex mix of genuine struggle for environmental and socioeconomic justice and a greed-fuelled criminality that has manifested in increased oil piracy, cultism and gang wars, political thuggery, kidnapping, oil bunkering, etc. The actors too are multifaceted, including local and regional elites, government officials, security agents, officials of the state oil corporation, and external actors with expertise in international oil shipping and finance (Asuni, 2009; Odobo, 2017).

Meanwhile, the emergent militant groups, such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), especially between 2004 and 2009, orchestrated several attacks against the oil companies and the Nigerian state. With arms and ammunition freely proliferating, the militants blew up oil pipelines and flow stations, captured oil vessels on the high sea, took many oil expatriates within the region hostage. No less than 120 oil workers were taken hostage by militants in the Niger Delta between 2006 and July 2009 (Bassey, 2018). The militancy had also resulted to a 40% drop in Nigeria's oil production capacity at the end of 2008, with significant consequences on government revenue from oil sale (Agbibo, 2013). The endless spiral of violence, sabotage of oil production and its hard-hitting consequences on an oil-dependent economy, coupled with ineffectiveness of the military responses earlier launched to contain the militancy, compelled the Nigerian government to seek an alternative non-adversarial approach to the crisis. Accordingly, the government announced the offer of amnesty to militant groups in the region who were willing to abandon armed militancy and embrace a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The Presidential Amnesty Programme

The Presidential Amnesty Programme was birthed following the groundwork carried out by the Niger Delta Technical Committee which was inaugurated on 8 September 2008. The remit of the Committee was to collate and review all past reports on the Niger Delta conflict, assess their recommendations, and then suggest to the Federal Government durable solutions to the wide-ranging challenges in the Niger Delta. Some of the Committee's recommendations included a bumping up of oil derivation revenue to the Niger Delta states from 13% to 25%, an effective and efficient independent regulation of oil pollution, strengthened sanctions regime against violator oil companies, and ending of gas flaring by 31 December 2008. It also recommended the establishment of a DDR commission to engage the Niger Delta militants with the prospect of amnesty and participation in the DDR programme for those willing to renounce rebellion (TCND, 2008).

Following the Committee's report, high level consultations involving government officials, the Niger Delta political and traditional elite, and top militant commanders were held. Within the period, then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan travelled repeatedly to several militant camps in the region to convince the militants to cease hostility and embrace peace. Following the success of the consultations, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, on 25 June 2009, announced the offer of presidential pardon to militants who had participated in the Niger Delta insurgency, and were willing to surrender all illegal weapons in their possession and renounce armed militancy.

The pardon offer was in place for 60 days – 6 August to 4 October 2009. A Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta was instituted to implement the initiative. By the end of the 60-day ultimatum on 4 October 2009, 20,192 militants had accepted the amnesty offer and yielded their arms and ammunitions to the government. Those who embraced the amnesty included top militant commanders such as Ateke Tom, Government Ekpemupolo, alias Tompolo, and Farah Dagogo. Some 2,760 arms of various grades, 287,445 ammunitions, 3,155 magazines, 1,090 dynamite caps, 763

explosives and sticks of dynamite, and 18 gunboats (Oluwaniyi, 2011) were surrendered to the amnesty committee representatives across the six arms collection centres that were opened in Edo, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Ondo and Rivers States respectively. A second phase of the amnesty was created in 2010 leading to the inclusion of 6,166 persons said to have embraced the amnesty offer after the expiration of the 60-day grace period. An additional 3,642 ex-militants were absorbed in October 2012, following further screening conducted by members of the amnesty committee (Ikelegbe and Umukoro, 2016).

Some of the ex-militants engaged in the second and third phases of the PAP were those who were initially doubtful of the sincerity of the initiative, but later realised the benefits of participating in it. A number of these individuals might have stayed back to resume the armed struggle in the event that the initiative collapsed. However, there were also claims that nearly a thousand non-militant youths from conflict-impacted communities in the Niger Delta were surreptitiously included in the amnesty programme (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2016b; Odobo, 2017). This suggests that the subsequent inclusion of more ex-militants after October 2009 was as a result of agitation for inclusion by genuine ex-militants and others who found their way into the programme through the backdoor.

The disarmament phase of the PAP was concluded in December 2009. The arms recovered from the ex-militants were deposited at the 82 Division of the Nigerian Army in Enugu, and later destroyed by the Army at a location in Enugu State on 25 May 2011 in compliance with the United Nations DDR guideline. Meanwhile, the demobilisation component of the PAP was concluded in December 2011, entailing the identification, registration and the documentation of the amnestied militants at the various designated sites. According to the implementation committee, each ex-militant was promised a monthly allowance of N65, 000 and vocational training (Oluwaniyi, 2011; Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2016a).

The initial stage of the demobilisation exercise appeared chaotic. There were complaints about the sanitary conditions and the absence of necessary facilities at the various

camps which left the ex-militants disenchanted, many of whom abandoned the camps in Benin, Port Harcourt and Yenagoa in protest. The demobilised militants also complained about delay in the payment of their monthly allowance. Some of them accused their commanders of withholding their allowance, and underpaying them when the money was eventually paid. Oluwaniyi (2011) and NEXTIER (2020) claimed too that the ex-militant leaders benefitted the most from the amnesty package and state patronage while the foot-soldiers were often shortchanged.

Meanwhile, rehabilitation of the ex-militants commenced in June 2010 at the Obubra camp in Cross River State. The exercise entailed medical and biometric checks, training of the ex-militants on non-violence, and counselling on career path. Feeding, accommodation and clothing were provided for the participants. After the rehabilitation exercise, the transformed militants are reintegrated into the community through educational capacity programme or vocational skills acquisition programme either locally or abroad, depending on fund availability, area of specialisation and the ex-militants' interests (NEXTIER, 2020). The reintegration programme lasts between a period of six months and five years of training. As of May 2019, about 2,577 amnesty beneficiaries were on educational scholarship; 1,060 of them were studying in about 10 private and government universities in Nigeria, while 1,517 others were studying abroad in over 50 universities in Europe, Asia, Africa and Americas. Within the same period, 20, 000 pardoned militants had graduated from various training in and outside Nigeria; about 3,243 of them were undergoing trainings, while 5,578 were awaiting enlistment into the training (Udo, 2019). PAP beneficiaries have received training in several areas, including the petroleum, agro-allied industries and marine sectors. The initiative has produced PhD holders, pilots, and specialists in ICT, pipeline welding, boat building, sea faring, and ocean diving.

An Appraisal of the Amnesty Initiative and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta

The introduction of PAP has helped to mitigate conflict and instability in the Niger Delta. Incidences of killings, kidnapping, and incessant sabotage of oil facilities in the region have

significantly reduced, leading to a steady flow of oil and increased revenue for the government. As a result, Nigeria's crude oil production improved to 2.2 million barrels from 700, 000 barrels per day before the programme was established. Furthermore, the PAP has improved the capacity of many Niger Delta youths through university education, vocational training programmes, apprenticeship schemes, and job placement initiatives. No fewer than 2,265 beneficiaries have received training in agriculture; 1,171 in automobile mechanics; 4,686 in welding/fabrication; 2,074 in entrepreneurship; 402 in carpentry, plumbing and pipe-fitting; 714 in electrical installation/maintenance; while no less than 13 of the beneficiaries have acquired PhD degrees (Udo, 2019).

In spite of these successes, the PAP is beset with numerous challenges that have inhibited its peacebuilding potential in the Niger Delta. First, there is a lack of clarity on the eligibility criteria that was used in selecting the PAP beneficiaries, since no independent verification was undertaken to ascertain the actual number of ex-agitators that were pardoned. This raised the concern that some of the ex-militant commanders inflated the number of foot soldiers under their control to maximise their share of the PAP package (Odobó, 2017).

In many ways, the PAP lacks an inclusionary focus—a key element of peacebuilding. Many ex-militants—mostly of non-Ijaw extraction—across the region have claimed non-inclusion in the amnesty programme or inequity in the allocation of amnesty benefits. The PAP continues to be viewed narrowly as an exclusively Ijaw programme among these groups of ex-agitators, seeing that a majority of the beneficiaries were of Ijaw ethnicity drawn from Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta and Ondo States (Omokhoa, 2015; Ikelegbe and Umukoro, 2016b). Additionally, the PAP focus has been on the ex-agitators to the exclusion of the ordinary people who were the primary victims of the militancy, the brutal state response, and the continuous oil-related degradation of the Niger Delta environment. The PAP failed to address the key issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction of property, social amenities and oil-bearing communities destroyed by insurgency and counterinsurgency activities before 2009.

A related criticism of the amnesty programme is that it is a strategy of appeasement of the most violent agitators. This probably explains why, in response to surrender of arms and a pledge to renounce militancy, the government awarded lucrative contracts to some of the ex-militant commanders. For instance, Tompolo, Asari Dokubo, Ateke Tom, and Victor Ben Ebikabowei (Boyloaf) were awarded pipeline protection contracts up to the sums of N3.6 billion, N1.44 billion, N560 million, and N560 million respectively (NEXTIER, 2020). The seeming cash-for-arms approach adopted by the government weakened the effectiveness of the PAP. The payment of N3, 000 daily allowance (during the integration period) and a monthly stipend of N65, 000 to the ex-agitators by the government inadvertently diverted the attention of most of the ex-militants from the peacebuilding impact of PAP towards the financial benefits of the initiative. As observed by Oluwaniyi (2011), the emphasis on money portends danger for the security and development of the Niger Delta. With the excess flow of money—or perhaps, scarcity of it when the PAP ends—and expanding political opportunities, the ex-combatants are likely to rearm themselves to re-engage in violent activities. By the way, the PAP has not totally addressed the proliferation of illicit weapons in the region. In fact, since 2015, there has been surge in youth restiveness, armed robbery, kidnapping, and oil theft in the Niger Delta (TFFP/PIND/NDPI, 2016; Ebiede, Langer & Tosun, 2020; Ebiede, Basse and Asuni, 2021), raising serious doubts about the DDR component of the PAP.

Fiscal profligacy has accompanied the management of militancy in the Niger Delta. This also highlights the problem of corruption in the implementation of the PAP. “Incidentally, the programme has taken the same route as other state institutions, as it is marred by corruption, nepotism and has no drive for optimal goals.... The PAP has evolved from being a policy into a full-fledged government institution... currently performing as a typical Nigerian institution faced with [a] lack of a clear structure of how it provides public service”, argued NEXTIER (2020: 12). The Niger Delta people and the larger Nigerian society have been inundated with reports about how the PAP has become characterised by patron-client networks, and blemished with widespread corruption. No fewer than three former coordinators

of the PAP (Kingsley Kuku, Paul Boroh, and Charles Dokubo) have been sacked, and alongside some other members of staff in the Amnesty Office, charged with financial impropriety and other acts of corruption that have derailed the objective of the programme.

More fundamentally, the people of the region have historically claimed that environmental degradation, inequitable access to oil resources, and neglect of the socioeconomic and infrastructural development of the region were the root causes of the conflict. The PAP was, therefore, perceived as a stabilisation tool that would enable a favourable environment for the government to concentrate on addressing the above issues. However, it has failed to address the critical issues that undergird conflict and instability in the Niger Delta. Despite the fact that infrastructural development and environmental remediation were included as objectives of the amnesty programme, in line with the recommendations of the Niger Delta Technical Committee report, these have hardly been discussed let alone addressed. No material development has occurred in the region besides the tokenistic development interventions, such as road construction and rehabilitation, undertaken by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of the Niger Delta Affairs.

The narrow implementation of the amnesty initiative, particularly the lack of attention to infrastructural development of the region, have led many observers to conclude that the PAP has not succeeded as a peacebuilding tool. It has failed to address the core conflict issues of underdevelopment, inequity in resource management, local economy dysfunction, and continued environmental degradation of Nigeria's oil belt (Ikelegbe and Umukoro, 2016a). The PAP is not only corrupt and unsustainable, it promotes warlordism and the spread of organised crime in the region (Sayne, 2013). It is not part of a larger Niger Delta peace plan because it focuses mostly on (ex) militants (Odobu, 2017). The PAP has "derailed from its original objectives..., [lacks] transparency, consistency and efficient management of resources... [and is] characterised by a vision targeted only toward reducing threats to oil

production” (NEXTIER, 2020). It has clearly become a mere attempt by the Nigerian government to buy short-term peace in the Niger Delta (Okonofua, 2016).

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the Presidential Amnesty Programme and its peacebuilding impact in post-conflict Niger Delta region. It has highlighted the remote and proximate factors that necessitated the establishment of the amnesty programme, and how the initiative has attempted to address conflict and facilitate sustainable peace in the region. The foregoing analysis shows that the discovery and commercial exploitation of crude oil in the Niger Delta region aggravated the Niger Delta peoples’ pre-existing struggle for equitable economic, political and social inclusion in the Nigerian state. The mindless exploitation of crude oil by the Nigerian state, in collusion with the multinational oil companies, degraded the region’s environment, disrupted the local economy, and weakened human security in the area. More importantly, the inability—or reluctance—of the Nigerian state to mitigate the negative footprints of oil exploitation created local grievances and self-determination struggles that inadvertently transformed into militancy with significant destabilising consequences on the Nigerian economy. To address the emergent threats, the Nigerian government instituted the amnesty policy with the hope that it would lead to durable peace in the Niger Delta.

The amnesty programme, no doubt, has achieved its main objective of security stabilisation, in relation to enabling an unencumbered production of crude oil. It successfully de-escalated the unprecedented levels of militancy violence that hitherto unsettled the extractive industry in the Niger Delta. However, it has failed to facilitate inclusive and durable peace in the Niger Delta. This is due to the flawed design and implementation of the programme. The PAP appears to be exclusively focused on placating the most violent actors in the region, rather than addressing the root causes of conflict in the area. Many other important peacebuilding issues that affect community cohesion have been left unaddressed, such as the yearning for environmental and socioeconomic justice.

The focus of the PAP is the promotion of peace, security and development in the Niger Delta region. However, as a peacebuilding initiative, it has been unable to achieve sustainable peace in the region because it has failed to (adequately) mainstream inclusiveness or broad-based participation in its activities. Successful peacebuilding programmes are often characterised by broad participation that incorporates the interests, needs and challenges of all segments of the targeted population. The essence of inclusion is to ensure that individuals and groups that may be excluded from the peacebuilding process do not resort to violence to communicate their demands, as has been recently experienced in the Niger Delta where emergent ethnic-based militias continue to amble for inclusion in the PAP, and where oil theft and illegal oil refining have reached new heights.

Thus, as a vital component of the Nigerian government's effort to address local grievances and promote durable peace in the Niger Delta, it is important to refocus the initiative towards responding to the root causes of the conflict, such as extreme poverty, and lack of basic infrastructures such as roads, electricity, healthcare and pipe-borne water. Adequate attention should also be given to the problems of environmental degradation and despoliation in the region, occasioned by decades of insensitive and greedy exploitation of crude oil. The identified challenges, particularly the environmental and developmental emancipation of the Niger Delta can only be brought about by resolving the fundamental questions of the Nigerian federation, especially fiscal control and equitable management of natural resources that is reflective of local participation.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES: A NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

A state is the domain for making authoritative and binding decisions. As a public institution that gives order to all and receives order from none, one of the fundamental responsibilities of the state is to ensure the security of the lives and properties of its citizens. Others include the protection of its territoriality and sovereignty and the guarantee of its socio-economic and political stability. However, this protective function of the state has been threatened by local and international terrorism and terrorism-related activities (Ogbonnaya and Ehgiamuose, 2013). The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria specifically states that “The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”.

Unfortunately, government on this constitutional responsibility has failed to provide a secured and safe environment for lives, properties and the conduct of business and economic activities (1999 CFRN cited in Eweta and Urhie, 2014: 1). Security in any society can be achieved in a tranquil situation devoid of threats to lives and property. Some of these threats are terrorism, political instability, environmental degradation, economic meltdown, religious intolerance, to mention a few. Amongst these threats, terrorism has currently drawn the attention of the world as developed and developing countries faced with threats of terrorism (Peterside, 2014).

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Terrorism is globally becoming household word as there is no nation that is completely absolved from its effect in the recent time. It has become a frightening phenomenon and a concern for many governments and citizens around the world which draws one's attention to the vulnerability of modern societies. Globalization has significantly influenced the spate of terrorism as the event in one part of the globe has direct or an indirect effect on other (Alao and Atere, 2012). Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and not a sole preserve of any class, clan, religion or race. Terrorism dates back to the era of the Roman Empire when Roman Emperors used terrorism to control domestic dissents and eliminate suspected enemies (Oche 2007). The act of terrorism in Africa as well as Nigeria dates back to the era of slavery where violence was employed in the efforts to exploit human material resources from the 15th to the 19th century by European imperialists. This implies that terrorism has been in existence with the evolutionary timeline of the Nigeria state right from inception, is not novel as the Boko Haram menace has made it appear. What is however new is the dimension the 21st century terrorists pose on Nigeria's national security architecture.

Terrorism, which has systematically crept into the Nigerian lexicon has gained currency and drawn increasing attention. Some analysts including policymakers and security officials have often and defensively argued that 'it is Nigeria's share of the prevailing global phenomenon'. Terrorism remains a significant threat to both national and international peace and security (Banunle and Apau, 2018). The level terrorism has affected the national security architecture in Nigeria both in the northern and southern parts has become a major issue for the government. Since 1990 when the activities of the Niger Delta militants started until recent times when Boko Haram insurgents arose in the Northern part of the country, Nigeria has witnessed unprecedented security challenges. These challenges ranges from bombings, suicide bomb attacks, sporadic shooting of unarmed innocent citizens, burning of police stations, churches, kidnapping of school girls and women, hostage taking, assassinations, execution, armed robbery etc had affected the national security architecture and as such hindered business activities, discouraged local and foreign investors, increases government expenditure on

security, all of these stifles and retards Nigeria's socio-economic development (Ewetan and Urhie, 2014). The events surrounding September 11, 2001 and other recent events of terrorism across the globe especially the current wave of terrorism in Nigeria, has focused our minds on issues of terrorism and national security in Nigeria. This study therefore aims at ascertaining how terrorism affect national security in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

It is on the basis of this, that this chapter examined the effects of terrorism on national security in the Northeast, orchestrated by the activities of the Boko Haram sect that has bedeviled the northern Nigeria since 2009. The chapter relied heavily on secondary sources of data such as Books, Journals, Magazines, Newspapers and other internet materials. The chapter is structured into five sections of which this introduction is a part. The second segment delves on conceptual review of concepts such as terrorism and national security. The third section analyses the effects of terrorism on national security in the northeastern Nigeria, fourth section discusses the challenges of national security in the fight against terrorism (Book Haram sect) in the North-Eastern Nigeria, while the last section is the conclusion and recommendations.

The Concept of Terrorism

There is no universal acceptable conceptual and operational definition of terrorism. Both the theoretical conceptualization and the empirical manifestation of terrorism are highly contested base on state, national, political, geopolitical, religious and even ideological constellations, giving rise to not one but many manifestations of terrorism, differing from one region to another, one sub-region to another and one country to another (Bartolotta, 2011). Terrorism is a major global threat and continues to be a subject of policy and academic research, as such, attempts at arriving at a definition have been made. The concept of terrorism has been used to mark forms of unaccepted, illogical violence projected against persons at the state or society, or any section of the populace. Terrorism is defined as the systematic use of violence and intimidation to coerce a government or community into acceding to specific political demands

(Pearsall and Trumble, 2006). In the case of Nigeria, terrorism is linked indiscriminately to legitimizing the objective soft he fundamentalist Islamic religious sect (Boko Haram).

At the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) defined an act of terrorism as “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage” (OAU, 1999). Similarly, the 2015 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation”. In addition, Forest and Giroux (Forest and Giroux 2011), define terrorism as a tactic that uses violence or threat of violence as a coercive strategy to cause fear and political intimidation. In the vein, Hoffman (1998: 32), views terrorism as a means of communicating a message and using violence as a way to further solidify the triumph of their cause. He establishes several common traits, including strategic targeting and the undeniable belief in the ultimate triumph over their enemies.

In November 2004, a United Nations Secretary General report described terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act” (UN, 2005). It is a premeditated use of threat or violence by subnational groups to obtain a political or self-interest objectives through intimidation of people, attacking of states, territories either by bombing, hijackings, and suicide attacks, among others. It implies a premeditated, political motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, and usually intended to influence an audience (US Commission, 2012; Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamuose, 2013). The problem with the above two definitions is that, due to the level of sophistication of ammunitions in the hand of terrorist, terror acts may be directed at both

combatants and non-combatants as we have seen in the September 11 attacks against the United States and the Boko Haram sect in the northern Nigeria.

Conceptualising National Security

A peaceful, stable and secure environment is considered to be one of the basic needs of every society (Huggins et al 2012). The maintenance of law and order in Nigeria in recent times has been very challenging such that the ability and capacity to manage our National Security by the Security Agencies is being doubted by the citizenry (Abimbola and Adesote 2012:22). Primarily, the Federal Government is charged with the responsibility of using the military, police and other security agencies to protect every citizen from all forms of security threats and incidents like armed robbery, kidnapping, civil disorder, large scale violence, insurgency, killing, bombing and other forms of security breaches.

National security has been one of the key interests in the studies of international relations and strategic studies. Generally, definitions of national security have been about the protection of states and their citizens from threats and dangers and the ability to preserve core values (Yong, 2011). In Nigeria's context, national security is concerned with protecting the lives and property of Nigerians, preserving her sovereignty, territoriality and its economy, and enhancing socio-cultural and political harmony (Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamuose, 2013). National security therefore, becomes the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic, diplomatic and political power. It is about how to maintain a more stable society for national progress and solidarity. McNamara (2005: 48), sees national security as part of the government policy which aims at generating favourable national and international strategic environment for the protection, promotion and proliferation of national values against existing or potential threats (2005:43). McNamara sees development as an important aspect of national security; hence, he states that in modernizing society: "Security means development". Security is not military hardware though it may include it. Security is not military force though it involves it. Security is not military activity though it may

encompass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security” (McNamara 2005: 48). According to Nzekwe (2005: 5)

National Security is the sum total of the vital national interest of a country. A vital national interest is one for which a country is willing to go to War either immediately or ultimately in order to defend it.

A nation is secured to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able if challenged to maintain them by victory in such a war. The ability of a country to maintain its sovereignty and protect its political, economic, social and other interests in a sovereign manner and act likewise in its relations with other states in the international system. It follows then that national security entails the protection of all the National interest upon which the surround of the country depends. In similar vein, Obasanjo (2009) defines national security as the aggregation of the security interests of the individuals, political entities, human associations and ethnic groups, which make up the nation. The security interest includes safety of life and property, economic, psychological and mental well-being and the freedom to pursue the attainment of legitimate objectives without hindrance” (Obasanjo 2009). Obasanjo’s definition is comprehensive as it touches every aspect of human endeavour and the society.

Other security analysts have contended that the current security challenges confronting the Nigeria state is capable of making the country porous for internal and external subversion and insurrection. Thus, they have called for more stringent security measures and policies rather than being saddled with peace-keeping operations in other countries while lacking the ability to deal with internal security crisis, conflicts and tensions. Finally, these analysts have submitted that current national defence budget and policy should be properly channelled towards economic, social and political development (Dixon, 2012; Azazi, 2012).

