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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

This edition is specially dedicated to one of our own in the person of Professor Hakeem Ibikunle Tijani for his examplary leadership and mentorship in the academics for the past thirty two (32) years, we celebrate you and pray that the Almighty God will continue to prosper your ways.

The NOUN International Journal of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution is a product of the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution of the Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria. The vision behind this academic Journal is to be able to promote research culture among the academia for the enhancement and development of the intellectual capacity of both the authours and the readers. The journal will also aid the promotion and assimilation of the values of Peace and Conflict Resolution in our societies. The Journal is an annual publication but may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time.

The articles in this Journal have been carefully selected, effectively peer reviewed and edited by the Editors who are tested and proven in their various fields of study and practices as seasoned academician and practitioners and I believe it will be a worthwhile reference material.

It is very important to note at this juncture that the production of this Journal would not have been made possible without the support of the immediate past Vice Chancellor of the University, in the person of **Prof. A. U. Adamu** who not only established the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution but also approved the production of the Journal.

I must of necessity appreciate my dearest and result oriented **Prof. Ganiyat Adejoke ADESINA-UTHMAN** who against all odds supported my proposal and motion for the creation of the Department and under whose tenure as a Dean the Department was established and the journal project was also set in motion, God Bless you ma. I also specially appreciate the person of **Dr. Basil Ibebunjo,** he is my teacher, my friend and a brother. He worked tirelessly to ensure that this vision metamorphosed into a memorable and concrete reality.

I sincerely appreciate the Editors who worked tirelessly to ensure that this vision came to a reality. Worthy of commendation also are my colleagues in the Department in the persons of; **Prof. Hakeem Ibikunle Tijani, Dr. Olabamiji Oyebode, Dr. Mathias Jarikre, Dr. Adeola Adams** and **Mrs. Anthonia Okonye** whose overwhelming support and efforts have continued to sustain the Department. I also sincerely appreciate all persons who have given their support for the actualization of this dream, may God bless you all.

Dr. Samuel Opeyemi Iroye
Editor-in-Chief/ HOD, Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution

NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]

<u>CALL FOR PAPERS</u>

The **NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]** is a peer-reviewed Journal publication of the **Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution**, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja, which publishes annually but may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time. The Editorial Board of the Journal welcomes well-researched original papers, for publication in the Journal which is released in the Month of March every year.

Paper submissions are welcome in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution any relative areas and they should adhere to the following guidelines.

1) Length of paper: Paper submissions should not be more than 5,000 words including footnotes and references.

2) Reference Style: All paper submissions must adhere to the APA Style or MLA Style of Citation.

3) Font style and size: All submissions should use the Times New Roman fonts (12 font size) including the References. The manuscript should be formatted using 1.5 line spacing.

4) Abstract: Manuscripts must contain an abstract of not more than 250 words, which explains the content of the paper. The abstract must be expressed in clear words in the following format: the background of the research; description of the research problem; explanation of the research methods adopted; explanation of the findings, conclusion and recommendations.

5) Keywords: Manuscripts should contain at least three keywords (not more than five keywords) for indexing purposes. This should be inserted immediately after the abstract.

6) Introduction: Paper submissions must contain an introduction, which should reveal the research problem the paper intends to investigate, the thesis statement (central issue/question to be resolved) and the roadmap explaining the step-by-step (section-by-section) process of resolving the problem. If the paper utilizes nondoctrinal methods, these should be clearly explained in the introduction.

7) Conclusion: Manuscripts must contain a conclusion section, which explains the findings of the paper and how the research problem was resolved. Where necessary, the conclusion should also contain the recommendations.

8) ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW OF MANUSCRIPT Articles sent for consideration must be accompany with a non-refundable assessment fee of N5,000 only. The articles will be subjected to a meticulous process of blind peer review, thereafter, authors whose articles are accepted for publication will be required to pay a publication fee of N15,000 only.

9) Manuscript should bear author(s) name(s), affiliated institution(s) and current mail addresses, GSM numbers and email addresses

10) It is the responsibility of authors to ensure that manuscripts do not infringe copyright of others. All submissions will undergo peer review and plagiarism check.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH AFRICAN INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONS: A STUDY OF THE ESANS IN EDO STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract
African societies have unique ways of managing conflict before the advent of colonialism. The methods stressed the need of fostering a spirit of peace and mutual respect for both individuals and groups, in times of peace and in times of conflict. This was effectively ensured through the institutions of the council of elders and age-set organisations in Africa. However, various forms of conflict have become more pronounced in the post-colonial era in the past few years. These conflicts include gender-based violence, land related conflicts, family conflicts and value- based conflicts, among others. The study therefore analysed the prospect of indigenous methods of conflict resolution in dealing with the aforementioned glitches using the Esans as a case study. The paper adopts historical research design with the application of both primary and secondary data. The Primary data was obtained from archival sources and oral interviews from respondents. Secondary data was obtained from published textbooks, journal articles and internet. The study established that indigenous institutions were important to peace building and conflict resolution but were truncated by the coming of the colonial masters. It was therefore recommended that the government and other stakeholders should as a matter of necessity, place more emphasis on the use of indigenous institutions in conflict management and resolution in Africa. This will ensure and further promote peaceful co-existence which Africans are known for.

Keywords: Esanland, Traditional Institutions, Conflict Resolution, Indigenous Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Before the coming of the colonialism, African societies had well-established mechanisms for peace education, confidence building, peacemaking, peace building, conflict monitoring, conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution. These institutions and methods were effective and highly respected and their decisions were binding on all the parties concerned. This is corroborated by Nwolise (2005) when he pointed out that, the Traditional African societies were known to maintain peace in their domains through their customs and traditions before the disruption of colonial administration.

African conflict resolution model was anchored on the dramatization of the issues involved in conflicts. The performance level of conflict resolution in African societies enabled participants in the ensuing drama to further understand and depreciate that custom and norms bequeathed to them by their ancestors. Olaoba (2010) opined that, the performance had always been stage managed by notable dramatic personae, which included experience elders, priests, age – grades, chiefs and kings in African societies. The stage as set for the drama of adjudication included homes (as family court), markets (as commercial court), streets (as open court) as Palaces (as royal court). Today, the stage now includes the media houses (as public court) and colonial court of heritage (as customary courts). Besides resolving the conflict, a vital aspect of the features of conflict resolution in indigenous African societies, was the education of all and sundry (present at the scene of resolution) about the cultural heritage of the society viz respect of personalities at the scene of conflict resolution, reverence to the supernatural, cross examination of evidence and interpretation of the cultural norms towards persuading the parties to the conflict, witnesses and the audience (especially on the amount of explanation turreted with the truth of the matter).

To Africans therefore, there is recognition of the importance of relationship and harmony in the community. The process of resolving conflict in traditional African societies, certain rules were observed by all participants in the drama of conflict resolution. The rules were tailored to equitable distribution of justice and the maintenance of law and order. Thus one of the officers involved in the conflict resolution (a character on the upper stage) was responsible for announcing to other dramatic personae of the commencement of the action on stage. Such announcement signaled to the participants (parties to the conflict, witnesses and audience) of the

serene atmosphere which should be adhered to (Olaoba, 2010). The African indigenous methods of conflict resolution places emphasis on the community and parties to the conflict, as opposed to the individuals in conflict. It is also less expensive and based on the principle of maintaining relationship. Thus, the goal of traditional mechanism was on restitution rather than retribution (Nwolise, 2001 in Mezie-Okoye, 2017).

The justification for this paper therefore is to explore the role of traditional methods of conflict resolution in Africa using the Esans of Edo State as a case study. This is because; the Esans are also known to have evolved well-established traditional mechanisms for conflict management and resolution which were peculiar to their own ways before the introduction of British system of government Osimen, (2017). This traditional method was built on customs and traditions and was culturally effective for resolving conflict within their communities and kingdoms. This was effectively ensured through the institution of the council of elders and age-set organisations. Okeke, (2006) opined that, the elders played an important role in defusing conflicts within and between societies. They were able to manage and counterbalance the aggressiveness and military orientation of the youth. Conflict was viewed as a communal concern. From the comments of scholars listed above, it can be stressed again, that there is the urgent need to re-discover the methods of conflict resolution that proved effective for Africa in the past. But it has to be stated from the outset, however, that even though the need to rediscover the time-honoured indigenous modes of conflict in African communities is hardly shared by scholars of peace and conflict without some disagreements, or sometimes, pessimism.

ORIGINS OF THE ESANS

Different accounts have been rendered by different Esan groups as to their individual origins. These accounts range from a myth of their dropping from sky to one saying that they came out of the ground. Thus while, the Opoji, Ewohimi, Ewu, Uromi and Egoro people believe that their ancestor came from the sky and was conquered by the Oba of Benin, who gave him a wife and the title of "Onogie". It is interesting however that very few of these myths of origin speak of the existence of an indigenous Esan People Before the wave of immigration from Benin, Nupe and other groups of people. By far the most popular and common account of the origin of the ancestor of the Esans is that they immigrants from Benin, the Bulk of which came in the middle of the 15th century during the reign of Oba Ewuare 'the great' or "the selfish"; as some people would rather call him. Some other chiefdoms in Ishan were also said to have been

founded by immigrants from ife and ifeku. The Onogie of Ekpoma is said to be made up of immigrants from "Tapa" a place known as "Ado Udo" in Nupe kingdom, in the current kogi state. The Onogie of Uromi and the Okaigun of Igueben were said to have been sent by the Oba of Benin to oversee his interests in these places. No exact date has been suggested on when the chiefdoms and since the people Igueben and Uromi clamied that the warriors who followed the Oba of Benin, to fight his war against Idah, were the founders of the cheifdoms and since the Idah War took place from 1515-1556, the assumption could therefore be that some chiefdoms in Esan land were founded in the early sixteenth century. Omonkhodion, (2012) however believe that is possible that there could have been a community of people already living in these areas before this period and that simply happened after the Idah war was that a defined leader emerged for each of these areas and the various chiefdoms were formally created and recognized by the Oba of Benin. Records also show that the population of Esan people was periodically augmented by immigrants from Benin and other areas which gave rise to the various chiefdoms being composed of people with heterogeneous origin. Okogie, (1960) however argues that "practically all the ruling houses of Ishan" came directly from Benin, 'to rule the people they found, in many cases, already firmly established. The implication of this is that the ruling houses were originally imposed on the inhabitants, but over the century they became institutionalized and accepted, since the system of the inheritance both within the ruling houses and the other families in Esan as a whole is 'traditionally' from father to son; a strict patrillineage (Omonkhodion, 2012). Thus, apart from a few preliminary problems with succession by some ruling houses or a few individual Onogie, the pattern of inheritance has been smooth and unproblematic. In very few cases, where an Onogie, has had the problem of ascertaining which of his two sons born on the same day, by two different wives is the older son, that there are usually more than one contestant to the throne.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE ESANS

Esanland is bordered to the south by Benin, to the south-west by Agbor, to the north by Etsako, to the east by River Niger. From the central town Ewu to Benin City, the Edo State capital, is 100kmThe original occupations in Esanland are mainly farming, hunting and trading. However, today, many Esan people have thrived in various professions such as teaching, law, medicine, engineering, military, architecture, banking, aviation, and politics and so on.

FIGURE 1: MAP SHOWING THE EIGHTEEN L.G.A IN EDO STATE

ESAN LAND MAP SHOWING ALL FIVE LGA AND HEADQUATERS

The autonomous clans/kingdoms in Esan land are currently administratively arranged as follows under the current five local government areas:
1. Esan-North-East LGA, Uromi: Uromi, Uzea
2. Esan Central LGA, Irrua: Irrua, Ugbegun, Okpoji, Idoa, Ewu
3. Esan West LGA, Ekpoma: Ekpoma, Iruekpen, Ogwa, Urohi, Ukhun, Egoro
4. Esan South East LGA, Ubiaja: Ubiaja, Ewohimhin, Emulu, Ohordua, Ẹbhoato, Okhuesan, Orowa, Ugboha, Oria,   Illushi, Onogholo
5.Igueben LGA, Igueben: Igueben, Ebele, Amaho, Ẹbhosa, Udo, Ekpon, Ujorgba, Ugun, Okalo

SOURCE: esanlandnigeria.blogspot.com

There are now 36 major clans in Esanland each of which is headed by a king called 'Onojie'. The major towns in alphabetical order are as follows:
1. Amahor 2. Ebelle 3. Egoro 4. Ekpoma 5. Ekpon 6. Emu 7. Ewatto 8. Ewohimi 9. Ewossa 10. Ewu 11. Idoa 12. Ifeku 13. Igueben 14. Ilushi 15. Irrua 16. Iyenlen 17. Ogwa 18. Ohordua 19. Okalo 20. Okhuesan 21. Onogholo 22. Opoji 23. Oria 24. Orowa 25. Ubiaja 26. Udo 27. Ugbegun 28. Ugboha 29. Ugun 30. Ujiogba 31. Ukhun 32. Uroh 33. Urohi 34. Uromi 35. Uzea. 36. Ebudin*

* Though, there is controversies surrounding Ebudin community be regarded as an autonomous clan due to her relationship and historical antecedent with Ugbegun community.

Esan-land today is divided into five local government areas namely;

Local Government Area	Headquarters
Esan West	Ekpoma
Esan Central	Irrua
Esan North-East	Uromi
Esan South-East	Ubiaja
Igueben	Igueben

FORMS OF SETTLEMENT OF THE ESANS

Esan people are mostly urban by nature, but the reasons for the comparatively absence of large towns as exist in Ibo and Yoruba areas are surplus of land which is free and communal, the comparative tranquility since the advent of the British, the proud trait of each Esan man wanting to be king in his own house or holding as an inalienable right of each man to go to hell in his own way, and a strong belief in witchcraft. If a man loses one or two children and suspects that someone in his village has been after him, he shifts to a cottage in the bush where he believes he can blossom. One good result of the armed burglary that swept Esan land in the post-war years of 1949 - 1953, is that many of these isolated cottages were abandoned. The inhabitants forgot their fears for witches and returned to swell the population of the growing towns and villages. Okojie, (n.d) opined that, the absence of any big river and any special industry also contributed to the existence of myriads of settlements with far

too many Enijie. During the devastating tribal wars each settlement was surrounded by a moat or ditch (lyala), while the actual settlement was situated in a belt of uncleared forest. Such a settlement consisted of several compounds with the men in front and the women's houses built behind and in the compound.

STRUCTURE OF LEADERSHIP IN ESAN TOWNS AND COMMUNITIES

To the average Esan man or woman, seniority and deference to elders is usually held in reverence Omonkhodion, (2012). In any Esan household, first male child is the head of the family. He is thus the head of the special type of family called "UELEN" This smallest family unit in Esan is actually a type of an extended family. This family type consists of a man, his wife or wives, his children younger brothers, unmarried sisters, his mother and house servant if they have any. If this is the smallest family unit in Esan, the impression one gets therefore one gets therefore is that there is really no nuclear type of family in Esan. The smallest family unit in Esan is the extended family type.

The head of the extended family unit who is usually the oldest male member of the unit, is usually referred to as OBHIJOGBE, this man is also the custodian of the ancestor shrine and usually acts as intermediary between his brothers get married and have children within their individual nuclear families, the OBHIJOGBE is still the overall head of these families and thus he is the one who gives names to all the children born to his brothers and his sons. He is thus the sole authority who can give out the hands of his sisters, daughters and his brothers' daughters in marriage. Usually his instructions are supposed to be binding on all member of the extended family (including his own mother).

A large number of UELEN forms an IDUMU while many IDUMU make up what is usually referred as EGBELE who are all descendants of a common ancestor. The implication of this is that it is considered as an incestuous act for members of the same Egbele to contract a marriage because they are supposed to be related by blood. Omonkhodion, (2012) however argued that, with modernisation and possibly westernization, the definition of incest is now limited to only know direct ancestral connection, beyond which inter marriage is allowed. Sometimes a number of EGBELES can come together to form a village, even when they have different patrilineages. In this case inter marriages allowed.

I. ODIONWELE: The ODIONWELE, who usually the oldest man in the village, is the accepted traditional head of any village. He is supposed to be the custodian of the village shrine and to act as an intermediary between the villagers and their ancestors. This title is usually only reserved for the natives. The implication of this is that even when a non-native who has lived in the village becomes the oldest man, he cannot become the ODIONWELE, until after he has been in the village for many generations and therefore become absorbed. The ODIONWELE is also in charge of settling disputes among the villagers and between husband and wives. He also speaks on behalf of the villagers in return the villagers pay homage to him from their products. Thus while the hunter will usually send him the choicest part of the animal they kill, the farmers send him very good tubers of yam from their farms and the palm wine taper sends him very good wine from their products. The ODIONWELE is usually held in reverence and everyone seeks his prayers especially on longevity. All small village meetings take place in his home while the larger one affecting the whole village is usually done in the village hut called OkOOGHELE. It is of note here to mention the fact that the quarrel settling power of the ODIONWELE is limited to only minor quarrels and squabbles as he is usually powerless to settle problems involving serious offences like murder, rape etc.

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┌─────────────────────────────┐
│       ODIONWELE             │
│                             │
│   Oldest man in village     │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              │
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│         EDION               │
│                             │
│    Male Over 45 years       │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              │
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│         IGENE               │
│                             │
│    Male 25-45 years         │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              │
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│      EGBONUGHELE            │
│                             │
│     Male 6-25 years         │
└─────────────────────────────┘
              │
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│     IBIHOKIN IKPA           │
│                             │
│     Male 0-6 years          │
└─────────────────────────────┘
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
These types of quarrels are usually sent to the ONOGIE who is the traditional ruler of series of villages under his domain. It must be noted that the Esan are a strong patrilineal, patrilocal and patrifocal society. Everything revolves around the men while the patriarchal type of authority is practiced and irrespective of the position of a male child in a family unit, he is still the "boss" of everyone within the UELEN.

i. EDION: As has been said already the ODIONWELE is the overall boss of the village. Next to him are the EDION who are the leaders of the village. They advise the ODIONWELE. To become an ODION in a village, the individual has to perform the ILODION ceremony. It is a very elaborate and expensive ceremony, which involves the wearing of white dress by the new ODION and the traditional acceptance of the new entrants into the society of ENEDION. Also this ceremony entitles the individual to a proper and elaborate burial ceremony when he dies. All the people in this category are usually exempted from public duties like communal labour. It is interesting to note that any man who is an OBHIJOGBE who has already completed the final burial ceremony of his father and has performed the IRUEN or clothing ceremony is usually regarded as an elder irrespective of his chronological age. The native priest and doctors (Ebo) sometimes are exempted from the age limits too, because of their special roles in the community.

ii. IGENE: This is a very active age grade. They performed the hazardous and more energy sapping tasks of the village like digging of the OGHODO (village pond). They bury the dead and lead communal house construction and roofing of building through communal labour of the village members. They can be called upon for any problems within the village. Whenever there is a call to duty and any one of them does not turn up, depending on the importance of the duty, a chicken or a goat is usually caught on behalf of the defaulter. Thus, this defaulter is compelled to pay owner of the animal the cost of the "kidnapped" animal. This is expected to serve as deterrent to future defaulters and make them realize the utility of communal labour. The Igene are usually in their most productive years of their lives, hence the importance with which they are seen in the village. They are all usually between the ages of 35-50 years of age, after which they will retire into EDION group.

iii. EGBONUGHELE: A literary translation of the word Egbonuhele is "those who sweep the street" Their duties include ensuring the cleanliness of the big open spaces, which are usually customary with many villages (i.e. UGHELE). When there are trees to be felled in the village, the Egbonughele people are also the ones who are usually called to perform this duty. They are also the in charges of the major part of any communal manual labour in the village. The IGENE only come to their assistance if the work is too much for them.

iv. IBHOKHAN IKPIA: This simply means male children. This is a special category this paper wishes to introduce into the culture and tradition of Esan considered them "classless". This is because there are initially no defined duties for them and thus, the process of their socialization is purely a family bases, the nuclear and the extended families. In fact, the word IKPIA (men or males) is not usually used in references to children in this category by some villages and towns in Esan. Rather they are usually called OMOE (friend) and only become qualified to be referred to as IKPIA after the attainment of the EGBONUGHELE status.

It is worthy to be notes, thus in every Esan town, the ONOGIE is the overall traditional boss of a town and its villages. The traditional head of every village is the ODIONWELE [usually the oldest man in the village]. Next to the ODIONWELE are the EDION [elders] followed immediately by the IGENE. The EGBONUGHELE are the next groups to the IGENE while the youngest groups are the babies who I have chosen to call IBHOKHINIKPIA.

THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN ESAN COMMUNITIES
The causes of conflict in human society vary (are many and various). Conflicts in human society can derive from one or a combination of sources. Albert (2001:4-5) has identified, among others, competition for resources, manipulation of information, psychological needs and contradictory value systems as major sources of conflict in human societies.

The Esans like other indigenous Africans are subject to the influence of all natural and generally accepted theories on the causes of conflict such as differences in perception, needs, values, power, desires, goals, opinions, and many other components of human interactions. While this is true for most human beings, the sources of conflict in Esanland are mostly land, chieftaincy position, sex matters (in relation to wife or daughter), family property, honour, murder or positioning, matrimonial fall-outs

(maltreatment of wife). These are the main sources of conflicts in Esanland. Beyond the unexplainable sources of conflict and also do lay the desirability of conflict from the generational point of view. Thus, conflict derived from diverse sources in African traditional societies. These included the family, economy, chieftaincy, social and religion as well as breakdown of deplumation relations and personal annoyance over behavioural pattern (Olaoba, 2010). According to Tsuwa (2014:23):

It is significant to note that the derivatives of conflict in traditional African societies were germane to the cultural activities of the people. Hence, peace and conflict are indices of culture allied to governance and social engineering in indigenous African societies. Conflict derived from the family's level even though it has been considered as the basic unity of African political culture. The individual in the family had the right of protest showcasing annoyance over many things. This could be over property inheritance, interpersonal relations and marital situation/matter. Wade (1956:308) and Max Gluckman (1956:101-105) have demonstrated, in their works, how conflict originated from the family.

PROCESS OF THE ESANS INDIGENOUS METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The process of conflict management, prevention and conflict resolution was in the hands of the elders which were effectively ensured through the institution of the council of elders or kings. The belief of Esan people sheds light on the importance of peacemaking and peacebuilding through the principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and a sense of shared destiny between peoples. It provides a value system for giving and receiving forgiveness. It provides a rationale for sacrificing or letting go of the desire to take revenge for past wrongs. It provides an inspiration and suggests guidelines for societies and their governments, on how to legislate and establish laws which will promote reconciliation and peace-building (Murithi, 2006).

Esan Communities preserved conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms which also served as institutions for maintaining law and order within communities. These mechanisms pre-dated colonialism and continue to exist and function till date. They place a high value on communal life, and maintaining positive relations within the society is a collective task in which everyone is involved. A dispute between fellow members of a society is perceived not merely as a matter of curiosity with regard to the affairs of one's neighbour; but in a very real sense an emerging conflict is seen to belong to the whole community. According to the conception of the Esan People, each member of the community is linked to each of the disputants, be they

victims or perpetrators. If everybody is willing to acknowledge this (that is, to accept the principles of togetherness), then people may either feel a sense of having been wronged, or a sense of responsibility for the wrong that has been committed. Due to this linkage, a law-breaking individual thus transforms his or her group into a law-breaking group. In the same way a disputing individual transforms his or her group into a disputing group. It therefore follows that if an individual is wronged, he or she may depend on the group to remedy the wrong, because in a sense, the group has also been wronged. Esan People established mechanisms for resolving conflict and promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding with a view to healing past wrongs and maintaining social cohesion and harmony within the communities. Consensus building was embraced as a cultural pillar with respect to the regulation and management of relationships between members of the community.

In principle, disputes in the various quarters or communities are brought before the quarter elders but their jurisdiction was limited to the arbitration of minor civil disputes between members of the same quarter. If the case was of any importance, or was too complicated for the quarters elders, the case was referred for settlement in Onogie (the king) at the village Meeting. Also any person, who was dissatisfied with the decisions of the elders, could take his case to the Onogie in the Village meeting. The elders in all quarters set purely as civil arbitrators and there was no machinery for the enforcement of their decision Omonkhodion, (2012). The elders were strictly forbidden to deal with all criminal cases. The sole judicial body was the Village Meeting, presided over by the Onogie in consultation with the Odionwele. The composition of the village meeting was the same for judicial as for administrative purposes. If a crime had been committed or if a civil dispute had arisen which was too important or too complicated for the quarter's eiders, and in which one or both of the parties had refused to accept the arbitraton of the Elders, the matter was immediately reported to the Onogie by the Odionwele of the quarter through the Senior Titled Man of that quarter. The Onogie would then appoint a day for the hearing of the case and the parties will be informed by the titled men of their quarters concerned. Each titled man also informed the Odiowele of his quarter of the day appointed by the Onogie for the hearing of the case.

In this case of a crime, the accused was brought before the Onogie immediately at the orders of the Odionwele of the quarter concerned. The Senior Titled Man of the quarter was responsible for bringing the accused before the Onogie, and men accused of crimes were detained in the Onogie's house till the day of the trial. Criminal cases were always dealt with as quickly as possible after the accused was brought before the

Onogie. If a party to a civil dispute refused to obey the summons of the Senior Titled man of his quarter or if an accused offered resistance when the Senior Titled Man went to take him before the Onogie, who then detailed the leader of the Otuleha to go to accompany the Senior Titled man and effect the arrest of the recalcitrant person and to bring him before the Onogie by force. Omonkhodion, (2012) believed that, the Otuleha were thus the police force of the community. The Village Meeting assembled outside the Onogie's palace. Anyone who wished to come to the meeting as an observer is usually allowed to attend. The full court consisted of the Onogie in consultation with the Senior Odionwele assisted by the entire elders and the Titled Men. The presence of at least one elder preferably the Odionwele and one Titled Man from Quarter or quarters from which the parties to the disputes came, was essential. If the Odionwele of a Quarter to which one of the parties belonged were unable to attend, he sent the Senior Titled Man accompanied by one of the junior elders to represent him and state his opinion before the Meeting. The Senior Titled Man always acted as spokesman for the Odionwele while the other elders who accompanied him, seem to hold a watching brief for the Odionwele and sees to it that the Odionwele's opinion was correctly interpreted to the Onogie.

Both parties state their case before the meeting and call their witnesses. The Onogie's cheif adviser was the Senior Odionwele but before announcing his decision the Onogie always took care to ascertain the opinions of the body of the elders, and difficult cases would be discussed with them at length. The person whose opinion was most sought after would in most cases be the Odionwele of the quarter concerned or if he were absent the Senior Titled Man who represented him. The Onogie could always ask for the opinion of any titled man for his advice on judicial matters; though this seems to have been less frequently sought than when administrative matters were under discussion. The function of the Title men was primarily that of messengers "between the Onogie and the Odionwele of the various quarters who were responsible for the appearance of the parties, and it was only as representative of the Odionwele of his quarter that Senior Titled man's opinion, seems to have been often consulted. In a domestic conflict situation or family conflict, it is first reported to the most senior member of the family or elder, usually a male. He assembles the disputing parties as well as other members of the family to his house where the conflict is resolved amicably between the parties. The scene is usually inside the family's thatched-roofed house or outside under a tree in the family compound. There, the parties sit opposite each other on a seat made of mud at two extremes of the house. Younger people are allowed to watch the proceedings but not to speak. The proceedings start with the family head welcoming everybody with a gin (locally called Ogogoro) and kola nut.