In the context of this work, National security encompasses the protection of the nation’s territorial integrity, the protection of national borders, maintenance of economic relations with the outside world, the preservation of the country’s nature, institution and governance.

Nigeria's profile ranking in global terrorism index in 2017

Rank	Country	Score
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.441
3	Nigeria	9.009
4	Syria	8.621
5	Pakistan	8.4
6	Yemen	7.877
7	Somalia	7.654
8	India	7.534
9	Turkey	7.519
10	Libya	7.256

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2017

From the above global terrorism index table, it can be deduced that Nigeria is having the total score of 9.009, as such, occupying number 3 position in the global terrorism ranking index 2017. What actually made this possible is the activities of the dreaded Islamic sect (Boko Haram) in the northern part of Nigeria. Some of these activities include bombing, suicide bomb attacks, sporadic shooting of unarmed and innocent citizens, burning of police stations, churches, kidnapping of school girls and women.

The Effects of Terrorism on National Security in Nigeria

The debilitating effects of terrorism on Nigeria's national security architecture is obvious. For instance, Ahokegh (2013) identified the effects as devastation in terms of destruction of thousands of lives and properties worth billions of Naira such as buildings, markets, stores, arsenals, offices, and their equipment and other structures. This postulation is a fact considering the destructive and destabilizing effects of terrorism in Nigeria over the recent years. The activities of the dreaded Islamic sect (Boko Haram) in the northern part of Nigeria, have created an atmosphere of siege and desolation in most parts of Northern Nigeria. Some

of these activities include bombing, suicide bomb attacks, sporadic shooting of unarmed and innocent citizens, burning of police stations, churches, kidnapping of school girls and women.

According to Bamidele (2012) perceives the effects of Boko Haram insurgency as erosion of national security and confidence of the general public on the ability of the security personnel to protect their lives and properties. The resultant public security volatility in the region has been an impediment to trade and investment, peaceful co-existence and stability, as well as sustainable livelihood and development (Okoli and Iortyer, 2014). This scenario has since complicated and accentuated the plight of the region as a developmentally challenged section of Nigeria. In respect of the effects of terrorism for the wider polity of Nigeria, it is to be noted that the Boko Haram insurgency has led to negative perception of Nigeria as an unsafe country by the wider world. This has damaged Nigeria's profile as a favourable international destination for investment, travel, tourism, scholarship, and migration (Okoli and Iortyer, 2014). It is also noted that, one of the impacts of terrorism in North Eastern Nigeria is perception of the image of the country across the globe as the country is turned into one of the terror haven zone and also the image of public perception of Islamic religion being smeared by the action of the few where sometimes some commentators and individuals linked Islam with terrorism directly (Aro, 2013). This does not augur well for the sustenance of the country's national security.

According to Olanrewaju (2015), the biggest and most the pressing terrorism challenge now facing Nigeria is the destructive Boko - Haram insurgency in the North East of Nigeria that has claimed thousands of lives and properties worth billions of naira. More so, on one of its assaults, invaded the government secondary school at Chibok, in Chibok Local Government Area, Borno State, and abducted some 276 school girls in April 2014, by the insurgents have not yet been released. Again, Boko Haram sect, on February 18, 2018, majestically cruised to the Government Girl's Secondary and Technical College, Dapchi, Busari Local Government Area, Yobe State, and carted away 113. The then Governor of Yobe State, Ibrahim Geidam, through his Press Director, Mr. Abdullahi Bego, had abruptly claimed

that the military has rescued the students (Inyang, 2018). Regrettably, this is disturbing the national security of Nigeria. There have recently been some false hopes raised on this security issue and federal government is currently involved in delicate negotiation with insurgents to free the girls and even before this period the sect has continue to pose serious security threat to the Nigerian state, many people have lost their lives; children have become orphans and many women widowed by the unscrupulous and incessant killings perpetrated by this group. In the face of this national embarrassment, Boko Haram constitutes a threat to Nigerian's national security. The security agencies are being restructured to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in tackling terror (Kelechi, 2012).

Furthermore, the extent of violence and destruction that has been associated with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been horrific. The advent of suicide bombing as a strategy for prosecuting terrorism by members of the sect has since signalled a new dimension to the national security challenge in Nigeria. To say the least, the rising incidence and prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nigeria have exposed the vulnerability of the Nigeria's national security architecture. The Boko Haram insurgency created food insecurity not only in the Northeast but the entire Nigeria and indeed, West Africa because millions of farmers were displaced with many agrarian societies displaced into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps leaving the land uncultivated for many years which caused hunger and food scarcity (Olojo, 2013). This is because the movement is perceived as a response to the hopelessness and deprivation that the youth in the Northeast which is poorest in the country is suffering from poverty, unemployment, corruption, inequality, injustice and other social issues such as depletion of Lake Chad and encroachment of herders into farms all led to additional poverty, food insecurity and joblessness. The above circumstances, orchestrated the problem of sustainability of Nigeria national security architecture.

The Challenges of National Security in the Fight Against Terrorism in Northern Nigeria
Nigeria government is confronted with critical challenges which seem to frustrate their efforts in the fight against terrorism in the northern Nigeria. The phenomenon of ethnicity and

religious intolerance have led to incessant recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have birthed copious militia organisations in the country, such as the Bakassi Boys, the Odua's People Congress (OPC), the Egbesu Boys; the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), amongst others (Salawu, 2010). The emergence of these militia organisations has made religious intolerance and fanaticism more violent and disturbing. The most notorious terrorist group that has posed serious challenges to Nigeria's national security, territoriality, sovereignty and unity in the recent time has been the Boko Haram.

In the face of complex and sophisticated terrorist attacks, stakeholders in government have responded by deploying troops aimed at combating terrorism. Given the level of atrocities of the terrorist activities, in the northern Nigeria, it comes as no surprise that the region as a whole has undergone a process of securitization in recent years, which has resulted in a multitude of forces on the ground (Apau and Banunle, 2019). However, there are several challenges compromising the fight against the menace of terrorism in the country, below are some of the challenges:

Corruption

Corruption simply means the encroachment, infringement and violation of due process. In the same vein, it means when laid down principles, rules and regulations are twisted simply for the purpose of personal gratification. The corrupt ridden nature of Nigerian society is found in all sectors of the economy (both private and public). Corruption is the most social problem that is affecting the entire sectors of Nigeria not only the security. It has been observed that corruption exists among the top-ranking security personnel, bureaucrats and politicians in the fight against insurgency (Sule, Azizuddin, Sanni and Mat, 2017). The pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria has made many top-ranking military officers to have been involved in the corrupt practices involving the money earmarked for fighting the insurgency in the

Northeast. The ruling government has failed to perform its duties because officials are busy amassing wealth at the detriment of the society.

For instance, an amount worth \$2.1 billion (approximately 1 trillion Naira) allocated for the procurement of weapons to address insurgency was diverted for the PDP Presidential campaign in the 2015 General Election through the office of the National Security Adviser Rtd Colonel Sambo Dasuki (EFCC, 2017 and Sule, Azizuddin, Sanni and Mat, 2018). There are many corruption allegations on the security personnel in the fight against insurgency.

Unemployment

The unemployment school of thought blames the emergence of terrorism in northeast Nigeria to unemployment. Unemployment is defined as when people are not engaged in meaningful work and are lacking the basic necessities of life. Corruption leads to unemployment, unemployment to conflicts and conflicts to insecurity. Many Nigerian youths have become preys to terrorists and are easily radicalized. In the Niger Delta region for instance, unemployed youths were the ones employed in the armed conflicts between Multinational Oil Companies and militants while many of such youths are members of the Boko-Haram Sect. One of the adherents of the employment school, Akani, (2014) terms terrorism as “an offshoot of unemployment”, claiming that frustration of unemployed youths’ fuels insurgency and terrorism. The idleness of the youths, contend these proponents, is consequential on the Almajiri system which serves as “a social laboratory for terrorist recruits”. It is also their opinion, and rightly so, that the Boko Haram conflict is being “sustained by these masses of unemployed youth”.

Corroborating the “poverty” and “unemployment” views, (Abdi Shuriye and Huud cited in Charles, et. al., 2018) submit that: poverty and unemployment have therefore served recipe' for the emergence of Boko Haram insurgence because this has left the hopeless poor people to be used as mercenary fighters. What this means theoretically is that poverty and unemployment increase the number of people who are prepared to kill or be killed (suicide bombers) for a given course at token benefit. In similar vein, Adegbami (2013) opined that,

idle mind; they say is the devil workshop so as the rate of unemployment continues to raise, so also the wave of terrorism related crimes and its attendant effects. These armies of unemployed people have really posed grave challenge to the national security, as they employ themselves by engaging in illegal activities such as terrorism, kidnapping, bombings, and other fraudulent activities.

Porous Borders

Nigeria is one of the countries in the world with a large geographical size, different climatic terrain and a porous border particularly in the North where it has the largest size with neighbourhood of more than four countries. Nigeria's land area (909, 890km²) is one of the biggest in the world (Babayo, Abdulkadir, Muhammad, and Kadir, 2019: 7-15). Porosity of Nigeria borders instigate smuggling and trans-border crimes. Smuggling and circulation of contraband goods like small arms and light weapons, human trafficking, drug trafficking posed serious challenge to Nigeria's national security. Ngoa (2012) opines that these hinder the social and economic development of not only Nigeria but the continent of Africa. Smuggling encourages proliferation of arms, ammunition which is aiding the activities of Boko-Haram sect in northern part has compounded criminality, terrorism in Nigeria.

Achumba et. al. (2013) also observed that the porous frontiers of the country, where individual movements are largely untracked have contributed to the level of insecurity in Nigeria. As a result of the porous borders there is an unchecked inflow of Small Arms and Light Weapons into the country which has aided criminality, terrorism and insecurity in the northeast Nigeria. Available data show that Nigeria host over 70 percent of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa (Edeko, 2011). Also, the porosity of the Nigerian borders has aided the uncontrollable influx of migrants, mainly young men, from neighboring countries such as Republic of Niger, Chad and Republic of Benin responsible for some of the criminal acts (Adeola and Oluyemi, 2012).

Nigeria has over one thousand illegal routes through which aliens from neighbouring country can trek-in into the country. This equally informs the high rate of crime, public

disorder and terrorism in Nigeria. The nature of Nigerian porous borders is identified by many scholars (El Kaim 2012, De Montclos 2014, Campbell 2014 and Ahokegh 2013) as one of the reasons why the fight against Boko Haram is challenging and continuous.

Absence of Cooperation Among the Security Personnel and Agencies

It is noticed that there is no cooperation and support among the security personnel and this is one of the challenges that led to the prolonging of the fight against insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria. There are tensions, rivalries, hostilities and discord among them especially the military, police and DSS. This has been reported severally. The joint operation by these security agencies often ended in fiasco being defeated severally by the Boko Haram insurgents for them later to engage in trading words of blame among them (Babayoet'al 2019). This is because of the failure to coordinate and design a strategic and tactical designation of responsibilities and operations among them. This has been observed by many scholars examined in this work such as Forest (2012), Zenn (2012), Rogers (2012) and Bamidele (2012) cited in (Babayoet'al 2019). The security agencies are operating competitively, thereby seeking unnecessary attention and vain glory and forget their primary common functions and goals, to join hands and maintain peace and secure lives and properties of the people.

Inadequate Logistic and Low Motivation of the Security Personnel

The present logistic holdings of the security agencies are comparatively insufficient and outdated to the magnitude of the threat posed by the menace of Boko Haram, it is an established fact that the equipment available to the security agencies is not only inadequate, but also obsolete and archaic. The security personnel are not given enough weapons to confront the insurgents, their mode of transportation made them vulnerable to guerrilla attacks from the insurgents, intelligence level is very low and intelligence gathering was inadequate. All these impede the success of the fight against insurgency as observed by De Montclos (2014). Inadequate logistic is one of the major challenges in the fight against terrorism in northern Nigeria. This simply implies that the fight against insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria is not successful because of the challenge of inadequate logistics that made the security

personnel vulnerable and expose to the dangers of being overwhelmed by the terrorists who appeared better organised and logistically more coordinated than the Nigerian security agencies.

It is recorded officially that the security personnel are not motivated in the fight against insurgency and this has led to low morale and lack of motivation to fight. In most cases, the weapons given to them is below that of the insurgents, their allowances were delayed and not paid in full and sometimes it was not paid at all, when an officer sustained a serious injury, he is allowed to be catered by his family instead of the government that he is serving (Sule, Sambo and Tal, 2018).The security personnel who laid down their lives at the highest risk of being killed by the insurgents abandoned their family and relatives to serve their country but, unfortunately, they were not paid even their salaries on time, their allowances were unnecessarily slashed, medical services were terrible for the injured officers in the field and their weapons are inferior to that of the insurgents.

Political Influence of Insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria

The war against insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria has been politicised for many years. The appointment of the service chiefs most times does not in any way reflect capability to translate vision into reality in the fight against the terrorists rather its politically influenced by those in government. The government is playing politics with the issue of insurgency by presenting false information and figures in the warfront. Sometimes the government and the security personnel will debunk the number of casualties either killed by the Boko Haram insurgents or the security agencies themselves with conflicting figures (Babayo et. al, 2019). On the other hand, the government and the security personnel will announce sometimes that they succeeded in capturing top Boko Haram commanders or killing them which later proved to be untrue as the said killed commanders will appear in a video clip to establish their existence (Giroux and Gilpin 2014).

The influential of people in the corridor of power has politicised the war against insurgency by claiming that it has succeed where it has not. For instance, on several occasions

the government claimed to have killed Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader more than ten times but, unfortunately, he will always appear in a video clip to debunk the claim and reassert his declaration of fighting the government (Babayo et. al., 2019). This political influence in the fight against terrorism has really posed grave challenge to the national security architecture of Nigeria.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons unlawfully in circulation is aiding the activities of Boko-Haram sect in northern part, is a challenge to the national security and has compounded criminality, terrorism in Nigeria. The rate at which arms and ammunition, especially the prohibited ones -weapons of mass destruction (WMD) found their way into this country, makes nonsense of the fire arms law in Nigeria would cause one to infer that there exist in the society a state of normlessness (Okumu, 2009). The availability of these arsenals in the hands of miscreants has indeed propelled them in their nefarious activities at the detriment of the Nigerians and Nigeria security personnel. The inability of Nigeria government to control the proliferation of arms and ammunition into the country is great danger to her national security.

The availability and the use of weapons of mass destruction and or disruption, namely, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons have continued to fuel terrorism. The sophisticated weapons at the disposal of Boko Haram remain one of the motivational spirals fuelling the activities of the insurgency in the north eastern parts of Nigeria. Some argue that the increasing desensitization of audience caused by media trends have forced terrorists to become more violent and spectacular (Neumann, 2009). A point of divergence from the above analysis was given by Zalman (2014) who believed that terrorist attacks are motivated by social and political injustice. People choose terrorism when they are trying to right what they perceive to be a social or political or historical wrong, i.e. when they have been stripped of their land or rights, or denied these.

Thus, Onuoha (2011) is of the view that the proliferation of arms and ammunition is a serious dilemma confronting the Nigerian State in their resolve to combating terrorism and other related offences. It is not only our domestic dilemma it is also an international dilemma. The inability of Nigerian government to control the proliferation of arms and ammunition into the country is great danger to her internal security (Onuoha 2011).

Conclusion

The chapter concludes that terrorism (Boko Haram) has debilitating effects on Nigeria's national security architecture. This postulation is obvious considering the destructive and destabilizing effects of terrorism in Nigeria over the recent years. The activities of the dreaded Islamic sect (Boko Haram) in the northern part of Nigeria, have created an atmosphere of siege and desolation in most parts of Northern Nigeria. Some of these activities include bombing, suicide bomb attacks, sporadic shooting of unarmed and innocent citizens, burning of police stations, churches, kidnapping of school girls and women. The Nigeria government is confronted with critical challenges which seem to frustrate their efforts in the fight against terrorism in the northern Nigeria. Some of these challenges that prevent the success of the fight against terrorism (Boko Haram sect) in Northeastern Nigeria are; unemployment, corruption, porous borders, lack of cooperation among security agencies because of political influence in the appointment of the service chiefs, this has greatly affected their productivity, lack of motivation and inadequate logistics for the security personnel, politicization and proliferation of small arms and light weapons amongst others were discussed in detail in the course of this work.

Government must improve the standard of living of the people through provision of jobs for the teeming unemployed youths: unemployed youths constitute a grave danger fuelling terrorism and insecurity in the northern Nigeria. These unemployed people now constitute a forum where Boko-Haram sect recruit new members. Creating employment in the critical sectors of the economy, for example agricultural sector and manufacturing sector as well as strengthening the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in order to diversify

and enhance jobs. This will give employment opportunity to the teeming unemployed youths will reduced the crimes in the land, most especially in the Northern part to assuage the temptation of joining a terrorist organisation.

Political influence (corruption) in the appointment of the service chiefs, it should be based on capability to translate vision into reality in the fight against the terrorists. Government shouldn't politicize the issue of terrorism (Boko Haram sect) and reveal the real situation on ground to keep the public alerted because this will help in saving lives and properties of Nigerians within the crisis zones.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

THE ROLE OF RACISM IN GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Samuel Opeyemi IROYE* and Florence Foluso AWOSAN†

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the spread of civilization worldwide, racism and gender-based violence remain serious social, health and security problems across the globe. Humans are known to exhibit different phenotypical characteristics (including skin colour) and behavioural traits, it is believed that these attributes are genetically determined, and that humans can be divided into distinct racial or ethnic groups based on them (Newman, 2012; Dennis, 2004). The worrisome aspect is the fact that over the years people of certain races are perceived to be inferior to others, and they are often subjected to discrimination, stigmatization, prejudices, violent attacks and other forms of injustice including unequal access to education, job opportunities, resources and political power (Newman, 2012).

In Germany, the Nazis party graded humans on a scale of pure Aryans (which include Germans, and other Germanic people such as Dutch, Scandinavian, English, etc.) to non-Aryan sub-humans (which include Poles, Russians, Ukrainians), to Jews who were considered inhuman and as such unworthy of life. Based on the Nazi racial ideology about 6 million Jews and 2.5 million ethnic poles were killed (Davies, 2006). In Poland, about 120,000 Polish people, mostly women and children were killed in the ethnic-based massacres by the Uranian Insurgent Army in the territory that was occupied by them between 1943 and 1945 (Davies, 2006). In the United States of America, the Naturalization Act of 1790 limited U.S. citizenship

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to whites only, the high caste Hindus were considered as not white persons, and were therefore racially ineligible for naturalized citizenship (Zhao and Park, 2013).

A deeper insight into racism was offered by Blay (2015) who opined that “Some people simplify racism as one group not liking another, and think "racist" and "prejudiced" are interchangeable. But racism is a concept that operates on both an individual *and* institutional level. At its core, racism is a system in which a dominant race benefits off the oppression of others whether they want to or not”. Over the past decades, many sub-Saharan African countries have experienced and continue to experience serious ethnic, religious, communal and political conflicts as a result of inequitable distribution of the scarce resources in these countries. This has been attributed to the perception that some ethnic or religious groups are unduly favoured at the expense of others, and with the disadvantaged ethnic or religious groups being disproportionately more affected by the consequences of the conflicts including mass killings, destruction of properties and displacement from their communities (Norwich University, 2017). The most notable conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in the 20th century include the Nigeria Civil War in 1967; the Lord’s Resistance army Insurgence in 1987; the Somali Civil War in 1991; the Rwandan Genocide in 1994; and the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in 1998. These conflicts caused an enormous loss of human life, the collapse of socio-economic systems, the degradation of health and education services across the continent, and subjected civilians to intense physical and psychological trauma that negatively impacted development throughout many African nations (Norwich University, 2017).

In recent the situation has become very precarious in Nigeria with terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and agitation for separation among groups (mostly in the southern part of the country) who felt marginalized and denied equal opportunities like their counterpart in the northern part of the country. Several episodes of violent clashes been separatist agitators and security agents resulting to loss of lives and properties have been recorded across the country in addition to the escalation of insecurity in almost all the states in the country.

Worse of all, women and children are the major victims of these conflicts, as girls and women who are lucky not to be killed are often raped and abducted to be used or sold as sex slaves. On the night of 14–15 April 2014, 276 mostly Christian female students aged from 16 to 18 were kidnapped by Islamic extremists from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria. Fifty-seven of them escaped immediately following the incident by jumping from the trucks on which they were being transported, and others have been rescued by the Nigerian Armed Forces on various occasions (The Guardian, 2014; Romo, 2018).

In January 2019, the Nigeria' anti-trafficking agency, NAPTIP, says it has found 20,000 to 45,000 kidnapped Nigerian women in southern Mali. Many of them were trafficked for sexual exploitation. The women were said to have come mostly from rural areas of six different states in Nigeria (Aljazeera, 2019). In January 2022, it was reported that several women who arrange sexual liaisons with bandits in the forest were arrested in Kaduna State by the Intelligence Response Team (IRT), a special police unit fighting kidnapping in the region. The worrisome aspect of it is the fact that one of the women arrested, is a housewife who supplied ladies, including her daughters to bandits in the forest (PM News, 2022). The latest report by the EpochTimes on 5th July 2022 indicates that terrorists kidnap hundreds of Nigeria women and use them as sex slaves (The EpochTimes, 2022). These reports are alarming as they indicate that women and girls have become endangered species in Nigeria with insecurity (which is believed to have political and religious undertone) emerging as the main driving force behind the menace.

Similar to the situation in Nigeria, women experience a lot of disadvantages across the world including high illiteracy rates, low pay for work of equal value, and poor access to healthcare among others. Women across the world therefore suffer from inequality as a result of either race or gender, and these factors too often intersect giving rise to compounded or double discrimination, and these are responsible for the disproportionately higher disadvantages faced by minority women in the labour market, trafficking in women, and race-

based violence against women (World Conference Against Racism, 2021). Incidents of rape in Bosnia, Kosovo, Burundi and Rwanda represent race-based targeting of women for an explicitly gender-based violation. Additionally, ethnic conflict produces a large number of female refugees who then become vulnerable to sexual violence and gender-related issues (World Conference Against Racism, 2021).

Although, domestic violence and sexual assault can affect anyone, regardless of race, age, gender, religion or sexuality, women are known to be more likely to be the victims of these types of violence; and while there are circumstances and challenges that are specific to each community of colour, generally women of colour are known to experience domestic violence and sexual assault at higher rates than the general population, and they are also less likely to report and seek help and support for domestic violence and sexual assault (Blackburn Center, 2017).

A United Nations Human Rights Council Report indicated that individuals experience discrimination and violence based on their sexual orientation and gender identity in which about 35% of girls and women in the world were estimated to have experienced physical and sexual abuse, about 70% of all human trafficking victims worldwide were girls or women, while about 200 million women and girls alive today have been victims of female genital mutilation (United Nations, 2015; Council of Europe, 2019).

A report by the Blackburn Center (2017) indicated that whereas, African American females experience intimate partner violence at a rate 35% higher than that of white female, they are less likely than white women to use human services, battered services, battered women's programs, or go to the hospital because of domestic violence; and for every African American woman who reports a rape, at least 15 African American women do not report theirs. Also, 41-61% of Asian women report physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner during their lifetime, while Native American and Native Alaskan women are 50% more likely to experience domestic violence than the next highest victimized demographic.

It is believed that women of colour are less likely to report their abuse and to seek help and support despite experiencing higher rates of domestic violence and sexual assault as a result of societal barriers (such as a lack of services in their community or a fear that the police will not take their report seriously) which often prevent survivors from doing taking these steps. It is also believed that while these barriers can affect all survivors, women of colour may face unique challenges and circumstances due to the intersectional oppression of both gender and race. In addition to the societal barriers that all survivors of domestic violence and sexual assault can face, survivors of colour also face other challenges including: cultural and/or religious beliefs that restrain the survivor from leaving the abusive relationship or involving outsiders; strong loyalty binds to race, culture and family; distrust of law enforcement, criminal justice system, and human services; lack of trust based on history of racism and classism in the host country; and fear that their experience will reflect on or confirm the stereotypes placed on their ethnicity or race (Blackburn Center, 2017).

It is evident that the disproportionately higher rates of violence and discrimination experienced by minority women across the globe is a gross violation of their fundamental human rights as specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the United Nations (Newman, 2012; United Nations, 2015). Article 01 of the UDHR states that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and that “They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”; while Article 02 of the declaration states that “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the declaration without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (United Nations, 2015).

Until recently, the intersection of gender and racial discrimination and its consequences had not been subject to detailed consideration. The problems were categorized as manifestations of either one form of discrimination or the other, but not both. Ultimately, this allowed the full scope of the problem to escape analysis, which then lead to ineffective or

inadequate remedies (World Conference Against Racism, 2021). Evidence from literature have shown that racialized and gender-based violence are deeply intertwined and rooted in prejudice and discrimination. It is believed that recognizing this relationship is crucial to addressing and preventing the violence experienced by those who are most marginalized in the society (American Civil Liberties Union, 2022). It is therefore necessary to examine the role of racism in gender-based violence with a view to developing strategies for breaking the unholy alliance between them, and this informed the conduct of this study.

The Concept Racism

Racism is the belief that groups of humans possess different behavioural traits corresponding to inherited attributes and can be divided based on the superiority of one race over another; or the prejudice, discrimination or antagonism directed against other people because they are of different race or ethnicity (Ghani, 2008; Dennis, 2004). Racism and racial discrimination are often used to describe discrimination on an ethnic or cultural basis, independent of whether these differences are described as racial. The 1965 UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines “racial discrimination” as any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life (United Nations, 2021). The convention further concludes that superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for it anywhere in the world, in theory or practice. This was further supported by the submission of the 1978 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice which states that “All human beings belong to a single species and are descended from a common stock. They are born equal in dignity and rights and all form an integral part of humanity. It added that "All peoples of the world possess equal faculties for attaining the highest level in intellectual, technical, social,

economic, cultural and political development" and "The differences between the achievements of the different peoples are entirely attributable to geographical, historical, political, economic, social and cultural factors" (UNESCO, 1979).

Conceptualizing Gender Based Violence

The United Nations Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women defines violence against women as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life (United Nations, 1993).

Whereas, violence is often erroneously often associated with only physical violence, thus neglecting other non-physical forms, it is a complex issue and five inter-related types of violence have been identified including physical, verbal (including hate speech), sexual, psychological and socio-economic (Council of Europe, 2019; European Institute for Gender Equality, 2022).

- **Physical violence:** Physical violence refers to any act which causes physical harm as a result of unlawful physical force. It includes beating, burning, kicking, punching, biting, maiming or killing, or the use of objects or weapons. Some classifications also include human trafficking and slavery in the category of physical violence because initial coercion is often experienced, and the people involved often end up becoming victims of further violence as a result of their enslavement
- **Verbal violence (including hate speech):** This can include issues that are specific to a person, such as put-downs (in private or in front of others), ridiculing, the use of swear-words that are especially uncomfortable for the other, saying bad things about the other’s loved ones, threatening with other forms of violence, either against the victim or against somebody dear to them. It can also take the form of, for example, coercion, defamation, verbal insult or harassment. At other times, the verbal abuse

may be relevant to the background of the victim, such as their religion, culture, language, (perceived) sexual orientation or traditions

- **Psychological violence:** Psychological violence refers to any act which causes psychological harm to an individual. It is believed that all forms of violence have a psychological aspect, since the main aim of being violent or abusive is to hurt the integrity and dignity of another person. Apart from this, there are certain forms of violence which take place using methods which cannot be placed in other categories, and which therefore can be said to achieve psychological violence in a ‘pure’ form. This includes isolation or confinement, withholding information, disinformation, and threatening behavior
- **Sexual violence:** Sexual violence refers to any sexual act performed on an individual without his or her consent. It includes engaging in non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration with another person, by the use of any body part or object; engaging in other non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a person; or causing someone else to engage in non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a third person. Marital rape and attempted rape constitute sexual violence. Examples of forced sexual activities include being forced to watch somebody masturbate, forcing somebody to masturbate in front of others, forced unsafe sex, sexual harassment, and abuse related to reproduction (e.g. forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, female genital mutilation).
- **Socio-economic violence:** It is believed that socio-economic deprivation can make a victim more vulnerable to other forms of violence and can even be the reason why other forms of violence are inflicted. Typical forms of socio-economic violence include taking away the earnings of the victim, not allowing them to have a separate income (giving them ‘housewife’ status, or making them work in a family business without a salary), or making the victim unfit for work through targeted physical abuse. Economic violence refers to any act or behavior which causes economic harm to an

individual. It can also take the form of, for example, property damage, restricting access to financial resources, education or the labor market, or not complying with economic responsibilities, such as alimony

However, it is important to note that even though there are different distinct forms of gender-based violence, an individual can experience a combination of them at a time.

Racism and Gender Based Violence

Evidence from the literature have shown that racialized gender-based violence is very prevalent across the world. Even though gender-based violence is an umbrella term for any harm that is perpetrated against a person's will and that results from power inequalities based on gender roles, attention is mostly focused on women and girls, while men and transgender individuals are often excluded. The truth is that all members of minority populations across the globe are at risk of racialized gender-based violence. A study that examined the impact of historical racism on modern gun violence in the city of Louisville, KY in the year 2020 reported that residents of red-graded neighbourhood had five times as many gunshot victims as compared to the residents of green-graded neighbourhood between year 2012 and 2018; and this was believed to be due to the redlining that was done in the city in 1933 in which the Whites communities were classified as green neighbourhood which indicates high suitability for investment by government and subsequently enjoyed high government backing for the failed mortgage at that time, while the African American and other minorities were classified as red neighbourhood which indicates low suitability for investment by government and subsequently had very little government backing for the failed mortgage at that time (Benns, Ruther, Nash, Bozeman, Harbrecht and Miller, 2020).

The authors submitted that the resulting economic disparities created by the redlining endure in many cities of the United States of America up till now and correlates strongly with the high prevalence of gunshot victims in the disadvantaged communities, thus bringing to the fore the impact of historical and institutional racism on modern gun violence in the country.

A study that examined the interaction of structural racism and firearm violence in Boston, United States, noted that firearm homicides disproportionately affect Black communities with poverty and concentrated disadvantage being associated with firearm violence. The study reported that the discriminatory lending practices (redlining) of the 1930s contributed to the increased rates of firearm violence through changes to neighbourhood environments, namely through preclusion from homeownership, poverty, poor educational attainment, and concentration (i.e. segregation) of Black communities (Poulson, Neufeld, Dechert, Allee and Kenzik, 2021). This is further supported by the finding in another study that explained how structural racism and disenfranchisement in the country caused dynamics in community violence among male in urban black communities (Burrell, White, Frerichs, Funchess, Cerulli, Digiovanni and Lich, 2021). Jones (2021) also submitted that racism unfairly disadvantages some individuals and communities, unfairly advantages other individuals and communities, and saps the strength of the whole society through the waste of human resources.

The incessant killing of Black men in the United States of America by the police in recent years as documented by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) provide additional evidence in support of the findings of these studies, and also bring to the fore the enormity of racialized gender-based violence in that country (BBC, 2021). On 17th July 2014, Eric Garner died after he was wrestled to the ground by a New York police officer on suspicion of illegally selling cigarettes. On 9th August 2014, Michael Brown was killed by a police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri, who was responding to reports that Brown had stolen a box of cigars. On 4th April 2015, Walter Scott who had been pulled over for having a defective light on his car in North Charleston, South Carolina and attempted to run away from the police officer after a brief scuffle was shot in the back five times by a White police officer who was later fired and eventually sentenced to 20 years in the prison. On 5th July 2016, Alton Sterling was killed after police responded to reports of a disturbance outside a shop. The two officers involved did not

face criminal charges, but one was dismissed and the other was suspended from the police (BBC, 2021).

On 18th March 2018, Stephon Clark died after being shot at least seven times in his grandmother's backyard in Sacramento, California, by police who were investigating a nearby break-in. On 25th May 2020 George Floyd died after being arrested in Minneapolis, United States and held down by police officers, one of whom had his knee on Mr Floyd's neck for more than nine minutes. The police officer involved was later fired, but was never prosecuted. On 11th April 2021, Daunte Wright was shot and killed in Brooklyn Center, just north of Minneapolis when he broke free and tried to re-enter his car after he was pulled over for a traffic violation, and the police told him that he was being arrested for an outstanding warrant (BBC, 2021).

Similar to the situation in the United States several instances of racially motivated killing of Black men were recorded in other developed countries including UK, Georgia and Canada. On 4th August 2011, Mark Duggan a 29-year-old black British man, was shot and killed by a police officer in Tottenham, North London who claimed that they were attempting to arrest Duggan on suspicion of planning an attack and that he was in possession of a handgun (The Guardian, 2014). On February 23, 2020, Ahmaud Arbery, a 25-year-old black man, was murdered during a racially motivated hate crime while jogging in Satilla Shores, a neighbourhood near Brunswick in Glynn County, Georgia, by 3 men who claimed that they erroneously assumed that he was a burglar. However, they were eventually convicted of murder (Bynum, 2021). On 20th March, 2015, Marc Ekama, a Black man in mental distress was fatally shot by the Peel Regional Police in his Mississauga public housing unit, Canada, while responding to a neighbour's complaint. The policemen claimed they opened fire after Ekamba stabbed two of the officers with a kitchen knife, and refused to drop it. However, seven years after the incident, the coroner's jury probing the case later called on the police forces across Ontario to strengthen training in anti-Black racism, implicit bias and mental health awareness (Balintec, 2022).

It appears that nowhere in the world is racism more openly practiced by government like South Africa where the Apartheid system of legislation that upheld segregationist policies against non-white citizens of South Africa was introduced after the National Party gained power in South Africa in 1948, and its all-white government immediately began enforcing existing policies of racial segregation. Under apartheid, non-white South Africans (a majority of the population) would be forced to live in separate areas from whites and use separate public facilities. Contact between the two groups would be limited. Despite strong and consistent opposition to apartheid within and outside of South Africa, its laws remained in effect for the better part of 50 years. This period witnessed violence on an unprecedented scale across the country in which many Black men were jailed including the activist Nelson Mandela who later became the president of South Africa after the end of apartheid, while many more were killed (History.Com Editors, 2020).

In contrast to the situation in the developed countries where men are the predominant victim of racialized gender-based violence, women and girls are the predominant victims racialized gender-based violence in the developing countries, and they also suffer from the consequences the more, particularly, in conflict situations. A study conducted in Chile reported that women of Aymara ethnicity experience a higher rate of gender-based violence as compared to women of other ethnic groups (Zapata-Sepulveda, Fernandez-Davila and Sanchez-Gomez, 2012). A study that examined sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) risks among Syrian refugee women and girls in Lebanon reported that unmarried girls were at high risk of child marriage, whereas married girls more often experienced some form of IPV and/or DV. Also, in abusive relationships, some girls and women continued to face violence as they sought divorces and attempted to flee unhealthy situations (Roupetz, Garbern, Michael, Bergquist, Glaesmer and Bartels, 2020). A systematic review and meta-analysis of cross-sectional studies on gender-based violence against women in sub-Saharan Africa by Muluneh, Stulz, Francis & Agho (2020) reported 44% pooled prevalence of intimate partner violence (IPV) with the most commonly reported form of IPV being emotional (29.4%), physical

(25.87%) and sexual (18.75%) violence. A study that examined the post-conflict scenario regarding sexual and gender-based violence among refugees and internally displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo noted that the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country has triggered sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, sexual slavery, trafficking, intimate partner violence, and sexual exploitation. Also, the gender inequalities and abuse of power experienced by women and young girls at refugee settings has further exacerbate their vulnerability to different forms of violence. The study reported that sexual assault survivors face physical and psychological sufferings, excruciating emotions, and profound disruption of their social well-being since they are often stigmatized and ostracized by society (Lugova, Samad and Haque, 2020).

Gender based violence is very prevalent in Nigeria, a recent World Bank Group report on “Gender-Based Violence: An Analysis of the Implications for the Nigeria for Women Project” submitted that GBV remains a challenge that significantly constrained women’s autonomy and opportunities in the country. It added that the conflict in Nigeria’s North East geopolitical zone has further contributed to a steep rise in violence targeted against women and children by Boko Haram (Quasim and Asubaro, 2022). Whereas, the national average for the lifetime and 12 months’ prevalence of sexual violence among women aged 15-49 years in Nigeria was 7.0% and 3.7% respectively, a lifetime and 12 months prevalence of 28.1% and 13.7% respectively was obtained in Taraba State (and it was the highest in the country). Similarly, whereas, the national average for the lifetime and 12 months’ prevalence of intimate partners violence among women aged 15-49 years (i.e., those who experienced emotional, physical or sexual violence by their husbands) in Nigeria was 25.0% and 19.0% respectively, a lifetime and 12 months prevalence of 70.9% and 25.6% respectively was obtained in Taraba State (being the highest in the country), followed by Edo State with a Lifetime and 12 months’ prevalence of 54.4% and 25.6% respectively. The surprising aspect of the report is the high tolerant attitude towards wife beating among the women surveyed with a national average for lifetime and 12 months’ tolerance to wife beating (i.e., those who agree that a husband is

justified in hitting or beating his wife for at least one specified reason— burns the food, argues with him, goes out without telling him, neglects the children, or refuses to have sex) of 34.7% and 24.7% respectively. The highest level of tolerance was obtained in Kebbi State with a lifetime and 12 months' tolerance of 73.1% and 49.5% respectively, followed by Taraba State with a lifetime and 12 months' tolerance of 66.1% and 22.6% respectively.

Concluding Remarks

Racism and gender-based violence are very prevalent worldwide, and they have become inextricably intertwined thus producing the racialized gender-based violence syndetic with serious physical, psychological and socio-economic effects on the victims. Also, racism plays the role of an effect modifier regarding gender-based violence in terms of the scale and consequences of gender-based violence in communities where it exists in one form or the other. It is therefore evident that prevention and control of gender-based violence in the various populations across the world is contingent on the eradication of racism through promulgation and enforcement of appropriate legislation by the government of the respective countries across the globe. Also, law enforcement agents should be educated on how to maintain law and order in their respective countries without racial bias.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ALTERNATIVE POLICING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM NIGERIA

Jibrin ABUBAKAR*

INTRODUCTION

The threat of insecurity has recently been a significant challenge for the Nigerian government and its people. Armed robberies, kidnappings, insurgency, human trafficking, assassinations, terrorism, and militancy are just a few of the crimes that are on the rise and are prevalent throughout the nation (Osakwe, 2009). This odd development is considered very worrisome in view of the basic responsibility of the government and state which is to protect lives and properties of Nigerians as reflected in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government” (Section 14(2) (b). Section 214 and 215 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, charges the Nigerian police force as a formal agency that is established by law with the responsibilities of social control and internal security of the nation, to promote and sustain democracy in the country (Njoku, 2012; Newswatch, 2010).

Indeed, the provision of security is viewed as the most fundamental obligation and task of any state (Alumona, 2019). This is why governments worldwide invest huge resources to ensure that lives and properties of their citizens are secured (Ekhomu, 2014). As part of government’s efforts to ensuring the security of lives and properties, community policing was adopted to allow for a symbiotic relationship between the police and members of the society to enhance peace and security.

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Several security agencies such as Operation Amotekun Security (OAS) by South-West, Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) in Ondo State, Neighbourhood Watch Group Security (NWGS) in Ebonyi State, Neighbourhood Safety Corps Agency (NSCA) in River state, Vigilante Security Team (VST) in Benue State, Anambra Vigilant Services (AVS) and Anambra State Joint Security Taskforce (ASJST), Ebube Agu Security Outfit (ESO) Imo state, Kaduna State Vigilance Service (KSVS) in the North, Yan Banga in Sokoto, Community Protection Guard in Zamfara and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Borno state. Others are Taraba State Marshalls Security (TSMS), Nigeria Hunters Association in Adamawa State and Hisbah Corps in Kano, among others established in various regions of Nigeria as a devised means of policing their communities for curbing or preventing crime and resolving insecurity (News Watch, 2010).

This approach was very effective in enabling the society in not just fighting crime but also in preventing crime. Given the current security challenges in the contemporary Nigerian society, experts and government arrived at an accord that there is a need to revisit community policing for the purpose of preventing and curbing seemingly unabated criminalities and terrorism in the country (Udoh, 2013). Also, it is essential for community participation in crime prevention and control to be intensified so as to guarantee safety of lives and properties in light of the many challenges facing the Nigerian police force. This paper therefore is informed by the growing spade of insecurity and how well Regional cum community policing can be used to tame the tides of the rampaging menace.

Perhaps the biggest vacuum that warrants the creation of regional security outfits is the constant depopulation of Nigeria's security operatives owing to death caused by the perpetrators of crimes. Other factors are: resignation, retirement and acute shortage of policemen to manage the ever-growing nature of insecurity in the country. The obvious condition of insecurity as reiterated above constitutes a major concern to all stakeholders, government and the community at large. The alarming rate at which crimes are committed and the increasing inability of the police to control crimes also put the state at a dilemma. For any

country to attain sustainable economic development, the citizens need peace and safe environment.

Recent trends of insecurity in Nigeria where crimes such as kidnapping, banditry, insurgency, armed robbery, cultism, terrorism among other further make it difficult to manage the menace. The situation is further aggravated by the increasing inability of security agencies especially the police to protect lives and properties. Fundamentally, the function of the police on security has become questionably contradictory because of its poor relationship with the communities it purports to serve. Thus, many societies in Nigeria have resorted to self-help through the establishment of police outfits whose operational modes isolated the police and violated legal precedents. However, in recognition of the statutory role of the police in ensuring security and based on the need to improve police-community relations, the support for community policing became imperative and justifiable too. Thus, this paper examines challenges inherent in the management of regional outfits in relation to peace building and national development.

Community, Policing and Security in Nigeria

There are many ways to employ the idea of community. A community can be defined as a group of individuals who have a same identity, such as race, ethnicity, or religion, or it can be a group of people who have a similar career, hobby, or need. "A geographical area with specific legal boundaries, occupied by residents engaged in associated economic activities, and comprising a politically self-governing unit" is how community was described as a component of a broader society (Dambazau, 2007: 246). Therefore, it is feasible to classify the definitions of community into the following categories: those based on neighbourhood, those emphasizing social contact, those highlighting a sense of belonging and social solidarity, and those based on rural or urban experience.

Once the word policing is mentioned what comes to the minds of vast majority of people is the activity of state police. However, policing is not just an activity of the state police, it involves any organized activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order,

security and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, and punishment (Baker, 2008). It is in fact a mechanism of governance. As such it can be authorized and provided by non-state groups as well as the state. The term community policing has been conceptualized in different ways by different Scholars. To Ikuteyijo and Rotimi (2012), community policing entails a community partnership in which people take active parts in ensuring a safe and secure environment. Wroblewski and Hess (2003: 134) defined community policing as “an organizational approach that promotes community, government and police partnerships; proactive problem solving; and community engagement to address the cause of crime, fear of crime and other community issues.” The essence of regional policing arrangement is to enshrine the principle of community policing where safety and security are participatory in nature and everyone assumes responsibility for the general health of their community not just a selected few, not just the local government administration, not just the safety forces, but absolutely everyone living in the community (Brown, 2001: 56).

Community policing is a system that employs a communal approach to policing, according to Miller and Hess (2002). The police and the community work together to identify crime and disorder problems and involve all facets of the community in the search for solutions. This process is known as community policing. By fostering a productive working relationship between the community and the police, it seeks to actively include both parties in the mission of crime control. Community members and the police are supposed to work together to create and maintain calm neighbourhoods in accordance with the community policing philosophy.

Regional policing can be viewed defined as alternative police outfits apart from the Nigerian Police Force which is managed by the Federal Government of Nigeria. Regional police force is often created by the state or regions. Examples are: Amotekun of South west, Ebube Agu in the Southeast, the Hisbah in the North, among others.

Rationale Behind Regional and Community Police Outfits in Nigeria

Like other nations of the world, community policing was adopted in Nigeria to overcome the inherent shortcomings of the purely reactive/traditional policing approach. Integrating many policing concepts into its operation, community policing had the mandate of conducting:

1. The first reality is that Nigeria is grossly under-policed. Given the over 200 million population, the Nigerian police that is a little over 300,000 are incapable of dealing with the upsurge domestic crimes bedeviling the country. So, the regional police outfits that are being floated may help fill gaps;
2. Regional police will help in achieving the goals of community policing against armed robbers, murder, assassination, kidnapping and other crimes;
3. Regional or state police will be fast and proactive in crime prevention and or management;
3. Community partnership in policing; and
4. Anti-corruption campaigns.

Additionally, it seeks to enhance the working circumstances of police personnel by completing an extensive training program for them (Gbenemene and Adishi, 2017). The main goals of this mission were to enhance criminal intelligence, guarantee transparency and accountability in the battle against crimes, and enhance public perceptions and police relations. When regional policing was initially introduced in Nigeria in 2003, Enugu State served as the test site. The US and UK governments provided funding to the CLEEN Foundation to carry out the six-objective pilot study. The project's overall goals included educating the public about community policing, fostering partnerships with civil society organizations, enhancing internal and external communications with host communities, providing adequate resources and infrastructure for security, enhancing leadership and management skills among police officers in the rank and file, and lowering violent crime and public fear of crime (Van, 2018). Numerous additional federated states have adopted community policing since it began operating in 2004.

Forms of Community and Regional Policing Outfits in Nigeria

Currently, the country is home to more than 2,000 recognized private security businesses and organizations (Inyang, 2013 citing Abraham and Williams, 2005). The O'odua People's Congress (OPC) in the south-west, the Bakassi Boys in the southeast, the religious/Islamic vigilantes known as Hisbah in the northern regions that practice Sharia law, and most recently the Amotekun in the south-west are prominent among them. In the past, OPC claimed to work for the cohesion, advancement, safety, and autonomy of all Oduduwa descendants, but starting in 1999, they shifted their main priorities from pursuing the self-determination of the Yoruba people to engaging in crime-fighting operations and resolving interpersonal conflicts. This shift in emphasis might have been motivated by the success of other independently founded vigilante organizations like the Bakassi Boys in the southeast. OPC eventually went beyond mere vigilantism and started taking part in several armed assaults and mass killings against other ethnic groups residing in southwest Nigeria, particularly in Lagos (Inyang, 2013 citing Nigeriafirst.org, 2006). The incident was attributed to the government-approved security agencies' lack of oversight of their operations.