After his welcome remarks, he sets the ground rules by advising parties not to use abusive or offensive languages against one another. He admonished those gathered not to take sides but reconcile the parties. He stresses that there is no need to decide guilt in spousal cases, only to reconcile the husband and wife because of the sacredness of marriage (Gbenemene, 2018).

The following offences were regarded as crimes: murder, manslaughter, larceny and arson; while adultery was regarded both as a criminal and civil offence. The crime of kidnapping was apparently unknown and no penalty was fixed for it. Rape was not considered a crime but religious offence which could be expiated by sacrifice to the offended juju. The method of dealing with the various offences is given below;

I.   Murder: The murderer was sold to one of the neighbouring villages as a slave.
ii.   Manslaughter: The man found guilty of manslaughter was forced to replace the man he had killed or be enslaved himself. The record of persons killed, point to the fact that most of the victims were hunters who were servants or slaves. The people had no record of titled men; being accidentally killed.
iii.   Larceny: The penalty was restoration of the stolen article or its equivalent value and fine of6/- in cowries but it has been upgraded alongside with civilizations.
iv.   Arson: The penalty for this offence, if no one was killed, was a fine in cowries. The amount is uncertain but it was heavier than that for larceny. This crime appears to have been very rare.
v.   Adultery: The adulterer had to provide a goat and fowl for purificatory sacrifice and to buy a new cloth for the woman. He also paid a fine of 6/-in cowries (it has been upgraded).

The enforcement of all the above penalties rests with the Otuleha, who is in turn assisted by the rest of the Igene (age-grade). The collection of fines was carried out also by the Otuleha, by the seizure of livestock and moveable which the accused is usually forced to pay for. The amount realized from fines for any negative act is usually divided amongst the Edion age-class.

In the context of peace building in various communities, conflict would be resolved through mutual consent and consultation of various mechanisms which served as a group mediation and reconciliation forum (Nomonde 2000). This reconciliation forum is communal in nature in the sense that the entire community is involved at various levels in trying to find a solution to a problem which was viewed as

threatening the social cohesion of the community. In principle, the proceedings would be led by a Council of Elders and the Chief or, if the disputes were larger, by the King himself. The process of ascertaining wrong-doing and finding a resolution included family members related to the victims and perpetrators, including women and the young. The mechanism therefore allowed members of the public to share their views and to generally make their opinions known. The larger community could thus be involved in the process of conflict resolution. In particular, members of the society had the right to put questions to the victims, perpetrators and witnesses as well as to put suggestions to the Council of Elders on possible ways forward. The Council of Elders, in its capacity as an intermediary, had an investigative function and it also played an advisory role to the Chief. By listening to the views of the members of the society, the Council of Elders could advise on solutions which would promote reconciliation between the aggrieved parties and thus maintain the overall objective of sustaining the unity and cohesion of the community. The process usually involves different stages (Murithi, 2006);

i.   Firstly, after a fact-finding process where the views of victims, perpetrators and witnesses were heard, the perpetrators – if considered to have done wrong – would be encouraged, both by the Council and other community members in the reconciliatory forum, to acknowledge responsibility or guilt.

ii.   Secondly, perpetrators would be encouraged to demonstrate genuine remorse or to repent.

iii. Thirdly, perpetrators would be encouraged to ask for forgiveness and victims in their turn would be encouraged to show mercy.

iv.   Fourthly, where possible and at the suggestion of the Council of Elders, perpetrators would be required to pay an appropriate compensation or reparation for the wrong done. (This was often more symbolic than a re-payment in kind, with the primary function of reinforcing the remorse of the perpetrators). Amnesty could thus be granted, but not with impunity.

v.   The fifth stage would seek to consolidate the whole process by encouraging the parties to commit themselves to reconciliation. This process of reconciliation tended to include the victim and his or her family members and friends as well as the perpetrator and his or her family members and friends. Both groups would be encouraged to embrace coexistence and to work towards healing the relationship between them and thus contribute towards restoring harmony within the community, which was vital in ensuring the

integrity and viability of the society. The act of reconciliation was vital in that it symbolised the willingness of the parties to move beyond the psychological bitterness that had prevailed in the minds of the parties during the conflict situation.

The process was not always straightforward in principles and practice, and there would naturally be instances of resistance in following through the various stages of the peacemaking process. This was particularly so with respect to the perpetrators, who tended to prefer that past events were not re-lived and brought out into the open. In the same way, victims would not always find it easy to forgive. In some instances forgiveness could be withheld, in which case the process could be held up in an impasse, with consequences for the relations between members of the community. However, forgiveness, when granted, would generate such a degree of goodwill that the people involved, and the society as a whole, could then move forward even from the most difficult situations. Murithi, (2006) further opined that, the wisdom of this process lies in the recognition that it is not possible to build a healthy community at peace with itself unless past wrongs are acknowledged and brought out into the open so that the truth of what happened can be determined and social trust and solidarity renewed through a process of forgiveness and reconciliation. A community in which there is no trust is ultimately not viable and gradually begins to tear itself apart. Therefore, the guiding principle of Esanland was based on the conception that parties need to be reconciled in order to re-build and maintain social trust and social cohesion, with a view to preventing a culture of vendetta or retribution from developing and escalating between individuals and families, or in the society as a whole.

CONCLUSION

The administration of justice in Esans was aimed at resolving conflicts rather than pronouncing judgments. Conflict resolution was tailored towards the restoration of peace and enhancement of harmony in indigenous African societies. Emphasis was placed on reconciliation and restoration of social harmony than on punishment of the conflicting parties. The administration of justice was made an open affair where all adults freely participated as observed in the study. There were no in-camera trials as court sessions as the processes were held in the open with the parties in conflict being freely cross-examined. Truth was the object of the delivery of justice. Most conflict management was left in the hands of the elders and Kings who liaise with the ancestors. Hence some conflicts are resolved by taking of Oath. The essence of

conflict resolution in indigenous Africa society includes usually includes;

> to remove the root-causes of the conflict; reconcile the conflicting parties genuinely; to preserve and ensure harmony, and make everybody involved in the resolved conflict happy and be at peace with each other again, and this required getting at truth; to set the right milieu for societal production and development; to promote good governance, law and order, to provide security of lives and property and to achieve collective well-being and happiness.

Therefore, the rejection or outright adulteration of those traditional methods of conflict resolution has led to violence, instability and retardation of development in African communities. The abandonment of utility laden traditional methods of bargaining and conflict resolution for foreign models is largely responsible for the multiplicity of avoidable conflict all over the continent of Africa. African methods of conflict resolution are more effective and efficient than the imported methods. This is justified by the fact that most Africans still prefer, and in fact, resort to the traditional methods of conflict resolution because modern methods have become faulty and inadequate in many conflicts in Africa. The whole-sale adoption of western methods of conflict resolution which do not reflect the cultural realities of the societies of Africa was discovered as one of the major problem promoting the escalating of conflicts in Africa. Africa has been adopting those aspects of western culture which are not productive or developmental and are seldom relevant for conflict resolution. The analyses of the conflict situations in Africa should be deepened and expanded to reflect the objectives peculiarities of the conflict configuration of the communities of Africa. As revealed in the study, the application of theories and methodologies of peace research and conflict resolution in Africa has largely neglected the simple fact that Africa had well developed and tested indigenous approaches and methods of conflict management, resolution, pacific settlement of disputes and peace buildings. It becomes necessary therefore, to peep into the cultural resources of African's rich past to discover the strategies that minimized conflicts and promoted peaceful co-existence among Africans.

Though, the study was not without shortcomings; one of the major weaknesses in the traditional methods of conflict resolution is the visible or considerable gender bias in the model. Men play dominant, almost exclusive, roles in the traditional methods of conflict resolution. Elders in conflict resolution are usually males. Chiefs and kings who resolve dispute are men-folks. Masquerades and vital societies which influence

dispute resolutions resolve around men. Deities and shrines which serve as objects and venues of conflict resolutions are propitiated by men. Even cross- examinations of witness are largely conducted and provided by men. What is particularly disturbing about traditional reconciliation practices is (that) the office holders are, almost universally men. In addition, where there practices have been seen to work, they normally exclude women from active roles, and tend to be about peace building between men. Women needs tend to be completely marginalized and excluded. Although many scholars like Zartman calls for "an urgent need to mainstream gender in all future peace- building processes in Africa", the focus of this study in different. The focus is not on gender issues in conflict resolution. It is about the role of indigenous methods in conflict resolutions in Africa using Esans in Edo State as a case study.

Finally, the paper therefore, highlights how African value systems and institutions of conflict resolution remain relevant and worthwhile towards promoting peace and harmony on the continent. It is hoped that the lessons to be drawn here will inform academic, policy makers, national and global discussions on the role of traditional institutions in dealing with conflict, justice, development, governance and peace. Certainly, traditional institutions will continue to shape the African landscape of conflict resolution.

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ENTRENCHING PEACE CULTURE IN THE AFRICAN CHILD: AN AFRICA PEACE STRATEGY

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Abstract
Peace in Africa has over the years been threatened by various armed conflicts including civil wars, militarism, ethno-religious crisis, terrorism and communal clashes. These threats do not only impact negatively on the development of the region, it similarly threatens the security and peace of the Continent. Although several efforts have been made in ensuring conflict prevention and for sustainable peace both internationally and regionally, African nations keep relapsing into violence. This study draws the attention on the active inclusion of children in the formulation and implementation of frameworks for conflict prevention and sustainable peace in Africa. Qualitative approach was adopted for study and analysis of the work. The paper concludes that although various peace strategies (frameworks and roadmaps) have been adopted by the African Union to silent the guns in Africa, it has however been unable to adequately prevent the relapses of violence and to ensure sustainable peace. This is because approaches formulated and adopted are not focused on children as a major stakeholder for sustainable peace. It was therefore recommended that children should be mainstreamed into the frameworks of the African Peace Strategies through entrenching of peace culture in the African child.

Keywords: Peace Culture, African Child, Peace Strategy

INTRODUCTION

The quest for peace by human society is as old as the history of human existence. Man seek inner peace as well as with his or her external environment to create a sense of freedom from any form of threats. In pursuing its desire for peace, human society has adapted various strategies that were unique to time-level of civilization, history, culture, as well as its internal and external interests.

In ancient cities, especially in the Greek, Roman, and Persian Kingdoms, Peace was arrived at through peace alliances/pacts, negotiations and oaths with one or more neighboring cities and powerful kingdoms. The purpose of these negotiations was among others to prevent invasions and to sometimes be under the protection of a more powerful kingdom. However, because this form of peace was achieved in this period, in some cases it was also achieved through coercion by a more powerful kingdom (Benham, 2009).

In the aftermath of world wars, I and II, and the effects of the wars which cuts beyond borders resulting from industrialization and massive technological advancement. The uniqueness of the time came with its resolve for peace that fits the uniqueness of the challenges. This resulted in the formation of the United Nations in 1945; an organization charged with the responsibility of the maintenance and management of world peace. In achieving this, the charter of the United Nations and through its various organs have put in place various strategies for peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. (United Nations, 2020). Among the programs and frameworks of the United Nations to promote world peace is the Sustainable Development Goal number 16 (SDG16) which among others aims to reduce violence and the, protection of children. Also, the UN promotes peace through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (**UNESCO**), which as the name suggests uses peace education and the culture of non-violence especially towards children as its main framework (UN, 2020).

Africa which has over the years been ravaged with various forms of armed conflicts including civil wars, ethnoreligious crisis, terrorism, has through the establishment of the African Union; similar to the structure of the United Nations has through treaties

between nation-states and in its development of several peace strategies to address the rising peace threats around the continent. Thus, the use of conflict resolution and peacekeeping strategies by the AU, is yet to successfully address the issues of armed conflicts that is inherent within the region. Like the UN, the AU has similarly developed various frameworks and programs to achieve its goal for peace within the region. This includes the AU agenda 2063 agenda 13 and 14 which is peace, security, and stability within the African continent. However, despite the various programs and frameworks both at the international level and regional levels, conflicting countries in Africa still relapse into violence. Armed conflicts are still prevalent within the region, and as such, peace has not been sustainable.

Consequently, this study is to understand why conflicting countries in Africa keep relapsing to violence despite peace efforts by the African Union and discussion on entrenching peace culture in the African child as an African peace strategy. Secondary research methodology is used and analysis for the study is non doctrinal; employing the review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) roadmap. The paper will achieve this aim by defining the major keywords of the paper, give a theoretical background to create a foundation for the discussions, make an overview of some conflicts within the region, give a brief review of the African's Union peace strategy, discussion on entrenching peace culture in the African child as an African peace strategy and finally conclusion and recommendations.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

The major concepts in this paper will be defined based on the aim and purpose of the paper.

Peace Culture: The United Nations (2020), defines Peace Culture as sets of values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes and to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals and groups. Rider (2008), further described Peace culture as the promotion of peaceable diversity such as patterns of belief, values, behavior, and accompanying institutional arrangements that promotes mutual caring and wellbeing

as well as equality that includes an appreciation of differences, stewardship and equitable sharing of a nation's resources amongst its members.

Peace Culture therefore can be said to involve the introduction of the goals and values of a nation in respect to its peace and security needs. Like other learnt behaviors, children can be socialized into a culture of peace in their homes and communities with the core values for the respect of human rights, equality and tolerance.

African Child: This is a person under 18 years that is birthed or is resident in Africa with or without the supervision of a legal adult.

Peace Strategy: Strategic Peace is a long-term run at all levels of a society that establishes and sustains relationships among people both locally and globally and addresses structural conditions that can generate to deadly conflicts. It further noted that strategic peace stretches across generations and addresses issues including violence, human rights and economic prosperity (KIIPS, 2020). Galtung (1996) in his quest for the promotion of systems that would create sustainable peace, identified three major peace strategies to include Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. He further explained that none of the three approaches to peace can function separately, they're all interconnected, interdependent and mutually reinforcing (Zondi, 2007) and therefore, each strategy alone cannot really be effective in creating peace without the application of other strategies. For this paper, however, peace strategy is the development of structural and constructional conditions that includes the participation of children for sustainable peace efforts through the inculcation of Peace Culture and values.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
System Theory
System theory studies society from various complex elements and societal arrangements that influences human interactions and relationships. This approach originated in the 19th century arising from the works of the English Sociologists Herbert Spencer and French philosopher Emile Durkheim (Gibson, 2007). The system theory is a deductive approach that seeks social problems and solutions by studying the various elements and sub-elements in society that gives rise to a

particular social behavior. According to them, society is influenced by its various interrelated components, a change in one affect change in others.

The theory further noted that, the elements of social behaviors in society are formed through adaptation, integration and maintenance of long-term patterns (Stichweh. 2020). That is the behavioral characteristics of a people in a society is dependent on the elements of its external environment. According to Vallancher et al (2008), all peace and conflict situations operate as dynamic systems; i.e. sets of interconnected elements that creates an emergence for a global state such as war and peace. They further explained that, to achieve a state of peace, focus should be on how a system can be transformed from the elements that perpetuates conflicts such as oppression, Injustice, Human Rights Violation etc. to elements that promotes peace. Consequently, since social behaviors are also formed through adaptation and integration in society, violent behaviors that give rise to conflicts and wars can also be adaptive and vice versa.

OVERVIEW OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND PEACE EFFORTS IN AFRICA
This background is to understand some African nations that have experienced a protracted crisis that has spanned for many years despite various peace efforts and interventions but has however been unable to successfully maintain sustainable peace within the countries. For this paper, a brief overview of the conflicts in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central Africa will be made.

Somalia Civil War
Somalia which gained her independence in 1960 has been in an ongoing civil war for over 30 decades. The violence which started as a clan-civil war in 1988 transcended into an insurgency in the early 2000s till date. According to Bradbury and Healy (2010), an important feature of the past decades in Somalia has been the emergence of a variety of Islamist movements seeking to establish an Islamic state not only in Somalia but also a regional and global agenda. The rise of this insurgency which developed from what started as a civil war and ethnic succession for the control of states resources has been difficult to quell thereby leaving the peace of the country fragile despite the various peace efforts.

The over 30years of civil war in Somalia has not only impacted on infrastructures and institutions but has resulted in the countless loss of lives and properties. However, children have also been the most hit in the crisis. Somalia has the highest record of child mortality coming from direct and indirect impacts of the conflicts with a record of 180 deaths per 1000 live birth (UNICEF, 2011). Children are noted to have not only lost their lives in these wars but have similarly suffered from various forms of abuse and violence. Children as young as 9 years are enlisted into armed groups as child soldiers (Humanium, 2020). According to Save the Children International (2009), it recorded that the recruitment of children into armed groups in Somalia has increased since 2017. It also revealed that Somalia has the highest cases of abduction of children worldwide with thousands of children displaced and unaccompanied.

As noted earlier, despite the ongoing war in Somalia, there has been various peace efforts and interventions regionally and internationally. Some of these peace efforts include the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); a Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Mission. It was involved in reconciliation processes between elders of the rival Abgal and Haber Gedar clans with a pact to end hostilities in 1994. The mission also mediated in the Kismayo initiative same year between the representatives of over 19 clans. IGAD Initiative Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) in 2002 also embarked on conflict resolution processes in Somalia. This was done with the help of its neighboring State- Kenya and the African Union. The two-year conference by the initiative succeeded in 2004 by bringing in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Bradbury and Healy, 2010). Efforts towards peace in Somalia have similarly been made within the region by both the regional bodies and some States within the continent. The African Union Mission in Somalia was also a peacekeeping mission, created in 2007 to succeed the IGASOM Mission. AMISON aimed to support a national reconciliation congress (AU, 2020). In addition to these peace efforts, several other peace processes have been implemented by neighboring countries; including the peace conferences supported by Ethiopia in 1996 and by Egypt in 1997 which initially brought in the Benadir Administration but was however short-lived. Another effort was in 2000 by the Djibouti government which hosted a Somalia national peace conference in Arta (Bradbury and Healy, 2020).

Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis

DRC has similarly experienced two major civil wars and several crises since its independence. The first war broke out in 1996 and the second broke out in 1998 and ended in 2003 (Zapata, 2011). Notably, before the civil war in 1996, Congo had suffered various conflicts since the 1960s shortly after its independence from Belgium. The crisis which started as a rebellion grew into several successionists and militia groups around the country (Hurst, 2009). The conflicts in Congo which was described by James (2018) as "A war that will never stop" in describing the breakout of severe crisis in 2007,2008, 2016 till date after the taking control of some regions by rebels.

The impact of the crisis in Congo has greatly affected children over the years. According to UNICEF (2017), about 1.5 million children in the Kasai region have been affected by the ongoing violence with over 600,000 displaced just within this region. Similarly, those children who survived are traumatized by their experiences from the barbarism perpetrated by armed groups that they witnessed. Also, tens of thousands of children are recruited and used by all parties of the conflicts (Reliefweb, 2003). And the lingering conflicts resulting in a child mortality of 167 deaths out of 1000 live births (Lindskog, 2016).

Consequently, ongoing efforts to resolve the conflicts and for peace in the DRC has been made. The UN in its effort has embarked on two separate missions in the country; MONUC in 1960 which was withdrawn in 1964, and MONUSCO in 2010. Another role the UN played was the broker for a ceasefire deal among belligerent parties by the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan during the France-Africa summit in Paris. Another is the negotiation in Lusaka whereby the UN Special Envoy for the DRC peace process was established. The UN with support from the AU, SADC has also embarked on several peace processes including the Sun City Agreement in 2002, the Pretoria Agreement, and the Luanda Agreement. Furthermore, in a combined effort by the international, regional and sub-regional bodies, the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC was signed in Addis Ababa in 2003 (UN Missions, 2020). Like the UN, the Africa Union has also been active in the peace processes in the DRC, although there was no established peacekeeping mission in Congo by the AU, it, however, was active in various mediation efforts. In 2016, the

AU sent in representatives to mediate in the crisis (Africa Center, 2017). Although the framework for peace in the DRC was done to address the underlying causes of the conflict and ensure sustainable peace, however, the country continues to be plagued by recurrent waves of conflict.

Central African Republic Crisis
Like most conflicts in Africa, the war in CAR is still ongoing and has spanned for decades since it gained independence from France in 1960 with waves of violent conflicts. However, the country plunged into a full-blown war after the coup by Francois Bozize in 2003, Which led to rebellion by the Seleka rebel group from the Northern region against the government-controlled by the Sothern region of the Republic. The Seleka milia allege of the marginalization and injustice of the Northern minorities. However, the war ended in 2007, after a peace agreement between all belligerents and the government. But in 2012, another war ensured with the Seleka milia lunching another rebellion after it accused the government and the Southern region for not honoring the peace agreement of 2007 (Concern Worldwide, 2017).

The crisis in CAR has affected over 2.3 million children across the country due to various forms of violence. 11% of children from the region are orphaned due to the conflict (Reliefweb, 2014) and over 643,000 children are internally displaced (UNICEF, 2018).

CAR's crisis has attracted the attention of both international and regional organizations in addressing the crisis and ensuring peace processes within the country. The UN peacekeeping mission; MINUSCA in CAR has been ongoing for about 10years. Part of its mandate includes transition processes, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization as well as the BINUCA mission which is the peacebuilding office deployed to consolidate peace and strengthen democratic institutions. (UN Peacekeeping, 2021). The missions were responsible for the facilitation of elections in 2016 and together with the AU and the ECCAS facilitated the signing of the Peace Accord in 2019 between the government and 14 armed groups (Howard, 2019). The AU and the sub-regional body; the ECCAS has been similarly active in building peace in CAR, one among many is the MISCA

mission which is the AU led peacekeeping mission in CAR, the mission has been active in peacebuilding efforts both as a convener and implementer of peace responses including the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation in 2015 (Carvalho & Lucey, 2016). The first conducted mediation engagement in 2013 was facilitated by the ECCAS with the signing of the peace agreement in Libreville (PSC Report, 2019).

From the foregoing, the following issues are noted in respect to conflict prevention and sustainable peace in Africa to include:

- The trends of the conflicts in Africa are similar, from the history of its experiences with colonial rules, post-independent challenges which include civil wars influenced by rebellions, ethnic militarism etc. consequently, responses and approaches to these challenges has been the same- the deployment of various peacekeeping missions.

- The major strategy that is employed by the AU's is mostly focused on Peacekeeping Missions such as disarmament, humanitarian efforts, and dialogue/mediations which are mostly short-term thereby leaving the established peace fragile. Efforts are not focused on long-term goals which focus on the establishment of systems, structures and institutions that can promote sustainable peace.

- The impacts of the conflicts are not discriminatory by age, gender or tribe. Children are impacted both directly and indirectly, immediate and long term and are noted to face the most impacts both in numbers and magnitude. The impacts on children include death, injury, displacement, loss of parents, mental and psychological trauma etc. according to research by Kadir and Shanoda et al (2018), it revealed that the severity or chronicity of the stresses that children endure during conflicts may arise to a lifetime of "toxic stress" which may result in aggression and may thereby impact the peace of a nation at the long run. Similarly, according to Botha and Abdile (2014), happenings within an environment becomes most impressionable on children especially between the ages of 12-17, meaning, children are most influenced by the happenings within their social environment and contribute to the development of their social identities, beliefs, and influences how they perceive, interpret and respond to their environment.

- The efforts for peace within the region are not child encompassing. Children who are the most impacted by violence in Africa are still the most discriminated in the peace processes. Children are only mostly included in humanitarian interventions during peacekeeping. However, children who are the ambassadors for sustainable peace in Africa, as they are the future, and the reflection they get is what may transcend to the future. The impacts of their environment can influence their behaviors in adulthood- a continued culture of violence.

AFRICAN PEACE STRATEGY

Following the vision of the AU Agenda 2063; building a peaceful, stable, secure, integrated, and prosperous Africa, the Agenda highlights the need for a dialogue-centered prevention approach as well as management and resolution of existing conflicts. The Agenda further acknowledged that in other to achieve sustainable conflict prevention and resolution, a culture of peace and tolerance must be cultivated and nurtured on children and youths in Africa.

In pursuit of the 2063 Agenda, the heads of the AU States in 2013 at Addis Ababa adopted the *"Silencing the Gun in Africa"* strategy. Among their solemn declaration was:

> *"to push forward the agenda of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-support, national reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction and development through the African Peace and Security Architecture; as well as ensure enforcement of and compliance with peace agreements and build Africa's peace-keeping and enforcement capacities through the standby force"*
> (African Union, 2013).

In achieving the strategy for Silencing the Gun, two major frameworks were developed by the AU- the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).

Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The APSA is the main existing framework of the AU in its strategy for Silencing the Gun in Africa. The roadmap for the region's mechanism takes into consideration the uniqueness of the experiences of the continent. The framework consists of five (5) major strategic priorities, these includes:

- Strategy 1: Conflict Prevention
- Strategy 2: Crisis/Conflict Management
- Strategy 3: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building
- Strategy 4: Strategic Security Issues
- Strategy 5: Coordination and Partnership

Consequently, some of the major programs of the APSA are;

- Peace and Security Council: this is the decision-making body for peace and security in the continent.
- Continental Early Warning System (CEWs): for the provision of timely information and analysis.
- African Standby Force: for rapid deployment for management of conflicts.
- Gender mainstreaming in Peace and Security: Aimed to ensure the participation of women in peace processes (AU, 2020).

Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

This is an expansion of the APSA framework. It is aimed to support sustainable peace, stability, and development of countries that have emerged or emerging from conflicts. Accordingly, the PCRD framework strives to address the root causes of conflict with the objective to prevent the relapse of violence and create the foundation for sustainable peace.

The PCRD policy framework was developed to address conflicts in three phases, short-term, medium term and long term. Like APSA, PCSD has five (5) focused scope as its pillars to address and resolve the root causes of conflicts, these includes; Humanitarian and Emergency Assistance, Political Governance and Transition,

Socio-economic Reconstruction and Development, Human Rights, Justice, and Reconciliation and Women and Gender.

The study of both the APSA and PCRD frameworks reviewed that although it recognizes children as a major contributor for sustainable peace through inculcating of peace culture, it, however, does not have a major child-focused program that centers on children as a major stakeholder for sustaining of Africa's peace. It however has its child focused programs on intervention efforts and assistance.

ENTRENCHING PEACE CULTURE IN THE AFRICAN CHILD AS AN AFRICAN PEACE STRATEGY

The greatest challenge faced by Africa is the continued system of violence ravaging the continent in various forms. Therefore, a transformation from this system requires the next generation (Children) to be taught and encouraged the choices to transition from a culture of violence (wars, terrorism, crimes, political instability, social inequalities, ethno-religious intolerance, hunger and humanitarian crisis) to a culture of peace (social justice, security, ethno-religious tolerance, human rights, political stability and participation and development). Peace culture like any other behavior can be learnt, according to Navarro and Nario (2010), those who want a violent way of living such as terrorist groups prepare young people for that, but those who want peace have neglected their young children and thus are unable to organize them for peace. The efficacy of peace culture therefore is the prevention of violence in conflicts by addressing the root causes rather than interventions after the eruption of violence and post conflict peace building (Juwe, Usifoh, Kasim & Ogboro, 2004).