The Bakassi Boys were not founded to defend the Ibos, the predominant ethnic group in the southeast of Nigeria, unlike the OPC. Their rise to prominence in 1999 was directly related to the frequency of "Mafia-style" armed robberies at significant markets in southeast Nigeria. Their success in taking down the "Mafia" gave them a legendary status, and most major cities in the southeast invited them to clean up areas around marketplaces that were thought to be infiltrated by criminals.

Similarly, the Hisbah Islamic vigilante group controls the Muslim States of Northern Nigeria and administers justice in accordance with Shariah law without the assistance of the conventional law enforcement institutions. The formal security institutions, in particular the NPF, have consistently opposed this type of setup as a result of this circumstance (Omede, 2011, Onifade, Imhonopi and Urim, 2013; Adeniyi and Olusesan, 2019). These organizations have reportedly clashed several times, putting the lives of those they were hired to safeguard

in peril. Concerned citizens and groups, especially human rights organizations, are now more interested than ever in seeing vigilante operations in Nigeria regulated or outright banned. However, it is considered that one security unit, whether formal or informal, cannot meet the needs of approximately 200 million Nigerians, including foreigners who live and conduct business there (Inyang and Abraham, 2013). Every security organization has weaknesses, hence cooperation between all security groups and organizations is necessary for the nation's security system to be effective. The Amotekun security outfit in south western Nigeria was established regionally as a result of this acknowledgment to reduce crime rates and secure the area (Olaitan, 2020; Egbunike, 2020).

Community Protection Guards (CPG) was established in Zamfara state in northern Nigeria with the goal of battling local terrorism and banditry. The state government developed the CPG along with other measures to suppress insurgency in the state, one of which includes hiring guards in each of the state's 19 emirate councils. The state's willingness to explore all methods for dealing with rising banditry and the resulting loss of lives in various regions of the state prompted the decision to establish the outfit (Bello, 2022).

The recent establishment of Ebube Agu, the joint South East security organization, by the South East Governors' Forum is perceived in the region as yet another effort to stem the flow of unrest in the nation. To combat the increased number of kidnappings, armed robberies, kidnappings, cultism, and other crimes in the South East, the regional security organization organizes the actions of all vigilante organizations in the region. The most alarming pattern is the recent assassination of security personnel in the area. All the South East states, with the exception of Enugu State, have been the targets of these vicious assaults. The attacks on the Imo State Police Command headquarters and the Owerri Correctional Center were its zenith (Gibson,2021).

The South East states have adopted different strategies to curtail this spate of insecurity, all to no avail. Anambra State for instance banned the use of tinted glasses by motorists in the state. In a state-wide broadcast following the killing of some security

operatives in the state, the government called on the people of Anambra to cooperate with the government to tackle the menace of insecurity in the state (Sun, 2021).

In the same vein, Niger State has taken proactive moves to counter the menace of banditry in the state. For instance, the government has enacted two major laws: One, the Law known as the “Vigilante Corp Law” will help streamline the activities of various vigilant groups, and the other hand, the Niger state Governor Abubakar Sani Bello had signed into law a bill passed by the state House of Assembly which makes kidnappers and Cattle rustlers to die by hanging, the governor has again signed into law, bill establishing the Vigilante Corp in the state (Adams, 2021).

Challenges of Alternative Policing in Nigeria

Despite the importance of regional policing in contemporary policing practice and the abundance of literature on the subject written by Nigerian authors, the country's policing system is not given much respect. Although regional policing has gained popularity in the United States, Canada, and other developed countries, Nigeria has only accepted it in theory, according to Chene (2012). When analyzing the results of the country's community policing pilot project, Abiri (2011) noted that the program's opponents in the police force and the politicization of the project's entire process contributed to the implementation's difficulties. The effect of this strategy on corruption and accountability has not yet been fully established in terms of anticorruption advantages.

Additionally, the negative reputation of the Nigerian Police is frequently to blame for the lack of cooperation from society's members in providing the police with important information. However, without the support of the general population, the tasks of crime prevention, detection, and conviction cannot be properly carried out. Other accusations against the police include exercising arrest and prosecution authority arbitrarily, corrupting and perverting the course of justice, using primitive investigative methods, cooperating with criminals, and repeatedly experiencing fatal shooting accidents (Olujinmi, 2005).

Alternative Policing: The Trend

The many challenges of the police force, the high incidences of crimes, the distrust for the police force and the incessant calls for police reformation necessitated the emergence of the alternative community security institutions or informal policing structures (IPS) that provides support services to the police force in the prevention and control of crimes. Though different arguments have emerged over the need for alternative forms of policing, the bottom line remains that alternative community police which are usually referred to as ‘vigilante organizations have the legal backings of the states that they are operational. They are reputed to be functional and efficient in the area of crime prevention and control reason being that they have the ability to identify a criminal no matter what effort is made at concealing identity (Aleyomi, 2013).

The development has been defended by academics with the justification that crime is a societal problem, not merely a problem for the criminal justice system, and that a variety of ideas and skills present in society can be employed to regulate crime. Because of the friendly relationship that exists between the residents of the community and the security agents, the new trend in community policing has helped the Nigerian police and other security agencies in crime prevention. These forms of community policing include Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), community guards, and State Police (Ikoh, 2013).

Conclusion

Regional or alternative policing is a growing strategy that can be adopted to ensure Nigeria’s continuous peace and security. However, its implementation must be holistic with members of the communities working towards one direction of fighting crimes. There is no gainsaying however that the creation of alternative police outfits in states and by regions will further stifle the finances of states and region to meet other needs. But when predicated against the background of its usefulness, it is pat to add that there cannot be development without peace, and there can’t be peace without development. The reality is that Nigeria is already under-

policed, and states cannot trust Federal police to provide security for their people, as seen by the recent creation of state and regional police outfits.

Regional and state governments must ensure the training of those recruited, and as well carry out effective background checks. The regional police outfits will enjoy the goodwill of people. The idea, concept and philosophy of community policing must be clear, and central around the people if regional or state police outfits should be backed by relevant laws to give them legal teeth. It must also be pointed out that there is the need to define the relationship between the federal police and the state or regional police outfits.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

TRENDS AND DYNAMISM OF KIDNAPPING IN KOGI STATE AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Adegbe Samson OJONUGWA*

INTRODUCTION

Freedom House reports that Nigeria recorded one of the highest rates of kidnapping in the world in 2013 (Freedom House 2014). The US department of state's country reports on Human Rights practices for 2013 indicates that kidnapping and related violence were serious problems in Nigeria. According to NYA international (2014), a crisis management and response consultancy that assists clients with abduction and kidnapping cases among others, stated that Nigeria was ranked as the number one country for kidnap for ransom incidents from the first half of 2014 and that kidnapping is under reported in Nigeria.

Also, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director of the CLEEN foundation, a Nigeria based NGO that promotes public safety, accountability, and justice, and that conducts an annual national crime and safety survey in Nigeria, indicated that kidnapping for ransom has become rampant in the last decade in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation 10 July, 2014). The CLEEN Foundation, 2013 National crime and safety survey sampled 11,518 Nigerian who were interviewed and found that nationally, three percent (3%) of respondents had been victims of kidnapping or attempt kidnapping. According to the survey, the South West region and Lagos had the highest incidence, followed by the South East and South-South, the rate of kidnapping in North central was not mention in which Kogi State is one of the states in the geopolitical zone.

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This chapter is important especially in view of the manner at which the crime is now escalating and some of the victims are least expected to be the targets of kidnappers. To further buttress the point to delve into the phenomenon of kidnapping in Kogi state focusing on Lokoja, Okene and Dekina Local Government Areas, for instance, on Monday 20th April, 2016 three member of Staff of the National Iron Ore mining company (NIOMCO) Ltd, situated at Itakpe along Lokoja-Okene highway were kidnapped for ransom. More so, according to Akubo (2017) attempt were made by suspected kidnappers including a serving Naval officer and two serving police officers to kidnap a five-year-old at Ojikpadala in Egume, Dekina Local Government Area of the state as they were paraded by police in Lokoja, the rise of kidnapping cases in Kogi state is worrisome if security agents that are charged with the responsibility of security of lives and properties are culprits this calls for concern.

In this chapter therefore, we examine trends and dynamism of kidnapping and its nexus between socio-economic development in Kogi State with the time frame between 2010 to 2018. The study attempts epistemological conceptualization of salient variables and typology of kidnapping were examined in Kogi State. The factors that determine kidnaping for ransom and strategies adopted by kidnappers during operations were ascertained along with reported cases and number of arrests made within the years under review.

Brief Conceptual Overview of Insecurity and Kidnapping

Insecurity can be seen as the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection. It refers to lack of inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity and social security (Adegbe, 2019).

Generally, development is defined as a state in which things are improving. But it is defined in different ways in various contexts, social, political, economic, religious, biological, science and technology, language and literature. But in the context of this paper, it is based on socio-economic development (Adegbe 2019). Socio-economic development is a product of development and can be defined as the process of social and economic transformation in a

society. Socio-economic development embraces changes taking place in the social sphere mostly of an economic nature. Socio-economic development can be measure by indicators like improvement in standard of living, increase in income, level of employment, level of investment, Gross Domestic product, and level of education, level of skill acquisition, live expectancy, and infrastructural development among others (IGI Global, 2022).

The North Carolina kidnapping acts (2004) defines kidnapping as the unlawful conferment, restraint or removal from one place to another of any person sixteen years of age or over without the person's consent for the purpose of obtaining a ransom, holding the victim hostage, facilitating the commission of felony or fight after the commission of the felony or for doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the victim. That means from the above perspective with the age factor, any person from sixteen above that is abducted that can be categorized as kidnapping. While William (2010) asserts that kidnapping is forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman or child, from their own country and sending them into another. This above definition includes children as victims of kidnap and also pointing out to human trafficking which William further stated that the crime is unquestionably a very heinous crime, to banish a man from his country and its consequences be productive of the cruellest and disagreeable hardship.

Similarly, because of the cruel act of kidnapping which can be describe as an act of an angry man who wants to take away person of value hostage, and who could only be rescued by loved ones after the payment of ransom accept otherwise. Kidnapping a person of value is in line with the assertion of Akpan (2010), which says "why should I kidnap, who will not pay"? Also, Tzaneli (2006) describes kidnapping from economic point of view, which sees kidnapping as business regulated by the laws of demand and supply and is type of social action that involves the calculation of the most efficient means to desired end but concluded that kidnappers are just at illegal side. Thus, since illegality has been established against activities of kidnappers, anyone involve is a culprit and must be prosecuted according to the established laws for such offences. More so, Briggs (2009) view kidnapping from political perspective

where kidnapping is seen as an instrument for political vendetta and setting political scores. This view according to Briggs is where politicians or contractors working for government directly are targeted, once the victim is kidnapped there will be high level of negotiation which will ultimately leads to ransom or it will be used as political tool which is motivated by attempt to suppress, outsmart, intimidate and subjugate political opponents or it might also be used to change government policy by a particular aggrieved group.

Arewa (2013) explained that these following ingredients are yardsticks to describe kidnapping, that is, there must be a taking or carrying away of one person or persons by another person or persons, the taken or carrying away must be by force or fraud, the taking away or carrying away must be without the person's consent or the consent of persons carried away, the carrying away must be without lawful excuse and ransom must be placed on the person or persons taken away. In view of this we cannot but agree with some common features of the definitions above like illegal, force, fraudulent, ransom, without consent, confinement among others.

Therefore, in line with context of this paper, kidnapping is a serious offence depriving people of their liberty and can be described as unlawfully holding of someone or group of persons' captives for the purpose of collecting ransom before they will be released. Kidnapping can be further explained as a criminal act of seizure of people through the use of dangerous weapons against their will and keeping them in a hideout until their freedom can be secured by payment of ransom (Adegbe, 2019). More so, kidnapping can be seen as the process of strategic planning by criminal elements to forcefully capture targeted victims that are financially buoyant in the society in order for financial exchange. Also, the seizure of persons may be at random; a situation where criminals just forcefully take people away to unknown destination after which calls will be put through to relatives or organizations of their victims in order to negotiate for the release of their victims after payment of certain amount of money.

Theoretical Epistemology

The paper hinged on Strain theory of crime by Robert K. Merton which was developed in 1938 (en.m.wikipedia.org). The theory stated that the society puts pressure on individuals to achieve socially accepted goals though they lack the means (Merton 1968). Also, the theory proposed that pressure derived from social factors like lack of quality education, unemployment, lack of stable income, social inequality, low opportunities among others drives individuals to commit crime (Charlotte, 2021).

The feeling of not meeting up with societal expectation of achievement or success drives so many people into illegal means of accumulating wealth. This pressure could lead to strain which lead individuals to commit crimes like kidnapping as a means to gain that financial security the society demands from them to be acceptable or to feel belong to the society (Sung and Robert 2015). This theory aptly captures kidnapping trends and dynamism in Kogi State where the pressure to be seen as people that have made it in life by the society has pushed many people into the crime of kidnapping (Robert, 2012).

Trends and dynamism of kidnapping in Nigeria

Typology of Kidnapping

The United Nations office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2003) has classified kidnapping into four as follows;

- i. Kidnapping for extortion (for ransom, to influence business decisions or to obtain commercial advantage).
- ii. Kidnapping between or within criminal groups (debt recovery or to secure advantage in a criminal market)
- iii. Kidnapping for sexual exploitation: this kidnapping is linked to domestic or family disputes (spouse or child adoption)
- iv. Revenge kidnapping: this is related to kidnapping for political or ideological reasons where perpetrators see it as avenue to get back to their perceived opponents or enemies.

Also, Pharaoh (2005) categorized it into three as follows

1. Criminal kidnapping: this hostage taken for ransom
2. Political kidnapping: this is to settle political scores or to further political objectives
3. Pathological kidnapping: this is parental kidnapping and kidnapping for sexual purposes.

Similarly, Turner (1998) attempts to simplify the classification based on four key rationales as follows;

1. Kidnapping for money but no politics
2. Kidnapping without any political or monetary motive
3. Kidnapping for money and politics
4. Kidnapping for politics but no money. According to Turner, from the above classification kidnapping has criminal, economic and political undertone

To Owonikoko, (2016) posited four basic forms as follows;

- i. Kidnapping for ransom: this is a kind of kidnapping in which the victims are abducted and concealed until when their relative pay ransom to release them
- ii. Kidnapping for Ritual: this kind of kidnapping in which the perpetrators basically kidnap a person usually for rituals purposes. This maybe for money ritual or acquisition of power for invincibility or life elongation.
- iii. Kidnapping for trafficking: this is a kind in which the perpetrators intend to traffic the victims for sex or hard labour out of the country or within the country but outside the victims' original abode.
- iv. Kidnapping for body spare parts harvest: this is seen as another form of kidnapping which is done for the supply of human spare parts especially abroad.

Ezeibe and Eze (2012) identified categories of kidnapping as follows:

1. Bride kidnapping: taking bride/bridegroom against the will or consent of his or her parent to unknown destination in order to marry. Yang and Hang (2007) puts it as cultural dimension where some communities use it as cultural practice, where bride

and groom conspired to marry each other and run away from home if the parents refused consent until reconciliation

2. Express kidnapping: this is opportunistic kidnapping motivated by pecuniary interests, whereby victims are held with the intent to elicit express ransom or usually executed by amateur kidnapers who engaged in the act out of sheer poverty. Mohammed (2008) expressed kidnapping as the method used in Latin America where a small ransom that a company or a family can easily pay as demand without institution
3. Tiger kidnapping: this kidnapping is done in an attempt to perpetrate another crime, e.g. holding a bank manager hostage to get him instruct his Staff to effect an illegal transfer which is similar to what a tiger does to a prowl.

Furthermore, Nkechukwu, Asogwa and Uchem (2014) posited two broad categories of kidnapping to be economic and political kidnapping where economic kidnapping is seen as when financial demand is made which could be either hard cash or some other financial resources and political kidnapping is where political concessions such as the release of prisoner, changes in the law and policy retreats are demanded.

Finally, all the categories of kidnapping from different scholarly perspectives, kidnapping for ransom is more in Kogi state while kidnapping for rituals or for spare parts harvest is not really been heard of except in Ankpa local government area of recent, where some vigilante personnel specialize in private parts harvest of their victims and not political scenario in Kogi State that warrant political kidnapping like in the case of Chris Ngige, Former Governor of Anambra state who was kidnapped on July 10, 2003 by his fellow political party members who were in opposition with him (Emewu and Anyanwu 2009). Also, Okpachi and Agagu (2017) supported the view that, it is only kidnapping for ransom or extortion that is prominent in Kogi state for illegal economic gain.

Factors determining kidnap for ransom

Kidnappers do not just kidnap people that do not have value on them. Thus, they kidnap base on strategic worth of victim, which in essence makes him or her worthwhile kidnap target. This value is determined by a number of factors including the following;

- 1. Personal affluence of victim:** this has to do with the material standing of the victim who are wealthy individuals in the society.
- 2. Family premium on victim:** when kidnappers have carried out their investigation about a particular family and discovered that they have only one child or only female or male child, the value of such child will be high when kidnapped
- 3. Corporate premium on victim:** The Chief Executive officers of Business conglomerate and strategic stakeholders in big companies are accorded great values, thus, they become kidnappers target
- 4. Political office holders:** public officeholders in the society and the level of their relevance, such as political appointees and those holding elective positions, paramount rulers, pastors of mega churches and the members of the family of the above people are targets of kidnappers
- 5. Social connections and networks:** members of social group and networks are seen as target. Tourists and travelers, top officials of political parties and their relations. (Okoli, Chukwuma, Agada and Fakumo 2014).
- 6. Expatriates:** experts that are working for various companies in Kogi State are target especially the foreign workers.

Strategy of Operation of Kidnappers

Kidnappers operate in a discrete and dangerous manner. They abduct people when they believe they can get ransom paid to them. Most at times they use an insider or a spy to monitor the movements of their targets. They gather information about the inside and outside activities of their targets to ease the operation when they want to strike to avoid lapses on their part (Source; interview, police Sergeant, Dekina command, (18/9/2018). Sometimes kidnappers dress in

Army uniform to escape security agents on the road and for their victims not to quickly suspect them this serves as a cover up or disguise for them in order to succeed in their nefarious acts (Source; Interview, Inspector of police, Lokoja police headquarters (11/9/2018). When they get to the place of their operations, they shoot gun into the air to intimidate people or to scare people before abducting their victims, sometimes they brandish the gun to compel compliance, and they blindfold their victims and whisk them away to an unknown destination (Interview with police sergeant, Dekina command, 18/9/2018).

They normally threaten the life of their victims with gun in order to obtain ransom from the families of their victims after which they would make calls to the relatives so that the ransom will quickly be paid. They take sexual advantage of their female victims at times, due to environmental stress their victims may die or they may be constrained to kill them if the ransom expected is not forthcoming, at times the victims might be killed and the ransom will be collected by the kidnapers. The kidnapers at times get their victims on social media especially Face book, for instance, the notorious kidnapper, Evans, has confessed that most of his victims are followed on Face book when they post on Face book their movements, those that just return from abroad like UK or USA to Nigeria are victims of Evans exploits in kidnapping. According to Assistant superintended of police at Okene, the kidnapers sometimes trail their victims to bush path or lonely place before they strike when they know nobody or security agents are nearby (Interview 3/9/2018). The kidnapers normally take victims to forest or a secluded private house that no member of the security will suspect that such criminal act is been perpetrated there. Kidnapers are motivated by profit rather than principle. It is chiefly motivated by financial gain (Briggs 2009).

However, as the figure 1.1 above has shown, a kidnapping episode may be truncated at any stage of the incident and resolution sets in. for example, leaked information, intelligence gathering, changed situation or lack of adequate planning stage. Similarly, the police, military or any other state and non-state security apparatuses may intervene in a kidnapping situation and release the victim or victims through force instead of negotiation, thus making resolution

set in at any stage before negotiation. Assistant superintendent of police at Okene area command was also in support of the view that at times police may strike the kidnapers hideout in the process of negotiation and they would abandon their victims by this no ransom will be collected (Interview 3/9/2018).

Nexus Between Kidnapping and Socio-Economic Development

Scholars have identified strong links between insecurity and development since cold war ended (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013, Chandler, 2007). They argued that development cannot be achieved in any nation where there are conflicts, crisis and war. There is a consensus in literature that insecurity and development are two different and inseparable concepts that affect each other, and this has naturally triggered debates on security development nexus (Chandler, 2007; Stan, 2004). Therefore, since kidnapping is a good example of insecurity, it constitutes insecurity in the society it also has strong link with socio-economic development of the society.

According to Ali (2013), there is no nation that can achieve socio-economic development in an environment of socio and physical insecurity. The increasing challenges of kidnapping in Kogi state have also been linked to failure of leadership to deliver good governance, and secure the welfare of person on the principles of freedom, equality, and justice. Since inception of democracy in Kogi state after a long military rule till date, Kogi state is still battling with socio-economic development because socio-economic indicators such as life expectancy, death rate, access to water, poverty rate, mortality rate and crime rate are still on the negative note. Kogi state is a classic illustration of an oxymoron, a poor state in the midst of abundant human and natural resources and this scenario also contributed to the security challenges such as kidnapping that has bedevilled the state which has grave consequences on socio-economic development of the state (Ali, 2013).

There is no investor, whether local or foreign, that will be motivated to invest in an unsafe and insecure environment. In globalized world investors are not only looking for high returns on their investments but also safe haven for their investments. Thus, the alarming level

of kidnapping in Kogi state has made the economy unattractive to foreign investors and in Kogi state expatriates and investors are scared because of been kidnapped and this is capable of having negative influence on the socio-economic development and this is essentially dependent on the level of economic activities in the state. The level of economic activities is in turn enhanced by peaceful co-existence of the people. In the absence of security, socio-economic development cannot be sustained as it destroys economic, human and social capital. The incessant kidnapping in Kogi state have made some travellers and commuters not to have confidence travelling through Kogi state and indigenes to go about their daily activities without fear.

The social life of many in Kogi state have changed due to kidnapper's activities and some people are subjected to self-imprisonment in their homes and offices (David, 2009). Some people build nice houses and fail to finish the exterior walls, presenting themselves with the look of poverty in an effort to prevent popularity. Some people are afraid of buying new vehicles, and even some rich people resort to using commercial motorcycles called "Okada" to markets, school and social outings, as a means to elude hostage takers (Soyombo, 2009). Kidnapping activities has contributed tremendously to high level of mistrust among people of Kogi state; the traditional African hospitality to strangers is no longer in vogue due to fear, and some people hardly return normal courteous greetings from strangers.

General overview of the three (3) selected Local Government Areas

Dekina Local Government Area: Dekina Local Government Area in Kogi State with administrative headquarters in the town of Dekina. Dekina local government is in the Eastern senatorial district of Kogi State. Dekina Local Government Area covers an area of 2,461km² with population of 260,968 as at the 2006 national population census and the projected population for 2016 is 352,300 (National Population Commission of Nigeria (Web)). Dekina local government area is bounded in the East by Ankpa Local Government area, in the West by Ajaokuta, Omala Local Government Areas, in the North by Bassa Local Government area and Ofu Local Government area at the South. Dekina was the capital of the former Bassa

province when the protectorate of Northern and Southern Nigeria were proclaimed in 1900. Local government reforms were undertaken in December, 1968 which reformed the native authorities into Local Governments and divided the Igala Native authority as a result of socio-economic and political restructuring to pave way for faster and more meaningful development, Dekina was carved out as a Local Government Area by then Kwara state Administration in 1969.