Entrenching peace culture as a value on children from an early age is important to create the foundations for sustainable peace and ensuring that the coming generation live in peace, harmony and security. Similarly, entrenching peace on the African child provides them with the various values, skills and knowledge to actively participate in constructing a peaceful and humane society (Juwe, Usigoh, Kasim & Ogboro, 2004).

Ways to Entrench Peace Culture in the African Child

According to United Nations, (1991), Peace culture can be instilled on the African child through the following;

1. Peace Education: this involves building the capacity of children to understand the issues of violence and peace through the development of school curriculum from pre-schools, primary schools to secondary schools using methods that are aged based (methods suitable based on age) that promotes the values, attitudes and behaviors for peace. The curriculum for peace education includes; conflict resolution, disarmament education, human and children's rights, global education, inter-faith education, multicultural education, gender education and development education. Notably, peace education is not only teaching about conflict and how to resolve them peacefully, it also involve the participation of children expressing their own ideas and co-operating with each other to eliminate violence (Navarro & Nario, 2010).

2. Promotion of fundamental human values including human rights and respect for human dignity.

3. Equity in the distribution of common wealth as well as political powers which promotes equality by gender, age, culture and religion.

4. Promoting sustainable economic and social development.

5. Fostering democratic participation through building of democratic foundations for democratic principles, practices and participation in all sectors of the society.

6. Promotion of norms and values for peace in the family, cultural and religious institutions.

From the forgoing, the roles for entrenching peace culture on the African child is inclusive of all societal institutions including governance (political and civil society organizations), family, religious institutions, cultural institutions, educational institutions and the media.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this study reveal that although the AU has a peace strategy to silence the gun in Africa with the formulation and implementation of various frameworks, however, the region continues to experience a relapse of violence. The AU has been unable to sustain peace within the region. The failure for sustainable peace is among others due to its approaches that is formulated and implemented which is not child focused. Children are the future of the continent and are therefore major stakeholders for sustainable peace. In the light of the forgoing, this study recommends that; the AU should have included in the APSA and PCRD frameworks, like gender mainstreaming, programs that are centered on children as stakeholders for sustainable peace. Also, the programs developed should among others include the imbibing of peace culture and values in children within the region most especially in regions that has experienced one or more forms of violent conflicts. Finally, this work recommends that Children should be introduced to and familiar with peace structures and processes that conform to Africa's peculiarities and needs.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND JUSTICE IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
Perhaps 'peace' is like 'happiness', 'justice', 'health' and other human ideals, a behavior that   every person and culture need to achieved,   but despite all these peace cannot be achieved without focus ,determination and sacrifice . This paper has questions to ask why resolution, justice and happiness not so desirable in Nigeria conflict in particular and many other countries of the world at large, but also so intangible and elusive. But perhaps peace is different from happiness, since it seems to require social harmony and political enfranchisement, whereas happiness appears, at least in Western culture, to be largely an individual matter. This paper has alternatively, view peace as indeed   something that does resemble individual happiness but implicit in our psychological make-up and intermittently explicit in our social behavior and cultural norms. For the culture of conflict resolution attitude to be rooted and sustain in Nigeria in particular and the World at large our leaders in Nigeria and other countries of the world need to be abide with the culture of effective governance with responsibility of ensuring the promotion of peace through operating transparent, productive and functional good governance in their respective countries in the world to provide policies that can fight back on political crisis, religious/ethnic conflict, terrorism and corruption in the entire global community.

Keywords: Peace, Conflict, Justice, Corruption and Inequality

Introduction

In recent time, the world has witnessed increased waves of violent extremism that have taken lives of many innocent people either based on religious, ethnic or political crisis (UNDP, 2016). In 2014 alone, the Global Terrorism Index (2015) had shown that, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, and Nigeria were the home of 78 percent of the lives lost to terrorist attacks in the globe.

Generally Speaking, scholars, practitioners and activists have underscored peace and conflict resolution with variables from the philosophical, sociological, political, economic, religious and even commonsense perspectives. From whatever perspective, peace remains an important element that continues to receive the attention of all sectors in the society. Without a doubt, Nigeria as a country need to strengthen the basic foundation for Peace strategies in its domain to drastically reduce any form of violent extremism as result of poor national economy that cannot accommodate the needs of the majority citizens as a result of higher level of insecurity, poverty, unemployment and poor conduct of governance.

Statement of Problem

However, through Peace strategies, policy makers and other relevant stakeholders need to learn how to demonstrate commitment on issues of operating good governance, conflict resolution, peace and security, peace advocacy, peace building, and conflict management and international politics (Abbas, 2015; Ramsbotham et al, 2016) Similarly, to overcome the rising level of crisis in different part of the country there is need for educating public and engaging various stakeholder in to the process of conflict resolution activities at various levels that could help in the transforming the society in order to attain a more just and equitable local, national and international communities peaceful society. The relevance of Peace strategy need be expose Nigerian leaders and other various stakeholders to embrace an avenue for providing functional governance, peace strategies through identify the causes and prevention of conflict, as well as the nature of violence, including social oppression, discrimination and marginalization and how they could be better addressed. Although social issues have been highlighted by researchers for decades, it is often asked whether there is a really problem of insecurity in Nigeria that make the institutions incapable to conduct their responsibilities rather than moving current waves of various categories of conflicts ? The causes and various actors of conflict has become

a key question keeps lingering among scholars and practitioners in the world which led to currently a perceived disconnect between the ideas and theories of Peace strategies and the current contemporary realities of security issues on the ground. This issue often creates debates on the relevance of the Peace strategies discipline to the current security challenges facing Nigeria and the World at large   . In addition, this has deepened the frustration that despite several decades of fighting insurgency and other criminal tendencies   in Nigeria, it is evident that Nigeria still remains one of the most violent extremism ridden areas around the globe.

The research has the following questions to ask:

     I.   What are causes of violent conflict in Nigeria?
    ii.   Is there any relationship linkage between the good governance and the level of insecurity in Nigeria?
   iii.   What are the various conflict resolution strategies the Nigerian government can use to resolve violent/non-violent conflicts

Conceptual Framework
The Concept of Peace

As simple as the word "peace" may seem, providing a clear-cut definition of it in the study of International Relations seems more demanding as historic events, ideologies and peculiar regional circumstances have shaped the meaning of peace (Richmond, 2008). But at a first glance, Galtung (1967: 12) describes it as an "umbrella concept". To him, it is a state of mind felt as a consequence of the actualization of certain stated human desires. That is, it is a feeling of internal serenity as a result of external stability.

Galtung (1967) also describes peace as touching the concept of law and order. That is, an anticipated social order achievable through the instrumentality of force and the threat of it. This concept, however, does not ignore violence; rather it erects regulations and outlines punishments to produce and maintain a state of tranquility. Also there is the idea of peace as absence of any mutually agreed hostility, otherwise known as "negative peace". It is important to note that this only rule out the existence of deliberate violence between groups or states, but considers the need for occasional revolts, protests, demonstrations, et cetera. On the other hand, a condition of order conjured by respect for human socio-cultural diversity is called "positive peace". It is a social condition where multi-culture is respected; multi-ethnic is loved; multi-idea is welcomed; multi-religion in embraced; minorities are protected; equality of rights,

equity, justice, guided liberty and freedom are guaranteed. Therefore, the characteristics of peace in International Relations could be cooperation and integration (Galtung, 1967; Scherrer, 2007). However, in the study of International Relations, there have been divergent views and debates on the right theory and practice to attain peace; especially in a world characterized by selfishness, greed, inequality, conflict, violence, war, power, exploitation, oppression, bluff, etc.

Perspectives on Peace as a Concept

Idealists are the most ambitious group in seeking international peace. Plato (1941) argued that the utopian peace is only found in an 'ideal form' just as Socrates' truth and goodness are found in an ideal form, which cannot be fully attainable. The idealists argued that man, by nature, is not violent; man is a peace lover, he will always want to keep peace with his neighbour, but in case of probable violence, social and political norms, regimes and organization could inhibit such (Richmond, 2008). In ancient political thoughts, Heraclitus, the Pythagorean philosophers, and the Greek ideal saw harmony – peace in this context – as an ultimate principle of state existence. They saw it as physical and ethical principle; a property on human nature (Sabine, 1973). That is, peace is inherent feature of human being.

Put differently, Bansikiza (2004) submits that peace is both a gift by God and an effort by the people to achieve it, individually and socially. Due to the fact that peace is not reached once and for all, it demands continuous attempt in connecting divided people, reconciling differences and removing bitterness harboured. However, the idealists' notion of a world void of war, promoting disarmament, the right of self-determination for all men, and the presence of a world government to ensure order and proper distribution of scarce resources brought about the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization after the World War I and World War II respectively (Angell, 1916; cited in Richmond, 2008).

Contrary to the above argument, the *Realists* describe international relations as a Hobbesian "state of nature"; i.e. a "state of war" (Mapel, 1996: 55), characterized by selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses, and stupidity (Waltz, 1993: 124). The realists argued that life is solitary, brutish, nasty and short, and life is the survival of the fittest. They asserted that since resources are scarce and unevenly distributed, man must struggle for survival. Therefore, peace, as put forward by the idealists is unattainable; chaos and man are inseparable (Morgenthau, 1949).

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The *Liberalists* are a more optimistic set who beliefs that peace in international relations is attainable in situations of cooperation and shared norms rather than the quest for power and security. They are concerned with the creation of harmonious domestic political structures with the introduction of acceptable international regimes, laws, and norms that will limit the excesses of states and multilateral organisations in their polity. Even though they share in the belief that peace is not achievable, they see peace as something to be aspired for. The liberalist's belief that interdependence will engender peaceful co-existence. They see international trade as necessary instrument in promoting such interdependence. To them, state will not necessarily go to war against another state it has trade relations with. That is, mutual benefits derived from trade relations will most often discourage an interruption of war, thus promoting peaceful condition.

The *Marxists* thigh the condition of peace in the international system to the realities of the global political economy. The idea that the global economic system is divided into a class structure (the developed and the developing countries, the haves and the have-nots, the bourgeois and the proletariats, the owners of factors of production and the owners of labour) manipulating the forces of exploitation and revolution for each other's specific interest. The Marxists contend that peace is not feasible in this arrangement unless there is justice and equality in the distribution of resources (Richmond, 2008).

Conceptualizing Conflict
Conflict itself is not evil; often times it arises from the process of seeking sustainable progress and satisfaction. We quickly forget our similar positive intentions, dissipating energies on the contradictory ideas of the path to the common end. Among other things, conflict emanates as a result of misunderstanding, man's superiority complex, and failure to compromise and reconcile ideas, beliefs, cultures and interests. If harnessed, it could serve as a powerful tool for progress. Meanwhile, for the purpose of this paper, we shall be conceptualizing conflict as it relates to the field of Politics.

Conflict could be conceptualized from two approaches, namely: the objectivist approach, which suggests that conflict emanates from the social and political structure of the society; and the subjectivist approach, advancing that apparent differences and incompatibility of goals cause conflict. The definitions of conflict will be therefore categorized under these two approaches.

Objectivist Approach

To Stedman (1991: 269), conflict 'emanates from the tugs and pulls of different identities, definitions of what is right, fair, and just'. March and Simon (1958; cited in Oyeshola, 2005: 105) view conflict as a 'break-down in standard mechanism of decision making'. While Forsyth (1990) posits that conflict transpires when 'the actions of beliefs of one or more member of a group are unacceptable to and, hence are resisted by one or more groups or members'. Mitchell, (1981: 18) sees it as a result of 'miss-match between social values and social structure'. But Nwolise (2003) summarizes it as a 'clash, confrontation, battle or struggle'.

Subjectivist Approach

Stagner (1967: 16) defines conflict as a 'situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both; each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal; and each party perceive the other as a barrier or threat to that goal'. Likewise, to Wallensteen (2002: 16), 'conflict is a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strike to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources'. Chaplin (1979: 109) describes it as 'the simultaneous occurrence of two or more mutually antagonistic impulses or motives'. Putting it differently, Wilson and Hanna (1990: 255) refer it as the 'struggle involving ideas, values and /or limited resources'.

Conflict Resolution Processes
Mediation

Mediation is a type of Conflict Resolution methods of which purpose is to facilitate negotiation between the disputants so as to enable them resolves their disputes. It is a voluntary, non-binding private dispute resolution process in which a neutral person helps the parties to reach amicable settlement of their disputes (Mahmud, 2005). It requires the direct participation of the third party mainly to encourage the disputants resolve their differences themselves. Usually, the parties voluntarily enter into mediation and choose the mediator who proposes solution for the parties" consideration and acceptance. The opinion expressed by the mediator, no matter how well and fair it may be, does not bind the parties until they agree to accept it. The duty of the mediator is not to determine rights and wrongs but to control the process leaving the outcome to the parties since he cannot impose any decision on the parties (Bercovitch et al., 1991). Prof. M.A. Ajomo sees the mediator as "a facilitating

intermediary-providing a non-binding adjudicatory decision" (Ajomo, 1996). Distinguishing the role of the mediator from that of the arbitrator, (Kehinde, 2005) maintained that;

"While the latter decides the dispute for the parties, the role of the skilled neutral mediator is to act as a catalyst by helping the parties in identifying and crystallizing each side's underlying interests and concerns, carry subtle messages and information between the parties, explore bases for agreement and develop co-operative and problem-solving approach. The common denominator to all these efforts by the mediator is the enhancement of communication between the parties in conflict" (Kehinde, 2005).

Though, legal rules may be relevant to mediation but not mandatory. It is just one of the factors to be considered in the process but more importance is accorded to the subsisting relationship and interest of the parties. That is why mediation is suitably adopted in the resolution of conflicts of a sensitive and confidential nature where the disputants would wish to settle them in private rather than in public as required in litigation.

Negotiation
Negotiation is the most common and familiar form of Conflict Resolution mechanism. It is a dialogue or a consensual discussion with a view to reaching a compromise without the aid of third parties. Negotiation has become an indispensable part of our daily lives as it happens in almost every transaction between two or more persons. It is a means to an end and not an end in itself, the end being a mutually beneficial dispute settlement. The Black"s Law Dictionary defined it as; 'A consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter. Negotiation usually involves complete autonomy for the parties involved without the intervention of third parties…'

Therefore, unlike in arbitration and mediation, the parties in negotiation are in full control of both the process and the outcome either in persons or by proxy (Kehinde, 2005). Where decisions are reached through this process, the parties are bound since they are the architects of both the process and the solution. However, we have professional negotiators who are skilled in specific areas and can from time to time be

called upon to lead ignorant or inexperienced parties in their negotiations. O.G. Amokaye maintained that in order to achieve a successful negotiation, it is important for the parties to seek the services of a legal practitioner especially in the assessment and preparations of pre-negotiation terms, and if necessary for an expert to be part of any negotiation team (Kehinde, 2005).

The principles that guide successful negotiations in other areas of our lives are also applicable to the environmental disputes. The Environmental Safety Guidelines for Petroleum Industries in Nigeria, 2002, encourages oil companies to negotiate compensation payable to the host communities in settlement of pollution related cases before embarking on litigation. In any case involving environmental damage, negotiation is the next stage after the assessment of the damage.

In some cases, to ascertain the quantum of damage and the concomitant compensation, experts may be involved. Usually, negotiation starts with the company offering some compensation arrived at by expert's assessment. Problems may occur if the victims feel that what they were paid as compensation was inadequate. Where the result of negotiation is turned down, further negotiation may be made or the aggrieved party may resort to litigation as in the case of *Joel Odum and ors v. Shell B.P.and Weco Nig.Ltd.*[xix]where the plaintiffs, being victims of pollution caused by the defendants, were paid compensation by the latter following negotiation reached between the two. Being dissatisfied with the amount paid to them as compensation, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants claiming the sum of N6,687.33 as the minimum unpaid balance of the compensation.

This is in respect of the same subject matter already negotiated out of court but the plaintiffs then contend that the compensation is inadequate going by the provision of the Rivers State Minimum Crop Compensation Edict No. 7 of 1973. While dismissing this action, the court held that adequate compensation as provided by the Oil Pipelines Act had been paid to the plaintiffs, and that the Rivers State Minimum Crop Compensation law is inconsistent with the Oil Pipelines Act. So, the victims lost.

It is unfortunate that most oil companies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria prefer litigation to negotiation because of the inordinate delay of cases in Nigerian courts, and the concomitant frustrations on the victims, coupled with the possibility of

striking out the cases on the ground of technicality. For instance, in *Shell Pet. Co. Nig. v. Ambah*[xx] the plaintiff went to court because the oil company has neglected, failed, and or refused to negotiate or pay reasonable or adequate compensation to the plaintiff and members of his family despite repeated demands. It is in view of this that led the judge to state that; "I shall not conclude this judgment without saying that the defendant ought not to allow this case to go to court. It is a matter they ought to have negotiated and settled out of court…".

Where negotiation is reached, the amount of compensation payable is determined. In the United States of America, for instance, a company, W.R. Grace and Co has recently agreed out of court to reimburse the federal government $250 million for the investigation and cleanup of asbestos contamination blamed for sickening hundreds of people, some fatally, in the northwestern Montana town of Libby though subject to the approval of U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge.

Also, in a pre-litigation negotiation, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), recently reached a $21.8 million settlement with 95 parties to clean up the spectrum superfund site in Elkton, Maryland of hazardous chemicals caused by the parties.

Successful negotiators possess and exhibit perceptual, persuasive, analytical and other basic negotiation skills for effective conflict management. The same skills that diplomats use to negotiate international peace agreements can equally be used in the resolution of environmental conflicts.

Conciliation

Conciliation as a type of ADR is another process of settling disputes in a friendly manner outside the court. It is a practice of bringing together the parties in a dispute to an independent third party, a conciliator, who meets with the parties so as to resolve their differences.

In Nigeria, conciliation is recognized by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as a method of conflict resolution. Section 37 of the Act provides that the parties to any agreement may seek amicable settlement of any dispute in relation to the agreement by conciliation. The process involves a neutral and disinterested persons meeting with

the disputants both separately and together and exploring how the dispute can be resolved. It involves an appointed councilor who does not intervene directly in the dispute, rather he does it indirectly by exploring the available possible avenues for settlement thereby allowing the parties do the settlement themselves (Kabir, 2011). It is advisory in nature.

The conciliation process finds its most solid and eventual success on the will of the parties to engage in a meaningful dialogue irrespective of the gravity of their differences. The conciliator usually has no authority to seek evidence or call witnesses. He neither makes a decision nor an award. He merely provides the environment for resolution of conflict. He helps them to establish communication, clarify miss-perceptions, deal with strong emotions, and build the trust necessary for cooperative problem solving. This is more imperative when the parties have little constructive communication. They see each other as enemy resulting from all they lost to the conflict. In this situation therefore, conciliation may be vital in resolving preliminary issues (Moore, 1991).

Conflict Transformation
Approach has earlier been introduced by John Paul of the School of Peace Building and later developed by some scholars like Lederach , J.P (1995) Preparing for peace: Conflict Transformation Across (New York: Syracuse University Press) . This is about building on longer standing relationships through a process of change in the perceptions and attitudes of the parties concerned. The aim of conflict transformation is to change the perception of the parties, their relationship and the conditions that created the conflict. Therefore, conflict transformation entails the coming into being of a new situation involving conflict issues, perceptions, relationships and communication patterns. As the conflict has become a permanent life threat and in most cases, have revered development in Nigeria and Africa, it should adequately underscore the need for laying an important basis for the formulation of right values, behaviours and attitudes that will promote balanced personal, social, economic and political relations. Although the use of dialogue and negotiations has to some extent been fruitful yet the Nigerian polity has not been crisis free. In view of this trend, a need for a socio economic and political reorientation of the populace cannot be overemphasized.

Conflict Management

According to Best (2007) conflict management entail the process of reducing the destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures and approaches by engaging with the parties involved in that conflict. In most cases, conflict management is often used synonymously with "conflict regulation" which covers issues of handling conflicts at different stages. This also includes efforts made to prevent conflict through proactive measures thereby limiting, containing and litigating conflict. The usage of the term "conflict management" indicates the reality that conflict is inevitable. As it remains so, what practitioners needs do is to therefore regulate and manage it. In either case, management of conflict uses peaceful or non-violent methods which are available at individual, family, group, community and even international levels divided in to two broad categories: proactive or reactive methods.

The **proactive methods** are aimed at preventing the occurrence of conflict in the first place by taking proactive measures such as: instilling trust between or among people/communities, bridging communication gap, good governance by government delivering its responsibilities of making life more meaningful; inter party collaborations as well as promoting internal democracy within party structures. The **reactive method** becomes necessary when the conflict cannot be managed locally because it has already turned violent. To address an already violent situation, it requires third party interventions like mediation, conciliation, arbitration and litigation. However, there is agreement among scholars and practitioners that there are five basic steps in managing conflicts.

First, conflict analysis involves the initial examination of the nature of the conflict, its causes and its consequences. Second, the conflict management strategy should be determined through the identification and selection of the appropriate approach, method and strategy for the conflict management. Third, pre-negotiation that may involve the actions taken or activities carried out prior to negotiation by identifying the victims of the conflict, inviting the conflicting parties for negotiation. Fourth, a negotiation that involves actions taken for the implementation of the chosen conflict management strategy. This includes setting up a committee comprising of the delegates of the conflicting parties and other stakeholders to negotiate on how to resolve such conflict to make reasonable conclusions and recommendations and then

give a report. Fifth, post-negotiation which has to do with the actions or activities carried out after the negotiation. This includes the presentation of reports of the negotiation and the implementation of the recommendations made in the reports.

Conflict Resolution

This includes a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management or transformation. By conflict resolution, the deeply rooted sources of conflict are expected to be addressed and resolved and the behaviour is no longer violent, nor are attitudes hostile any longer, while the structure of the conflict has been changed (Ramsbotham et al, 2016). Furthermore, at this level, the outcomes of the resolution are to be mutually acceptable by parties concerned for sustained peace. However, there are differences in the approach to conflict resolution depending on the culture and civilisation of the people and their society.

For instance, the African Traditional Dispute Resolution **(ATDR)** differs from the Western Alternative Dispute Resolution **(WADR)**. Although in Africa, the approaches differ from one culture to another most communities have traditional leaders known as Chiefs or Emirs and have some traditional powers conferred on them to solve disputes. On the other hand, the **WADR** promote the use of non-violent means to the conflict including grass root community- based activities through good governance, communication collaboration, negotiation, and mediation etc. It can be said that in principle conflict resolution connotes a sense of finality, where the parties are mutually satisfied with the outcome of a settlement and the conflict is resolved in a true sense. There are also other ways to resolve conflicts such as surrendering, running away, overpowering the opponent with violent acts, filing a lawsuit, etc.

Beyond the ones explained above, the current movement toward **Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)**, sometimes referred to simply as conflict resolution, grew out of the belief that there are better options to resolve conflict than using violence or going to court. Over the years, the terms ADR and conflict resolution are used somewhat interchangeably and refer to a wide range of processes that encourage nonviolent dispute resolution outside of the traditional court system. The idea is about the search for an application of "*non- conventional*" peaceful methods of settling the dispute and

solving conflict situation using the least expensive methods and that satisfies both parties as well as ways to preserve and protect the relationship after settlement have been reached. In most societies, this approach usually promotes peaceful coexistence after solving the conflict.

Beyond the ATDR, WADR, ADR as earlier explained, there are other forms or approaches to conflict resolution the world over. This may include **negotiation** which is a discussion among two or more people with the goal of reaching an agreement. It may also involve **mediation** seen as a voluntary and confidential process in which a neutral third-party facilitator helps people discuss difficult issues and negotiate an agreement. Basic steps in this process include gathering information, framing the issues, developing options, negotiating, and formalizing agreements. The parties in mediation create their own solutions and the mediator does not have any decision-making power over the outcome. **Arbitration** is also another option which is a process in which a third-party neutral, after reviewing evidence and listening to arguments from both sides, issues a decision to settle the case. Arbitration is often used in commercial and labor/management disputes.

A hybrid that combines as explained earlier is **Mediation-Arbitration**. In this case, prior to the session, the disputing parties agree to try mediation first, but give the neutral third party the authority to make a decision if mediation is not successful. Also of relevance is **Early Neutral Evaluation** which involves using a court-appointed attorney to review a case before it goes to trial. The attorney reviews the merits of the case and encourages the parties involved in the case to attempt resolution. If there is no final resolution, the attorney then informs the disputants about how to proceed with litigation and gives an opinion on the likely outcome if the case goes to trial.

Another approach is the **Community Conferencing** which is a form of structured conversation involving members of a community (offenders, victims, family, friends, etc) affected by a dispute or a crime. Using a script, the facilitator invites people to express how they were affected and how they wish to address the harm inflicted. Another one is the **Collaborative Law** which is a process for solving disputes in which the attorneys commit to reaching a settlement without using litigation. Also important is **Negotiated Rulemaking** considered as a collaborative process in which government agencies seek input from a variety of stakeholders before issuing a new

rule. Finally, **Peer Mediation** involves young people act as mediators to help resolve disputes among their peers. In most cases, the student mediators are trained and supervised by a teacher or other adult.

Theories of Peace and Conflict Resolution

There exist theories of Peace Strategies as advanced by scholars to study, understand and analyze peace and conflict situation. In most cases, using concrete facts, propositions and principles, these theories as explained hereunder provide several political, social, economic, psychological, environmental and biological realities that explain the causes, dynamics and impacts of conflicts in and between people s and societies.

Structural theory sees structural defects, either internally generated or externally conditioned as the main cause of conflict in society. This theory has two sub-orientations. The radical structural theory was propounded by Marx and Engel, and developed by Vladimir Lenin. The radical theorists claim that exploitative and unjust nature of human society's domination of one class by other results into political or economic discrimination, with the end result leading to crises and war. The theorists believed that economic relationship in capital societies need to change through revolution or radical transformation.

The liberal structural theory propounded by Ross, Scarborough and Galtung see conflict as a phenomenon that is built in human societies according to how they are structured and organized.

They agreed that conflict arises as a result of deep-rooted structural dysfunction such as political and economic inequality, corruption, injustice, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, disease, overpopulation and exploitation. Johan Galtung argues that whenever economic and political discrimination and lack of tolerance in plural societies are embedded in such human social relationship, conflicts are bound to occur higher than societies where opposite social relationship is established.

Realist theorists mainly in their analysis of international politics believe that countries operate in their own self-interest and struggle for power. These theorists believe that imperfection in the globe has its roots in certain forces that are inherent in human nature, that human is selfish, individualistic and naturally conflictive. The desire to achieve such selfish and individualistic desire more often leads to conflicts.

Root Causes of Conflict and Violence in Nigeria

Why do humans clash? It may be two or more neighbors disagreeing over a river or a land. In a developing country like Nigeria, whatever a conflict's scale, the students of peace and conflict resolution seek to understand its nature and causes. Despite the fact that there are several causes of violence in our societies but for the purpose of this proposal, the most salient ones are briefly discussed.

Indigenes/Settler Spectacle

It does not matter how long one might have stayed in a place or community once the person does not belong to the ethnic group within the territory then he/she is unfortunately regarded as settler not fit to enjoy certain rights and privileges that community in Nigeria. In most Nigeria communities, the said *indigenes* usually hold sway over political structures in their areas and the so called *settlers* also who also predominantly depend on the state resources as means of livelihood are usually treated as second class citizens.

Religious Domination Crisis

Even though in spite of the fact that Nigeria is a secular country, violent and non-violent conflicts in are on the increase in Nigeria leading to ethno -religious clashes between various religious group with different belief of faith that contradict the teaching of other group that reason can easily trigger conflict in various communities in Nigeria.

Conclusion

Peace is a pre-condition for our emotional well-being, but a peaceful state of mind that is subject to cognitive disruptions and aggressive eruptions. The paper was of the view that the concept of Peace is a linchpin of social harmony, economic equity and political justice, but peace is also constantly ruptured by wars and other forms of violent conflict in Nigeria and many other countries. For society to lives in peace and harmony there is need for adopting various appropriate means of conflict resolution in addressing misunderstanding between individuals, groups and nations.

Recommendations

The paper has the following things to be observed for peace to be sustained between groups or society:

I. The Nigeria Government needs to show commitment in addressing the level of insecurity in the country by providing all the necessary needed mechanism in ground that could help in addressing emergence of conflicts.

ii. Citizens need to explore peaceful means to resolve conflict situations rather than occurrences to violence.

iii. Government in Nigeria need to operate open, transparent and accountable system of government that would be responsive for the people's needs and aspirations

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MANAGING PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT AND RESILIENCE BUILDING THROUGH CREATIVE ARTS: A CASE ANALYSIS OF IFE/MODAKEKE INTERNAL CRISIS

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Abstract

One of the most prolonged social conflicts in Southwest Nigeria was the Ife/Modakeke crisis. It spanned through decades and at a point assumed the status of a war given the number of fatalities. The conflict remained intractable and resurged many times, however, since the early 2000s there appears to be relative peace. How has this peace been achieved? The purpose of this study is to investigate management paradigms and how art-based approaches have contributed to resilience building in an effort at creating communality and friendship between the two communities. The survey utilised observation of six art-based forms in practice,   interviews of 30 respondents and 6 FGDs. Findings revealed that in addition to different management efforts in the past, story-telling, theatre performances, sporting events, games, festivals and songs are veritable tools for managing and creating resilience among the warring parties. Post-conflict engagement in these art-based forms was used to create fun, ease tension, teach lessons in tolerance, promote intimacy and warn on the adverse effects of hostility. It is argued that if not for different management techniques and resilience building through art-based performances among other strategies, the conflict may have re-occurred with little tipping or trigger. It is, thus, proposed that while dialogue continues, government and people of the area should invest more in art-based techniques to enhance interaction among Ife and Modakeke natives.

Keywords: prolonged social conflict, management paradigms, art-based forms, resilience building, communality.

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Nigerian state is faced with fierce and regular internal conflicts that have widened the trust-gap among different cleavages, clans, communities and ethnic groups. This is due to strife for limited resources among the highly impoverished and historically incompatible populace in a structurally unbalanced state. The situation of Nigeria validates Waldman's (2009) position that most conflicts in developing countries tend to be internal, occurring between different identity groups within the state. These conflicts tend to arise over issues of identity, economic and political marginalisation, injustice, resource scarcity, and ethnic discrimination. Agreeing to this assertion, Onyejiaku, Ghasi and Okwor (2018) opined that conflicts begin when individuals or groups in relationship perceive differences. Conflicts of this nature are prolonged, compounded or become intractable by an environment of mutual suspicion, chronic underdevelopment and poverty.

Internal conflicts leading to destruction of lives and properties have disrupted Nigeria's development (Dalhatu, 2012). When people go on rampage during violent conflicts, they destroy public properties and facilities and either kill or maim human capital needed to lubricate development. Odozi and Oyelere (2019) gave a clearer picture of the aftermath of conflict on a nation as they asserted that it reduces welfare for households and impose costs on individuals and the economy through several broad channels of waste and reconstruction. In most situations, what pervades in Nigeria after communal conflict is negative peace. Suffice to say that negative peace is inimical to progress as it affects the socio-political stability and cohesion of various groups, especially in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria (Ajibola, 2014).

The Ife/Modakeke conflict was regarded as one of the longest intra-ethnic crises in southwest Nigeria (Asiyanbola 2010). The conflict ranged for about a century leaving behind memories of pains, agonies and horrors as a result of land dispute, identity and power. Asiyanbola (2010) was of the opinion that the causes of the conflicts between the Ifes and Modakekes was partly economic, party politics and identity issues and have continued to add novel dynamics with time. The conflict has become its own raison d'être, its own self-empowered, and self-fulfilling, as it had

since detached from its original cause (Augsburger 1992; Omotayo 2005). Ife/Modakeke conflicts always left behind sad memories of unquantifiable loss. Adegbite, Balogun and Buba (2016) averred that the effects of the last conflict in both Ife and Modakeke were enormous, and are still felt till today. The conflict has limited the spatial pattern of expansion and growth of both communities.

There are many studies on Ife/Modakeke conflict, however, few of them situated it within the realm of protracted social conflict and also few examined the different strategies being used to build resilience in the last two decades. None of these studies to the best of our knowledge has considered the role of art-based approaches in securing relative peace since 2000. Thus, this research aims at examining different management strategies used before 2000 and finding out how art-based approaches have contributed to efforts at building resilience in Ife/Modakeke conflict since 2000. The specific objectives are: To examine the complexity of Ife/Modakeke relationship; establish the different episodes of conflict; review the different management strategies employed before year 2000; and examine the impact of art-based approaches in resilience building since year 2000. In order to achieve the objectives, the following research questions are put forward: What was the historical origin of the protracted Ife/Modakeke conflict? What was the course of Ife/Modakeke conflict? How has the Ife/Modakeke conflict been managed over the years? In what ways have art-based approaches contributed to resilience building since 2000?

Conceptual Discourse

Conflict generally refers to disagreement between two or more individuals over a matter. It could also be likened to a struggle or a contest. Madalina (2016) opined that conflict refers to some forms of friction, disagreement, or discord arising between individuals or within a group or among groups when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. Thakore (2013) viewed conflict as an outcome of

behaviours and also an integral part of human life. He is of the opinion that when there is interaction there is bound to be conflict and it can mean expression of hostility, negative attitudes, antagonism, aggression, rivalry, and misunderstanding. According to Waldman (2009) most conflicts in Africa tend to be internal, occurring between different identity groups within a state. Conflicts involving groups are often prolonged by perception which is often skewed towards self-interest and ego. This is while Swanström and Weissmann (2005) posited that perception should be included as a central concept since the conflicts and the opponent's intentions often are defined according to subjective perceptions.

The concept of art-based approach was proposed in the early 1990s (Bresler, 2011). It grew and expanded rapidly, spawning distinct genres. It embodies realization of vicarious experience through creativity. According to Gioia (2014) art-based approach presents aspects of the social-emotional world to us via direct experience of artistic form, be it visual art, theatrical production, novel, poetry, or other literary genres. As such, meanings are formed beyond what words can convey through performance. This tends to agree with the postulation that art is an indirect means for exposing dominant narratives and empowering change in human psyche. The idea of imagined imagery broadens the uses of art within art therapy practice and research (Gioia, 2014). Jokela and Huhmarniemi (2018) also opined that art as an approach may be the intervention for problem solving or gaining new knowledge and understanding. They believed that art can also be the subject of development and social engineering.

Art-based approach is the utilisation of art in such a way that members of a community can collectively search for knowledge, tactics and experiences through participation. Thus, Epskamp (1999) asserted that both the process and product of art-making could be used as tools to support reconciliation, rehabilitation, commemoration, and community building. The genres of arts that can be used for achieving peace include drama, dance, music and other art forms such as painting and

games. **Art-based approaches are veritable tools for social learning**. Social Learning Theory (SLT) is a theory which posits that behaviours can be learnt through observation, imitation and social interaction. The term resilience suggests ability to endure or adapt. Johansson (2018) argued that resilience should not be conceived merely as the ability to bounce back to an original state, it should include the amount of disturbance that a system can absorb before being pushed across a threshold.

The term resilience was adopted by behavioural sciences to describe the adjustment and coping capacities of individuals, human communities and larger societies that sustain during stressful moments (Gal, 2014). It connotes ability to withstand and survive social, political, economic and ecological adversities in a complex world of predictable and unpredictable vagaries of nature. It is a collective activity embarked upon to bounce back after a conflict, suffering, trauma or conflict-induced stress. Resilience is construed in this study as a wider collective and social representation of what it means to endure and wriggle through difficulty by humans. Resilience in this context emphasises the "community" or "societal" aspect of the term. This is why it is argued that neglect of collective resiliency and failure to build on existing social capital within communities will fail to produce desired results in conflict-prone society (Nguyen-Gillham, Giacaman, Naser and Boyce, 2008). The failure of people to work to endure and overcome adversities of conflict will make it to re-occur. The importance of positioning resilience within a context of 'social suffering' has been emphasised by Nguyen-Gillham, Giacaman, Naser and Boyce (2008) in their study of how Palestinian adolescents cope with military occupation of West Bank. Resilience is often borne out of the desire to continue to survive in an environment despite the hostility imposed by extraneous factors and abnormal living conditions.

Massive community participation in social activities is a manifestation of resilience in post-conflict society. As a relational approach to mutual self-help, when people self-organise to support one another, they draw on former or current social networks temporarily disrupted by armed conflict over a period of time (Oxley, 2018).

Therefore, locally initiated paradigms like art-based approach may produce far-reaching effects in strengthening relationships among ex-warriors and reduce the possibility of relapsing into armed conflict.

Conflict management is popular in conflict literature as a strategy to contain negative effect of conflicts which cannot be totally resolved. Burton (I987) *averred that* conflict management is an attempt by the status quo to manage the dispute or to avoid escalation of the conflict. Conflict management entails planning measures to avoid conflict as well as taking rapid and effective measures when it occurs (Madalina, 2016). Conflict management involves acquiring skills related to self-awareness, conflict resolution, conflict communication and collaboration.

Ife and Modakeke communities are situated in Osun State, South-West Zone of Nigeria. The Zone is traditionally inhabited by the Yorubas. *Ile-Ife/Modakeke is located in Osun State, Nigeria and has two LGAs: Ife Central, and Ife East. Ife Central has 10 political wards while Ife East has 8 wards: Ile-Ife 5; and Modakeke 3. Ile-Ife shares a boundary with Ifewara in the South, Ifetedo in the East, Osu in the West and Ipetumodu in the North. However, according to the United Nations world population prospects, the current metro area population of Ife in 2020 is 374,000, which is a 2.47% increase from 2019. In 2014, Modakeke has a total population of 119,529 and is located in the Ife East, with an Area Office (Oke, 2018).*

Protracted Social Conflict Theoretical Underpinning

When violent conflicts cannot be resolved permanently over a period of time it is tagged as prolonged social conflict (PSC) (Azar, 1985; Beaudoi, 2013). PSC is often marked with sporadic episodes of violence, exhibition of some breakpoints during which there is cessation of hostilities but lingering prejudice in the psyche and behaviour of people without distinguishable point of termination. Failure to address social injustice and inequality in the social structure are largely responsible for

prolonged hostility in PSC. It is the product of political and economic inequality and ideological domination of one social group over another that prevents total resolution of social conflict (Azar, 1985). Tensions over non-tangible assets such as social, economic and political power, and urge for revenge are seated firmly in the relational aspects of PSC (Beaudoi, 2013).

Azar (1985) identified four components in his conceptualization of PSC to include effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and social recognition of identity (p. 29). The requirement for the fragmentation and eventual development of a situation of a PSC within a multi-communal society or at least the factor that increases the potential for PSC to arise is usually associated with the emergence of politically active communities within such a society (Leventis and Tsokkalides, 2018). For instance, there is a clear a historical pattern of rivalry and contest between the Ife and Modakeke and this extends to different parties they choose during the eras of party politics in Nigeria. If a community has no real access, or perceives itself as being denied such access, to political and/or financial power, the likelihood of a PSC developing are increased (Leventis and Tsokkalides, 2018). The case of Ife/Modakeke conflict illustrates a situation whereby the Modakeke people perceive neglect of their needs for autonomy and release from servitude. The PSC is being adopted for this study because of its relevance in explaining historical malice and wrong perception that prolong Ife/Modakeke conflict.

Methodology

This survey utilised qualitative approach. The primary data were obtained from participant observation, interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). Participant Observation was undertaken by the researcher at the various art-based events for twelve months. **Art-based activities purposively sampled for observation were story-telling, theatre performances, sporting events, Ayo olopon game, Olojo Festival and Edi Festival Song.** Thirty respondents, distributed equally among the

Ife and Modakeke natives, were engaged in in-depth interviews. Six FGDs consisting of three in Ife and three in Modakeke were conducted. The secondary data were obtained through information retrieved from existing sources: research articles and Internet.

Ife and Modakeke Historical Trajectory

By the 18th century, Oyo Empire was marred by internal problems that affected the military strength and activities it was known for. Yoruba, Fulani and Hausa soldiers whose military expeditions evolved from creating a state independent of Oyo were responsible for the fall of Oyo Empire. The refugees from the attacks began to migrate South with Ife receiving trickles of these migrants at first and with the worsening of the situation in the Oyo areas, Ife territory became refugee camp and final settlement for some people. The first set of refugees were said to have migrated to and settled in Ile-Ife from 1770 and they were said to have been from Ejigbo, Offa, Ede, Ikoyi, Ogbaagba, Oje, Ola, Oko and Irawo.

The Ife people gladly accommodated the Modakeke refugees and encouraged them to trade and farm. Smith (1988) observed that the refugees and their hosts also enjoyed military cooperation. Soon intra-tribal rivalry ensued. The build-up of acrimony between Ife and the refugees who lived within several quarters and compounds with the Ife people led to the eventual murder of a number of Ife kings, namely, Akinmoyero, Gbanlare, Gbegbaaje and Wunmonije who did not share their subjects' stand of animosity towards the refugees.

 Upon the ascension of Ooni Adegunle a.k.a.Abewela Gberengede, the bitterness between the refugees and their Ife hosts had become very heated that the Ife people demanded that the refugees be sent out of Ile-Ife. The Ooni ordered their relocation to a temporary settlement at Iraye, under Obalaaye; Iwinrin, under Obawinrin; Ijugbe, under Obalejugbe and Oke-Awo, under Owa-Fegun. Elugbaju (2018) noted that the Ooni Abewela's decision to move the refugees out of Ile-Ife to the expanse of land stretching across three communities owned by different families were soon given an

entirely new dimension by the Ife people who concluded that the Ooni was sympathetic to the Modakeke people at the detriment of the interests of the Ife people. This action according to Alao (2004) and a number of other factors culminated in the eventual murder of Ooni Abewela by the Ife people. It is equally this resettlement in a separate part of Ife land that gives the Modakeke people a distinct sense of autonomy as sub-tribe of Yoruba till today and usually fuels the crisis that persists.

Ife/Modakeke conflict spanned over a century. Elugbaju (2016) identified seven major wars between the Ife and Modakeke. The first Ife/Modakeke conflict occurred between 1835 and 1849 (Albert, 1999; Oladoyin, 2001) and it marked the beginning of an age-long communal violence between the Modakeke and Ife. Ife people proceeded to raise another siege against Modakeke within the space of a month but they were routed, their city razed to the ground, their artefacts looted and a large number of them were captured and sold into slavery. As a result, Ile-Ife was abandoned by its people who relocated to Isoya, Okegbo and other Ife towns where they remained till 1858 (Johnson, 1966).

The skirmishes and eventual murder of Obalaaye, an Ife chief, precipitated a break out of a very violent war in 1882 (Akinjogbin, 1992). Again, the Modakeke were victorious. What followed was the total destruction and desertion of Ile-Ife (Elugbaju, 2018).Ife was raised as a town again in 1894 after the intervention of British colonialists in the Kiriji and eventual ending of hostilities in Yorubaland in 1893.

According to Alao (2004) by 1934, the conflict between the Ife and Modakeke people resurfaced again but under the garb of religion.. The Modakeke people sought the approval of the D. O. to conduct their Friday prayers in Modakeke instead of the mosque in Ile-Ife. This conflict which was couched in religion was largely regarded as Modakeke's attempt at getting autonomy in order to conduct its own affairs within Ile-Ife. This was seriously contested by the people of Ife but it did not degenerate into an open violent conflict.

With the cocoa boom of 1946 in Nigeria, particularly in the western part of the country, the people of Modakeke revolted against the payment of *isakole* for the Ife people who owned the land and leased it to them. The Modakeke people began this conflict by refusing to pay their respective landlords royalties. This was followed by the *anti-isakole* agitations in the press, sponsored by the literate Modakeke people in Lagos.

Also, with the decolonisation process in full gear in Nigeria in the mid-20th century and formation of political parties and the new local government law which became operative in 1955, the animosity between Ife and Modakeke led to quest for greater autonomy by the Modakeke people through choice of political party (Ogundipe, 1996). While the Ife people subscribed to Action Group (A.G.), the Modakeke people went with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.). Through N.C.N.C they sought to entrench their separatist agenda by political means when they began the agitation for a separate council. This was carried over into the Second Republic of 1979- 1983 when the Ife people endorsed Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N.) and the Modakeke people supported the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).

The struggle between UPN and NPN compounded the conflict between Ife and Modakeke so much that Ile-Ife became a battle ground and in 1981, the people of Modakeke launched an unwarranted attack on the people of Ife residing at Akarabata, Oke-Eso and Ojoyin where they burnt, looted properties as well as maimed and killed a lot of people. Also, the 1983 gubernatorial elections which saw N.P.N emerging victorious made Modakeke people who were largely N.P.N supporters to launch attacks on Ife people and murdered four prominent Ife sons alongside a Modakeke politician who was their representative at the State House of Assembly but of U.P.N. membership.

The recommendation of Mbanefo panel for the reform of local government and boundary adjustment in 1996 for the creation of Ife East Local Government with headquarters at Enuwa angered the Modakeke people who thought late Ooni Okunade Sijuade manipulated the report. This perceived loss by the people of Modakeke led to a breakdown of law and order; the people of Ife were attacked, a lot of people were killed and properties damaged in two major intra-tribal wars that lasted from 1996 to 2000.

Efforts at Managing the Ife/Modakeke Conflict

According to Olayiwola and Okorie (2010), the first attempt to resolve the conflict was made by Ooni Abeweila in 1847 to find a new settlement for the Modakekes. Unfortunately, this peace strategy employed did not work. In 1854 a resolution for the conflict was brokered by Ibadan when Ogunmola sent mediators to negotiate the terms of peace that brought Ife people back to their home. This resolution lasted from 1854 to 1878 during which the Ife and Modakeke people lived in harmony till the breakout of the Yoruba internecine wars, popularly regarded as Ekitiparapo *(Kiriji)* wars which engulfed the entire Yorubaland.

In the treaty negotiated by the British to end Kiriji war, the people Ife demand for the evacuation of Modakeke from Ife land according to Olaniyan (1992) resulted in the present Ode-Omu founded in 1908. In 1909, during the reign of Ooni Sijuwade Adelekan Olubuse I, this treaty was implemented and the Modakeke people were evacuated from Ile-Ife. This option of resolution which would have permanently resolved the conflict lasted till 1922 when the people of Modakeke were allowed to return and resettle in Ile-Ife.

During the reign of Ooni Ademiluyi Ajagun between 1910 and 1930 a request was made to the colonial government to allow the return of Modakek people to Ife to boost the remuneration of the King and accede to various attempts made by the Modakeke people to negotiate their return back to Ile-Ife. With the approval of the colonial authorities, the people of Modakeke were allowed to move back to Ile-Ife but under an agreement to move into a new quarter in Ile-Ife, called Iraye quarters. There, they would be subjects under Obalaaye and thus, Iraye quarter was created in addition to the 5 original quarters (Ogundipe 1996). The Modakeke agreed to the periodic payment of isakole to the Ooni and also, individuals who wished to farm paid isakole on lands they leased from families that owned them. A new treaty was signed in 1922 under the auspices of the colonialists which lasted till the end of the Ooni Ademiluyi's

reign (Ogundipe 1996). The 1922 treaty began to collapse especially in 1934 when the people of Modakeke sought to pursue their autonomy under the guise of religious struggle.

The *isakole* problem was taken to the court where it was decided that the people of Modakeke who farmed on the lands owned by the people of Ife were bound to pay the *isakole*, an order to which the people of Modakeke refused to comply. The Egbe Omo Oduduwa waded into the conflict and helped to work out a solution based on the payment of low rate *isakole.* Freehold of land made available by the Native Authority and or evacuation of the people of . In 1978, with the Land Use Decree, the people of Modakeke ceased all forms of *isakole* payment and this precipitated a conflict in 1981 (Olaniyan 1992).

In 1981, the failure of the government of Oyo state to grant the recommendation of the commission of Enquiry on Local Government led to another spate of violent clashes. The violent conflicts led to the creation of another Commission of Inquiry whose finding was that Modakeke was not a distinct town but a quarter in Ile Ife. The recommendation was endorsed by Oyo State Government (Olaniyan, 1992).

In 1996, the Mbanefo Panel on ethnic conflicts and boundary adjustment in Nigeria recommended the creation of Ife East local Government as against the request of the people of Modakeke who pursued the creation of Ife North East Local Government. This led to a breakdown of law and order as a result of the people of Modakake's violent protest (Ogindipe, 1996).

Other resolution methods initiated included the use of police and military forces to separate parties and enforce ceasefire, court trial of belligerents and the 1987 Justice KayodeEso/IbidapoObe Judicial Commission of Inquiry. Olusegun Obasanjo's administration waded into the matter by setting up committees such as Chief Alex Akinyele-led committee, Commodore Olabode George's committee and between 1999 and 2002 the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC).

Osun State government recently created area development office to take care of the interest of Modakeke people as semi-autonomous entity.

Government has also collaborated with the United States Agency for International Development/Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) which involved the conventional introduction of the Ife-Modakeke Inter-people group Peace Advocacy Committee on 16th of September 2000 (Albert, 2001). Since 2000 the Ife and Modakeke people seemed to have sheathed their swords. How has this been achieved through resilience building is the next focus of this study report.

Resilience Building through Art-based Approaches since 2000

The results from the survey indicate that there are several art-based activities in both communities. These art-based activities include story-telling, music, drums, performance arts, rituals, festivals and games. From observations, interviews and FGDs held, it was discovered that there is representation of each side at most of these performances.

Observation of story-telling session revealed that it is used as a resilience building tool to ease tension arising from protracted conflict. At different socio-cultural gatherings, the Ife/Modakeke people tell stories to refresh the memories of the old as a means of inducting the young ones on bitter experiences of hostility. These stories are aimed at inculcating self-transcendence (beyond the self: the other) virtues of resilience building. The Kiriji war, the civil war and heroic acts of Moremi and Ogedengbe are often revisited. When stories of the Ife/ Modakeke conflicts are told, they are aimed at dissuading future occurrence. This finding further validates Gioia's (2014) submission that story-telling is used to construct symbols, signs and images that depict experiences of war in a manner to construct a palatable narrative.

Respondents to interviews clearly stated that theatre performances have been devised as a potent instrument of passing out information to the people in the communities.

Schools, local dramatic societies and clubs organise drama outings and invite guests from Ife and Modakeke to watch their performances. In the past, Alarinjo theatre groups of Ogunde, I Show Pepper, Baba Sala and Oyin Ogunjobi have staged different performances in the area to relieve tension. Today, in both communities, government through the state's council for arts and culture roll out several plays (published and unpublished) which are being showcased at major events within the two communities to promote resilience.

FGD participants agreed that theatre performances in Ife/Modakeke area have been used as a tool for social learning to change perception, attitude and behaviour. This finding corroborates Bandura's (1977) proposition that humans have the ability to develop ideas about new behaviours through regular four major elements in dramatic performance namely: **Attention; Retention; Reproduction** and **Motivation.** Succinctly put, if attention is paid to a particular action, there is the likelihood of retention, reproduction and motivation to repeat such action for physiological, social and political benefits. Sellers, Cochran and Branch (2006) also agreed that SLT is comprised of four key elements: imitation, definition, differential associations, and differential reinforcement which are useful in human relations. Attitudes and behaviours of individuals determine the net balance of costs and rewards in social relations and are critical in cost-benefit analysis before embarking on violent conflict.

Observation of sporting events such as soccer and athletics as used in the two communities revealed that they are beneficial in developing the spirit of sportsmanship especially among secondary school students and youth clubs. Some of the respondents to interviews also said they always anticipate the coming of the sports fiestas as they help to create new friendship and entrench existing ones. *Yearly tournaments are arranged, supported by government and sponsored by corporate organisations.* Non-Governmental Organizations and Multinational Corporations such as USAID, MTN, Globacom, Bet9ja, among others have also been involved in the sponsorship of events on both sides with the aim of promoting peace. *Inter-house*

sports competitions in schools extend invitation across the Ife and Modakeke communities. They are occasions where people forget their differences.

Participant observation showed that Ayo Olopon is a board game which is strategically played between two players. It requires prowess and systematic calculations for a winner to emerge between the two players. The players acquire seeds based on their wit and responsiveness to calculation. It is a game that teaches endurance. Friendship is strengthened through the game as it is usually a melting point for adults residing in an area. During the game, banters and jokes are thrown at each other which arouse laughter among spectators. Interactions during the game promote ego transcendence (self: beyond ego) of resilience building as you don't think of self alone and you also develop the ability to stomach criticism.

Interviewees and FGD p articipants submitted that Olojo Festival held in Ife is a celebration of Ogun, the god of iron. It is marked with a lot of fun and pageantry. On the seventh day, which is the grand finale of the event, Ooni receives a large number of people, including visitors, tourists and culture enthusiasts from across the world. It was observed that the yearly festival involved emissaries from Modakeke kingdom who are received by the Ooni of Ife. The festival also represents spiritual transcendence (beyond space and time) of resilience building. This is because participants no longer look at the mundane world of materialism but focus is on the spiritual existence and the hereafter. Observation also revealed that during Olojo festival, the king alongside his chief priest prays for the development of the communities, enjoins harmony and cleanses the land through rituals.

Edi Festival is common to the Ife people and it is held for married people with the aim of restoring and building a happy home. As there are inter-communal marriages among the Ife and Modakeke people, it provides opportunities for interacting and emphasising values inherent in peaceful co-existence. The importance of intra-tribal marriages has been well documented in literature. According to Oke (2018), at the festival those who violate marital norms are punished to serve as deterrent to others. The period of Edì festival is also viewed as a period of cleansing the society of deviant

or anti-social behaviours. For example, there is the custom of "blocking" the door steps of thieves, adulterers, wife beaters, house-wives rivals and the habit of ridiculing those that exhibit deviant behaviours.

In a nutshell, findings of this study corroborate Epskamp's (1999) framework which included among others mediation beyond the medium of the spoken dialogue, increased understanding and appreciation of divergent worldviews, facilitating continuing dialogue, inspiring new visions based on trust and faith, reaching a working consensus within the community on fundamental issues, improving community interaction and socialization, and dismantling a climate of fear and distrust through art-based performances. With the different art-based forms people from both sides of the divide develop coping mechanisms for resisting the temptation of relapsing back into violence as a means of settling their differences. According to respondents, art in this regard has the capacity to enhance emotional intelligence and ability for tolerance of participants and spectators as they eventually see the whole world as a stage that is temporal.