Dekina local government area council is in charge of public administration in Dekina. The council is led by a chairman who is the Executive head of the Local Government. The Dekina legislative council makes laws governing Dekina Local government area. It consists of 12 councilors representing the 12 wards of the Local Government Area. The twelve wards of Dekina Local government area are; Abocho, Adumu Egume, Anyigba, Dekina town, Emewe, Iyale, Odu I, Odu II, OganeInigu, Ogbabede, Ojikpadala, Okura Olafia. The Kogi state university is located in the area and notable hotels (www.tukool.com, 2018).

Okene Local Government Area: Okene Local Government Area was created in 1976 from the then Ebira Division by the Administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo, following the 1976 Local Government Reform. The people of Okene Local Government Area are a part of Ebira Tao people of the central senatorial district of Kogi state. They are believed to have migrated from Jukun in the present-day Taraba state and had a brief stopover in Idah before moving to its present location. The present Okene Local Government is comprised of Okene, Okengwe districts. There are 11 wards in the Local government which are Bariki, Otutu, Orietesu, Lafia/Obessa, Okene-Eba, Idoji, Onyukolo, Obehira-Eba, Obehira-Urete, ABugu/Ozuga and Upogoro/Odenku wards.

Okene runs along the A2 highway and it had an area of 328km² and a population of 320,260 at the 2006 census but the projected population for 2016 is 439,500. The people are predominantly Muslims with a large size of Christian population too. To a great extent, there is a fusion of tradition and religions with only a negligible few still practicing exclusively traditional religion. The Federal College of Education is situated in Okene along Okene-

Lokoja express road. There is also a satellite campus of the Kogi polytechnic and there are also different high schools and hotels in Okene Local Government Area (<https://nuraabatemiuser.wordpress.com>).

Lokoja Local Government Area: Lokoja Local Government Area of Kogi State with an area of 2180 km² and a population 195,261 at the 2006 census and the projected population for 2016 is 265,400 (National Population Commission of Nigeria, 2006). It is bounded by the Niger in the North and East upstream from the capital until the border with Kwara state, and includes the city of Lokoja. Although the area has been inhabited for thousands of years, the present settlement at Lokoja was established in 1857 by the British explorer William Baikie at the site of an earlier model farm constructed during the failed Niger expedition of 1841. Lokoja was the first settlement for the British in Nigeria; it was the capital of the British colonial government after the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914. The first Governor General, Sir Frederick Lugard, governed the new national capital of Nigeria from Lokoja. Lokoja is close to the new Federal Capital territory in Abuja. It is also home to Kogi state polytechnic, Federal University Lokoja and Private Salem University. Near Lokoja is Ajaokuta steel company. The magnificent rivers Benue and Niger met in Lokoja forming the famous confluence from which Kogi state derives its official name. Lokoja saddles some strategic roads to at least, five geopolitical zones out of the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria, thus is essentially a transit route to sixteen other states including FCT.


Besides all these, historical relic such as the Lugard House, the first primary school in Northern Nigeria, the first cantonment church, the first hospital in Northern Nigeria, Iron of liberty, graveyards of the deposed Emirs and Europeans commentaries are major tourism potentials which continue to attract people from all work of life to the town. The area grew to become cosmopolitan settlement peopled mostly by different ethnic groups from the middle belt and Hausa from the Northern Nigeria. These cosmopolitan natures have remained up till date (<https://www.britannica.com>).

Table 1: Reported cases of kidnapping and persons arrested in Study Areas 2010-2018

Years under Review	DEKINA		OKENE		LOKOJA	
	Number of reported cases	Number of persons arrested	Number of reported cases	Number of persons arrested	Number of reported cases	Number of persons arrested
2010	8	12	10	8	1	2
2011	5	6	4	3	-	-
2012	7	9	8	10	2	4
2013	4	7	7	12	4	5
2014	10	12	13	10	3	4
2015	6	8	11	14	5	8
2016	16	17	17	18	6	4
2017	11	19	15	22	2	3
2018	6	11	9	16	4	7
Total	73	101	94	113	27	37

Source: The Nigeria Police Kogi State Command Lokoja (2020)

Fig 2: Clustered chart of reported cases of kidnapping and number arrest in Study Areas 2010-2018



Dekina

- Reported cases
- No. of arrest

Okene

- Reported cases
- No. of arrest

Lokoja


- Reported cases
- No. of arrest

The table and figure above show that the total number of reported cases of kidnapping in the years under review is 194 which Okene have the total number of 94, followed by Dekina at 73, and the least is Lokoja at 27, and in 2016 in the study areas, 39 was the highest number of reported cases of kidnapping with Okene at 17, followed by Dekina at 16 and Lokoja is the least at 6, and 2011 have the least reported cases of kidnapping at 9 with Okene 4, Dekina 5 and Lokoja; no reported case of kidnapping thereby no arrest was made, this shows that kidnapping is more prevalent at the outskirts of the state capital which is the main town.

According to Inspector of police at police headquarters Lokoja, he stated that because of the increase in kidnapping in Kogi state especially in Okene local government in 2016, the

inspector general of police has to deploy special anti-kidnapping squad from Abuja to the area and they spent two months to curtail the crime (Interview 07/01/19).

Figure 2: Map of Kogi State, with different colours of legend showing the three local government study areas



Source: Akintoyin (2018).

One of the trends of insecurity in Nigeria is kidnapping. Kidnapping constitutes insecurity in the society and it has a strong link and adverse effect on the socio-economic development of the society. There is no nation that can achieve socio-economic development in an environment of socio and physical insecurity. Also, it was established that there are several types of kidnapping which the naming may be differ but at times they are similar in purpose. There is pathology kidnapping, kidnapping for sexual exploitation, Political kidnapping, kidnapping for ransom, bride kidnapping, kidnapping for Ritual among others. Basically, all these can be categorized into three broad groups of political kidnapping, economic kidnapping

and social kidnapping. And all the categories of kidnapping from different scholarly perspectives, kidnapping for ransom is more in Kogi state.

Moreover factors that drive the kind of persons to be kidnapped; individuals that have financial resources thus, kidnappers consider personal affluence of victim, family premium on victim, corporate premium on victim, political office holders, expatriates among others and the kidnappers normally adopt different strategies to kidnap their victims ranging from mounting surveillance and monitoring their target, planning and execution, disguising in army camouflage, kidnappers normally threaten the life of their victims with gun in order to put pressure on the families of victims to pay ransom.

Conclusion

The trends of kidnaping in Nigeria is growing with its various nuances and manifestations. The socio-economic development of victims and communities being affected by these anomies. The trend of the waves of kidnapping in Kogi State remain unabated due to the lack of determination of the indigenes and will to fight it from the government. Some community leaders and security agencies compromised the security of the State by their unfirmed measures to curb the menace. Kidnapping and associated ills can be checkmated only if the indigenes are determined to flush out criminal elements in their domain with the support of the government and security agencies.

There is therefore the need for citizens to imbibe security tips and form security neighbourhood watch groups that would ensure safety in their environment. Similarly, non-governmental organisations should mobilise all arsenals in their disposal to equip and educate citizens on security challenges in the country. Traditional rulers and community leaders should have a local designed template of identifying all the people residing in their locality in order to observe their activities critically by that criminal hanging around will be checkmated.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

HATE SPEECH, POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AND VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: THE IMPLICATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Philips O. OKOLO, PhD* and David E. ATIYE†

INTRODUCTION

The wave of democracy-building raced across Latin America and Eastern Europe before spreading to Asia and then Africa in the 1980s-90s has increased the hope of democratic consolidation in the fourth republic experience in Nigeria, which the country transited from military regime to multi-party civilian dispensation. Since 1974, there had been a dramatic growth in the number of democracies, rising from 41 to 150 by 2003 (Diamond, 2006). Over the year, these new democratically elected leaders have contravened the fundamental democratic principles in most third world country, and in particularly in Nigeria.

The desperation of party politics and political parties in Nigeria to acquire and control political power, has made them resort to all sorts of activities, to include; hate speeches campaigns, political violence, moral and immoral act to ensure that political party capture power at all means. This portray Nigeria historical trajectory of the electoral process in the colonial and post-colonial state which is characterized by violence (Adesote and Abimbola, 2014), electoral fraud, maladministration and sharp practices (Ogoh, 2016) which often stimulates tension and create civil unrest in the political system, and these had indisputably derived the democratic practice in Nigeria to a kin abysmal dilemma (Efebeh and Okolo, 2016).

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Between 1954 and 2019, Nigeria has had 12 national elections and several state and local government elections. The results of this election have been scrutinized critically, and it was found that violence occurred both before and after the vote. Nwolise (2007), Campbell (2010) and Orji and Uzodi (2012) political violence in Nigeria has been related to enmity, religious division, widespread poverty and insufficient institutionalisation of democratic processes including hate speeches, political parties and the independent electoral commission; law enforcement agencies; the judiciary; and the independent electoral commission. The role of hate speech in electoral violence has undermined democratic consolidations in Nigeria, most notable examples this 2011 post electoral violence in Northern Nigeria and the body language of 2015 general elections (FGN, 2011; Chedotum et..al, 2013). Pre- and post-election violence, according to Ezeibe (2013) is prone and evolved into a series of hate campaigns leading to political violence, accusations and counter-accusations among frontline political parties and their candidates, which is both verbal attacks and is devoid of progress and fresh ideas (Baiyewu, 2015). The political class in Nigeria went on to setup standard rules and regulation strengthen some of their actions and inactions (Odufowokan, 2015) which can promote socio-economic tension and violence conflict or disorder that pose a dangerous threat to democratic consolidation.

In particularly the 2015 general election, between former president Goodluck Jonathan of the people Democratic Party (PDP) and Muhammadu Buhari All Progressives Congress, (APC) is case in point, went Rev. Father Mbaka advice his Adoration Ministry followers not to vote for former President Goodluck Jonathan in the fourths coming election in 16th February 2015. This took difference dimension on the other hand, when Fayose took the front page of a national newspaper to tell Nigerian that, APC, presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, would likely die in office if elected, claiming that people like Murtala Muhammed, Sani Abacha and Umaru Yar'Adua, (North-west) all former heads of state from that zone had died in office (ICIR, 2015). This public utterance credited to politicians, religious

leaders, and their supporters have become a source of worry that, if left unchecked, is capable of plunging the country into serious political tension and violence (Malik, 2015).

With the increasing spate of hate speeches during political campaign and violence among political parties in Nigeria, undermining democratic consolidation. Therefore, this paper seeks to interrogate their implication on democratic consolidation process.

Defining Hate Speech

The term "hate speech" refers to any statement that targets an individual or group based on characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, religion, race, or physical or mental handicap (Dictionary.com, 2011). An individual or a group (religious, social, political, or corporate) that is disparaged in any way is regarded to have engaged in hate speech. Hate speech can be prosecuted in Nigeria under the legislation of incitement to political violence and other forms of abuse. According to Ezeibe (2015), hate speech is any kind of communication that incites others to engage in acts of violence or prejudice. Moreover, their speeches degrade the dignity of others. hate speech uses derogatory epithets to degrade and stigmatize people on the basis of their colour, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or any other type of group affiliation. This is according to Adibe (2014) as referenced by Segun (2015). Hate speech frequently serves as a springboard for other forms of bigotry, such as harassment and threats of physical assault, as well as for more severe criminal activity.

As defined by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CMCE), hate speech includes any type of statement intended to inspire or justify hatred of one's ethnic or religious group, one's ethnic or religious origin, or one's religion in general. With such comes prejudice and discrimination towards people who are seen to be different from the rest of the population (ICIR, 2015). Acts of insulting other religions, abusing ethnic or linguistic affiliations, and expressing contempt for people's origins are examples of hate speech in Nigeria. Abusing or desecrating symbols of cultural or religious practises, and degrading or ridiculing traditional or cultural institutions from other people are also examples of hate speech

in Nigeria and demeaning, maligning, or ostracising others because of their racial or linguistic affiliations is an example of prejudice (Rufus, 2015, p.134).

There is no question that hate speech and its hatred are a trigger for political violence and it is quite unlikely that there would be any hate-motivated violent assault anywhere without hate speech and the hatred that it propagates (ICIR, 2015).

Political Campaigns

A political campaign is a strategy used by political parties to sway the opinions of a target audience or the broader public. Electoral campaigns and referendums are commonly referred to as "political campaigns" in democratic societies. The most high-profile candidates in modern politics are those vying for the position of head of state, usually a President or Prime Minister (Boundless, 2016). Political campaigns have been around for as long as humanity has been. A system for managing the activities of the many societies that we have across the world has become a need as people have gotten more civilized. If you're running for political office, you're going to need the support of people or a group of people to do so. For candidates running for various posts, political campaigns have become a platform in order to persuade the public to vote for them.

During the election campaign season in Nigeria political parties will undergo a major shakeup, resulting in cross-carpeting (political jumpology) and a wide range of actions and topics, which is a necessary phase in the electoral process of every nation and is reflected in the real voting process. During a campaign, a candidate must explain to voters what he or she intends to do if elected to office. "Manifestoes" are the phrase used to describe this. In order to win the election; a candidate must convince the public that he or she is the ideal person to fill a position of authority that has become empty. When campaigning in Nigeria, it's common to hear politicians make hate speeches against their opponents' personalities, parties, ethnicities, and faiths in place of the more traditional issue-based approach.

The Concept of Violence

There is no agreed-upon definition of violence. The word encompasses all forms of protest, military intervention, forcible coercion, huge devastation, and condemnation of people and property. A similar difference between violence and force was proposed by Wolf (1969). Violence, in his view, is the ability or act of forcing one's will on another, and this imposition may be seen illegitimate by others. Whereas, force is the ability to force one's will on another or the act of doing so when the imposition is considered legal. An individual or group that wants to change a government or circumstance may use violence as a means of accomplishing their goal (Jacquin, 2017: Internet). The term "election violence" refers to any acts of hostility or aggression that take place before, during, or after the voting period. Threatening voters with physical or verbal violence, interfering with the election with force, or even injuring those participating in the process are all examples given by Egobueze and Ojirika (2017: 3).

Democratic Consolidation

The term "democratic consolidation" refers to the strengthening of political institutions, such as political parties, the legislature, and the electoral commissions. It refers to the way government functions in terms of accountability, openness, constitutionality, rule of law, and bureaucracy. Formal and informal democratic institutions are included in this perspective (Khorram-Manesh, 2013). Other academics, on the other hand, believe that democracy is "consolidated" when it is projected to survive for a long time (Schedler, 1997; O'Donnell, 1996; Valenzuela, 1990). Democratic consolidation is complicated by the need to move away from authoritarian regimes and toward more representative forms of government (O'Donnell, 1996). To some extent, that's what's at issue here: whether or not these new institutions are capable of withstanding another cycle of authoritarian control and whether or not their long-term prospects look bright (Valenzuela, 1990).

By normalising behavioural and institutional changes, it is possible to reduce democratic uncertainties by eradicating institutions, procedures, and expectations that are unnecessary to the functioning of a democratic regime. This allows for the new initiatives that

have been spurred on by the transition to a democracy. Increased citizen access, growth of democratic citizenship and culture, and expansion of leadership recruitment and training are only some of the civil society functions that must be strengthened in order for normalization to take place (Matlosa, 2008). At this point, the only option for those who have just lost a political battle is to return and try again in a democratic system of institutions. (O'Donnell, 1996: 3).

Theoretical Framework

The social identity theory, proposed by Tajfel and Turner in 1982, was used in this work to explain the psychological foundation of inter-group prejudice. Many individuals, according to this idea, define themselves and others by belonging to particular social groupings such as ethnic groups or religious denominations or affiliations or gender or age groups or political parties. According to Turner in 1982, a person's personal, familial, or national level of self might be triggered in a variety of social situations.

Underpinning the idea of social identity is the assumption that individuals and organizations have a desire to compete with one another for resources such as physical space and resources that are seldom available (if solely the so-called resources are scarce at all). Different people have different values, cultures, customs, and the complete range of human psychology (Nnoli (1978). A significant factor that determines power play, resource control, and ultimately which groups or individuals get what is a difference in value systems.

Hate speech is used to determine political power shifts, public official responsibility and dissenting voices and counter-dissent, blackmail and intelligence on the executive branch, terrorism and religious uprising, allocation of resources and the awarding of contracts, and the appointment of people to political positions regardless of their qualifications (Okolie and Okoedion, 2019). These are the factors that have influenced Nigerian politics' course and focal point. Although political parties are based on elite rivalry, this is a significant element in the spread of hate speech and acts of political violence.

To obtain political and economic power, the political elites draw on, distort, and occasionally manufacture materials and meanings from the cultural heritage of the group they are trying to represent in order to defend their well-being or existence (Erunke, 2011: 14). As Apam (2011; 144) put it, there is always a struggle for power, economic gain and social prestige between the political elite, class and leadership group inside and among different ethnic groups. Social identity theory is important because of its capacity to explain and contrast how the political elite misuse of political power, alienation, marginalization and exclusion have generated hate speech and political violence in Nigeria.

Political Campaign and the Evidence of Hate Speech in Nigeria

In a democratic setting like ours, the use of hate speech is more dominant during electioneering campaigns through the theatre of abhorrence utterances in Nigeria. Table 1.1 below lists some of the more virulent anti-Semitic statements made by Nigerian political and religious figures.

Table 1: Hate speeches in Nigeria, 2010-2017

S/N	YEAR	HATE SPEAKER	HATE SPEECH	SOURCE
1	2010	former Kaduna State, Alhaji Lawan Kaita	In the event that President Goodluck Jonathan wins the 2011 elections, the North will make Nigeria unruly and hence impossible to rule. Our grabbing the president is akin to anything less than a Northern President.	Jason, 2011
2	2010	Shehu Sani, a Kaduna based civil rights activist	There's no way Jonathan, the outgoing president, should run in the next presidential election. Anyone who challenges his authority does so at their own peril, and it will only fuel political unrest.	Daily trust newspaper 8/5/10
3	2010	Dr.Junaidu Mohammed, National Coordinator of the Coalition of Northern Politicians	There is no Nigeria unless it is a Northerner... There would be bloodshed if the PDP endorses Goodluck Jonathan for the 2011 presidential election.	Guardian newspaper 02/11/10

Table 1. Continued

4	2011	General Muhammadu Buhari, candidate for president of the Congress for Progressive Change	Hopefully, something will happen by the year 2015. If they don't hold a free and fair election, they'll be in big trouble. The dog and the baboon would be drenched in blood if what happened in 2011 happened again in 2015.	Vanguard Newspaper 15/05/12
5	2012	Dr. Junaidu Mohammed, national coordinator of the Coalition of Northern Politicians	If the 2015 general election is not free and fair, it might be the final election in the history of the United States.	29/3/12, issue of Leadership
6	2012	Chinua Achebe, a foremost Nigerian writer	The Igbo man had an unassailable edge because of the culture's openness to change, individuality, and strong competitiveness... He was not confined by traditional hierarchies or a cautious religion, unlike the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba.	8/8/13 - Daily Post
7	2013	Femi Fani-Kayode	The Igbos, as a whole, are illiterate, uncultured, uncontrolled, and vulgar... A person's only goal in life is to accumulate as much money as possible.	8/8/13 - Daily Post
8	2013	Asari Doukubo Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Force (NDPSF).	Even if Goodluck Jonathan is not elected president by 2015, there would be no peace in the Niger Delta or anywhere else until God takes his life, something we rarely pray for.	5/5/13 Vanguard Newspaper
9	2013	Chief Arthur Eze PDP Chieftain	That small man named Ngige joined the Awolowo group, those who massacred Igbos because we handed him authority. Igbos were slain by the Awolowo group, this is why we transferred power to Ngige.	Premium Times 13/11/13
10	2014	Alhaji Lai Mohammed	If the 2015 elections are rigged, the party will refuse to accept the results and will proceed to create a parallel government instead.	Leadership 21/11/14

Table 1. Continued

11	2014	Governor Shema Ibrahim of Kastina State	You should not be surrounded by political bugs. Even in households, cockroaches are only found in the toilet. If you find a cockroach, crush it immediately.	Premium Times 19/11/14
12	2014	Northern Elder Forum	If Jonathan and the PDP win in 2015, those who vote for them would be deemed enemies of the north.	Vanguard, 15/10/14.
13	2014	Asiwaju Bola Tinubu	A rig and roast is in store. We don't need to go to court; we can just chase them away.	Tell,7/7/14.
14	2014	Former Governor of Akwa Ibom State, Godswill Akpabio	There will be consequences for those who try to gain power through the back door. They're going to die, I can tell you that much	Punch Newspaper 17/7/14
15	2014	South East Self Determination Coalition (SESD)	We can promise those bloodthirsty assassins that their campaign will not go unanswered this time.	Vanguard Newspaper 5/12/14
16	2014	Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari	Do-or-die isn't enough for 2015. We're both men, and we'll meet on the battlefield.	News Express 3/5/ 14
17	2014	Rivers States Governor, Rotimi Amechi	The Nigerian military's biggest problem isn't finance, but corruption. To make up for their own failures, they now want to execute some 50 police officers. The troops have the right to demonstrate against the government's inability to adequately equip them.	Nation's newspaper, 9/12/14
18	2015	Wife of former President, Patience Jonathan	What happened to him? Old guy wey no get brain, him brain don die patapata, him dey drag with him pikin mate - Buhari wants to know what he's after. An elderly guy who is unsure about his own age. It's as if you haven't a brain at all.	Express New, 4/3/14

Table 1. Continued

19	2015	Wife of former President, Patience Jonathan	Stone anybody who comes to you and claims that things have changed. Is it now that you've reached old age that you wish to modify what you didn't accomplish in 1985?	Nation 15/3/15
20	2015	The Governor of Ekiti State, Peter Ayodele Fayose	Murtala Muhammed, Sani Abacha, and Umaru Yar'Adua, all leaders of the North West, all died while in office.	ThisDay Newspaper 19/1/15
21	2015	Oba Akiolu of Lagos	In the name of God, if anybody of you, on Saturday, goes against my will that Ambode be the next governor of Lagos state, the individual would perish in this river... When it comes to the Igbos and other Lagos residents, they should follow the Oba of Lagos's footsteps...	ThisDay Newspaper4 /4/15
22	2015	Dr. Abraham Ariyo, U.S based Nigerian Doctor	In South Africa, you can observe the massacre of the Igbo people. That's exactly what's going to happen in Lagos... In Abuja, when will the Igbos be slaughtered? We'll keep busing them to Onitsha as long as they need us to.	Quick News Africa, 20/4/15.
23	2015	Former River State governor, Rotimi Amaechi	The All-Progressives Congress Party (APC) would organise a parallel administration if the February 14th and 28th elections are rigged.	ThisDay Newspaper4 /4/15
24	2015	Director of Media and Publicity, PDP, Chief Femi Fani-Kayode	We (PDP) are aware that they (APC) may have some difficulties with the English language; thus, if they desire to hold the conversation in their native language, we are prepared to pay for a translation or an interpreter.	http://www.peoplesdailyng.com/2015
25	2017	Femi Fani Kayode'	Refers to President Buhari as "son of perdition and tyrannical servant of Satan who did not emanate from a	Vanguard, 2/6/17

			righteous lineage or noble stock but is a wicked, unforgiving sadistic, bloodthirsty and vengeful Amalekite”.	
26	2017	Asari Dokubo, an ex-Niger Delta militant	Rotating presidency to Northern Nigeria “So we are going to wait for another 50 years under the bondage of people we are better than?”	Daily Post, 6/11/17
27	2017	Northern Christian Elders Forum (NCEF)	“Nigeria is on the throes of war over President Buhari’s attempt to impose Sharia.	Daily Trust, 7/10/17

Source: Ezeibe (2015); People’s Daily (2015); Odunayo (2016);

The Implication of Hate Speech on Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria

For some time now, social scientist and scholars have averred those political campaigns in Nigeria have move from the original issues-based rules and regulations. It is now a do-or-die affair in the country, because of the belief or assumption that a sitting president or election officials do not deserve to lose elections (Nigerian Insight, 2015). However, rather than educating the political community about the need of considering political elites and leaders as potential and representative of the people, they resort to hate speech (Akubor, 2015). Nigeria's National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Chairman, Chidi Odinkalu believes that Nigeria would devour itself in subsequent elections due of the worsening condition (Premium Times, 2015). Hate speeches pose grave implication on democratic consolidation in Nigeria from the four discussed perspectives as followed:

First and foremost, hate speech hinges the smooth maintenance of law and order in society but rather served as a driver of violent conflicts (CITAD, 2016) because both speaking and written words have power to influence others to act (New Internationalist Magazine, 2012). In Nigeria, those seeking certain political position and powers become reckless in the use of language that, they denigrate a particular person or a group on the idea of race, colour, ethnicity, gender, disability, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or other characteristics (Rufus, 2019). This situation was also reported within the case of Kenya, Rwanda, Cote d’Ivoire and other African countries (Akubor, 2015).