Conclusion

The Ife/Modakeke conflict is effectively situated within the realm of PSC as efforts aimed at managing or resolving the conflict for a century did not totally remove animosity. However, the relationship between Ife and Modakeke people earlier fraught with historical biases; crave for autonomy and political manoeuvring has been changed through social learning. Since 2000 both communities have co-existed without major occurrence of violence. A number of factors account for this relative peace of which this study has brought to fore art-based approaches. Ife-Modakeke is endowed with lots of art-based activities which include storytelling, theatre performance, games and festivals which have been used to build resilience that helps both communities to transcend parochial and sentimental cleavages.

Participation in art-based approaches that are didactic has changed the perception of Ife/Modakeke people and has enhanced interactivity. In view of the fact that arts are

verisimilitudes of real human behaviours, they have been useful in social learning paradigm which has helped in building resilience to historical malaise. Sports, drama, games, music and drums as genres of arts have proved useful in Ife/Modakeke to instil commonly shared social behaviour and condemn anti-social and deviant actions, attitudes, feelings and behaviours which have helped to put hostilities on hold. The circle of violence in Ife/Modakeke protracted social conflict has been broken through the use of art-based performances in the last two decades.

However, a number of challenges face the use of art-based approaches which include mutual suspicion, trust- gap and financial incapacitation. Christianity and Islam have also driven people away from some traditional practices which they tag as idolatry. A lot of campaign is needed to change this wrong perception. *Governments at all levels also need to participate in some art-based events and* collaborate with both national and international agencies and donors who are vast and interested in the area of promoting art-based culture for peace.

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REFLECTION ON ISSUES AND THEMES IN THE APPLICATION OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT

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Abstract
This paper contends that the global regime of commodification of knowledge operational since the turn of the 21st century is equally applicable to the formulation and proliferation of methodological frameworks for impact assessment in the field of peacebuilding. While the situation speaks to the political economy of knowledge production in general, it also specifically underscores how the articulation of expertise in peace and conflict studies tend to be influenced substantially by the logic of capitalist specification for consumerism. The study argue that in spite of this reality, it is possible to analyse and render the issues and themes in normative taxonomical terms. Based on the peace and conflict impact assessment derivative labels, this paper presents an overview of issues and themes in the application of PCIA methodological frameworks for peacebuilding outcomes. The paper also highlights the relative connectivity of the issues by addressing contending questions of ownership, level and quality of participation, attribution and gap between micro and macro levels, standard operational procedures and the use of theory. The paper, therefore, concludes that the issues are situated within practice and meta-theoretical perspectives of good practices and lesson learned in the application of PCIA frameworks.

Keywords: Peace and conflict impact assessment, good practice, lesson learned, methodological framework, participation

Introduction
Following the in-road made by the success of Do-No-Harm project, several institutions such as International Research Centre, British Department for International Development (DFID), and Canadian International Development Agency commissioned researches that resulted in analytical methods based on the application of early warning systems through the lens conflict analysis milieus. Scholars and practitioners like Bush (1998), Anne-Marie Laprise (1998), Suzanna Verstegen (1999), Michael Warner (1999), Fewer (1999, 2004), elaborated on the analysis of peace and conflict-related issues in project management cycle in order to assess the positive and negative impact. In the views of Zupan (2005), this has facilitated the enhancement of the components of peace and conflict-sensitive execution. Sustaining the discussion on peace and conflict-sensitive tactics to the advancement and expansion of evaluation apparatuses, the works of Spencer 1998, Houghton and Robertson 2001, Goodhead and Hulme 1997, Ross 2001, Rothman 1997, Klingebiel 1999, Uvin 1999, Kreimer 1998, Sorbo et al, 1999, Smith and PRIO 2004, Kumar and Rosenthal 1998, Kumar et al, 1999, Jacoby 2000, Ball et al, 1999, Fischer 2001, Wils and Zupan 2004, Church and Shouldice 2002, 2003 and others, provided the donor-oriented framework for planning and monitoring processes and challenges faced. Although these works classified as conflict impact assessment (CIA) and peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) resulted in dissimilar techniques with varying convolutions. However, a common strand of analysis of core conflict context dimension was a common technique.

Since then (Do-No-Harm project), a plethora framework, approaches, tools and methodologies in the emergent cottage enterprise of PCIA in the development and peacebuilding field with varying quality, scope, depth and process, has evolved. They include Conflict Impact Assessment, Conflict Sensitive Programming, peace and Conflict Development Analysis, Conflict Impact Assessment System, Conflict Sensitive Approaches, Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) – "Do No Harm", Conflict Assessment, Conflict Risk Analysis, Peace and Conflict Assessment Model (PCA), Strategic Conflict Assessment, Conflict Development Analysis (Bush, 2005:7), etc. The proliferation of evaluation and impact assessment activities with PCIA

derivative labels (Bush, 2005:7) and the attempt to distinguish one brand from another necessitated Niels Dabelstein (OECD-DAC, 1999) and Kenneth Bush (2005) to characterise the situation as methodological anarchy and commodification of an idea, respectively.

However, in respect of the common criteria discerned from the literature, these evaluation systems, frameworks, tools, methodologies and approaches are beginning to blend into a set of standard criteria and methodology (Hoffman, 2005:4). As a standard criterion for assessing and evaluating peace and conflict-related concerns, the various tools, approaches, methodologies, suggest a focus on monitoring and procedures, within the sphere of project management cycle that emphasises project: coverage and effect; suitability and consequence; adeptness and efficacy; aptness; lucidity, and sustainability. Ostensibly, the situation has engendered debate and reflections on the issues and themes regarding the sundry challenges from field experienced in the practice of gauging and weighing the result of peacebuilding undertakings in conflict zones.

In the light of the debate on the issues and themes in PCIA, academics and practitioners have predominantly shared their thoughts on the ownership question through the myriad of stakeholders; the level and quality of participation; the question of attribution to address the gap between micro and macro levels; generally applicable indicators; the demands on operational standards, attendant procedures against the backdrop of flexible approaches versus uncluttered. For this paper, however, the central concern was the gleaning of these issues and themes as challenges in the complex task of assessing and measuring the impact and outcomes of peacebuilding activities. Thus, the central argument of the paper is that the issues and themes in the knowledge and practice of PCIA portray perennial strategic deficit because of the complexities and dynamisms of conflict situations. It also argues that to further develop the various methodological frameworks to overcome the related challenges and shortfalls, there is the pressing need for good practice and share lesson learned by actors of peacebuilding concerning each context as no two conflict situations have the same context, actors and conflict drivers.

The Question of Ownership of the Process by Various Stakeholders

In interrogating the issue of ownership and participating in the conduct of assessment and evaluation in the field of peacebuilding using the derivative labels of PCIA is primed on two prongs. First, is the issue of the owner of the process wherein empowerment and disempowerment of indigenous capacity becomes a catalyst for integration and social change. In this sense, it pertinently serves as a token of development and peacebuilding when indigenous capacity is strengthened and community members empowered, it, in turn, reinforces conflict sensitivity. Conversely, the process is conflict blind when it is designed to disempower community members. Disempowerment is stripping a specific conflict community of the results that are associated with a particular intervention. According to Bush (2005), it implicates losing people losing control over fundamental areas of their lives, including an element of overpowering (Bush, 2005:5). Second, as a tool or methodology designed in the western/northern scientific discourse in line with the logic of capitalist specification for consumerism.

Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff (2005) queried the propriety of branding something that is meant for the consumption of a wide range of audience. So, concepts cannot be collectively owned in the global community when there is an insistence on ownership. They concede that conflict sensitivity has gone above the engagement of tools. Therefore, beyond being deceptive, it also restrictive because of the difficulty that other people will face in a bid to adapt, adjust and deploy for the operational context of their organisations. According to them, what seems critical in the debate on ownership and methodology are the answers to questions such as whether people are using the existing tools, at what level and with what outcome, are the tools or processes working or living up to their potential. Undoubtedly, taking ownership of the process is essential but one way to sustain ownership is through participation in the entire process.

The Level and Quality of Participation

The level and quality of participation can be discerned at two distinct levels but are mutually linked for seamless impact assessment. On the first level, is the multilateral

and multinational donor agencies and organisations (including its project staff), who initiated and are responsible for the funding of the intervention for peacebuilding outcomes. And, on the second level, is the participation of people from the conflict zone. People and their participation are central to impact assessment. PCIA is people-dependent, according to Bush (2003:6), the people living in the conflict environment are the real experts in PCIA when they are engaged to provide information and analysis on the peace and conflict dynamics and indicators. Participation of people from the zone of conflict is germane; however, there has to be a caveat. That is ascription must not be given to the northerners as evil. Also, the southerners should not be portrayed as white or black. According to Paffenholz (2005), caution must be extended to the Southern gatekeepers as well.

Bush (2005) focuses on the underpinning issues of disempowerment and commodification in the development industry about the danger of the lack of community participation. Following Bush's argument, it is crucial to focus on community rather than on the intervention, as it is germane to instrumentalism, based on the allocation of financial resources in the project budget and decision-making process to reflect the needs of those on the ground. Bush's passionate critique of the development industry does not appear to suggest exclusive community empowerment in conflict zones. Rather, a more fundamental paradigmatic shift becomes inevitable as he envisions a tectonic shift that would engender an incremental and strategic change along with each project, each programme, each organisation, at a time (Bush, 2005:4). Bush (2003) provides a critical perspective in the debate on practice and politics of peacebuilding against the background of international donor (bilateral and multilateral) agencies, who have seized the idea of PCIA. Schmelzle (2005:3) advance that haven extensively participated in the development and practice of PCIA, especially in Mindanao and Habarana; he uncovered the predominance of the empowerment and wisdom of the south above the agencies of the north, as well as the rendering of consultancy services and fine-tuning of the logical frame.

From the author's interaction with development practitioners, agencies and some NGO staff in the Niger Delta region, it was observed that PCIA was alien to development interventions. It was curious to realize that project implementation in

conflict-prone communities is largely unaware of such tools (Jarikre, 2016:105). Several years after the Nigeria Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution had prescribed as a policy option the need to imbibe appropriate PCIA culture through practice to mainstream peacebuilding (IPCR, 2002) and stimulate the quality and impact of the development projects executed while improving the institutional capacity of development agencies for the conflict-sensitive approach to Do No Harm (Jarikre, 2018:50). The literature on conflict and development intervention still depicts the absence of sufficient data on peacebuilding outcomes. This includes insufficient academic engagement of PCIA of development initiatives in the various intervention programmes in the region. Similarly, the tools and use of the PCIA was interrogated by Ahmed (2011). Also, he analysed perceptions from the efforts of IDAs in Pakistan, which has witnessed extremist, sectarian and militant violence, surmised that PCIA is non-existent at the grassroots level and there is lack of comprehension of such tool at the project level in Pakistan. Nevertheless, it will suffice to say that the exciting work related to PCIA is found in the project locations and not in the cities of northern orientation. Bush (2005:3) defers that interpreting the impact of peace and conflict potentials through the lens of the expertise of PCIA would largely depend on those that are close to the ground.

Whereas the engagement of PCIA lenses of peacebuilding activities is dependent on the participation of two sets of critical stakeholders - the development agencies and people in the conflict zone, less importance is placed on the product and too much attention is given to selling. Thus, there is the shift of paradigm to the development agencies who are presumed to be the buyers and the communities. The critical issue is how to engage the people who are supposedly the real expert in the PCIA process and methodology. Thania Paffenholz (2005) addressed the critical issues of process and methodology when she posits that a principal means that can help to manage the PCIA process would be engaging in a hands-on or taking part in a workshop with stakeholders (Paffenholz 2005:1) and the critical questions should include "Who should participate in PCIA workshops? During such workshops, it would be germane to make use of learning tools such as case studies and practical examples.

The question of attribution, especially addressing the gap between micro and macro levels

The issue with attribution gap in the peacebuilding field often emerges from conducting baseline data collection against the backdrop of societal cleavages such as political, social, economic, cultural, lack of resources and willingness.

Practitioners and researchers in the cottage industry of development and peacebuilding are required to constantly and consistently review baseline data to underscore what is being assessed, to understand and overcome the challenges of attribution gap. In this way, consideration should be given to the impact of a specific project in terms of its micro and macro-political, social and economic import. For instance, what is the impact of a water project in a conflict-prone creek community where oil exploration, on the micro, meso and macro spheres of the local community, the oil-rich Niger Delta region and the entire Nigeria State? To undermine the challenges and issues of attribution and address the gap between different levels of conflicts, it is pertinent to consider the limited impact of a development project in conflict zones within the local, regional and national frameworks. Unfortunately, we have seen a flurry of activities, tools, theories and terminology in respect of the gap in attribution which have engendered debate on its related methodology in PCIA. However, what ways were devised to overcome such challenges is hanging in a delicate balance. The solutions offered in the debate often provide insight into what is considered as the need for a unified methodology and generally applicable evaluation criteria in PCIA.

Paffenholz (2003; 2005) and Barbolet *et al* (2005) prominently discuss the idea of establishing a connection between different the levels of conflict (micro, meso and macro) as well as the intervention and good practice in developing indicators. Leonhardt (2003) identified three salient issues in lending voice to the debate on the range of issues of practicalities of PCIA. The issues include the challenge of adopting generic peacebuilding frameworks for evaluation due to no uniform conflict situation and peacebuilding approaches and processes; absences of PCIA approach/process to address the issues of causality and attribution; and placing PCIA in the wider context

of the instrument used by development/aid agencies to mainstream peacebuilding. Leonhardt (2003) and Hoffman (2005) tends to agree on the need for a unified methodology and generally applicable evaluation criteria and indicators (of PCIA), Manuela Leonhardt feels strongly that such generic peacebuilding framework is utopian. She thinks that it is the outcome role peacebuilding agencies that have not been clearly defined. It also covers the fact that peace as a concept has a keenly contested nature, coupled with multiplicities of theories of actions. She also brought to the fore the fact that peacebuilding is a dynamic process (Leonhardt, 2003:57). For her, both Mark Hoffman (2003) and Kenneth Bush (1998, 2003) seem to downplay the significance of the imminent challenges to the impact of peace and conflict methodologies. To this end, she argues the proceeding questions should receive appropriate answers from the PCIA methodologies: "How can a broad conflict context accommodate individual peacebuilding projects? How can the suitable levels of evaluation be determined? How can the micro-macro connections be identified? How can visible changes be ascribed to third party intervention in situations of conflict?" (Leonhardt, 2003:61). These questions amongst others provide the framework of the research matrix adapted to stimulate community discourse to achieve the objectives of evaluation work in the peacebuilding activities of development agencies in the Niger Delta region

Generally applicable indicators
Broadly speaking, an indicator provides a baseline criterion from which the impact of peace can be evaluated or outcomes of peacebuilding activities. Peace and conflict indicators help to set the proper framework for evaluating change and impact. This is suggestive of better indices to differentiate between what we may term as convention project and peacebuilding activity. Hoffman (2005) thinks that it is against the backdrop of peace and conflict indicators that PCIA embarks on an evaluation and not on the effectiveness of the development of a project, outputs and outcome. For instances, a school building project in a conflict zone may have a different goal from a conventional school project at peacetime, which underscores the obvious goal of increasing knowledge and human capacity development in line with competitive education and academic excellence. While the ultimate goal in the conflict situation is

to constructively engage the younger population from joining militant groups in the area as well as ensuring that there is a robust improvement in inter-group relations. It also entails establishing a haven for seamless interactions and to some extent help in reducing or defying stereotypes (Bush, 1998). Thus, in the context of impact where it concerns peace and conflict issues, a project can succeed; however, when it has to do with some specific criteria, such a project can fail (Bornstein, 2010). Thus, the debate on the issue of generally applicable indicators is primed on articulating appropriate evaluation methodologies and criteria to address sundry constraints but the complex conflict situation has not engendered such impetus.

It appears that with the array of internal evaluation by DANIDA, SIDA and OECD/DAC, professional evaluations have coalesced into standardised methodology and criteria, these include guidelines and criteria to determine weight and suitability, value and competence, aptness, being sustainable, lucidity, synchronisation, as well as complementarity of projects intervention (Hoffman, 2003:15). However, Hoffman (2003) taking a swap at Bush's A Measure for Peace, submits that the impact of peace and conflict cannot be measured through any deployable set of indicators, however, he conjectures it is development and articulation of deployable benchmarks that will make the case more convincing (Hoffman, 2003:34)

On the issue of project goals and indicators of success, Ross observes that Bush (2003) and Hoffman (2003) discussed the subject of probable conflict amid the varied objectives in any project, while Ross' (2001) and Rothman's (1998) tactic to goal and establishing certain indicators involves frontally the stakeholders that are engaged in the process and unequivocally recognises that over some time, it is possible for there to be a shift in goals as far as projects are concerned. Ross contends that contemplating on how to design a broad set of evaluation standard across a wider spectrum of interventions is a source of tension underlying PCIA methodology, especially when people are working specifically in a conflict. It is therefore important to advance suitable indigenous pointers of success but not involved in goal setting. Jutersonke and Kartas (2010), guided by PCIA principles as elucidated by

Kenneth Bush, offer an episodic assessment of peace and conflict effect by mapping the effects of foreign aid and development policies concerning reckless exploitation of natural resources at the expense of the Madagascar people. Though the research adopted a historical framework to couch out conflict indicators for structural conflict dimension which deepen the understanding of how PCIA strengthens peacebuilding, it failed to make normative statements on indicators.

The question of standard operation procedures versus open and flexible approaches

Looking at the customary operational processes against uncluttered and elastic methodologies, an attempt is being made here to sift through the various tools, approaches and methodologies identified by scholar and practitioners in the PCIA derivatives. These include the traditional donor evaluation criteria, action evaluation methodology, common analytical framework, conflict sensitivity, and 'aid for peace approach'. These array of tools, approaches and methodologies can further be classified within three dominant dimensions under the label of; conflict sensitivity; effective evaluation of peace interventions; and planning and assessment (P&A) approach (Paffenholz, 2005:2) in the debate on the development of PCIA methodology. As a means of detailing the development of PCIA methodology from its undefined approach from the beginning, Thania Paffenholz classifies the evolution of PCIA debate into three phases based on the timeline leading to planning and assessment approach. Each phase deals with related issues of conflict situation and measures, to cope with the situation aimed at "reducing the negative impact of the intervention and enhancing contribution to peacebuilding" (Paffenholz, 2005:3).

Hoffman (2003) provides a short but critical analysis on the three approaches to developing PCIA: standard traditional donor evaluation criteria; methods for embarking on the assessment of development regarding peace and conflict, multi-mandate bodies executing humanitarian programmes (*A Measure for Peace*) and those that have an explicit emphasis on information by NGOs that into peacebuilding and conflict resolution. A catalogue of these approaches by Hoffman locates the traditional donor evaluation within the project cycle management (PCM) to include

project identification and design, project implementation and project evaluation. Hoffman's catalogue of PCIA methodologies is fused with a critique of Bush's *A Measure for Peace* (1998), Ross and Rothman's Action Evaluation methodology (1999), DFID's strategic conflict assessment (CSA) and peacebuilding framework. The critique is not gratuitous but attempts to establish a nexus with the evaluation procedures and conflict resolution methods. It may also entail fresh approaches that would be constant and within the framework of the normative values and objectives of conflict resolution (Hoffman 2003:27).

Drawing on years of fieldwork, predominantly undertaken in Sri Lanka, Gsanger and Feyen (2003) explored PCIA methodology on the perspective of development practitioner characterised creating benefits that can be measured, putting in place cost-effective measures, building a mind-set for result generation and having partners legitimised in the country that is playing host. Their contribution to the debate on PCIA methodology is focused on how inputs can be evaluated and monitored. It would also involve the use of outputs and the measurement of impacts which considered quintessential to development practitioners. Accordingly, they observe that looking at PCIA from the perspective of a development practitioner, one is inclined to conclude that impact of development projects on peacebuilding is highly political and a technical task.

More importantly, the conceptual design and the practice of PCIA have recognisable gaps. Though, PCIA is a useful tool on the one hand and, on the other hand, the existing PCIA contexts are not explicit enough in proposing strategic approaches that are root in practicability (Gsanger and Feyen 2003:68). To this end, they propose a common logical analytical framework that will be politically, socially, economically and institutionally sensitive. In their view, a common analytical framework will avail all stakeholders and partners a common ground to assess intended and unintended impacts and encourage local participation and ownership. It will also help to guide the involvement of stakeholders and ensure that actions are transparent and affordable. Gsanger and Feyen's common analytical framework is augmented by explicit schedules and merges components that deal with specific matters to be considered.

Sometimes it should be considered as lacking in the specifics with its broad spectrum of open-ended opportunities of methodological pluralism that builds upon the strength of various approaches. However, it is in this sense that Ross (2001) argues that the concern for an overriding procedure for evaluation standard across a wider spectrum of interventions is a source of tension underlying PCIA methodology, especially when people working on specific context ought to develop appropriate local indicators of success but are not involved in goal setting.

Action Evaluation (AE) is a methodology developed by Jay Rothman (2003:83), to address a serious limitation in his conflict resolution work and help the stakeholder design initiatives that can be collaborative enough to ensure (baseline stage). It will suffice as a vehicle for helping to promote and endorse it. Action evaluation as a fundamental component of PCIA methodology attempt to deepen the question concerning the possibility of some limitations that may spring up from the emerging PCIA approaches as it expands the basis of the three the stages connected with action evaluation. It, therefore, entails evolving a peacebuilding tool that will establish a baseline, improve on the formative monitoring, and summative assessment. Rothman's conceptual framework of action evaluation is based on analysis of success and its approximation but Mark Hoffman (2003) probed the criteria of success and evolving goals which are important components of AE. For him, the first goal of action evaluation ought to transit from a particular project emphasis. The goal should be a generalised project pattern to enhance its useful application in the field. (Hoffman, 2003:28).

On conflict sensitivity, Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff (2005), addressed the issue of utility and dilemma of conflict sensitivity among development, humanitarian, governments, donors and civil society actors in the field of peacebuilding. Drawing from their two-years of extensive consultation process conducted through a conglomeration of Six NGOs that domiciled in the north and south of Kenya, Uganda and Sri Lanka and beyond, they illustrate the symbiotic nature of conflict sensitivity and PCIA. According to them, conflict sensitivity emerged from the diverse literature and thinking on PCIA, irrespective of the

significant insight provided by other development discourse such as Mary Anderson's *Do-No-Harm*, research on the assessment of macro conflict conducted by DFID, USAID, the World Bank, as well some donors. Barbolet *et al,* (2005:4), posit that there is a perception possibility that PCIA can be engaged as an approach to managing issues of conflict sensitivity. On the other hand, conflict sensitivity can be acknowledged as a segment of PCIA. Accordingly, with the use of the plus-based strategy, achieving conflict sensitivity is sure across a broad spectrum of activities in the development and humanitarian field. They argue that the effectiveness of a tool must be hinged on a broad framework which includes specific geographical conditions institutional milieu (Barbolet et al, 2005:4).

The study of Paffenholz (2005) brought to the fore the concept of 'Aid for Peace Approach'. It is a concept that offers a different framework, unveiling fresh multi-purpose and multi-layers of processes involving integrate preparation, assessing and evaluating peace within the context of latent conflict, manifest violent conflict, and post-violent conflict contexts. The basic model of Aid for Peace focuses on the objectives and activities of peacebuilding and emergent peace and conflict outcomes as well as the indicators for monitoring. More significantly, the prototype represents a milestone in the cottage peacebuilding industry, as it provides an unambiguous link amid the conditions in a definite setting. It implicates that intervening in peacebuilding as a goal must produce contextual relevance and effects as far peace and conflict are concerned (Paffenholz, 2005:5).

Paffenholz's Aid for Peace approach contains a seven-step sequence that builds on each other. The process begins with modifying the Aid for Peace route which entails module clarification, module application, designing the Terms of Reference (TORs), team building and conceiving the next phase. Carrying analysis on conflict, peace and establishing conflict scenarios will be executed in step 2. In step 3, the need for peacebuilding will be analysed in-depth with the use of a matrix that is structured. Step 4 will involve doing an assessment and evaluation of the relevance of peacebuilding intervention. It will be done through the aid of a relevant scale, conducting a survey and doing a baseline study for new programmes. Step 5 has to do

with organising an assessment, conducting for interventions that are triggered by tension and violence. Step 6 will be the assessment and evaluation of an instant and comprehensive outcome of a peacebuilding and conflict intervention programme. Step 7 has to do with making recommendations and designing plans for implementation (Paffenholz, 2005:8).

The role of theory
Scholars like Thania Paffenholz, Adam Barbolet *et al*. and Kenneth Bush, are development practitioners and scholars of PCIA that have acknowledged the role and importance of theory. They have affirmed the underlying explicit assumptions of probable effects as well as the bearings of projects depend on social change theories (Fischer and Wils, 2003:6). Although development agencies rarely articulate the theory of change that guide their work at the outset (Andersen and Olson, 2003), and even as PCIA authors have shown narrow dialogue on making the best use of theory (Fischer and Wils, 2003:6), most projects reflect a theory of change that is often not articulated at the outset of any development project.

There is consensus amongst theorists and practitioners that theories of change contribute to monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding projects. This is because peacebuilding activities revolve on the pivot of numerous assumptions (Care International, 2012:3). More importantly, the development project is often than not predicated on the methods and that are established in the theories of change (OECD DAC, 2008:77). In the thoughts of Nan (2010), the theory of change explicates that an expected outcome is the resultant effect of some specific action embarked upon. From the purview of CARE International Nepal (2012), Theory of Change offers a narrative on the dynamics of a change process that can be engaged to create, follow up and conduct an evaluation of initiatives that border on social change, like peacebuilding (CARE International Nepal, 2012:3).

For Ross (2003), a theory is crucial in PCIA in at least two ways: First, people have a conceptual knowledge of how the world works concerning their social, political and economic worlds. Second, it explains the effect of a specific project on behaviour and

attitude not only on the immediate but also on the extended beneficiary (Ross and Rothman, 1999). According to Ross (2003), theory is about local and academic knowledge about the world, whereby social actions are articulated in local terms to underscore the fact that there is no reason to use secret knowledge to control projects as outsiders could do. However, Leonhardt (2003) avers that neither Bush nor Hoffman gives prominence to the role of theory in PCIA as their positions appear to betray the depth of knowledge of most theories of social action that are critical on priority setting and resource allocation. Nevertheless, Mark Hoffman (2003) advanced the need for the uniformity in the theory and practice of PCIA. He suggested that should involve a methodology which is single and can serve the needs of end-users and agencies involved in the execution of interventions (Leonhardt, 2003:57). This is premised on the fact that there is an inherent gap between theory and practice which has to be closed. According to Hoffman (2013:15), all the energies exerted on PCIAs can best be described as a dead-end, However, the works of Thania Paffenholz (2005), Barbolet *et. al.* (2005) and Kenneth Bush (2003) tend to suggest that theory is available in an abundant measure. Thus, Schmelzle (2005:7) queried the inability of the authors to come with a develop theory that will of top priority (Schmelzle, 2005:7). While, Ross (2003), in his article, "PCIA is a Peacebuilding Tool" underscores the point that PCIA methodologies including Bush's *Measure of Peace* have an inherent theory of change that can link all the elements together (Ross, 2003:80). Andersen and Olson (2003), concerning experience, gathered through RPP, observe that agencies rarely articulate the theory of change that guides their work. To this end, the development and use of theories of change remain implicit and not discussed, even when there is a synergy among development agencies. This underscores the fact that development agencies assume that development initiatives are the building blocks of peace without determining the actual impact of development initiative on the Peace Writ Large. Suffice it say that, drawing from the author's review and application of various PCIA frameworks, methodologies, tools and approaches of peacebuilding initiatives in the Niger Delta, it is obvious that the theory of change is most relevant to the evaluation and assessment of peacebuilding activities being carried out.