Ahmed Lemu's Panel Report on the post-election violence in Nigeria demonstrates that hate speech had a big part in motivating people to violence. A total of over a thousand people were killed across the nation, with the highest death toll of 847 occurring in Kaduna State during the 2011 presidential post-election violence, according to the committee's findings (Akubor, 2015). There was a lot of worry leading up to the March 28, 2015 presidential election that the vote would turn violent due to previous experiences with politicians elites who saw the elections as a desperate affair, in their electioneering efforts, they use caustic remarks, half-truths, and blatant falsehoods (Ibraheem, Ogwezzy and Tejumaiye, 2015 and Ezeibe 2015).

Secondly, the loss of human lives and damage of property is inevitable when a country is plunged into a significant political crisis by hate speech, which is why this subject was also discussed. There have been several instances of election violence, and kin issues of political thuggery which poses several implications, resulting to deaths of innocent people, the displacement of others, and the damage of property (Adesote and Abimbola, 2014; Okolo, Agbai and Boubai, 2022). In December 2003, the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal (UNICT) sentenced numerous media executives in Rwanda to prison for inciting and conspiring to commit genocide and crimes against humanity. According to the tribunal, media executives were responsible for killing thousands of innocent individuals without the use of guns, knives or any other weapons by writing pieces that fostered a mindset conducive to genocide (CITAD, 2016). It causes a scenario where security agents seem inactive in addressing election related violence in Nigeria (Okolo, 2021). As a result of this action, human capital is wasted and the power of the people is diminished in a democratic system.

The Muslim North candidate of the APC, General Muhammadu Buhari's supporters, set fire to this bus and a number of other cars. The effects of hate speech on the public, particularly young people, are exacerbated when individuals lack basic understanding or information about politics, particularly the political process. Another clear implication of hate speech toward democratic consolidation in Nigeria is by creating political apathy to the

electorates, when politicians resort to threats and hate statements when they fear that they might lose elections. This could raise tensions and sense of insecurity in the Nigerian political system that can produce negative political behaviours among the citizens.

Low voter turnout during general elections is undesirable because of these behaviours and perceived threats, which prevent the public from exercising their voting rights. On August 9, 2014, during the state's governorship election, former governor Rauf Aregbesola allegedly instructed APC supporters to assault security personnel with amulets, charms, and other magical items (Rufus, 2019:137). In addition, he said that unsubstantiated calls for the use of amulets and the perception of a probable breakout of violence in the voting arena might frighten away huge numbers of credible and patriotic anticipated voters from participating fully in the election process. Furthermore, according to Okoro (2012), there were reports of poor attendance in the governorship elections held in Kogi, the Cross Rivers, Adamawa, Bayelsa and Sokoto states, which he attributed to a dread of the political climate.

Equally, another threatens danger of hate speech in Nigeria journeys of democratic consolidation is the attitude of the Nigerian people, have been unable to achieve national integration, cohesiveness, and togetherness because of a lack of political tolerance and a lack of detribalized leaders and politicians willing to work toward these goals. Political intolerance has led to inter- and intra-ethnic/religious conflicts, thus disrupting peaceful ethnic relationship (Okolo, 2010), which have resulted in deaths and damage of private and public property in several Nigerian regions today. Political disunion and bigotry can cause retardation in the growth of political consciousness, and democratic consolidation because other ethnic, religious, and political parties are afraid to intimidate them.

Concluding Remarks

In Nigeria, hate statements aimed at winning political power sparked violence and weakened democratic consolidation via the institutions. Ethnic and religious intolerance have contributed to a dramatic increase in election violence in Nigeria from 2011 to date because of the country's political and social climate of intolerance. Political campaign of column, defamation,

condemnation and outright disrespect of opposition political parties in the country have become the order of the day, despite the country legal frameworks prohibiting hate speeches; still, this violence-inciting act has continued to permeate every nook and cranny of the country unabated as offenders commit the crime with utmost impunity by undermining the rules and regulations guiding the game of politics in Nigeria.

Independent electoral commission of Nigeria (INEC) should develop and put in place rigorous rules and regulations to guide against hate speech by adhering to their constitutional obligation of monitoring activities and ensuring strict adherence to their separate legal frameworks. There is also much for CSOs in Nigeria to do, such as the scaling up their efforts to educate the public about the significance of politics, democratic governance standards, and the necessity to eliminate ethnic and religious views in the political process by increasing their efforts in civil education. Similarly, political parties should stop mobilising electorates along ethnic and religious prejudices, political parties and create solid ideological framework to campaign on the basis of political concerns such as economic, political, socio-cultural and educational services.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

EMERGING ISSUES OF CORRUPTION AND INSECURITY: IMPACT ON NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Aziegbemhin S. IKHAYERE, PhD*

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is immensely blessed with abundant resources which enhanced her high potentials for greatness to reckon with in the comity of nations. Among these are its large population of a dynamic labour force, agriculture, atmosphere, biodiversity, oceans and coastal areas, forests, freshwater and mountains and great reservoir of oil and gas deposits which projects her as the largest exporter of oil in Africa. It is most unfortunate that amidst this numerous resource wealth by divine providence, development is still elusive (Ikelegbe and Opukri, 2010). Nigeria has no excuse whatsoever, to allow its system to deteriorate to such an extent where corrupt practices become the norm while insecurity, the order of the day (Adekparusi, 2020). The major challenges facing every Nigerian citizen have been the issues of corruption and insecurity that have eaten deep into the fabrics of our nascent democracy with their grievous attendant effects on the socio-economic development of the nation. Expat Insider Survey of 2019 by InterNations alludes that Nigeria has been adjudged the third most dangerous nation in the world (Adekparusi, 2020) bases on the threat these twin vices pose on the indigenes and visitors to Nigeria, alike.

Corruption has become a 'hard nut to crack' and the commonest issue everyone in Nigeria has to contend with in recent times. As serious that, it has defiled series of approaches or perspectives to finding solution to its end, to such an extent that it would be nearly correct to opine that it is a way of life. Almost everyone and visually in every sector in Nigeria, literate or illiterate, public officials or others in the private sector, defence and security personnel or

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bloody civilians, agents to checkmate the vices or those being investigated, leaders or the led, employers of labour or the employees live in suspicion, accusations and counter accusations, that in one way or the other knows something about corruption, can cite cases and can attempt some levels of analysis. This social menace triggers off a worrisome situation of insecurity that truncates progressive stride towards socio-economic development. It is capable also to scare foreign investors and their contributions to economic and social development. Resulting from the incessant activities of Fulani militant group, Nigeria currently features on the Global Terrorism Index as the fourth deadliest terror group in the world. Adekpearusi (2020), asserts that when institutions of a country are weak impunity becomes wide spread, her security architecture becomes feeble thereby creating a propagation or training ground for all manner of criminal activities and social ills; terrorist groups have room to flourish, kidnapping, human trafficking, banditry, child harvesting, police brutality and the likes, could be traced to weak institutions.

Meanwhile, this is a clear aberration from the provisions of 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which categorically states that ‘the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary responsibility of government’. In a related vein, the present administration pleaded its uncompromised commitment to its agenda for zero tolerance to corruption and insecurity but unfortunately, the same government has failed in its constitutional obligation to provide a safe and secure environment for lives and property as well as in the fulfilment of its promises to fight these social vices to a halt (Okonkwo, Ndubuisi-Okolo and Anagbogu, 2015). The implication of this detour is that the nation’s leaders succeeded only in making Nigeria a laughing stock of other nations. It is more laughable for a nation that was referred as the giant of Africa still cannot provide effective leadership after over sixty years of independence. This should serve the more reason the ugly happenings in the polity should be of a great concern to all Nigerians. Adesina and Akanle (2015) enunciate these as havening clearly shown sights of ineptitude, ineffectiveness, idiocy, tribalism, nepotism, favouritism, and finally, the emergence of political godfathers,

mismanagement, misdirection, misappropriations, corruption, lack of planning, policy inconsistencies and many others have become the trade mark of every administration that has ruled the Nigerian nation.

However, literature on related subject of corruption and insecurity across the world, especially on the developing countries and particularly on Nigeria are copious, yet the alarming rate of these evil vices keep on generating threat and perpetual fears thereby stimulating a more worrisome situation while their dimension are insufficiently understood. This thus necessitates fresh and current interrogations of the problematic. It is against this background that this study examines the existing perspectives and attempt interrogations of the twin problem of corruption and insecurity and their implications on the Nigerian political economy. It critically examines corruption and insecurity within the Nigerian society from related literature and personal observation perspectives. Therefore, the methodology employed for the study is essentially library research, while descriptive method is used in its analysis. It however engages the Frustration-Aggression Theory of the Nigerian system for its theoretical framework. The study has further expanded the wealth of the body of knowledge on the subject and offers some useful suggestions that will immensely contribute in the fight against the prevalent vices and to bring about an end to a corrupt and insecure society for the renaissance of all-round development in Nigeria.

The Concepts of Corruption, Insecurity and Development

Three main thematic concepts (corruption, insecurity and development) are gamine and desire clarification in this study.

Corruption: Corruption is a dishonest and illegal behaviour of people particularly, those in authority, allegation of bribery and corruption in private public and governmental establishment. It is the use of public office for private gain. It refers to any behaviour that deviates from the norm or socially unacceptable (Ajodo-Adebanjoko and Okorie, 2014).

There are different forms through which corruption manifest with their peculiarities and characteristics. Some of these types include grand corruption, political corruption,

professional corruption, economic corruption, religious corruption, moral corruption, organised corruption and working-class corruption. There are other forms corruption may take that could be categorised as cronyism, bribery, favouritism, fraud, patronage, extortion, embezzlement and influence peddling. The causes of corruption in Nigeria are numerous but some of them are: greed, poor reward system, social environment, societal and family pressure, ostentatious living, poor reward system, get-rich-quick syndrome, inadequate motivation and lack of capital punishment of corrupt cases (Akindele, 2005).

According to Osadosa (2012), a study of Nigeria history reveals that past leaders moulded Nigeria with great zeal for success based on the way and manner they collectively exhibited patriotism and self-sacrifice to achieve political independence for the country. But now, reverse is the case as the magnitude of corruption in Nigeria has become alarming and disheartening. Corruption has been institutionalised in the Nigerian polity, and has eaten deep into the fabrics of the society. It has become the major focus of considerable attention, hand-wringing and lamentation in and outside Nigeria. Global Public advocacy and international organisations including Transparency International have committed in efforts to combat it, as well as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Finance Crime Commission (EFCC) are at the home front. We do not claim any special insights on this issue (Anazodo, Igbokwe-Ibeto and Nkah, 2015). In addressing the issue of corruption, we propose to reflect our own personal views and the experiences of other Nigerians. The cost of corruption is too cheap and the political will to implement anti-corruption laws is absent that it has continued to defy all possible solutions (Igbokwe-Ibeto and Okoye, 2014).

Corruption permeates every sector of the Nigerian economy and it has infiltrated the literates as well as the illiterates, the rich and the poor. It is obvious that corruption is the primary cause of insecurity in Nigeria since studies have traced the factors that champion course of insecurity to corruption (Ajodo-Adebanjoko, et al., 2014). A study conducted by Osunyikanmi in 2007 posits that even the highly endowed nation with natural and human resources remains perpetually underdeveloped where corruption exists. However, poor

availability of data to measure the extent and index of bribery, embezzlements and frauds in the country might render the comprehensive analysis of these tendencies slightly difficult.

INSECURITY: Conceptualising security by some scholars placed emphasis on the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion, political and socio-economic aims of the nation (Igbuzor, 2011; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Security according to Omede (2012) could be seen as a dynamic condition which involves the ability of a state to counter threats to its core values and interests.

The connotation of the concept of insecurity therefore, is divergent. It comprises absence of safety; or presence of danger, hazard, uncertainty, lack of protection; and lack of safety. To Beland (2005), insecurity is “the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection”. It refers to lack of or inadequate freedom from danger. Insecurity as defined by Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpan-Robaro (2013), is of two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is a state of being open or subject to danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury. Secondly, insecurity is a state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune. These definitions underscore a major point that the victims of insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of would happen but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers when they occur. Insecurity is a fear of the unknown; A feeling of trepidation and unsafe. It is a state of being unable to protect lives and property. It is a state of being subject to danger or threat. This means that such a person is vulnerable to danger, injury or loss from both internal and external causes. From this definition, it can be deduced that in such situation the sovereignty of the nation cannot safeguard the citizens and her resources both within and outside the country (Udeh, Okoroafor and Ihezue, 2013). Insecurity can also be a feeling of being insecure in one’s environment, under such condition of feeling insecure, there is lack of confidence because of the thinking that one is not good enough or loved. Insecurity could also be referred as an unsafe feeling, as the state of mind characterised by

self-doubt and vulnerability. It is a feeling of being a target for hurt or harm (Abamara, Okoye, Oguegbe and Joe-Akunne, 2015).

Most scholarly articles on insecurity in Cold-War era focused on the traditional approach to security which is state-centric. Under such premise, insecurity only refers to or conceived as threats to the state which often account for the race for arms and nuclear weapon (Ajodo-Adebanjoko and Ugwuoke, 2014). However, in the post- Cold War era, human security or a people centred view of security has assumed centre- stage. This is based on the fact that threats to human lives emanate not only from situation of violent conflict but other non-conflict sources (Saliu, Luqman and Abdullahi, 2007). Insecurity in its true sense is a plain fear, the fear that one is not safe in his immediate environment. Considering insecurity from global perspective, some countries of the world, especially the third world countries are currently experiencing political, economic and social insecurity which are orchestrated by the respective leadership of these countries. This is the result of deviation from the wishes and aspirations of the colonial fathers or leaders (Osadosa, 2012). Insecurity in this context refers to a situation of fear or anything that causes fear, harm or has the tendency of causing fear or harm to an individual or group of persons. Such issues could be politico-strategic, socio-economic, or ecological in nature; for instance, political instability, poverty, environmental degradation, lack of access to education, discrimination on the basis of gender, diseases and unemployment (Udeh, et. al., 2013).

Insecurity uneasiness has continued to haunt all the inhabitants of Nigeria as tension keeps growing daily, many have started to realise that government cannot effectively guarantee the security of lives and property. This has become glare in the Nigeria situation as the state security agents who are saddled with the responsibility for the security of lives and property which include – the police, the military, immigration, prison service and other security agencies have all performed abysmally in the discharge of their duties. The multifaceted nature of insecurity in Nigeria is such that one cannot accurately categorise in terms of patterns. There is no disputing the fact that at different times in the past different

groups have held the Nigerian nation to ransom; and in each of these times the groups reigned, the nation's security agencies were able to deal with the situations by quelling their lawless conducts through superior fire power and tactical approaches. The government has always reached a form of compromise with these lawless groups, it became weaker and new groups emerged to use violent means to extract a commitment from government (Agomuo, 2013). In a typical behaviour of a nation that thrives on rent economy, the government has always sought to buy peace and always ended with the peace of the graveyard like the current situation in the Niger Delta where former militants have been transformed into either top-level government contractors or emergency crude oil refiners in the creeks or kidnap merchants, despite an amnesty programme that still costs the government billions of Naira every year (Adegbami, 2013).

Development

The concept of economic development cannot be discussed in isolation of economic growth. This is because economic growth is a major aspect of economic development (Sen, 1983). While economic growth is the increasing capacity to satisfy the needs and wants of the economy overtime, which is conventionally measured as the percentage rate of increase in real gross domestic product (GDP); economic development is the process of improving the quality of human life and is measured by increase in per capita income. It aims at reducing poverty and enhancing individual economic opportunities. It can be defined to include better education, improved health and nutrition, conservation of natural resources, a clear environment and a richer cultural life (Penn State University, 2008). Generally, economic development refers to the sustained, concerted actions of policy makers and communities that promote the standard of living and economic health of a specific area. It is the quantitative and qualitative changes in the economy which involve actions in multiple areas including development of human capital, critical infrastructure, regional competitiveness, environmental sustainability, social inclusion, health, safety, literacy and other initiatives.

However, Ikhayere (2021) opines that the words developed, underdeveloped, undeveloped and less-developed, are often used to denote the social and economic conditions of the people in a given country or region. The concept of development according to Ikhayere (2021) is elusive, it is perceived not only as a condition of life but also as a goal to be attained, and as the capacity to grow, change and develop. These three ideas of development are bound together in efforts to understand and deal with the phenomenon of development. The evidences of the condition of underdevelopment are frequently given in terms of poverty. However, the starkest evidence of underdeveloped populations is found and expressed in terms of hunger and starvation, the scantiest housing, the barest of clothing, and the poorest of health (Gant, 2006).

It is worthy to note here that greater number of populations of the developing countries are still living in absolute poverty, hunger and are not sheltered adequately from hostile weather. They suffer ill health and those who survive childhood die early. The people are illiterates, insecure, and experience only unhappy leisure, certainly a condition of underdevelopment. These assertions align with those of Dudley Seers” (1969), that to ascertain a country or nation that is developed or underdeveloped, answers must first be found to these questions: “What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? And what has been happening to inequality?” Appropriate answers to these questions Seers concluded, would determine a country adjudged developed or underdeveloped; that is if all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have as in the case of Nigeria, it would be strange to call the result developed, even if per capita income doubled (Ikhayere, 2016). Seers eventually suggest that development is when a country experiences a reduction or elimination of poverty, inequality and unemployment. This applies of course, to the future too in regards to planning. A plan which conveys no targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be considered a development plan (IDS, 2021).

Igbuzor (2004), notes that the main causes of poverty in Nigeria include illiteracy, unemployment, ignorance, high inflation rates, poor economic governance, insecurity of life and property, huge foreign debt, higher incidence of diseases, environmental degradation, large family size, inadequate access to employment opportunities and lack of adequate access to land and capital.

Moreover, it is pertinent to note that adequate utilisation and proper management of available resources is germane to development. A country which utilises resources effectively is considered to be more developed than a country which does not. Utilisation potential increases the growth and application of scientific knowledge and technology. In this wise, Nigeria as a country is not satisfying the expectations of its population and to that extent, is not developed and to say the least, the goal of development is not in sight. Development as an objective can be considered from two levels: first, is from the perspective of eradication of poverty, which a concerned development plan must certainly focus on – the quality of life beyond mere sustenance as assured by respect for the rights of human dignity and liberty; second, which is the higher purpose of development. According to Ozoh (2010), the problem of inability of the underdeveloped countries to grow emanates from defective economic and socio-political institutional setups, defective attitude towards work, technological backwardness, low entrepreneurial skills and talents, indiscipline, limited size of market and imperfection, lack of basic industries due to capital deficiency and defective education, among others. All of these of course, characterizes our nation Nigeria and are orchestrated majorly by the high levels of corruption and insecurity.

Theoretical Framework

Frustration-Aggression is the choicest theory for the framework of this study. The pioneer proponents of Frustration-Aggression Theory- Dollard, Doob, Mowrer and Sears (1939), stated that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour presupposes the existence of frustration and that frustration leads to some forms of aggression. In other words, all aggressive behaviour must be preceded by frustration. The universal validity of this theory was however challenged

and this may have prompted conceptual reversal of same to “frustration produces instigation to aggression but this is not the only type of instigation that it may produce” (Miller, Sears, Mowrer, Doob and Dollard, 1941). This modification makes aggression, especially in relation to retaliation, one of the consequences of frustration and not its only outcome.

The theory stipulates that aggression is the result of frustration which is the effect of inability to attain individual goals. In view of that, insecurity is the product of aggressive behaviour which results from unresolved issues such as poverty and unemployment among others. Applying this to the study, corruption in the country has resulted in abject poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, injustice, absence of infrastructure, ethnic conflicts, and militancy of all which in turn have resulted in insecurity (Ajodo-Adebanjoko and Okorie, 2014). According to Davis (1983), frustration is a direct blockade of a person’s movement toward a defined goal; it produces irritable and uneasy feelings within the individual. When it persists, the victim is aggressively pushed to seek substitute goal. Relating frustration-aggression theory of corruption from Nigeria perspective, it could be put that violence, kidnapping, robbery, rapping, mass destruction of lives and property and the likes, are reprisal due to frustration resulting from goal blockade. On the other hand, Nigerians who take to corruption use it as substitute means to goal attainment, because they feel highly insecure in the prevalent economic predicament in the country (Adebayo, 2013).

Current Interrogations of the Effects of Corruption and Insecurity on National Development in Nigeria

Corruption and insecurity have crippled and have significantly impeded the economic development of the country. They are both evil locust that has grained and anchored itself deeply within every sphere of the Nigerian economy which must be fought. They have stolen the resources of wealthy and endowed countries and thereby creating or contributing immensely to the vicious poverty circle, unemployment, and decay in public infrastructures in Nigeria. This is because, the further corrupt and insecure a nation is the more backward and subdued her industrial and economic development would be affected (Okenna, 2020). According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index

(HDI) report of 2005, Nigeria is ranked as the 158th out of 159 third world underdeveloped countries of the world despite its abundance of human and natural resources. This is due to the high level of corruption especially in the political, social and economic sphere and it is a very worrisome situation.

In more specific terms, corruption and insecurity have been the bane of development and adversely affected the economic, political and social transformation - the major cause of development setback for Nigeria (Ajodo-Adebanjoko, et. al., 2014). Economically, corruption and insecurity encourage capital flight as many foreign investors are reluctant to invest in Nigeria for fear of losing their money to swindlers and fraudsters, as many had been victims of those popularly known as '419ers'. Insecurity on the other hand, continues to take its toll on the economy. In many parts of the country, property worth billions of Naira has been destroyed while many businesses have come to a standstill as a result of violence and protests. Many investors local and foreign have been discouraged from doing business in and with the country, while some foreigners have relocated to other countries. The cost of corruption is also seen in the fact that sixty-two years after independence Nigeria has not been able to celebrate one day of uninterrupted power supply, still battling with access to portable water, debt on the increase as incessant borrowing is quite enormous and value of Nigeria currency- worthless as current exchange rate is presently about N800 to \$1. Imagine, in recent time, the Federal Government made public her intention to further borrow \$29.96bn, amidst caution by the International Monetary Fund on the nation's disturbing current debt profile. When money is injected into a corruption-infested system without clear-cut plans on how to exterminate insecurity and corruption, the ultimate impact of such liquidity is hardly left by the citizens who continue to suffer effects of corruption through diversion, mismanagement or outright looting (Adeparusi, 2020).

Politically, corruption flouts or subverts formal processes, undermines the legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance. The lack of legitimacy in turn creates enabling environment for insecurity to thrive (Ogunleye, Adewale, Alese and

Ogunde, 2011). It is no longer News that there are a lot of embezzlements in the political system, of the billions of Naira allocated for military and security hardware as well as routine security votes in the form of statutory allocation to political leaders at federal, state and local government levels. It is though the problem of insecurity in Nigeria has become an avenue for certain individuals in government to gain unrestricted access to national treasury with which they enrich themselves and their cronies (Adeparusi, 2020).

In the same vein, infrastructural development suffers great setback, while the existing few are left to decay and dilapidated as fund allocated on yearly budgets for infrastructural development have always been embezzled and diverted into private accounts. It is laughable to find school pupils sitting on bare floor or under trees to learn for dearth of furniture or classrooms in this twenty-first century, while the political leaders send their children for study in foreign countries leaving the children of the masses at the mercy of teachers who embark on regular strike actions. High death rate is another problem resulting from lack of medical care and fake drugs attributed to corruption. Victims of this are mostly the poor as the wealth has access to medical treatment abroad. Above all, selection into political leadership at every level in Nigeria has always been laid on corrupt foundation such that credible candidates cannot gain access to positions by election or appointment, while the rich would influence their ways, recycling themselves, swopping from one political party to the other and from legislative to executive arms, yet policies that will benefit the generality of the people will not be enacted. Corruption therefore continues to make the rich richer and the poor, poorer (Adesina et al, 2015).

Socially, corruption and insecurity have done greater harm to the country's image globally than any other phenomenon. Nigeria has lost its credibility before the international community to the extent that it is currently reputed as the most corrupt and insecure country in the world (Ajodo-Adebanjoko, et al, 2014). A supposed buoyant economy of Nigeria has been so damaged and become unpleasant by the twin social vices called corruption and

insecurity; food security, job opportunities, religious worship, other forms of socialisation, and so on, are threatened by corruption and insecurity (Adeparusi, 2020).

McNamara (1968), giving credence to the need for nations to build military forces insisted that development is essential for security. He however regrets that ignorance on the part of leaders results to this fact problematic. In his words:

The rub is that we do not always grasp the meaning of security in this context. In a modernising society, security means development, security is not military hardware, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activities though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature. This is what we do not always understand and what government of modernising nations do not always understand.

The emphasis of this assertion is on the importance of development above any other. That government must look beyond mere equipping or applying defence and security forces in their search for national security. Rather, they should give serious attention to the factors which enhance development such as solutions to issues of poverty, unemployment, hunger and starvation, lack of social amenities; low technologic advancement, obnoxious laws and policies, inequality, election malpractices and abuse of human and people's rights.

Recent Narratives of Frustration-Aggression and its Implications on Peaceful Coexistence of Nigeria Nationalism

The nexus of concepts of this study is insecurity in the country as fallouts of conflicts and non-conflict sources. Corruption and insecurity are therefore twin challenges of development in Nigeria. While corruption is the result of various factors ranging from political, social to economic; insecurity is mainly the offshoot of corruption. The effects of corruption and insecurity on Nigeria's socio-economic development are myriad. In other words, corruption and insecurity pose severe development challenge to the nation as they threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria as a nation (Udeh, et. al., 2013). Since corruption gives rise to insecurity and insecurity instigates all forms of agitations, secessions, and hostility; there is need to first

eliminate corruption which is the root cause of all the problems, for security to be restored in order to create enabling environment for development in Nigeria.

Having a critical view at the implications of corruption in Nigeria, it is an understatement to state that corruption has been the major cause of frustration to the Nigerian youth - the strength of the nation who has been rendered jobless, helpless and hopeless by selfish, greedy and unpatriotic leaders that the country has had. Overcoming the oppression or siege on the populace in the nation by the few greedy leaders resulted in strong resistance and mass killings as experienced in the recent #EndSARS protest nationwide (Sanni and Ogunlowo, 2021). Regional secession attempts have been witnessed at different times in the country, having reason for their actions. Some of the recent ones are- the Niger Delta militants' action over oil revenue derivation; the South-West move headed by Sunday Igboho- over usurpation of ancestral rights of leadership; the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) led by Nnadi Kalu – over marginalisation (Nwanike, 2022). Amidst all these, it has been observed that the present administration chose to worsen the situation through lopsided appointments of Federal positions in the country. Leaders should give attention to those issues capable of uniting and not issues that will divide the nation; rather than favouring a particular geopolitical zone with infrastructures, welfare services and appointments at the detriment of others.

However, it may sound hard to state that most of the violence and deviant experiences in the country can be reprisal for what were not done right and the consequences are now manifesting in different unexpected ways. Imagine scores of people dying daily through insurgency and banditry, while many innocent citizens are kidnapped and thrown into unknown forests for ransoms and the few who gain freedom are traumatised for their entire lives. The emerging issues as exemplified by the current trends of killings in less than two months (January 1 to February 16, 2021), has 1,525 deaths figure, which is conservative, covers only reported cases arising from the Fulani herdsmen crisis, Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and robbery which activities have been perceived to be same and towards

terrorising innocent citizens (NST, 2021). According to a report by Global Rights, 3,188 lives were lost between January and December 2019 to violent attacks across Nigeria. Going by the Global Terrorism Index 2020, Nigeria is the third country most impacted by terrorism after Afghanistan and Libya.

However, it has been found that having a high degree of social cohesion contributes measurably to economic growth and investment, to good governance, health and social security (Stanley, 2003). It is noteworthy that the concept of social cohesion refers to the willingness of citizens of a country to cooperate and work together towards ensuring the survival and prosperity of the country. This sounds as a mirage with high rate of poverty and unemployment, particularly amongst the youth demographic. Social tensions and agitations for self-existence in the pockets of the country have continued to brew in spite of the country's transition from military rule to democracy in 1999. From then till date, the country's uninterrupted 23 years of democratic experience has not been assessed with mixed reactions, as it has been fraught with several challenges. Over this period, the country has become more divided along social, political, economic, ethnic, religious and knowledge lines; questioning the root of our social fabric and co-existence as a people and crucially justifying the need to investigate social cohesion within our context (API, 2019).

Mitigating Corruption and Insecurity for National Development and Mutual Existence

These twin vices, corruption and insecurity are no longer just a problem that affects our security sector, but the entire economy is at stake if something is not done to fix the menaces. It will take effective leadership and good governance to eliminate corruption and insecurity. Under such environment, transparency, accountability and adherence to the rule are vital if the fight against corruption and insecurity is to be achieved; and in order to have the capacity to ensure political stability in the country and to guarantee economic growth and development. Policy makers must avoid seeing policies or taking certain actions through the eyes of a particular ethnic group, religion or race. The danger of such actions creates struggles and agitations among the people. The culture of a society enhances or hinders their development.

The perception of corruption as an amoral act stem from the socio-economic and political wellbeing of its citizens. The notion can only be jettisoned through effective leadership and good governance. Orientation and re-orientation of leaders and followers alike should be made a continuous exercise. Best values and practices in the globe should be internalised in Nigeria. Indeed, it appears that the problem has often been the gap between words and action. Nigerian leaders should match their words with action. Be stable and consistent in its policies and programmes as well as ensure equity and egalitarian society without discrimination. Then, the people will definitely build trust and confidence on the government/leaders and follow suit by performing their obligatory duties and responsibilities and eschew violence, dissidence or agitations.

Poverty and unemployment issues should be addressed to change the narrative. Government at all levels should establish a more viable and result-oriented agency capable of addressing the problems of abject poverty and unemployment among large population of Nigerians, this will aid in reducing the level of poverty, crime and violence in the country. The need to create an enabling environment for job opportunities for the teeming unemployed youths should be seen as paramount. This can be done through laws, policies, programmes, projects and provision of infrastructural facilities like roads, potable pipe borne water and constant power supply that can attract investment especially foreign direct investment.

Moral conducts and social responsibilities should be re-defined. Corruption and insecurity need to be eliminated for Nigeria to be able to effectively play its role as the giant of Africa and a force to reckon with globally. Eradicating corruption and insecurity from Nigeria is a task that should not be left to the government alone; all hands must therefore be on deck if the country is to be purged of this twin evil. The society should shun individuals with ill-gotten wealth or whose sources of income are questionable while the government, traditional and religious leaders should not give recognition or titles to such individuals. Any citizen confirmed to have corruptly enriched himself should not only be made to regurgitate such ill-gotten wealth but should be permanently remove from such an organisation, be it a

workplace or place of worship. In a related vein, Organisations should have social responsibilities towards the society in which it is located. There is no doubt that adequate attention to social responsibilities on the part of organisation could remove some of the corruption precipitating factors and thereby reduce corruption, insecurity and crime. But rather people should be handsomely remunerated in their places of work. If this is done it will minimise the rate of corruption in Nigeria.

There is the need to conscientiously improve on Law enforcement and to have equipped security formation, they are Sacrosanct. Law enforcement agents should be equipped adequately to deal with the problem of terrorism. A well-equipped, funded and coordinated security can protect lives and property through intelligence gathering mechanism with the cooperation of the international community. There must be zero tolerance for corruption by the government and corrupt individuals who use their ill-gotten wealth to sponsor acts of terrorism should be prosecuted accordingly if found guilty.

Conclusion

Corruption and insecurity have done more harm to our nation than anything else as they have been the root causes of setbacks, disdains and economic crunches. Ever since the twin evil found its way to the Nigerian system and most developing African countries experiences have been retrogressive strides in terms of national development. The worse has happened to Nigeria in recent times under the present administration at the increasing rates of killings, maiming, kidnapping and raping since Fulani herdsmen, Boko Haram and the likes, have reinforced and occupied virtually all forest locations throughout the country with more sophisticated weapons than those of national defence and security forces. It is time for all citizens and leaders to start to think of where they have gotten things wrong that these evils have befallen the nation. Many evils at a time - unemployment, poverty, inflation, infrastructural decay, ASSU strike, and so on.

Corruption rears poverty, unemployment and invites conflicts as well as exacerbates insecurity. Corruption remains a major cause of insecurity in Nigeria because those factors

that give rise to insecurity are the products of corruption. However, a top priority attention must be given to the eradication of corruption and insecurity if the nation's transformation agenda will manifest and all Nigerian citizens, irrespective language or tribe will live harmoniously.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

NEGOTIATING SECESSION: THE 2005 MACHOKOS AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUDAN

Bayo T. ASALA, PhD*

INTRODUCTION

It was long way to Machakos Agreement. The untimely death of the former leader of South Sudanese when John Garang was killed in a helicopter crash on his way from Kenya after a meeting on 30 July 2005 led to new dimension in the protracted conflict which was burnt out of shrewdness and racism in Sudan. He was replaced by Salva Kiir Mayardit. LeRiche and Arnold (2012: 115-116) argued that, although it was delayed, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) was formed on 20 September and the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) came into existence on 22 October 2005, as initiated by internal mechanisms. To many observers, including people in the Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), Garang's demise led to a speedy end of the protracted discord, discrimination, and racism, and to the negotiations and the peaceful achievement of freedom for the people of South Sudan.

The strategy deployed by South Sudanese leaders managed to unite in the face of this disaster by September 2005, just as they had done so many times in the last two decades of war. They opted to resolve their differences in order to achieve the common goal of secession through the implementation of local initiatives or internal mechanisms. The strategy deployed in this conflict can be a borrow leaf to resolve other conflicts tearing the countries in Africa apart. It is of note that after the secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, the two countries have never embarked on any war.

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An unassuming Salva Kiir Mayardit, the former deputy to Garang, took over leadership of the South. However, Khartoum had very little knowledge of Kiir's personality and therefore tended to him cautiously. It was hardly known to outsiders that he had been loyal to the cause and was the last surviving founding member of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). He was often underrated and discriminated against by the leadership in Khartoum as observed by the Gurtong Focus Monthly (2011: 4-5). Mr. Salva Kiir realised from the very onset that the position of First Vice President of Government of Unity (GoUN), and the national ministerial posts assigned to Southerners were simply based on racism, a front for a parallel government only answerable to Omar al-Bashir. Leonardo (2017) explained further that this prompted Kiir to withdraw to Juba to prepare his region for secession, only visiting Khartoum when the occasion demanded. Unlike Garang, who would have dominated the place, Kiir's tactical withdrawal was mistaken for weakness, as Khartoum would continue to freely plot his downfall and that of the South.

What followed was six years of relative calm after the signing of the CPA. This was like the situation after the emergence of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, leading to the end of the first civil war. However, Khartoum continued to arm the Liberation Redemption Army (LRA), South Sudanese militiamen and the Arab tribes of Southern Darfur in order to destabilise the CPA and this motivated Southern Sudanese to unite for secession. While Kiir could only contain a serious confrontation militarily as it happened twice in Malakal during the Interim Period, he always followed up with the olive branch for South Sudanese in the service of Khartoum, appealing for their better side and offering to take them into the ranks and file of the SPLM. That way, he disarmed Khartoum all the time, particularly when Gen. Matiep Nhial was taken with all his men and armaments (Leonardo, 2017).

Breidlid, Said, Wawa and Farren (2014) pointed out that, as enshrined in a new constitution, the defining rationale of the Interim Period was to encourage Southern voters to decide whether or not to secede from Sudan in the culminating referendum. Ultimately, this effort failed to persuade Southerners of its imperative for giving unity a chance, since reform,

notably in terms of democratisation, was widely lacking. The Interim Period led to a major accomplishment because the Republic of South Sudan emerged peacefully and the civil war was decisively concluded via the implementation of the internal mechanisms of conflict resolution in Sudan. However, the chapter will only analyse the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the Machakos Agreement.

Though, a series of six protocols were signed between 2002 and 2004 with the mediation of the regional organisation IGAD, which described what had to be done to resolve the conflict between the National Congress Party (NCP), and the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). (Breidlid, et. al., 2014).

The six protocols are as follows:

1. The Machakos Protocol signed in Machakos, Kenya on 20 July 2002 where the main principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government as well as the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan, and on state and religion were outlined.
2. The Protocol on security arrangements signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 25 September 2003. The security arrangement included the end of hostilities between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). It also described the structure and functions of the armed forces during the pre-interim periods. Three legally accepted armed forces were deployed in Sudan: Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) north of the January 1, 1956, border line, Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) south of the January 1, 1956, borderline and the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) which comprised both the SPLA and SAF. The Government of Sudan and Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army agreed to form the JIU with equal representatives from both sides. It was agreed that JIU would be in major towns and cities both in the North and the South to keep the peace and to retain their troops in the North and the South, respectively.
3. The third protocol was on wealth-sharing. The document was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on January 7, 2004. This protocol outlined in detail how both oil and other revenues in

Sudan were to be equally shared between the North and the South, which also included the disputed southern areas of Blue Nile and Kordofan states and the Abyei region. The governments of Southern Sudan and Khartoum were to share all oil and other revenues derived from the South into two equal parts while the states that produce oil will receive two percent, that is, one percent each from the GoSS and the GoS. Oil revenue was given top priority in the discussions. The detailed wealth sharing agreement also provided for a new national currency and the creation of a parallel Central Bank in the North and the South.

4. Next was the protocol on power-sharing. It was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004. In this protocol, the parties agreed to run a decentralised system of governance with significant devolution of powers. The Government of National Unity (GoNU) was to be responsible for protecting and promoting the sovereignty of Sudan, while the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was to exercise governmental powers in the Southern Region on a semi-autonomous basis. Moreover, the various states were to run their own government affairs through local government provisions in consultation with the Central Government. On the other side, the disputed areas such as Abyei and Nuba Mountains were to have their independent administrators and governors after the referendum.
5. The Protocol on conflict resolution in Southern Kordofan, Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile states, signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004. This protocol stated that the three states had the right to self-determination and could vote to be united with either the South or the North.
6. The Protocol on the resolution of the conflict in Abyei, signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004. This region was the most contested between the North and the South, owing to the economic and political importance of its oil fields. Therefore, negotiation was prolonged before it was finally agreed that a referendum would be conducted

simultaneously with the referendum in the South on 9 January 2011 so that the Abyei region could decide whether to belong to the South or the North. (Breidlid, et. al. 2014)

Implementation of the Protocols

The modalities adopted to implement the various protocols took place in two stages, viz:

- a. a six-month pre-interim period, where the CPA was incorporated into the Transitional Constitution
- b. A six-year interim period ending in a referendum to decide if the South would become independent and whether Abyei was to be incorporated into the South. The referendum took place on 9th January 2011. (Mr. Joseph 2017)

Achievements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The following are significant achievements of the CPA:

1. Southern Sudan was able to form the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) running its autonomous activities with its interim constitution, legislative assembly and executive functions.
2. Security and peace returned to most parts of Southern Sudan, although some groups of militias caused problems and the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continued in some parts of Equatoria.
3. The introduction of the New Sudanese Pound managed by both the Central Bank of Sudan and the Bank of Southern Sudan, including the establishment of other financial and commercial banks such as Sudan Microfinance Institutions (SUMI), Nile Commercial Bank, Buffalo Bank, and Kenya Commercial Bank.
4. With a new Southern Sudan school curriculum, all children of Southern Sudan were by 2010 supposed to have access to either formal or informal education. This was hindered, however, by lack of qualified teachers, poor or non-existent school buildings, overcrowded classes and inadequate school materials.
5. There were basic health care facilities to prevent common diseases in the South, although unevenly spread and too scarce in rural areas.

6. There was freedom of movement as well as of the press and association throughout the states, despite a few cases of censorship.
7. The return of refugees from neighbouring countries and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
8. For the first time after the twenty-two years of civil war, the GoSS managed to pay salaries to both army and civil servants.
10. Economic recovery and progress took place, but primarily in the urban areas. (Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute).

The Challenges of the Implementation of CPA

Numerous challenges followed the final signing of the CPA in 2005. Dr. John Garang's death on July 30, 2005 in a helicopter crash was a major setback as he had led the SPLM/A since 1983 and had been the driving force behind the peace negotiations. The relationship between the NCP and the SPLM/A had always been fragile but became even more precarious when the NCP suspected that the new leader of SPLM/A, Salva Kiir, might not be committed to the idea of a New Sudan and might insist on an independent Southern Sudan, unlike his predecessor. Other challenges were as follows:

- The NCP rejected the findings of a commission set up to determine the border of Abyei. The Abyei protocol has thus not yet been implemented since the border demarcation has not been finalised. Sudan's Chief of Security, Mr. Salah Gosh, made it clear on July 30, 2010 that his government would not accept the ruling of the International Court of Justice on Abyei.
- The NCP rejected the demarcation of the north-south border, with implications for oil revenue sharing as well as national elections and the referendum.
- During the Interim Period the NCP delayed considerably to fund the national census which was central to the national elections.
- The Central Government was not transparent about the sharing of oil revenue.

- Both the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudanese Armed Forces were slow to redeploy their forces, meaning that large numbers of troops were around the contested border areas.
- Both the South and the North recorded serious issues regarding the transparency of the elections of April 2010.
- There was generally a lack of commitment to quick and committed implementation of the CPA by the Central Government. It was on this basis that the SPLM withdrew her representatives in the National Parliament in 2008. The SPLM accused the government in the North of not being serious in the implementation and using its majority interest against Southern Sudan. Two remarks by prominent NCP politicians in 2010 did not bode well for the referendum of 31st July 2010. Minister of Finance Mr. Awad Abu Jazz said: “We will never accept the secession of the South.” And Vice President Taha reiterated his position on 2nd August 2010, saying that if the South is allowed to separate it would continue to split further into even smaller tribal entities.
- There was inadequate institutional capacity for the GoSS officials to effectively run the government. This severely affected service delivery for the citizens of Sudan.
- There was rampant and widespread corruption in the Government of Southern Sudan, leaving many citizens doubting if it could be a viable and sustainable government.
- There were frequent ethnic and tribal conflicts in the South which posed a great challenge to the implementation of the CPA. Some of these conflicts were fueled by the Khartoum government to destabilise the GoSS.
- Favouritism and tribalism in the employment market left many competent young people across Southern Sudan without a job. It was considered acceptable practice for a ministry to have three quarters of its employees recruited along tribal lines.
- There were no competent legal courts at different levels of government in the South, and this made it difficult to implement the CPA. (United Nations Mission in Sudan, 2011).

Flaws of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The internal mechanisms were primarily aimed at ending the prolonged conflict as a result of racism and discrimination. However, the CPA was not comprehensive in the sense that it did not address the problems in Darfur or Eastern Sudan. Moreover, neither the opposition parties in the North (for example, the Umma Party) nor Southern opposition parties were part of the peace process. The SPLM failed to approach its opponents in the South for a combined strategy and policy. This situation was exploited by Khartoum who used militias to violate the agreement. Other challenges included violation by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the lack of agreement over Abyei (no protocol signed), key ministries in the Government of National Unity (GoUN) being filled by NCP people, the presence of a weak Southern minister in the GoNU, unequal wealth sharing, the sponsoring of militias by the NCP, and lack of a mandate by CPA observers to enforce implementation of the CPA. (Gurtong Focus Monthly, 2017)

Dr. Mario Awet contended that there was no doubt that international involvement helped to achieve the CPA. Therefore, the focus on the North-South conflict which is as result of Arab-African discrimination in coded ‘racism,’ diverted attention from the other conflicts and civil wars in the country, especially during the first years. It was published in The Tell Magazine (2010) that the arrest warrant which the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued for Omar al-Bashir on 4 March 2009 seemed, however, to shift focus to the Darfur conflict. Within the GoNU, which was composed of representatives from both the NCP and the SPLM, the basic conflict lines were maintained. One Southern politician working in the North summed up the view held by Southern informants in and around Khartoum: “Even though there is a Unity Government, we from the South have little say in the government’s decisions, especially when religious principles are invoked.” It was a bad omen when the SPLM pulled out temporarily from the National Unity Government in 2007 because they perceived that major parts of the CPA were not implemented.