Conclusion

The task of this paper has been to provide an overview of issues and themes in PCIA without providing one-fit-all answers to contending questions in assessing the impact of projects on conflict and peace dynamics and not how projects are affected by conflicts. Thus, the thrust of the reengagement of themes and issues of methodological framework of PCIA does not foist certainties in the application of PCIA processes, approaches and tools rather it resonates the plethora of questions, challenges and ideas on good practice and lesson learned to further interrogate the fluidity of PCIA in the peacebuilding field. Ostensibly, there is no consensus among practitioner and scholars on best practices on how to assess, monitor and evaluate peace practice and peacebuilding activities rather there is the dire need for good practice and lesson learned as the catalyst that galvanizes PCIA application. This is because deep cleavages not only between practitioners and scholars but also between southern and northern partners concerning case realities are noticeable in the application of PCIA methodological framework.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM IN THE TRADITIONAL UZUAKOLI COMMUNITY OF SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA.

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Abstract
Conflict resolution is an integral part of the Igbo society and was bequeathed to the people by the forbearers of the society. Recently, it was observed that the people were ignoring the traditional method of conflict resolution in their communities for legal procedures. The current upsurge of these lawsuits amongst members of the society denotes that the indigenous conflict resolution methods are gradually heading towards extinction. In view of the above problem, this research work is designed for the evaluation of Igbo traditional method of conflict resolution with particular reference to Uzuakoli community in Abia State. The methodology used is a qualitative research method which through interviews, observations, published documents and data collected critically assessed the traditional conflict resolution in the community. The study discovers a well-organized conflict resolution mechanism set by the people, but undermined by the inundating culture of the Western world.

Keywords: Uzuakoli, Conflict, Resolution, Strategies, Traditional, Community,

Introduction

The Igbo is an ethnic group that predominantly inhabited the densely populated Eastern part of Nigeria and has variations in some of their cultures such as in art styles, attire and religious practices which differentiate community members among others in the region. The people have a peculiar social structure that include various subgroups organized by clan, lineage, and village affiliation which defines their level of interactions, inter-relationships; as well influence unavoidable disagreements and conflicts in their interactional processes as in other ethnic communities. Conflicts, perhaps, cannot be equivocated as an intrinsic and inevitable spice of the society,[1] that exist among the Igbo people. Hence, it was believed whenever people gather in the family or social group there are bound to be conflict which could result from varying degree of individual interest. Consequently, all the members of the family may not share the same view, but may likely have divergent opinion as when friends or town tenaciously hold views that are diametrically opposed.[2]

However, the history of pre-colonial and post-colonial Igbo society did not exclude issues of conflicts and local wars. Sources of most conflicts in our area of study are linked to community migration and demographic insecurity, quest to protect cultural identity, and murder. The predominant sources of the contemporary Igbo indigenous conflict are boundary disputes, struggles for inheritance[3] and family squabbles and domestic violence – that is, disagreement between spouse and persons in intimate relationship. Apparently, conflicts among the people usually manifests 'whenever or wherever' incompatible events occurred and may result in 'win – lose' character or in most cases, produce 'win-win' situation in settlement.[4]

It is worthy of note that prior to the advent of the Christianity, the people had a well laid-down traditional process and channels for conflict resolution which was based on the general confidence in the processes, mediators, arbiters, and adjudicators.[5] This went a long way in enhancing the fraternal relationship which existed among the people. Disputants and the traditional peace facilitators were constrained to act on the path of truth, impartiality, transparency and fairness by the law and the presence of spirit-forces of the land. The people insist that a good judgment 'cut' into the flesh as well as the bone of the matter in dispute. This implies a "hostile compromise" in which there are neither victor nor vanquish.

The community has traditional institutions and personalities for conflict resolution alongside guiding principles which the warring parties, arbitrators and adjudicators must follow in settlement and report of cases, depending on the type and nature of the conflict. The traditional institutions include: Family (Ime – Ulo Nna); Eldest male in family or group of small related families (Okpara or Okpara – Ikwu), regarded as occupying ancestral seat for justice and holding ancestral spears for its dispensation; Hamlet (Ikwu-ezi); Clan (Umu-nna or amala);Umuada or Umuokpo (females born in kindred or village); Age grades (Oti ogbo); Council of elders (ndi – okieny or ndi – Ichie); Village assembly tribunal (nzuko obodo); Oracles or deities (ndi-isi agbara n'agbara); Secret cult or masquerade-system (ndi-okonko or ndi-mmanuwu); The village assembly and the kings (oha-na-eze); Council of title chiefs (ndi-nze na-ozo); The king and his cabinet chiefs (Eze na ndi oso-eze), among others. The leadership of these institution usually comprise people with an ancestral trace to the society, for proper understanding and knowledge of their culture which is to be applied in the conflict resolution process.[8]

Uzoakoli
The settlement of Uzuakoli in Bende local government, is about 10miles from Umuahia linked by road and rail. The town is bounded to the north by Akoli, to north-west by Amaorji Lodu and Ubani Umuahia, to the south-east by Amaeke, Ukume and Okwuehi, all in Ibeku Umuahia. It is also bounded to the east by Ozuitem. Uzuakoli was among the communities that experienced the invasion of the European missionaries in the early 1920s, and was the last community in Abia, solders invaded and ended their battle in 1969-70, during the civil war.[9]

The origin of Uzuakoli people as an Igbo community is traced to Ezere Isu as the grandfather through Akoli their claimed father, all in Imenyi.[10] The people just like other Igbo communities appreciate the dual existence world between the spiritual and physical world. The existence of the 'Supreme Being' (Obasi di n'elu) and the ancestors or gods were the occupants of the spiritual world, while the living being (man) is the inhabitants of the populated physical world.

By the traditional belief of the people, "the Supreme Being (God) does not function in isolation but carries out multitudinous array of functions through the instrumentality of the lesser gods (deities and divinity)". These deities are seen as gods between the

'Obasi di n'elu (Supreme God) and the people which orders their activities on the physical world.

Conflict Resolution Strategies

The Uzuakoli people have a well laid down indigenous rules through which they forestall escalation of conflict in the societies. These rules are quite unwritten but provided procedures and channels for complaints/litigation in the society. It also provided for indigenous institutions a definite way of responding to different conflicts, beginning from the family to the apex institution and authority in the communities.[11]

Honesty and truthfulness was the significant principle of conflict resolution in the pre-colonial era of the community.[12] The people belief that it is a taboo to give false witness or judgment before the shining sun and the land of their ancestors or gods, and that such will invoke spirit forces of the ancestors or wrath of the gods on whosoever that does so. Presently, honesty and truth can no longer be found in the arbitration process since all deities guiding against that had been destroyed. And since God's punishment is not immediate, people have continued with all manners of anomalies in the indigenous conflict resolution system.

Family

The eldest man is held with high respect and considered to stand tall in sustaining peace and harmonious relations in the family and all complaints of dispute are channeled through him.[13] It is his duty to inform other elders of the family who agree on a date to summon parties to the conflict for hearing and settlement of the matter. There is no fee involved in the complaints as observed and recounted by respondent.[14] The family does not arbitrate over cases of members, but mediate peace and co-existence of members which is it's central objective.[15]

At the arrival of all parties concerned (mediators and disputants) on the summons to the family compound for resolution, the family head declares the meeting open and parties are allowed to freely narrate their case without interruptions or intimidation from anybody. A respondent said: Parties are also permitted to pick listeners from relatives as maternal uncle or a sister married out from the family, if the case is

between brothers. In a conflict between husband and wife when it gets to the family head for settlement, those summoned as listeners include both parents and the conflict (Onye nkpa n'aka aku or onye mbuba).[16]

After the complainant has presented his/her case, the defendant is given a chance to ask the complainant questions followed by the family members (mediators) and other listeners. The same is applied to the defendant after narrating his own side of the matter. And after all hearings, parties to the conflict are excused out to examine their presentations and verify key statement by them to reach at the truth of the matter. At the end, the guilty was asked to apologize the offended and promise never to do such again for peace and co-existence of the family.

In the resolution of conflict that involved threat of life between brothers, incest and injury from related member of the family (mostly the child to a daughter married out), and a woman to pack her cooking pot to the fathers home or elsewhere by the husband: the elders and Umuada (daughter married out from the family) are to be summoned by the family head on the aforementioned case to perform propitiation sacrifice to appease 'Erima' (the gods that protects and regulate interaction among blood related persons in the family) for re-enforcement of relationships among the blood related members. Persons involved in threat to life case will be made to take the concussion of sand and other particles mixed together and are usually hanged on the well of the family head. And they are enjoined to eat together and vow never to be involved in any evil act against each other.[17]

In the case of of murder, incest and extra-marital affair by a married woman in the family, certain sacrifices are also conducted.[18] Unintentional murder required "Nsi-orikota" (an appeasement sacrifice) usually prepared by the elders of the village with one goat, one fowl (non-laying hen), tuber of yam, kaolin, Igbo kola nut of four-piece in a shield and some leaves mortared together and given to the parties involved to reunite and open a fresh relationship free of human blood, pains and grudges. While the sacrifice for incest "Erima" involves one fowl (non-laying hen), Igbo kola, pan-wine of 10liters and one yam. A non-childbearing woman born in the family (Ada-nwanyi) together with the elderly men of the family will gather and the oldest/head of the family involved would take the two native-sexual offenders into a room nude and

flog them four strokes of cane interchangeably. And for extra-marital affair, a sacrifice of appeasement is offered to the husband with one fowl (non-laying hen), 10litres of palm wine, Igbo kola nut with pieces in the shield and one yam. Some items are equally expected from the man who laid her in addition to a male fowl. Except the sacrifice takes place, the man will not eat nor drink from the wife's pot.[18]

Hamlet

The hamlet is led by the eldest man, with a team of other elders from different families of the hamlet in the community. Conflict resolution technique used by them is arbitration with litigation mode and fee involved in reporting cases. The hamlet leader usually take upon himself the responsibility of informing other elders whenever there are cases to handle. They agree within the leadership team and mandate the leader to pass information across to the accused and inform both parties to the conflict and the people on the agreed date of the meeting. Hamlet leader signals the parties and urge them to converge at a venue for the settlement, while he reaches out to the people for summons through a town crier, usually without a definite agenda.[19]

Cases handled at this level are mainly problem between two families, kindred or two different individuals who on their own could not resolve their matter but prefer to bring it to the hamlet. The hamlet leader, with other elders declare the meeting open by making the agenda known to other members present as the arbitration panel. The complainant narrates his or her case at the behest of the hamlet leader. At that juncture, the complainant and the defendant must have paid an equivalent fee or two bottles of gin drink for litigation. After narrating his case, he receives questions from both the defendant and other members of the panel, after which the defendant is called upon to narrate his own side of the case and also entertain questions from both the complainant and the arbitration panel. They are asked for 'Isiaka-Ikpe' (their submissions) on the case. The litigants are usually excused from the venue for strict scrutiny of their key statements and witnesses could be invited at the back by the panel for more facts on the matter.[20]

The hamlet arbitration panel with all traditional means of truth verifications and test of validity reaches a conclusive decision on the settlement of the matter and then invite in the parties to the conflict and they are coaxed to accept the decision as the

appointed members of the panel pronounce their decision and reparation is made where necessary.[21] At the end, the elders usually drop few words of advice and recount the cord of peace which has been so cordial among them and warn never to erode that and peace is restored between the parties.

They are asked to give 'Ihe ibu Ikpe' (what they have –usually little cash in appreciation to entertain the people) in a situation they give only gin for litigation. [21]

Umu-ada

The Umu-ada are mainly first daughters born in the community but married out but still have the interest of their maternal home at heart. According to the people's custom, these children of their daughters are accorded with respect and regard as special members of the maternal villages. Obviously, the Umu-ada is a veritable instrument of conflict resolution in the Uzuakoli community. They negotiate and mediate peace and harmonious relationships among family members and also force family members to comply with the decision of the family-head or leadership of the lineage.[22]

The Umu-ada promotes peace and co-existence between clans of their communities by resolving crisis of leadership or other crisis which might bedevil the intra/inter-relationship of families of villages as may be deemed necessary by them to intervene. Hence, they are a unique institution for conflict resolution and, play a very vital role in the sustainability of peace and unity of their paternal homes. [23]

Age-Grade

The age-grade association are men and women believed to have been born in the same period alongside others. The age period of the group members ranges at least from one to three years gap of birth across families in communities. The age-group is an institution of development and peace in the society. They contribute immensely in the growth of communities through enforcement of the village laws, decision and taking up some social needs like water borehole. The age-group implement village sanctions on defaulters of community rules and bring to book whosoever that disobey the elders or violates the general assembly verdict.[24] In conflict resolution, the age-group resolves disputes between members and any other matter of dispute reported by

concerned parties. They can litigate an unresolved matter between them and a member to the king's palace or the elder's council for settlement.[25]

They mediate and arbitrate over cases reported by its members through a formal complaint mechanism to the head of the age-grade or the secretary who informs other principal members within the community or at the central level on a date for hearing. In a situation, any of the parties to the conflict snub the association's summons on repeated occasion, they stand to face a disciplinary action of suspension from the age-grade meeting. Parties are not forced to adhere to association verdict or decision, rather are encouraged to accept the reached decision on their matter and have their relationship restored, though they have an open option to appeal to any other arbitration panel in the society.[26]The age-group also intervenes in community conflicts to prevent escalation of crisis and restore peace through negotiation. Hence, the age-groups are valuable assets of peace and development in the community.

Village Assembly
The arbitration seating is made up of every adult male while the jury members are old men from different families of each community in Uzuakoli. Women are permitted to hang out at the venue during resolution at the village square if and only if involved in litigation or witness to the matter in dispute. The village-general assembly tribunal is a well democratized system with caution and consciousness of the existing peaceful relationship of the community in resolving conflicts. They play a levelheaded view in airing vies and show decorum to the traditions, and the elders present. For instance, the younger ones who had their elderly family members in the square, suggest to them (the elderly) for proper swift reasoning and share before the assembly to avoid being faulted for fine. Prohibition of interrupting the plaintiff and the defendant while speaking, nor the witness during testifying as well as other persons while asking questions within the meeting shows their interest and intention to make peace.[27]

They treat all manners of cases such as debt, physical combat, land/boundary disputes, and inheritance except controversial matters that involve accusation of disease infliction or death which is usually referred to the council of elders where one could find the required deities for such matters.[28] Litigation here is done through an appointed individual from any of the hamlets by the village development union.

Usually the appointed individual takes the responsibility of communicating with parties to the conflict on a scheduled date for hearing, though there are issues of urgency where the summoning call could be arranged immediately for hearing. There is litigation fee which may likely vary across communities. In the case of Amamba, the litigation fee is one-thousand naira (N1000) just as in the Agbozu community. The litigation fee could also be accompanied with two bottles of gin-drink which is at the discretion of the complainant.[29]

Formerly the litigation fee of the community was 50k, later N1 and went to N50; and N100 to the present N1000 which is fixed to control the incessant jingling of the native court summons bell less severe issues that could be tolerated or handled at the family or hamlet level. The person in charge of the general assembly court litigations moderate the native court session to ensure strict adherence of every individual to the court rules. Fines are applicable for individual misconduct, such fines are been paid by defaulters through the collection of one or two bottles of gin-drink. And nobody is permitted to exchange words with another, smoke cigarette or take tobacco snuff in the venue. Interruption and side talks are highly prohibited.[30]

The moderator (presiding individual) usually declares the gathering open with a remark (Ikpa-Ama) to begin hearing on the cases. Plaintiff is normally called upon to freely table his case and thereupon asked questions by both the defendant and jury. Usually the defendant will be the first to ask question, followed by any other member of the general assembly. The defendant will equally tell his own version of the matter and same takes place in questioning. Witnesses are been given a chance to tell what they know about a case. For boundary matters, the arbitrators normally move to the site or selected individuals to go into the site and bring back report on their findings which will form basis on decision of the judgment.

The excuse of parties or to stand aside to take decision for conclusive resolution of conflict after presentation of pleas and all questions exhausted, shows their will for justice, peace and collective responsibility in the village unity. They plead strict observation and control during proceedings which also depicts mutuality and orderliness for peaceful resolutions in the society. Hence, the village assemblies are therefore instrumental to the peace and harmonious relationships that exist between families and among members of the society.

Council of Elders

The elders in the council are representatives of different kindred and clan and also the symbol of the dual existing ancestors in the society. They handle exceptional cases of controversy which required a strong investigation and consultation of the gods to resolve. Such cases are mysterious death of an individual which another is accused to be responsible; a calamity on the community believed to be wrath of the gods or controversial accusation of an individual to have inflicted sickness on someone. They treat other cases as land dispute, inheritance dispute, cultural rights between villages; murder which attracts a negative sanction from the gods, etc. On the case of diabolic accusation of killing another (Ebubu-Nsu).[31]

Such was usually settled by giving the accused a concoction call (Uhiala) from the elders council court after (Nkwo-Ukwu ano) 8 days interval of 4 times for hearing and verdict. One year is to mark the person's innocence and if he/she did not die or his or her involved alleged act of killing another then will be celebrated. While on the case of "Igbu-Ochu' (intentional killing of another) the "Uhiala" sacrifice was also given to the culprit on 8 days interval of 7 times for appeasement of the gods.

Litigation with them takes the same process with other indigenous institution but might vary in fee. The elders and oracles through libations and sacrifices connect the ancestors to appease the gods of the land for continuous peaceful existence of persons, family or village involved in the act. Hence, the elders' council is a sustaining variable to the peace of the communities in partnership with the gods.

Eze's Palace

The king usually played interventional role on conflict in the community. The intervention in the king's domain might take the shape of summons to intervene between two parties, either through formal complaint by one party before the traditional royal stool or his cabinet. In a situation where an informal complaint is lodged nothing is required from the disputants. The (king) Eze alone or with few selected cabinet members are to find out details and summon both parties for advice and caution to avoid trouble.

Some cases involve litigation fee equivalent to what complainant paid. After the report, the Eze sends a message to summon on the matter outside criminal cases. The

Eze sets up an arbitration panel in his council or cabinet after the plaintiff and defendant must have responded to the summons with their witnesses or relatives as listeners to the arbitrage process. The plaintiff is interrogated or cross-examined by the defendant, arbitration panel and even listeners to the process after stating his/her case. The same is applied to the defendant after stating his side of the case. After which they are sked to make their final submissions to the case (Isa'ka Ipke).[32]

Eze sets up a jury from his council and the invitees with members of the panel. The jury sorts out the lies in their submissions after the two parties who are sent out of sight, are invited back for judgment and before the judgment they normally give what they have (Ihe Ibu-Ikpe) to entertain members of the panel for the time spent. Thereupon, the Eze is empowered to declare the judgment.[33]

Okonko Fraternity

The Okonko fraternity is a cultural medium of peace making in the Uzoakoli community. The fraternity usually a stand in resolving of land dispute and inheritance, and also hold control of farm lands or any other property entrusted to it as a body. Litigants usually pay equivalent fee and gin-drink for registration of their cases. The fraternity have a general overseer and secretary general from "Ndi-Anyaogu", Umuachiama. Another custodian of the fraternal affairs is according to villages and hamlets who take directive from the overseer.

In report of cases, the complainant goes to their parish head of the fraternity who communicate other members on a date to site for hearing. If on a land or property matter, the fraternity serves summon to the defendant after flagging their symbol (Obu or Ohiri) leave which indicate an injunction to the concerned land or property. The hearing takes normal process or other indigenous arbitration body in the society.[22] The Okonko fraternity played a unique role in holding control of property or land given to them by a complainant pending onthe hearing and decision on the matter. They stand to follow up court cases on property under their watch should a defendant refuse to respond to summon and choose to go for a lawsuit.

The litigation of parties to two different parish head almost ruined the peace that existed among the parishioners of the fraternity when one Mr. Ukam gave their land as the family head to Umueze Okonko fraternal parish and his brother gave to

Umuachiama fraternal parish/head of Okonko Uzuakoli. The Umueze had Mr. Ukam as their grandson and agitated it was his right to hold control of their farm land as the family head while Mr. Onyeabor and the support group argued Mr. Ukam should share the land not to pro rata the land to Mr. Onyeabor. The communities intervened and saved the Okonko fraternity from disintegration by the two groups in the struggle.[34]

DEITIES
Obi-ala
The Obi-ala Uzuakoli formerly served as the entrance to the elders' council court. It is a deity responsible for resolving controversial cases and conflict. It is a sacred place built by the forbearers of the society which prohibited elders from standing on falsehood, sentiments and bribe taking. Any elder who defiles the sanity of the Obi usually go in for it. It is the supreme court of the land, people like, illegitimate born of the land, women and the insane do not enter into the Obi-ala. For the women folk, they stand outside to present their case to the oracle as it kills any person who infringed any of its rules.[35]

In the Obi-ala, the only sacrifice required for its appeasement is truth. Any oath taking in a case of dispute settlement, the elders will pour wine and kola nut of four cotyledons inside a dug hole after which the parties to the conflict are to bend down and drink from this dug hole called "Uhi-ala". The faulted after taking the oath will be severely punished to death by the gods if no intervention sacrifice is made to appease the gods and set him free.[36]

Erima
The Erima is adjudged the god and bond of the kinship and is a mixture of sand and other molded particles usually hanged on the wall of the oldest man and head of the family.[25] It is used to settle conflict of threat to life and incest. It could close the generation of the entire kindred if neglected in case of incest, murder of a relation, marriage of blood related person, force of blood either by fighting among blood related group, forceful quench of cooking fire in a woman's kitchen mud, living a husband home with cooking pots and plates, if neglected and propitiatory sacrifice snubbed to appease the gods, and concerned parties go back to sit together.[37]

Conflict resolution strategies in Uzuakoli is suited for the people's custom to maintain peace, harmonious relationship and is married with the extrajudicial processes. The case of ostracisation though was the common negotiation tool on case that will bring calamity on the society or cases that could escalate or destroy the peace and development of the community and the case of murder which could escalate to involve others in the fight for reparation. The first negotiation step is for the perpetrator to leave the community for seven years.[38]It is used to forestall any possible escalation of conflict. The issue of mixed concoction as "Uhiala, Erima and Nsohu" for people to take as oath for truth telling, protecting and uniting is another sign of extrajudicial mode in the conflict resolution of the society.

The Community
The enhancement of peaceful relationship is the prime aim of all socio-political structures in Igbo society. Communities take upon them the role and responsibility of institutionalizing indigenous bodies to handle problems of disagreement and conflicts at all levels of human interactions in the society.

Conflict Prevention Role
The community in sacred role of maintaining peace and harmony placed fines of N2,000 and N5,000 for adults who fight and use of sharp element as weapon respectively.[39] Every disagreement that could lead to physical combat between two individuals are expected to be reported through the appropriate channel for peaceful settlement. They play the role of emergency response on matters that requires urgency to forestall escalation of the core cause of the conflict.

These include the intervention and separation of individual or group in a physical fight, and resolve the conflict where possible or arraign the parties to a tribunal which is ever ready to attend to cases even without formal litigation or report to enhance peace and harmonious relationship in the society.[27] Communities in Uzuakoli have also insisted on forcing their members to exhaust all indigenous channels provided for conflict resolution before taking it to the police, that is, all matters must be reported to the appropriate quarters mostly the community square general assembly tribunal while any defilement to that attracts a fine of N5,000.[40]

Peace Making

The people have often solicited and made peace between two clans or villages of the society. They usually play these roles through the family heads, village heads, community town union, women association or the youth association. An aged woman from Uzuakoli recalled the 1988 Uzuakoli Youth reconciliatory movement. The youths in Diaspora came in between to make peace between Amamba community and Eluoma Community.[41]

They also recounted how the Uzuakoli Development Union (UDA) intervened, made and restored peace on the "Itu-eye" (feast of Ilaoso ceremonial date) misunderstanding between Ngwu and other communities of Uzuakoli. Women association as a socio-political unit in the communities play relevant roles in maintaining peace and harmonious relationship between family group and hamlets.[42] Another was the intervention into Amamba town union's conflict with the youths in 2005.[43] The women also facilitate peace by resolving matters of sex abuse in villages, negotiate peace between fathers (men of the land) and youth, men of their community and another community.[44]

Peace Building

Uzuakoli indigenes have continued to enhance peace through the bequeathed culture of their forbearers in the community. The people have a cultural festival called "Abia" which followed as an end party of their new yam festival. On the very day of the festival, mostly relative of different families and friends are been hospitably hosted with telling of stories of their blood relationship and myths on their ancestral lineage.[45]

Another cultural celebration of peace building of the people is "Ila-oso" Uzuakoli. The people arrange this festival in way that a particular day is assigned to each community to demonstrate their cultural heritage round other communities of Uzuakoli. This depicts high sense of mutuality among relations and the spirit of co-existence in the society. The introduction of inter community sports game by the youth movement in 1988 to inculcate and retain the spirit of oneness in the minds of the younger ones and encouragement by the elders to inter marry has been a medium to enhance peace in the community. The people have an adage which says that "Ogo bu-ikwu-ato" (the in-laws are one's next of kin) which means any issue of conflict that

links one's wife, husband or relatives or both should be treated homely with the spirit of tolerance, accommodation and compromise. [46]

The People
Indigenous conflict resolution in Uzuakoli communities is an enormous responsibility indeed, the peace facilitators strive to repose the confidence of parties to the conflict and the hope of general public who look up to them in the conflict resolution process of the society. It is observed that many members of the communities are pursuing settlement of their cases at the law court.[47]

There is a complete loss of confidence in the indigenous resolution process of the society because corruption has infiltrated the system as in the law court today. There is a lot of unreliability on the arbitrating process due to the presence of some unscrupulous individuals in the arbitration panels who take bribe to conceal truth and jeopardize fairness, equity and natural justice. The arbitrators in most cases allow these unscrupulous elements among them to override decisions with their discretionary powers in matters they have vested interest. Hence, there is distrust in traditional dispute resolution process presently in the community. This research finding shows that they currently lack coherence and brevity in reaching conclusive decision and reliable verdict.[48]

Conclusion
The study in Uzuakoli established the Igbo social structure and cultural life as major source of conflict in the society. Issues like family inheritance, land and cultural rights are all linked to conflict among people in the Igbo communities. The presence of peace practice in all the indigenous institution of Uzuakoli shows that peace-making is the cultural heritage of the Igbo people.

In the evaluation of conflict resolution strategies in Uzuakoli community, the study was able to bring to knowledge how organized and rich the custom and traditions is in handling cases as they emerge in the society. Resolutions amongst disputing parties are binding among the people and the tradition is tailored to suite cases according to their nature and shape. For example the case of incest and witchcraft, you will agree

with me that the law court do not have a conclusive solution to it than law court judgment for the former while the latter is always an enormous task for the court to decided. The study also established that the law court does not resolve indigenous conflict because when two parties head for English court one must return unhappy as a loser. That means, there was no settlement between them, rather an award of victory. The study emphasized on the court verdicts of indigenous conflict and its menace in the community which had negative effect on the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Enhancement of mutual relationship was observed as a significant role of Igbo socio-political structures in the community. Conflict resolution was adopted across indigenous institutions to resolve conflict among members. It was also noted that the communities played emergency responds to crisis and preventive measures in conflict management by dissuading conflicting parties, collection of fines and sanctions as reparations to curb violent conflict and unnecessary disputes between/among parties in the community.

The role of peace-making was also marked as their cultural heritage which is usually demonstrated by the family and village heads, town unions, women association or youths in the communities. More so, peace-building was linked to the people's cultural festivals, subgroups and village affiliations which they demonstrate as group celebrations, clearing of roads and intra/inter village sports games. Finally, the study confirmed gradual loss of confidence in the indigenous conflict resolution process. It pointed out the activities of unscrupulous arbiters who had infiltrated the system with bribery and corruption as in the law court. Impartiality, lack of bravery and the use of deities were other confirmed factors that is bringing lost in interest in the process by Christians.

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POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE AND ITS THREAT TO NATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE 2007 AND 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS

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Abstract
This study examines post-election violence and its threat to national peace and security in Nigeria, focusing on the 2007 and 2011 General Elections. Statistical tools were used to collect the primary data in this study and analyzed by the use of frequency and percentage tables. The history of elections in the Nigerian state has often been characterized by threats to the survival of the state based on the manipulation of ethnicity, religion, the fragile nature of political institutions, poorly conducted elections leading to violence and poor political culture. The study concludes that there is a linkage between post-election violence and emerging threat to national peace and security. The study recommends among others that: elective political offices be made part-time to make them less attractive and contentious, an election offences commission be established to sanction electoral offenders, and the judiciary should be strengthened to be fully independent, transparent and incorruptible in adjudication of post-election litigation.

Keywords: *Post- Election Violence, Elections, National Peace and Security, Democracy*

Introduction

The 2007 general elections in Nigeria was the third, and that of 2011 was the fourth since 1999 when the military handed over power to elected civilians and was the first time an opposition had a fighting chance of wresting power from the ruling party - Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). At worst, it was expected to be an evenly contested election between the ruling PDP and the main opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC) the party formed in February 2013 from a merger of three disparate and regionally based political parties. Before the emergence of the APC, opposition parties were mostly fragmented along regional and ethnic lines, making it impossible for them to mount a credible challenge to the ruling PDP (Aniekwe, 2011)

Indeed, the possibility of erstwhile winners becoming losers and erstwhile losers becoming winners is to a large extent a function of an impartial administration of elections (Adebayo, 2011). In contrast, the process of election administration in Nigeria has generated a lot of controversy. It was against the backdrop of the controversial and problematic nature of election administration in Nigeria, particularly the 2007 Presidential elections , that the Umaru Musa Yar' Adua administration which emerged through that disputed elections set up an Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) as soon as it came to power in 2007. The committee was asked to examine the entire electoral process with a view to ensuring that the country is able to raise the quality and standard of its general elections with the hope that this new direction will drastically improve the country's democracy (Akhakpe, 2008).

While, the sustainability of democracy in Nigeria continues to be complicated by several reports of malpractice in the electoral administrative process, the implication of Nigeria's history of election administration for the enthronement of a democratic order is yet to be critically and fully explored. By critically examining the location of elections in democratic practice, this paper attempts an examination of the implications of Nigeria's history of election administration and its sustainability. The history of elections in the Nigerian state has been characterized by threats to statehood based on the manipulation of ethnicity as divisive mechanism for the acquisition of political power by political actors, the fragile nature of political and democratic institutions, and poor political culture among others (Omodia 2012)

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Election rigging refers to any interference in the due process of election in order to give undue advantage either to a candidate or a political party. Even a seemingly harmless act as late delivery of electoral materials can lead to a major disadvantage to one party, thereby triggering post-election violence. Lack of electoral integrity has led to post-election violence in many countries in Africa. Electoral integrity is even more problematic in countries such as Nigeria where ethnicity is pre-eminent in politics. In such societies, the victory or defeat of a particular candidate or party is perceived as victory or defeat of an entire community or religious group. As such, irregularities that would prevent candidates and their communities from clinching electoral victory are often opposed, sometimes violently, by the entire community (Ojo, 2015).

The unregulated use of money in politics has become widely practiced. This is owing to non-adherence to existing regulations on party financing and the absence of strict legislation to regulate limits of individual party finance, making it possible for politicians and political parties to engage in illegal party financing and corruption since the First Republic (Ojo, 2015). According to Alabi (2015), the level of direct experience with vote buying was slightly lower than that recalled for the 2007 general elections, at 16 percent. But the 2011 figure captured only half the campaign period, whereas the 2007 figure covered the entire campaign, so it is reasonable to project that vote buying in Nigerian elections was at least as frequent in 2007 as in 2011. The influence of money in deciding electoral outcomes often generates bitterness and the feeling of having been cheated by the losing political party and its supporters. Added to the winner takes all, it leads to frustration and sometimes aggressive violent reaction by the opposition, rather than seeking redress in post-election litigation.

This constitutes threat to national peace and security in a post-election period, and the study seeks to examine its wider implications as it affects election management that ought to ensure peace and stability. In doing this, the methodology used led to the collection of primary data that was subsequently analyzed through frequency and percentage tables.

Objectives of the Study

i)   Evaluate the causes of post-election violence in Nigeria.

ii)   Examine the effects of post-election violence on national peace and security in Nigeria.

iii)   How to mitigate the problem of post-election violence so that it does not impinge on national peace and security.

Research Questions

i)   What are the causes of post-election violence in Nigeria?

ii)   What are the effects of post-election violence on national peace and security in Nigeria?

iii)   How can the problem of post-election violence be mitigated so that it does not impinge on national peace and security?

Conceptual Framework

Elections

Elections are means of selecting those to represent the people in different elective public positions within the polity. Election provides citizens with influence over policy making (Powell 2000). Elections could be a process of ratification, in the sense that they are aimed at giving a winning government and ruling party some appearances of legitimacy, acceptability and to mobilize the people for popular participation in development. But under democracy, elections play wider roles such as: instruments of accountability, mobilization of the people, promotion of legitimacy, among other functions. Competitive political elections are vital to the survival of democracy. This democratic method of arriving at acceptable political leaders is well expanded in Schumpeter (1942), who stressed that this *institutional arrangement is critical for selecting leaders to political, legislative and executive positions. It is a method by which the individual acquires the power to participate in state decisions by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote.*

Election is an irreducible feature of democratic governance. Democracy here is defined as a social system of administrating a nation-state where political parties and independent candidates compete for elective positions in a free and fair electoral atmosphere, and in which the citizens are legally empowered to choose those who will run the affairs of the state within a given period. According to Awa (2012) such elections are supposed to be competitive, free and fair both substantively and procedurally; and in which the ability of the elected representatives to exercise decision-making power is subject to the rule of law, and usually moderated by a constitution that emphasizes the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, and which places constraints on the leaders and on the extent to which the will of the majority can be exercised against the rights of minorities.

Election Administration
Election administration as Ejragbe (2010) notes entails the organization and conduct of elections to elective (political) public offices by an electoral management body (EMB). This definition aptly subsumes both structure and processes. By structure is meant the bureaucracy that is set up or established to organize and conduct elections which is usually an electoral body like the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). It should be noted however, that apart from this specific bureaucracy whose primary function is the administration of elections, there are agencies or institutions like the police, security agencies and civil society groups whose support and cooperation are vital to the operation of the electoral management body. By process however, is meant the rules, procedures and activities relating to among others: the establishment of electoral bodies, the appointment of their members, selection and training of electoral officials, constituency delimitation, voter education, registration of political parties, registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, balloting, counting of the ballots, declaration of results, and in some cases supervision of party nomination congresses (Adejumobi, 2010).

Election and Democracy
Election is central to the effective functioning of modern representative democracy. Since direct democracy has become almost impossible to practice on account of the

large population in every modern political society, electing or selecting political leaders through periodic elections has become the norm. As Schumpeter (1942) puts it democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them. Since everybody cannot make such decisions at any given point in time, they have to select those to represent them.

Adejumobi (2010) avers that a progressive political system should be characterized by regular, fair and free elections in which politicians organize into parties, compete to form the government by the right of virtually all adult citizens to vote and by guarantee of a range of familiar political and civil rights. It means that there is an organic link between democracy and elections. For this linkage to be productive, it has to meet certain essential conditions. These include: the people have to be empowered to make political choices without hindrance, and the political atmosphere under which this choice is made should be free from threat, intimidation and manipulation.

Democratic practice on the other hand may simply be defined as the institutionalization of a democratic regime; of which the electoral administration process is a critical part of. Indeed, there is an inextricable link between elections and the enthronement of a democratic system. Elections are no doubt a critical part of the democratic process and all other variables of democracy do not just revolve around elections alone, but on the quality of the electoral process (Odion-Akhaine, 2009)

National Peace, Post-Election Violence and Security
The concept of security of a nation goes back to the beginning of nation-states. According to Berkowitz and Bock (1965), National Security can most fruitfully be defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats. While, Gwarzo (2010) sees national security as freedom from hunger, or from threat to a nation's ability to protect and defend itself, promote its cherished values and interests, and enhance the well-being of its people. From the above definition, it can be observed that national security is not restricted only to weapons and military

preparedness but encompasses political, social and economic wellbeing of the people. As such, threats to any of these constitute a threat to national security.

The association between national security and democratic rule is that of mutual transmissibility of impacts and repercussions. Therefore, with prolonged years of military rule, it is expedient to note that only a democratic system can provide succour to Nigerians at this critical security challenged period and create space necessary for the transformation of the state from the authoritarian form experienced under the military rule. This is expected to open up channels hitherto blocked for dialogue, negotiation and peaceful settlement of conflict geared towards consensus building that could lead to national peace.

In Nigeria, elections have always been hotly contested under party politics that is intemperate and violence prone. The 2011 general elections were no different as the two presidential candidates- Goodluck Jonathan of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) slugged it out up to the the Supreme Court. The court in its ruling in the petition filed by the CPC on the presidential elections, affirmed that President Goodluck Jonathan and Vice president Namadi Sambo were validly elected, but the CPC objected and declared it a political judgment due to the deep polarization within the polity at that time (The Daily Sun 29th December, 2011).

The political unrest and spate of insecurity which have invaded parts of the Northern geo- political zone have their links to the disputed presidential elections in 2011. For the umpteenth time, it has shown that politics of tolerance and accommodation, bargaining and compromise are yet to be enthroned in the Fourth Republic politics. The aftermath of the general elections of 2011 continues to pose major threat to the socio-economic and political development of the country. All over the world, democracy is taken serious because it is assumed to have the magic wand to effectively deal with inter and intra group conflicts arising from competition for power. However, the winner-takes all politics /zero sum game that defines the democratic model, carries with it potentials for electoral crisis and violence. It is a

system where the winner at elections takes all and the loser is left with nothing. Since everybody wants to be in the mainstream of the subsisting politics, elections become almost like a matter of life and death. In this context, managers of the electoral processes are sometimes compromise the rules because the pressure, from the gladiators is often too enormous. However, the subsequent 2015 general elections widely adjudged as one of the best so far have shown however that with the right political will and tolerance, there could be a progressive improvement in the conduct and integrity of elections (Ugbudian, 2015).

Theoretical Framework
The Structural Functionalism Theory
The structural functionalism theory quoted in Hay (2009) stressed that the basic assumption of the theory sees the society as a living organism made up of component parts, which functions harmoniously for the survival of the whole system. If any part fails to contribute to identifiably useful functions and does not promote values or consensus among members of the society, it will not be passed on from one generation to the next and could potentially create problems both for the functionality and structure of a political system. Powell (2010) also concurred with this proposition on the utility of structural functionalism in a political system.

Political scientists also introduced structural-functionalism into the discipline in the 1960s as a means of comparing different political systems (Odion-Akhaine (2009). Almond and Powell (2010) describe their approach as probabilistic functionalism and emphasise that structures within political systems are highly interdependent but not necessarily intended to exist at equilibrium as purported by early structural-functionalists. The political science approach to structural-functionalism is probabilistic because it assumes that if one structure within the system changes, then there is a high probability that other structures in the system will also adjust to accommodate for that change.

The political science application of structural-functionalism, however, provides particularly good insight into how structural-functionalism might be applied to describe the structures and functions of complex political systems. Although structural-functionalism has been used to analyse and compare political systems, and

systems theory has been applied in planning, the principles behind structural-functionalism are yet to be applied to practical analysis or evaluation of the governance process.

A practical structural-functional framework can also act as a tool for self-reference (individuals and institutions within a system are capable of reflecting on their system and how it works) and identifying the impact of both internal and external conflict and required changes to both structural and functional components in the system. Using structural-functionalism pragmatically moves it from just being an abstract theory to its application as a highly empirical and useful analytical tool, as demonstrated by Powell (2010). This theoretical framework is adopted for this paper in the context of the fact that threats to the structure of a nation-state arising from mismanaged elections have the capacity to affect its functionalism- survival and viability.

Research Methodology
Area of Study
Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), one of the six area councils or local government areas (LGAs) that make up the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) since it officially became Nigeria's new capital on 12 December 1991 was the area of study for this research paper.

Research Design
It is a Survey Research Study using questionnaire as the instrument of drawing information from respondents.

Population of the Study
The population of the study is 200 respondents cutting across stakeholders made up of political office holders, politicians, legislators, voters with PVCs, INEC staff, Civil Society and others.

Data Analysis and Interpretation of Results

Table 1: **The post-election violence in 2007 and 2011 coupled with the other internal security challenges created tensions and insecurity in the country**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	80	40
Agree	94	47
Disagree	20	10
Strongly Disagree	6	3
Undecided	0	0
Total	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

87 percent of the respondents agree that the post-election violence coupled with the Boko Haram insurgency created tensions and insecurity in the country.

Table 2: **The political unrest and spate of insecurity which have pervaded parts of the Northern geo-political zone have their links to the disputed presidential elections in 2011**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	60	30
Agree	100	50
Disagree	20	10
Strongly Disagree	20	10
Undecided	0	0
Total	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

80 percent of the respondents said they agree that the political unrest and spate of insecurity which have pervaded parts of the Northern geo-political zone have their links to the disputed presidential elections in 2011.

Table 3: **Credible elections enhance security, development and political stability**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	80	40
Agree	60	30
Disagree	40	20
Strongly Disagree	20	10
Undecided	0	0
Total	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

70 percent of the respondents affirmed that credible elections enhance security, development and political stability.

Table 4: **There is a linkage between post-election violence and emerging threats to national peace and security**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	90	45
Agree	60	30
Disagree	30	15
Strongly Disagree	20	10
Undecided	0	0
Total	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

75 percent agreed that there is a linkage between post-election violence and emerging threats to national peace and security.

Table 5: **Post-election violence has a negative effect on national peace and security in Nigeria**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	80	40
Agree	94	47
Disagree	20	10
Strongly Disagree	6	3
Undecided	0	0
Total	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

87 percent aver that post-election violence has a negative effect on national peace and security in Nigeria.

Table 6: **There is a relationship between election crisis and national security in Nigeria**

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree	90	45
Agree	60	30
Disagree	30	15
Strongly Disagree	20	10
Undecided	0	0
Undecided	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

70 percent support the claim that there is a relationship between election crisis and national security in Nigeria.

Research Question/ Proposition I

Ho: That there is no linkage between post-election violence and emerging threats to national peace and security in Nigeria.

H₁: That there is a linkage between post-election violence and emerging threats to national peace and security in Nigeria.

	Male	Female	Total
Strongly Agree	80	10	90
Agree	30	30	60
Disagree	10	20	30
Strongly Disagree	12	8	20
Undecided	0	0	0
Total	132	68	200

Observed	Expected	0-E	$(0-E)^2$	$(0-E)^2/E$
80	59.4	20.6	424.36	7.14
10	30.6	-20.6	424.36	13.87
30	39.6	-9.6	92.16	2.33
30	20.4	9.6	92.16	4.52
10	19.8	-9.8	96.04	4.85
20	10.2	9.8	96.04	9.42
12	13.2	-1.2	1.44	0.11
8	6.8	1.2	1.44	0.21
				42.36

$X^2 = 42.36$

Conclusion: since the computed value of chi - square (42.36) is greater than the critical value (3.84), therefore the alternate proposition (Hi) "That there is a linkage between post-election violence and emerging threats to national peace and security in Nigeria" is accepted and is valid.

Research Question/ Proposition 2

Ho: That post-election violence had no negative effect on national peace and security in Nigeria

H$_1$: That post-election violence has negative effect on national peace and security in Nigeria

	Male	Female	Total
Strongly Agree	70	10	80
Agree	44	50	94
Disagree	15	5	20
Strongly Disagree	3	3	6
Undecided	0	0	0
Total	132	68	200

Observed	Expected	0-E	$(0-E)^2$	$(0-E)^2/E$
70	52.8	17.2	295.84	5.60
10	27.2	-17.2	295.84	10.88
44	62.04	-18.04	325.44	5.25
50	31.96	18.04	325.44	10.18
15	13.2	-1.8	3.24	0.25

5	6.8	1.8	3.24	0.48
3	3.96	-0.96	0.92	0.23
3	2.04	0.96	0.92	0.45
				33.32

$X^2 = 33.32$

Conclusion: since the computed value of chi - square (33.32) is greater than the critical value (3.84), therefore the alternate proposition (Hi) "H_1: That post-election violence has negative effect on national peace and security in Nigeria" is valid.

Research Question/ Proposition 3

Ho: That post-election violence cannot impinge on national peace and security.

H_1: That post-election violence can impinge on national peace and security.

	Male	Female	Total
Strongly Agree	80	10	90
Agree	30	30	60
Disagree	10	20	30
Strongly Disagree	12	8	20
Undecided	0	0	0
Total	132	68	200

Observed	Expected	0-E	$(0-E)^2$	$(0-E)^2/E$
80	59.4	20.6	424.36	7.14
10	30.6	-20.6	424.36	13.87

30	39.6	-9.6	92.16	2.33
30	20.4	9.6	92.16	4.52
10	19.8	-9.8	96.04	4.85
20	10.2	9.8	96.04	9.42
12	13.2	-1.2	1.44	0.11
8	6.8	1.2	1.44	0.21
				42.36

X^2 = 42.36

Conclusion: since the computed value of chi - square (42.36) is greater than the critical value (3.84), therefore the alternate proposition (Hi) **H₁:** That post-election violence can impinge on national peace and security in Nigeria is accepted.

Conclusion

It has been contended that the current Nigerian democratic practice is in need of further deepening in order to ensure its sustenance because of demonstrable shortcomings which could threaten its progression. Against the background that previous democratic experiments in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Republics in Nigeria collapsed due to poorly conducted general elections among other contentious political issues. It is important that efforts be devoted at to overcoming the current electoral deficiencies in order to ensure the sustenance of the current democratic system. In line with this, it has been argued that the current democratic deficiencies as a fall out of the disputed 2007 and 2011 general elections are not unrelated to the present contentious structure of the Nigerian State which has led to cries and demands for its restructuring in order to ensure enduring peace and stability, and to stem the emerging threats to its survival partly due to perceived defective electoral processes by many stakeholders.

Recommendations:

1. Full autonomy for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) with its annual budget as a first line charge from the consolidated national revenue, and the appointment of INEC Chairman and other national officers by a national plebiscite, rather by the President as is currently the case will ensure greater independence and integrity for the body.

2. The establishment of Election Offences Commission as suggested by the Justice Uwais Electoral Reform Committee to sanction those who flout the Electoral Law by committing offences such as rigging, falsification of documents and election results, arson, thuggery and other forms of post-election violence be implemented.

3. Peace education through periodic mass civic education and public enlightenment of the citizens by the National Orientation Agency, Political Parties, Civil Society Organizations and the Mass Media on the dangers of electoral violence and the judicial consequences for offenders.

4. Making political offices as part - time and less attractive to de-emphasize the winner takes all zero-sum game syndrome largely responsible for the desperation to win elections at all costs that poses existential threats to the peace and security of the Nigerian State.

5. Institutional strengthening of all agencies related to the elections to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

6. Strengthening of the Judiciary to be fully independent, transparent and incorruptible to effectively handle post-election litigation without fear or favour.

7. Enhanced electoral monitoring by election monitoring groups, are essential for the institutionalization of effective electoral administration for democratic participation and citizen engagement.

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SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SECURITY QUESTION IN NIGERIA: A PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract
This study interrogates the lingering issue of Security Sector Reform, human rights and the general security question in Nigeria using mostly secondary sources data. The study finds that in spite of efforts to reform the security sector, starting with the Obasanjo led civilian government in 1999, little or nothing may have been achieved in this direction. This is evident from the fact that Amnesty International, the global watchdog on human rights, has continued to churn out damning reports on the handling of almost every case of civil unrest and uprising by both the police and military forces. The latest and perhaps most devasting was the handling of #EndSARS protests, where the international community and news media accused the Nigerian security forces of gross human rights abuses. The study concludes that is therefore the need to continually reform the security sector and reposition them for the challenges of protecting the nation and its citizens in the era of complex security challenges. Recommendations include that the government must articulate a short, medium and long term SSR policy framework that must transcend successive administrations. Additionally, it was recommended that it is not enough to proscribe SARS. Government and members of the police force must take seriously lessons learned from the #EndSARS in order to ensure that such ugly circumstances are not repeated.

Keywords: Security, Reforms, Human rights, Amnesty International, Government, #EndSARS.

Introduction

The need for global security sector reforms is often generally attributed to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and the consequent cessation of the bipolar balance it created between the US (with her sphere of influence) and Soviet Russia (with her allies). Without a doubt, this incident foisted on mankind a new world order and ushered in a complicated security environment which resulted in the search for various paradigms to promote sustainable peace and development globally. However, the fact is that different countries and regions had cogent reasons to reform their security sector to curb increased new security challenges.

For Nigeria, the dire need for security sector reforms was more internal than any imperatives of the Cold War. Shortly after the country's independence in October, 1960 and nationalisation of the political and military leadership of the country, a bloody civil war ensued between May 1967 and January 1970. From a total of 7,000 personnel organised into only two infantry Brigades in 1967, the country's army grew to some 250,000 officers and men in 1970 (Bali, 1989: 164). This brought about the first and critical need for demobilisation and reforms. Shortly after, there were coups, counter-coups and failed coups that made the military further meddle with politics and governance which impacted negatively on their professionalism, civil-military relationships, and human rights. Additionally, Nigeria's security forces have been accused of being incapable of handling the nation's internal security challenges when it is called upon to do so. As the International Crisis Group reported,

> In the last decade, however, the military has been in steep decline. Its inability to subdue the insurgency by militant groups in the Niger Delta left the government with no option other than to offer the militants an amnesty in 2009. In 2012, it was unable to deploy for front-line operations under the Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) against al-Qaeda-affiliated rebels.5 Losses of territory, personnel and equipment to Boko Haram insurgents, particularly in 2014 and early 2015, exposed deep flaws (International Crisis Group, 2016: 1).

The return to civil rule in 1999 with President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration and the first major efforts at reforming the military brought some hope that human rights violations and highhandedness (which characterised the past military administrations) would be a thing of the past. This hope was short-lived as the military (under the democratic dispensation) was yet repeatedly accused of human rights abuses in the course of its involvement in internal security management.

Indeed, Nigeria's multi-ethnic composition is a catalyst for intra and inter-ethnic rivalry which sometimes becomes violent in nature. Historical and contemporary examples include: Ibo-Hausa community in Kano: Zango-Kataf in Kaduna State; Yoruba-Hausa community in Shagamu, Ogun State; Eleme-Okrika in Rivers State; Itsekiri-Ijaw/Urhobo in Delta State; Ijaw-Ilaje conflict in Ondo State; Tiv-Jukun in Wukari, Taraba State; Ogoni-Adoni in Rivers State; Ife-Modakeke in Osun State; Chamba-Kuteb in Taraba State; Aguleri-Umuleri in Anambra State; Basa-Egbura in Nassarawa State; Hausa/Fulani-Sawaya in Bauchi State; Fulani-Irigwe and Yelwa-Shendam, both in Plateau State (Imobighe, 2003; Omotayo, 2005). The more recent herdsmen-farmer clashes in parts of the country is another example. There have also been cases of alleged abuses by military units during internal security operations, particularly retaliatory strikes such as in Odi, Bayelsa state (November 1999), Zaki Biam, Benue state (October 2001), Niger Delta Crisis (early 1990s to October 2009), War on Boko Haram (ongoing) and the crackdown of members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).

Amnesty International (AI), the global watchdog on human rights, has in its various reports continually made damning reports on Nigeria. In its Nigeria 2017/2018 Human Rights report, AI summarised its report thus:

> The armed group Boko Haram continued to carry out attacks, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Reports of continued extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and torture and other ill-treatment, which, in some cases, led to deaths in custody. Conditions in military detention conditions were harsh. Communal violence occurred across the country. Thousands of people were forcibly evicted from their homes (Amnesty International, 2018).

In all ramifications, the above is clearly an indictment of the Nigerian security forces. From the foregoing, it can be seen that we have a three-prong problem of grave insecurity, a security sector in dire need of reform for effectiveness and human rights abuses that result from the other two key issues. These issues are dealt with in the course of this study using mostly secondary sources data.

Conceptual Clarifications
Security: The concept of security has been variously defined by scholars. Going by the traditional conception of security, Imobighe (2003: vii) noted that security is a primary concern for every state and "has to do with the freedom from danger, fear,

anxiety or uncertainty… and is a condition of being protected from, or not being exposed to danger." The concept of human security, a people-centred and multi-disciplinary understanding of security started gaining prominence in the 1990s. In 2003, the Committee for Human Security (CHS), broadened the concept of security to include human security. It was noted that security should not just be the absence of violent conflict, but must emphasize the preservation of human rights, democratic/good governance, access to health care, education, and assurances that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Stemming from the above, CHS stated that human security is

> freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security (Committee for Human Security, 2003).

Buzan broadened the discourse on security to five sectors. Going beyond the militaristic/state centric paradigm, political, economic, societal, and environmental security were thus included in the discourse. He insisted that these "five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other" (Busan, 1991: 65). Other scholars such as Booth (1994) made similar assertions, emphasizing that the state must be dislodged as the primary keepers of security and allowance be made for a range of other players such as non-state actors, individuals, ethnic/cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and mankind in general. Some of these conception were not even articulated in the new Millennium, therefore it becomes easy to see that security of any state cannot be pursued without recourse to the fundamental protection of human rights.