Moreover, the fragility of the CPA was exposed in February 2009 by the fighting in Malakal, Southern Sudan between the SPLA and the Gabriel Tang-led militia which was being

supported by the NCP. The stalemate in late 2007, the Malakal fighting in 2009 and the dispute over oil revenues signaled a return to “normalcy.” Political and military incidents confirmed the fragility of the situation and clearly exposed the suspicions and anxieties felt by both parties in the conflict. Agreement over the distribution of oil revenues in October 2012, one year after South Sudan independence, seemed somewhat to ease the tension between North Sudan and South Sudan, although border issues and the Abyei question remained unresolved. There was a sense of cultural and religious superiority among the Northerners, deadlocked their perception of the conflict. Conversely, in the South and in the IDP camps in and around Khartoum, the conflict was understood as something inevitable, given the attitudes of the NCP and the Arabs in general as reported in the United Nations Media Monitoring Report. (2008)

Preparations for the 2011 Referendum

According to the Machakos Protocol, the referendum which took place in 2011 gave equal weight to the option of “unity” and “secession,” and an end to racial discrimination. According to SPLM/A policy, unity based on secular principles had earlier been the preferred option. However, there was little doubt that the grassroots in the South were sceptical to continued unity with the North, based on the war and previous arrangements. Some sceptics characterised the last years of the interim period as “antagonistic co-operation.” Secessionists made a strong case against the union based on previous experiences and argued for an independent Southern Sudan. People in the South were anxious that the referendum would not be conducted freely and fairly. If the referendum process had been interfered with or had been postponed, another civil war might have broken out following a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

While unity did not appear to be a very attractive option among Southerners, secession was also not without its own challenges. One was the weak governmental structure in Southern Sudan, considering the lack of human capacity and competence, rampant corruption, deficient service delivery and decentralisation hitches. The present study found that “tribal conflict and leadership fragmentation” increased cases of cattle rustling just as marginalised youths played

a part in the prolongation of the crisis. This chapter also reports that increased intra-South violence claimed more than 2 500 lives, and displaced 350,000 in 2009.

The January 2011 Referendum in Southern Sudan

As a fallout of the CPA, a referendum was held in Southern Sudan from 9-15 January 2011. Southern Sudanese were to decide whether Southern Sudan should remain part of Sudan or become independent. Southern Sudanese living in the North and in the diaspora also voted in the referendum. While Southern Sudan politicians, headed by Salva Kiir, openly favoured secession and independence for Southern Sudan, they also insisted that it was important that the transition be peaceful, whatever the outcome. Sudan’s President Omar al Bashir said that Southern Sudan had the right to decide its future since unity “could not be imposed by force.” (South Sudan referendum2011)

In conclusion, the referendum turned out to be very peaceful, its success credited to the leadership in the North and the South. The results of the referendum were published on 7 February 2011. The people of Southern Sudan had voted overwhelmingly for secession and independence.

Table 1. Results of the Referendum Published February 2011

Yes or No	Votes	Percentage
Yes	3,792,518	98.83%
No	44,888	1.1%
Valid votes	3,837,406	99.62%
Invalid or blank votes	14,588	0.38%
Total votes	3,851,994	100.00%

Source: Breidlid et. al. (2014).

South Sudan thus became independent on 9th July 2011. It emerged as the 56th nation in Africa under the name 'The Republic of South Sudan' even though names such as 'The Nile Republic' and 'Kush' were proposed. Interestingly, Sudan was the first state to recognise South Sudan as a nation-state.

Lessons to African Countries

The protracted conflict in Sudan which lasted for the period of 191 years, that is 1820-2011, ended through a referendum by the people in southern Sudan who felt that they could not cohabit with the people in the Republic of Sudan. That data and the analysis above proof of the decision of the people where over 98 per cent voted in favour of secession. This paper is not arguing that secession should be the order of the day in Africa but the peace patterns and processes in which conflict is attained could be a lesson. For example, in Nigeria, where there is agitation from various ethnic groups such as Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) calling for Igbo nation, Niger-Delta Militia calling for South-South nation, and Oduduwa, calling for the Yoruba nation among others calling for separation.

It is very important from the case of Sudan for these groups to look within and adopt from the above case to use the internal mechanism or indigenous strategies to find a lasting solution to the unwanted destruction of lives and property among them. The Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan were able to become what are today based on the use of both conventional and traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution. Although, the current palaver in the Republic of South Sudan is due to leadership fragmentation among the major ethnic groups in the country. The study has shown that the government is putting all things together to resolve and restore the country to where peace will reign.

Concluding Remarks

The case of South Sudan is a good one for African states when it comes to secession. The two countries parted by the will of the people who voted on the accord and were not motivated by godfatherism to justify their future. The study further examines the internal and external mechanisms that were adopted for ending Sudan's second civil war in 2011, culminating in

the secession of South Sudan following the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a process supervised by third parties. The analysis shows as follows:

1. There was no due consultation among stakeholders in the North and the South before the country's independence in 1956, hence the outbreak of the first civil war which ended in 1972. Furthermore, the abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement by President Jafaar Nimeiri led to another civil war between 1983 and 2011.
2. Third parties played key roles in ending the conflict. At various times they got the warlords to have roundtable discussions in 2002. In 2005 they got the warlords to sign the CPA which specified an interim period of six years for the stakeholders to decide if the North and the South of Sudan could cohabit.
3. Although the external mechanisms originally failed to end the conflict, they were nevertheless successfully combined with the internal mechanisms in later years.
4. Third-party intervention has continued to maintain peace between the two countries since the secession in 2011.
5. The local initiatives or internal mechanisms had first been pointed out by the local people, especially the women in Southern Sudan, who were troubled by the long war. They had suggested that the local initiatives would suffice to resolve the conflict.

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

UNCONVENTIONAL DIMENSIONS TO A CULTURE OF PEACE FOR NATION-BUILDING: APPROACHES FROM NIGERIA

Okechukwu NDECHE*

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) through the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/243 of October 6, 1999, proclaimed the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace for implementation by member states. The UN defined a Culture of Peace as a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life based on respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation. There is an assumption that the promotion of a culture of peace for non-violent actions and for peaceful settlement of conflicts as envisaged by the UN document is one that is best undertaken through the learning and teaching of formal, informal, and semi-formal peace education.

This is not strictly the case as the Resolution further mandated member nations in Art. 14 (c) under actions to advance understanding, tolerance, and solidarity to “study further, the local or indigenous practices and traditions of dispute settlement and promotion of tolerance with the objective of learning from them”. We submit that these local or traditional practices constitute the multicultural people-centred but largely unexplored unconventional and uncustomary methods of promoting a culture of peace beyond the existing formal structures and institutions. Nigeria as a modern state was created on January 1, 1914, following the consolidation and unification of two hitherto separate colonial territorial administrations of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with its central administrative capital at Lagos by Sir Frederick Lugard (Falola, 1999; Coleman,

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1958; Burns, 1942). The amalgamation of Nigeria coincided with World War I which began on July 28, 1914 and ended in 1918 with a profound impact on the constitutional and political development with its first Constitution established in 1922 as Clifford's Constitution which introduced the elective principle and the subsequent first elections in Nigeria in 1923 (Burns, 1942).

The early colonial government and administration of Lord Lugard introduced the policy of Indirect Rule system of local government using indigenous rulers and political institutions to consolidate their power and secure cooperation (Falola, 1999; Falola and Heaton, 2008). This proved that indigenous people had value and contributed to building the Nigerian state through its period under colonial rule up until the attainment of political independence in 1960 and beyond. Nigerian nationalism which is an identity-driven shared expression of love and loyalty to the new nation thrived and sustained the peaceful movement and quest for independence. Nationalism is a movement to create a new political nationality that is self-governing (Coleman, 1958). The nationalists expressed their nationalism in different cultural ways such as deliberate efforts to promote Nigerian food, names, forms of dress, language, and religion, and in the process reinforced their interconnectedness and mutual cooperation in their peaceful anti-colonial struggle.

Toward a Culture of Peace for Nation-building in Nigeria

It can be argued that Nigeria started the construction of a culture of peace long before the UN Resolution A/53/243 of 1999. The evolving nation went through significant milestones in its colonial constitutional and political developments largely through a culture of dialogue at national conferences culminating in the adoption of a federal system of government in the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution reflecting the views and wishes of the founding fathers to maintain and live as one nation which has been reinforced by subsequent constitutions thereafter.

Kirk-Greene (1971) maintains that Nigeria is a giant of promise, the hope of Africa despite the strains and stresses. More than 100 years since its creation in 1914 and over 50 years since the end of the civil war, Nigerians have continued to consolidate their nation-

building efforts through the promotion of a robust culture of peace and peaceful coexistence. Nation-building is a structural process, the result of deliberate state policies constructed and aimed at achieving integration and development within the boundaries of the relevant state (Mylonas, 2020; Odeyemi, 2014). One of the key deliberate policies for enhancing national integration, peace and unity in the country is the establishment of the one-year compulsory National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) by Decree No. 24 of 22nd May 1973 which stated that the NYSC is being established "with a view to the proper encouragement and development of common ties among the youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity" (NYSC: <https://www.nysc.gov.ng/aboutscheme.html>). The policy of Unity Schools better known as Federal Government Colleges was introduced about the same time as the NYSC to foster national integration and national building among young boys and girls from the different cultural, geographical, and social backgrounds of the country, and geared toward producing detribalized citizens with a spirit of unity. These formal unifying policies and principles of governance reflecting Nigerian diversity have been accorded constitutional recognition under the Federal Character principle of S. 14(3) and (4) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. Other formal governmental structures for promoting a culture of peace for nation-building could be found in the creation of various inter-state sports and cultural festivals to drive home the need for peace, unity, and progress reflected in the national motto as provided by S. 15(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.

Since 1999, Peace Education for a culture of peace is taught as part of the curriculum and academic programme of the departments of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) in tertiary institutions of learning in Nigeria. While these formal efforts from the government and the academia underscore the critical need and relevance of Peace Education, they are not enough to achieve sustainable peaceful coexistence for nation-building hence our position that unconventional and uncustomary methods usually employed by the mass of the citizens should be interrogated and strengthened. The post-civil war strains and stresses on the nation have continued to manifest through nascent ethnoreligious conflicts in the Niger-Delta militancy,

Boko Haram with its affiliates and factions activities in the Northeast, resurgent secessionist agitations in the Southeast and Southwest, banditry and urban terrorism in the Northwest and Northcentral geopolitical regions of the country.

Many of the aforementioned crisis and conflict situations have been addressed using both force and conciliatory measures with varying degrees of success. For instance, while amnesty for the militants was instituted in 2009 by the late President Umar Yar'Adua for the Niger Delta, the application of the same model to Boko Haram terrorists in the Northeast by President Muhammadu Buhari has not yielded any appreciable result and impact. Richard (2021) argued that Nigeria, has witnessed a series of outbreaks of ethnic violence, religious extremism, dehumanization, and school violence, and examined the role music education for instance can play in schools as an asset to promote peace and curb violence in higher institutions of Nigeria. The inadequacy of formal intervention methods and the gap that needs to be covered by complementing with unconventional approaches recommends academic examination. This is what the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms have leveraged to make the approach the more preferred option over litigation or the use of force. If there is peace among a group of people, they live and work together in a friendly and harmonious manner (Ajagun, 2019).

Some of the non-conventional methods of promoting a culture of peace have practical applications in the everyday life of Nigerians. A peace park or a park for peace is ideal for the promotion of a culture of sustainable peace and peaceful coexistence.

Perspectives on Unconventional Peace Culture methods

The UN Culture of Peace Resolution A/RES/53/243 of 1999 represents a comprehensive and integrated approach to preventing violence and violent conflicts and an alternative to the culture of war and violence. The declaration defined areas of action that nations and individuals are enjoined to promote including human rights, justice, democracy, development, and environmental protection. However, these elements of the culture of peace are not in themselves self-executory and therefore require appropriate mediums and channels of peace

learning to communicate and inculcate them in human beings. We submit that peace museums, monuments, peace parks, peace gardens, markets, literary works, arts, schools, religious places of worship, intercultural engagements, sports, governmental organisations, civic groups are among some of the mediums and channels of peace education (Ndeche, et. al., 2022).

We argue that any peace process designed to enthrone a culture of peace for nation-building must of necessity incorporate the key concepts of peace which according to Galtung (1969) is categorised into negative peace which is the absence of direct physical violence, and positive peace which is the absence of indirect and structural violence and the presence of conditions of well-being and just relationships. These uncustomary methods have the advantage that they tend to promote active non-violence and offer restorative rather than retributive justice systems to ensure peace and harmony in society. They are often unwritten and simple codes of behaviour that are easily imbibed and translated into practical lifestyles.

Case Study: Exploring key Abuja Parks for a Culture of Peace Role in Nation-Building

Peace Parks as “zones of peace” inspire “belief in nonviolence and faith in a secure future” (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace 2010: 95). Ali (2005) maintains that scholars have only recently begun to examine the utility of “environment peace-making using conservation as a direct means of conflict resolution challenges” with Peace parks constituting a “new vision for addressing global conflicts which will suffer growing pains before making cognitive acceptance and practical results” (Ali, 2005: 59-60). The concept of “peace parks or parks for peace” according to the Environmental Change and Security Programme (ECSP) (2005) presents a real-time channel for promoting peace education and the culture of peace. The key parks in Abuja offer the right environment for peace learning and peacebuilding which we shall briefly examine.

The Abuja International Peace Park (AIPP) and Unity Fountain

Abuja boasts of several parks, gardens, and green areas that dot the landscape of this Centre of Unity, with one officially and uniquely designated and dedicated as the Abuja International Peace Park (AIPP) which like its counterparts in many developed and developing centres of

the world contributes to promoting a culture of peace and conservation of nature. The Park which is prominent for its name was conceptualized and purposely provided for in the Abuja Master Plan of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) 1979 as a dedicated public space and a special type of multiuse park with unique tourism attractions and features that promote environmental peace-making and peacebuilding. Studies on peace parks and their contribution to nation-building in Nigeria are emerging, and not much scholarly literature is presently available in our case study. The AIPP located on the map (<https://big-map.net/place/map/225701>) was officially established as a world standard park in 1993 and dedicated during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Abuja in December 2003 as an intercultural recreational and tourist attraction and masterpiece. It is physically located on Tafawa Balewa Way, Garki, Abuja, Federal Capital Territory.

The major landmarks bordering the park include the Abuja International Conference Centre (AICC), the NICON-Luxury Hotel, Abuja, the Abuja Cultural Pavilion, the Radio House Headquarters of the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Abuja, and the ECOWAS Parliament. Distortions in the Abuja Master plan 1979 and conflicts arising from use and occupation including pending litigations between the Department of Parks and Recreation/FCT Administration and the Private Park Operators (PPOs) have led to the relocation of all Peace Park-related activities to the Unity Fountain Abuja located between the Millennium Park and Transcorp Hilton Hotel on Shehu Shagari Way, Abuja.

The Fountain is open daily from 7 am to 7 pm and is a meeting point for most rallies, peaceful protests, and activism in the FCT of Abuja. The Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG), EndSARS protests, and June 12 protests were recent events that held at the Fountain. According to Channels Tv podcast (2021 December 8), a group called the “Coalition of Gender-Based Violence Responders” has staged a solemn protest at the Unity Fountain in Abuja, the nation’s capital demanding a probe into the death of an SS1 boarding student at a school in Abuja who died in June 2021 of alleged rape complications. The Peace Park serves as a major tourist and recreational attraction that contributes to the social development and

economic sustainability of the Capital City. The Cultural Pavilion of the Park provides the venue for the celebration of key international and national events including the International Day of Peace held every September 21 during which intercultural and inter-faith dialogues including meditation and prayer for peace are conducted. Peace is the cornerstone of development and unity and therefore the values of peace to live by and nurture for the next generation should be articulated and shared through the medium of peace parks with its tourist attractions and appeal to the youth (Jibril, 2010).

Peace and Biodiversity Dialogue Initiative (PBDI) (2017) submit that parks for peace are established with specific objectives among which are “promoting the resolution of armed conflict and/or reconciliation following armed conflict – building trust, understanding, reconciliation and cooperation between and among countries, communities, agencies, and stakeholders, preventing and resolving tension, including over access to natural resources (<https://www.cbd.int/peace/about/peace-park>). Nigeria fought a civil war from 1967 to 1970 and the need to establish a place for promoting the ideals of peace, non-violence, and peace-making is a Peace Park just like war museums (an ideal name should be Peace Museum) are established after such events. Peace Parks have become a global phenomenon (Duffy, 2007).

The Jabi Lake Park and Mall

This Park like the International Peace Park and the Millennium Park stands on a tripod with them as a major landmark in Abuja. Jabi Lake Park is located on Alex Ekwueme Way in the Jabi District of the city and boasts of a large man-made lake, Jabi Boat Club (JBC: <https://www.jabiboatclub.net/>), open-air multi-sporting facilities, and walkways, among other world-class facilities for both tourism and entertainment. The Jabi Lake Mall located on Bala Sokoto Way, opposite the bank of the lake is a waterfront mall with over 120 shops including a Cinema Hall, and a Shoprite hypermarket among others. The mall offers a unique environment for celebrating outdoor festivities such as national holiday events, religious festivals, National Democracy Day (June 12), Children’s Day, and other intercultural observances free from discrimination and violence. Tourists, entertainers, shoppers, guides,

merchants, and a good cultural mix of humankind can be located within the mall arena during the hours of business daily. Unlike the Unity Fountain, the Jabi Lake Park and Mall have no record of social activists' engagements in them being completely dedicated to tourism and entertainment.

The Millennium Park

This Park located in Maitama District and opposite the Unity Fountain close to the Three-Arms-Zone is the largest public park of Abuja Federal Capital Territory (Source: <https://myfctagov.ng/index.php/directory/millennium-park-abuja/>). The park is divided into two sides with one side dedicated to uncontaminated nature and the other side dedicated to the scientific knowledge of the environment. This park opens daily from 7 am to 5 pm and attracts many tourists and those who need to enjoy its unique ecological ambiance. It is adjudged by this researcher from observation and interactions with both officials and users of the facilities to be the best maintained of all the public parks in Abuja

National Children's Park and Zoo

Located in the Asokoro district of Abuja, behind the Presidential Villa, the facility is reasonably close to Aso Rock and boasts various kinds of animals, a large playground for kids to play around, and a lake. The facility opens Monday through Saturday from 8 am and closes at 5 pm. It is closed on Sundays. The zoo is undergoing restoration and modern

Reflections on the integrative nature of Abuja Parks for Peace and Nation-Building

Building the culture of peace in Nigeria as envisaged by our UN conceptual framework, will require mediums of peace education such as the AIPP was established to serve. Peace education is the initiation of a learning process aiming at entrenching a peace culture. According to Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace (2010) Peace Education has been defined by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) the process of promoting the acquisition of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values needed to bring about behaviour change that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence for a peaceful and harmonious society and environment. According to Mehta (2019) "Education is the principal

means of promoting a culture of peace” and this includes not only formal education in schools but also informal and non-formal education in the full range of social institutions” (Mehta 2919, p. 82). Peace parks, therefore, offer opportunities for peace-learning, and peace-making both in formal, informal, non-formal semi-formal intercultural, and cross-cultural settings.

Abuja parks are incubators of peace culture. They are part of the Green Areas of Abuja Master Plan and consequently contribute to managing the peaceful coexistence between humans and nature thus, promoting environmental peace-making, peace education and ecological diplomacy. The facilities available in the park for recreational exercises, entertainment, information, and social interactions promote aspects of positive peace needed for national economic development like what the world-renowned Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park on the Canada-US border established in 1932 to commemorate the long history of peace and friendship between Canada and the United States serves (www.glacierwaterton.com). The nature of the park environment offers full gender equality opportunity and component of the peace culture as there is no discrimination by gender or other inhibitory and prohibitory actions and practices. Freedom of expression offered by the parks for citizens to freely ventilate their feelings and the media reportage and coverage of the events mark the parks as social must-haves for the citizens and residents alike.

Democracy education is founded on the enjoyment of democratic rights including the right to participate in the government of the country and to criticise the government policies and actions where necessary as provided by S. 14 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended). The Unity Fountain has been the muster point of assembly of peaceful protests and demonstrations in the nation’s capital city. This is a significant contribution to the building of a culture of tolerance among the residents and between the government and the governed. Culture brings people together and the “Unity in Diversity” slogan of the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes positive meaning in an atmosphere of peace and social cohesion designed to promote active non-violence, anti-war consciousness, and prevent violence and violent conflicts (Nwakunor, 2016).

Table. Key Contributions of Abuja Parks to Peace Culture.

S/No	Key Concept	Contribution to a Culture of Peace
1	Medium of Peace Education	Venue of International Day of Peace; peace talks, walks, peace pilgrimage.
2	Environmental/Ecological peace education	Green area for conservation, preservation of natural environment.
3	Tourism and recreation	Social developmental infrastructure for positive peace, entertainment, sports.
4	Democracy education	Peace rallies, peaceful protests for and against public/government policies
5	Gender equality	Open access to all. No discrimination, restriction or prohibition based on gender.
6	Human rights education	Rights to freedom of movement, expression, press
7	Cultural hub	Interfaith, intercultural, and multicultural mix, a Garden of Eden providing Arts, literary works, and music for the culture of peace.
8	Zone of Peace	Tolerance, nonviolence, harmony, peace consciousness
9	Dispute settlement	Informal, traditional intervention methods of dispute settlement through dialogue

Cultural Pavilion of the Department of Arts and Culture located at the AIPP site exhibits a collection of the cultural wealth of our varied communities and significantly contributes to our knowledge and understanding of the elements of the culture of peace necessary for strengthening our unity, inclusivity, political, economic, and social development. Entrenching a peace culture in the Nigerian child through exposure to Peace Parks will enhance peace, security, and nation-building (Ndabula, 2021; Olatunji et al., 2016). Peaceful coexistence is a core value of a culture and a key element of sustainable development (Tauna, Amos: Daily Post, 2021 November 10).

Conclusion

Nation-building is an interactive and integrative process that is driven by the leadership and the citizenry. It is anchored on a Culture of Peace. Nigeria has made appreciable progress in constructing a nation of the dream of our founding fathers. The nationalist struggle for her independence was largely nonviolent and replete with communitarian values of unity and oneness among the diverse groups. The post-independence and post-civil war challenges to the collective nation-building efforts have been successfully managed using the inherent intervention options offered by the unconventional and uncustomary methods of peace learning, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. These methods have offered platforms for the building of meaningful relationships outside of our ethnic and religious enclaves to foster a patriotic and national spirit. The common threads uniting and bonding Nigerians are far stronger than the attempts to break them. Nowhere has this organic approach to nation-building been expressed than in our case study of Abuja parks which offer unlimited opportunities for engagement in peace advocacy and imbibing peaceful virtues with their all-inclusive multiculturalism.

Governments at all levels should recognise and promote the contributions to environmental peacemaking provided by these parks in Abuja and the entire nation. It is suggested that the Sambisa Forest in Borno State could be renamed Sambisa International Peace Garden by the Federal Government to take it away from the present connotative identification with insurgency and terrorism where it offers a sanctuary. Sambisa international Peace Garden will no doubt be a new zone of peace, a possible place of peace pilgrimage, and a future UNESCO Cultural Heritage Site with huge potential to contribute to world-class tourist attractions and socio-economic mobilisation for sustainable growth and development of Nigeria. As an example, Sambisa Forest, could become converted to Sambisa Peace Park. It could ultimately become comparable to the renowned UNESCO Heritage Site, Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park, rather than the den of terrorists that it currently is.

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