Human Rights: The concept of human rights became popular in the aftermath of the horrors and devastations of World War II. The United Nations (UN) subsequently pledged to ensure that there is universal respect for fundamental human freedom and dignity. Subsequently, there was the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on December 10, 1948 by the UN (United Nations, 2020). The term human rights has been conceptualised in various ways by different scholars. To Christian Bay, human rights are any claims that ought to have legal and moral protection to make sure that basic needs will be met (Vincent, 1986: 12-14). Scot Davidson sees human rights as closely connected with the protection of individuals from the excesses of state government or other authorities in certain areas of their

lives. To him, human rights should encompass much more, such as the creation of social conditions by the state in which individuals can develop their fullest potential (Biswal, 2006: 44).

Security Sector Reform (SSR)
The idea to reform the security sector became a concern for security experts and democracy advocates in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. It accompanied the change in traditional concepts of security that has the state as its main focus and emphasized a balance between State security and human security and rights. Fayeye (2003) described security sector (SS) as governmental institutions with the authority to use, or order the use of force in order to protect the state and its citizens. From his conception (using Nigeria as an example), governmental or security institutions include not only the military and para-military arms, but also the judiciary, foreign affairs, and other institutions of the Nigerian State. Similarly, he explained SSR to be the transformation of security institutions so that they can play a more effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for citizens of the country (Fayeye, 2003). SSR is sometimes also referred to as security sector transformation (SST) or security sector governance (SSG).

Dehez (2010) noted that ideally, SSR should address the dual challenge posed by security services and security sector in general on governance by transforming military forces to defend their country against foreign enemies, while trying to institutionalize civilian oversight and/or parliamentary control. He further explained that the objective of SSR is to strengthen oversight and executive control of all security services from military to paramilitary and at the same time, enhance their operational capabilities, while maintaining a peaceful, co-existing and organized society. It must however be noted that contemporary security challenges to the state such as Nigeria is more internal than external. This means that the need to balance security operations of the state with human security becomes more cogent.

Military Reforms specifically focuses on reforms within the armed forces (Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy and Nigeria Air Force). The Nigerian armed forces are responsible for the protection of the country. This is enshrined in Section 217 (2), as can be seen below:

a) Defend Nigeria from external aggression;

b) Maintain the country's territorial integrity and secure its borders from violation through land, sea or air;

c) Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called up to do so by the President, but also subject to such condition as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and

d) Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

Similarly, just like item (c) above, Section 8 (1) of the Armed Forces Act provides that the President shall determine the operational use of the armed forces, which includes internal security of the country. Without a doubt, the armed forces are becoming more important in internal security management, since the regular paramilitary are usually more or less overwhelmed by internal security crisis and resultant armed hostilities that bedevil the country.

Military Reforms in Nigeria
The need for SSR is generally ascribed to the emergence of the reform in the sector from the policy of the UK based Department for International Development (DFID). This was tied to the provision of assistance to countries that had been excluded from such aids by the imperative of the Cold War (International Crisis Group, 2016: 3). According to Bendix and Stanley, it was also needed to overcome the new challenges posed by demands for an effective development donor role in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and anti-terrorism… promote human development, helps to reduce poverty and allows people including poor people – to expand their options in life (Bendix and Stanley, 2008).

The first need for military reforms came shortly after the war in early 1970. One of the major consequences of the civil war was the increase in the size of the armed forces. From a total of about 7,000 personnel which was organised into only two infantry Brigades in 1967, Nigeria's military forces grew to over 250,000 officers and men in 1970 (Bali, 186: 164). There was therefore the cogent need to carry out reforms in the form of post-civil war demobilisation exercise. There were several failed efforts from

successive military governments to reform the country's security forces in the different areas of need. This was due to a number of forces including, personal interest, the will and lack of proper understanding of the benefits of SSR. Consequently, from 1966 to 1999, the armed forces executed six successful coups, two failed attempts and had three alleged coup plots.

The venture of members of the armed forces into politics/governance not only eroded their professionalism but also resulted in the loss of many good men, undermined accountability, civilian control of the military and severely damaged civil-military relations. As many as 117 personnel of the armed forces were killed during and after failed/successful coups, while hundreds were forcibly retired, particularly 1985 to 1993 (International Crisis Group, 2016: 3). Also, such coups invariably caused suspicion and thus led Heads of State to sometimes deliberately enfeeble or proscribe certain services or their units. International sanctions adversely impacted on the capability of the armed forces to repair or procure weapons. As an example, at the time Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, the Nigerian military itself was in a state of decay, and its professionalism eroded… out of a total of 90 combat aircrafts, perhaps only five Alpha Jets of the air force could still fly (Williams, 2007: 250).

It thus becomes obvious that by this time, there was great need to reform the military. The return to civil rule in 1999, with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, resulted in the lifting of sanctions placed on the Nigerian Military government and by extension, the country by the Western world. Fortunately, President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999) (an ex-military leader), saw the cogent need to reform the military. In addition to training/retraining, downsizing and right-sizing and re-equipping the services, Obasanjo took several steps toward achieving this goal. These steps include:

a) Retiring over 100 senior officers who had held various appointments during military regimes;
b) Replacing service chiefs with younger professional officers who had never held any such public positions as Federal Minister, State governor, head of corporations;
c) Restoration of civilian control of the military by subordinating the military to the authority of democratically-elected and constituted civil authority;

d)   Reforming the military justice system by placing all military court decisions under subject to review of the Supreme Court;

e)   Placing the defence budget and other such military matters under the oversight function of the legislative (President Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999).

With all the above in place, the government subsequently pursued the restoration of some bilateral military relationships that had their aid programs frozen particularly during the Abacha dictatorship. The U.S. Pentagon, which shunned the military for years because of what it described as" political meddling, rampant corruption and abysmal human rights record", suddenly started quietly courting one of Africa's most influential armed forces (Farah, 200: A14). One of the immediate results of these reforms came shortly on 1 April 2000, when visiting Defence Secretary William S. Cohen, announced that the U.S. would support the military with $10.6 million. Part of the package included $4 million to help train pilots and refurbish Nigeria's aging fleet of C-130 airplanes. The U.S. and Nigeria agreed to pay $3.5 million apiece to MPRI to design a professionalization program for the services. This also covered institutional reform and improving the capacity of civil authorities (particularly the defence ministry) in the administration and also, control the military. Similar reforms programmes had been implemented in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Croatia and Colombia by the same U.S. based private consultancy company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) (Dickson, 2013: 206). In addition to the MPRI, other agencies that have been involved in reforming the military include the British Defence Advisory Team and American government's International Military Education and Training programme.

The need for a professional and reformed military was articulated in the National Defence Policy of 2006 (a document which in itself is one of the benefits of SSR). According to the National Defence Policy,

…the need to pay particular attention to the implications of recent events in the country, sub-region, and emerging global trends becomes extremely important…In view of this insecure environment the Federal Government of Nigeria has identified the need for a strong defence in support of her foreign policy and national security objective (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006: 2).

However, top leadership of the army, particularly the Gen. Victor Malu (Chief of Staff from 1999 until 2001), resisted some of the programmes, particularly the use of foreign military to train Nigerian forces. In sum, Obasanjo's pursuit of reforms became questionable due to cases of human rights violations and attempts to change the constitution to guarantee himself a third presidential term.

President Musa Yar' Adua's government succeeded President Obasanjo and was president between 2007 and 2010. In spite of the fact that security was one of the Seven Point Agenda of his administration, he was incapacitated for the most time and eventually died. He therefore did not make any appreciable efforts in SSR. His successor, Godluck Jonathan did not include SSR in the Transformation Agenda of his government and did not display much interest in military reforms. This was in spite of the rise in security challenges during this tenure. In fact, he lost his bid for a second term chiefly because of internal security concerns.

The trend from the post-Obasanjo era was that the military leadership developed and implemented its own reform programme. As an example, in May 2004 the then COAS, General Martin Luther Agwai, put together a Change Management Committee and mandated it to determine the structure, equipment and training needs of the Nigerian army to meet the threats and challenges for the next decade and beyond.

Security Concerns in Nigeria
From Nigeria's defence posture, it can be deduced that the country has a policy of neighbourliness and non-aggressiveness towards her immediate and remote neighbours. Since after independence, the country has had a bitter-sweet relationship with its immediate neighbours. These countries (Cameroun, Chadian, Niger and Benin), have at one time or the other maltreated Nigerians or encroached on the territorial integrity of the country. Equatorial Guinea even aided the murder of Nigerian labourers employed in the country and permitted apartheid South Africa a free-hold to set-up strategies for surveillance and possible military attack on Nigeria (Ate, 1992).

Nigeria's immediate neighbours are smaller countries with regards to military might, population, human and natural resources and landmass. However, they all have one thing in common; a neo-colonial linkage and defence pact link with France. A political-psychological, rather than a purely military explanation is posited to explain Nigeria's history of tepid policy towards its immediate neighbours. This is because "Nigeria enjoys directly an overwhelming military superiority over its five immediate neighbours combined, in terms of size and armament" (Imobighe, 1992). The defence pact that Nigeria's immediate neighbours have with foreign powers notwithstanding, Nigeria could still pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. Her immense oil wealth, human resources and socio-economic standing in the continent and globe could be put to use in this regard. Nigeria's treatment of her immediate neighbours with "kid's gloves" is occasioned by her foreign policy/politics of Afro-centricism. This good neighborliness policies earned her the nickname – "Big Brother Africa." In the words of Akinbobola and Adebowale:

> The commitment of Nigeria to the promotion of unity and good neighbourliness with other African States became more pronounced with the handing over of the Bakassi territory to Cameroon in 2006 following an International Court of Justice ruling of October 2002 (Akinbobola, and Adebowale, 2008: 51).

Nigeria therefore has little or no security concerns from its immediate neighbours. Additionally, from current global security equations, we find that due to the increase in the number of democratic states, inter-state wars or chances of it greatly reduced (Dokubo, 2006: 116; Snow, 1994: 34: Bergsten, 2001). However, internal security threats are potent enough to threaten the peace, security and unity of Nigeria to warrant the use of military forces. Example include religious and communal clashes, criminality like kidnaping and human trafficking, terrorism, militancy and secessionism.

Ordinarily, such threats to internal security are supposed to be dealt with by internal security agents such as the Police, Immigration, Customs Services, and others. However, in recent times, such internal security threats have become so grave that the

armed forces have invariably been needed to quell them. As harmless as they may appear, these activities may present dangers that are potent enough to overcome the regular internal security forces such as the different branches of the police. Take for example, the religious riot otherwise known as the Maitasine Riots of December 1980, which was led by Muhammed Marwa. After causing series of disturbances in Kano City, on December 18, the sect launched an attack on the police, churches, the general public and even on some Mosques. That day, four policemen were killed, while many others were injured. Encouraged by their successes, the next day (December 19), the sect took over strategic locations in the city of Kano, including the Fagge mosque, schools, a cinema house and the Sabon Gari market, killing and maiming anyone in their path. This havoc lasted eleven days, before the Nigerian Army was called in to arrest the situation.

It took the army two days to dislodge the sect while their leader was killed in the operation. More than 1,000 members of the sect were arrested and detained in prison where they received agonizing treatment from the police. The crisis lasted for 11 days, claiming the lives of more than 4,179 people. Hundreds of houses and shops were either torched/ destroyed (Okafor, 1997). The devastating effects of other internal security crisis such as the Niger Delta militancy and the War on Boko Haram are well known and documented. Asymmetry or irregular warfare is therefore the major security challenges Nigeria faces in contemporary times.

Combating Insecurity and Guaranteeing Human Rights: The Nexus Historically, Nigerian military forces have always been involved in internal security management since colonial times. About ten companies of the newly created Nigerian Regiment were used to quell the Egba riot shortly after World War I. Similarly, colonial military forces were used to end the quest of Nwanyeruwa (from Oloko town in present day Abia State and other women from six ethnic groups namely Ibibio, Andoni, Orgoni, Bonny, Opobo and Igbo), in the so-called Aba Women's Riot (War) of November 1929 (Mba, 1989). Military forces have also been called in to quell internal insurrections such as Maitasine Riots (December 1980), Ife-Modake Crises (1990s), the Ijaw- Itsekiri crises (Warri Crises), Odi Crisis (1999), Zaki Biam (2001), Niger Delta Crisis, Sharia Crisis of 2000 (in Kaduna), Yelwa-Shendam, Jos and Kano Crisis

(2004), the ongoing War on Boko Haram, conflict with the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members and others.

These operations are called Military Operations other than War (MOOTW). Although they are not war, they are more or less war-like, presenting real life threatening and death situations for both the military forces and civilians. Again, because these conflicts are irregular wars and are carried out by insurgents within civilian population, there is a high potential for civilian casualties. It is at such point that human rights abuses may result because, a thin line separates combating internal security and protection of human right. The International Crisis Group puts this in perspective:

> The military's poor human rights record has had a debilitating impact on effectiveness. Serious abuse of civilian communities, from the Ogoni (in the mid-1990s) to Odi (1999) and Zaki Biam (2001), and more recent extrajudicial killings, mostly in the context of countering militant and separatist groups from Boko Haram and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) to the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), have alienated citizens, whose cooperation is crucial for successful internal security operations (International Crisis Group, 2016: ii).

Realizing that human right violations and impunity were key issues the past military governments had with the international community, the new civilian government led by President Obasanjo established a Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) in 1999. The commission (which later became popularly known as the Oputa Panel), was chaired by the respectable Justice Chukwudifu Oputa. The Oputa Panel was mandated to determine persons and institutions involved in the gross human rights violations that occurred from the first day the military took over power in January 15, 1966 to the day before the return to democratic governance on May 28, 1999. As is traditional, the Commission was also to determine the effects of violations and recommend measures to redress past injustices and prevent new ones.

Public hearing was held across Nigeria for about three years and in May 2002, the Panel submitted its 15,000-page report to Obasanjo. The Oputa Panel's report was faulted because it was basically driven by the Presidency, excluding other stakeholders and the Civil Society in general. The report of the Commission was never published and no one was indicted. It was however still the first step towards the mending of bridges between the civil and military (Kukah, 2011). Other major failings of the Obasanjo led administration with regards to human rights was his failure to investigate human rights violations in Odi (1999) and Zaki Biam (2001), which he was said to have sanctioned.

Interestingly, Amnesty International has faulted successive Nigerian governments, both civil and military. The report on Nigeria for 2017/2018 was no less damning. AI stated that the military arbitrarily arrested and held thousands of young men, women and children in detention centres around the country. It also noted that the detainees were denied access to lawyers and family members. The report on Nigeria for 2017/18 also noted that no less than ten IPOB members were killed and 12 others wounded by soldiers in Umuahia, Abia State on September 14, 2017. In its defence, the military said that they were killed when they tried to resist the arrest of their leader Nnamdi Kanu at his home. AI also reported human rights abuses in the War on Boko Haram, which has resulted in at least 1.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. In the same report, AI accused the Nigerian Air Force of bombing an IDP camp in Rann, headquarters of Kala Balge local government, in Borno state (on January 17, 2016), killing at least 167 civilians including many children. The Nigerian military said the bombing was an accident as the town, Rann was not identified as a humanitarian camp. The police and other internal security agents were also indicted by the report (Amnesty International, 2016).

This goes to show that there is still a systemic problem. Nigeria's security sector still operates within the framework of the colonial forces, which were organised to protect the interest of the colonial masters and not the citizens. Until there is an attitudinal change, there will always be damning human rights cases involving the country's combined security forces.

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In recognition of the importance of Human Rights in contemporary times, the current COAS Gen. T. Y. Buratai, at a one-day Security and Human Rights Workshop organised by oil giants, AGIP in Abuja stated:

> The issue of human rights has assumed greater responsibility, not only among the armed forces, but indeed all actors that are involved, especially in security and its management. We understand the consequences of human rights violation. Ordinarily, our rules of engagement are aimed at protecting the lives and property of individual; we will do everything possible within the rules of law, constitutional provision, we will not deviate from that (PM News, 2018).

However, policy articulation and execution are miles apart as can be seen from the section below.

Current Realities with a Focus on #EndSARS
The need for SSR was again emphasised by the #EndSARS movement which rocked and gave Nigeria a rude awakening. The Twitter campaign started three years ago on December 2, 2017, after an online footage surfaced showing an extrajudicial killing by members of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). The protest which called for the disbanding of SARS was taken to the social media by Nigerian youths, where they used twitter to amplify the call through the hashtag #EndSARS. In addition to gathering about 28 million tweets alone, it also garnered solidarity demonstrations by Nigerians in diaspora and sympathizers was witnessed in cities across the world (Kazeem, 2020). Kazeem reported that SARS operatives

> typically target and detain young men by accusing them of being online fraudsters, simply on the evidence of owning a laptop or smartphone, and then request arbitrary and exorbitant bail fees before they regain their freedom. In more extreme cases, SARS officers abduct civilian targets and force them to make withdrawals at an ATM in exchange for their freedom, sometimes at gunpoint. The unit is also known to target young women as well with several reports of women being raped while in detention (Kazeem, 2020).

In addition to the wanton destruction of lives and property, the protests also created international image crisis for Nigeria. CNN, the international news media made several damming news reports particularly about the participation of members of the Nigerian Army on dispatching Lekki protesters. The Nigeria government condemned the reports stating its disdain for what it regarded as the insensitivity of the news media. Olufemi (2020) reported that President Buhari was "was disgusted by the coverage, which did not give attention to the policemen that were killed, the stations that were burnt, and prisons that were opened."

Additionally, Amnesty International wrote the President Buhari a letter, alleging that the army

> between 6:45pm and 9:00pm of 20 October, the Nigerian army and police reportedly killed at least 12 peaceful protesters and left several injured in Lekki and Alasusa - two locations in the capital, Lagos- when they without warning opened fire on thousands of people who were peacefully calling for good governance and an end to police brutality as part of the #EndSARS movement (Amnesty International, 2020: 1).

Similarly, there already is a US Congressional Report on the incident titled, Nigeria: #EndSARS Protests Against Police. The report accused the police and military forces of human rights abuses stating that "on October 20, army and police reportedly used live fire to disperse demonstrators in the Lekki and Alausa areas of Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, killing several and injuring hundreds" (Husted, 2020: 2). The report also stated that various world leaders joined the US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to criticise the crackdown. On October 22, Pompeo condemned action of the armed forces: "the use of excessive force by military forces who fired on unarmed demonstrators in Lagos," asking the Nigerian security services to "show maximum restraint and respect fundamental rights and for demonstrators to remain peaceful" (Husted, 2020: 2). Without that, these events put Nigeria is negative light and could have been avoided if SSR had been adequately carried out.

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Conclusion

Contemporary national security challenges in Nigeria are mostly internal and in asymmetric forms. This poses greater challenges for the security forces, especially the military which has to operate in an alien environment and at the same time, worry about protecting the human rights of civilians. There is therefore the need to continually reform the security sector and reposition them for the challenges of protecting the nation and its citizens in the era of complex security challenges.

Recommendations

i)   The government must articulate a short, medium and long term SSR policy framework that must transcend successive administrations;

ii)   Such policies must be holistic, covering all aspects of improved and sustained funding, accountability and transparency, welfare for staff and their families, improvement in civil military relationship, equipment, training and retraining, human rights protection,

iii)   The National Defence Policy should be expanded to include a section on Security Policy. Such documents should be reviewed annually to capture current security concerns;

iv)   The leadership of the military must be consulted and be made to drive the process as such reforms cannot succeed without them;

v)   The military Sections/Department of Civil-Military Relations and Human Rights should be strengthened through better collaboration with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC); and

vi)   The country's legislative arms should be more diligent in carrying out their appropriation and oversight duties. There should be training to improve expertise of members and committee staff on security matters. There should also be better scrutiny of military leadership nominees to ensure the best are given the job of leading the armed forces.

vii)   It is not enough to proscribe SARS. Government and members of the police force must take seriously lessons learned from the #EndSARS. New policy framework should be drafted on how to deal with civil protest.

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPEN GRAZING PROHIBITION AND RANCHES ESTABLISHMENT LAW 2017 IN BENUE STATE: INTERROGATING MATTERS ARISING

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Abstract

The paper examines the implementation of the law in Benue state and interrogates some issues arising from it including but not limited to: the Federal and Benue state government relations, threats by Miyetti Allah and increased attacks on Benue communities by herdsmen, explosion in the number of IDPs with its attendant consequences among others. The paper also interrogates the effect of the implementation of the law in the state on the outcome of the 2019 general elections and submits that the federal government must take decisive majors to collaborate with states, local governments and other stakeholders in finding lasting solutions to the problem. The paper suggests ranching of livestock as the most universally acceptable solution to the herders/farmers crises in Benue state and Nigeria at large.

Keywords: Open grazing, Ranching, Herdsmen/ Miyetti Allah, Farmers, Conflict

Introduction

Every society encounters a variety of challenges on daily basis. However, what makes one society different from another is the way and manner in which they handle their peculiar challenges. It is not an overstatement to say that for over one decade now, there has been a sustained increment in the number of violent clashes between herdsmen and farmers across different regions in the country but particularly in the North –Central zone of Nigeria. While this conflict has been deepening, the Federal Government could not come out with any practical policy or legal solution apart from deploying security personnel to the affected areas after every major attack on the communities with heavy casualties. In Benue state, the Fulani herdsmen and the local

farmers had lived peacefully together for several decades. However, in the last one and half decades, the seemingly orderly disposition of the herdsmen has disappeared and in its place we now have herdsmen who carry AK47 and other automatic rifles which they have used to kill and main hundreds of unsuspecting farmers and driven them out of their land and homes. As noted by Idyorough (2017:124), from 2008 to date, herdsmen have visited Benue farmers with series of attack every year, displacing, killing many and destroying property worth billions of naira.

The enactment and subsequent implementation of "Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017" in Benue state was therefore a collective response of the people of Benue state to look for a solution to their common problem (Herdsmen attacks). It could be recalled that in February 2016, Agatu Local Government Area of Benue state was attacked by armed herdsmen leaving over 300 people dead with property amounting to billions of naira destroyed (Peter Duru, 2016). The herdsmen claimed responsibility for this attack through a press conference but none of them was arrested for questioning by the security agencies. This very attack opened the eyes of every Benue indigene and the people of the state intensified their call for laws that will protect them against these trigger happy herdsmen. It was against this background that the law banning open grazing of livestock and promoting establishment of ranches came into effect in Benue state in 2017.

Theoretical Framework
Many theories can be used to explain the incessant conflict going on between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria today. However, this study has adopted the Eco-violence Theory to explain the phenomenon. The theory was developed in 1999 by Homer-Dixon. The theory is useful to understand the rising conflicts between farmers and herdsmen. Homer-Dixon focuses on population variables. He views population pressure as closely linked to the potential scarcity of renewable resourcesand that resource scarcity can cause violent conflict under unfavourable conditions. Homer-Dixon (1999) asserts that large populations in many developing countries are highly dependent on four key environmental resources that are fundamental to their livelihood: fresh water, cropland, forests and fish. The theory assumes that competition over scarce ecological resources engenders violent conflict. This trend has been aggravated in contemporary times owing to the impacts of climate change, which has exacerbated ecological scarcity across the world (Onuoha, 2007). The

rising wave of militancy among the Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria in recent time is probably driven by a dire struggle for survival in an environment that is competitive and hostile to their collective sustainable livelihood. Eco-violence theory is therefore based on the assumption that competition over scarce ecological resources engenders violent conflict.

The Enactment and Implementation of "Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017" in Benue State

The events leading to the enactment of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law in Benue state had come along way. For about one and half a decade now, Benue state is visited by large number of herdsmen every dry season. When they come, there are always series of crises that lead to several attacks on the defenseless farmers who are usually killed on their farmland by the herdsmen. Several reports have been given to the security agencies over these crises but it appeared the Federal Government was either confused or unwilling to come out with a definite solution on the conflict between farmers and herdsmen which was no longer affecting only Benue state but the entire Middle Belt and of course, the whole country. Corroborating this position, Kwaja C. and Bukola I.(2017:7) state that:

> Over the past decade, escalating tensions between primarily sedentary farmers and nomadic and semi-nomadic herders in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria have resulted in hundreds of deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands in Benue state alone. In response to these rising tensions and cycles of attacks, the Benue State Government passed legislation that banned open grazing on May 22, 2017. The law prohibited the open grazing of livestock or the practice of allowing cattle to roam freely in search of pasture and water beginning on November 1, 2017 and called instead for the establishment of ranches within the state.

It is therefore important to appreciate the fact that the passage of this law was the only option the people of Benue state were left with to protect their ancestral land from the herdsmen who were ready to do anything to occupy the state for grazing as the 2016 invasion and occupation of Agatu Local Government Area in the state had revealed. Thus the Law came into being as a collective resolve of the Benue People struggling to survive in a highly multi-ethnic, complex and competitive Nigeria Federal Structure.

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An overview of the Benue State "Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017"

As stated in the legislation, the main target of the Law is to achieve six main objectives: (i) Prevent the destruction of crop farms, community ponds, settlements and property by open rearing and grazing of livestock; (ii) prevent clashes between nomadic livestock herders and crop farmers; (iii) protect the environment from degradation and pollution caused by open rearing and over grazing of livestock; (iv) optimize the use of land resources in the face of overstretched land and increasing population; (v) prevent, control and manage the spread of diseases as well as ease the implementation of policies that enhance the production of high quality and healthy livestock for local and international markets; (vi) create a conducive environment for large scale crop production (Benue State Government, 2017). The six objectives that the Law seeks to achieve are very fantastic. However, where there are arguments for and against the Law is in the implementation aspect which the paper will highlight a few of those concerns.

The Livestock Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Benue state is vested with the powers to administer, regulate and control livestock in the State. The Department is by this Law to issue or cause to be issued permits subject to the Governors approval to graze livestock on such ranches, to Benue citizens, residents and other livestock owners. The Livestock Department acting under the commissioner of the Ministry and on behalf of the Governor has the authority to issue ranching permits, withdraw permits, provide guidance and regulations for enforcement by the Livestock Special Task Force as well as coordinate actions of the Local Government Advisory Committee which represent the interest of stakeholders at the grassroots level.

The major area of agitations by some stakeholders concerning the provisions of the law is in the area of Issuance and Renewal of Ranching Leases. As observed by Kwaja C. and Bukola I.(2017:12), the issue of indigeneity is prominent in the case of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017 as it imposes conditions upon potential ranchers based on their status as 'indigene' or 'non-indigene'. For instance, potential ranchers who do not qualify as indigenes of Benue State must submit applications which require an environmental impact assessment and multiple layers of assessment and approval by the landowner, head of the family, kindred or clan head and the chairman of Traditional Council in the relevant Local Government Area (Section 5a and Sec 6, Open Grazing Prohibition Law). In the case

that a potential application receives consent from all of the above, the application is then subjected to the approval of the Governor (Section 7-9). Once the lease is granted, the applicant must pay concessions to the landowner, family head, and kindred head whose consent to establish a ranch is valid for one year and must be renewed annually. A secondary process of approval is also needed for the construction of fencing to secure the ranch.

These conditions are only applicable for persons classified as non-indigenes of Benue State. Indigenes who wish to establish a ranch upon their own land are exempted from compliance with these conditions. The majority of herders who are non-indigenes of Benue State would have to comply with the application process to procure a ranching lease. The tedious application process, the need to renew the lease annually, and the uncertainty of retaining the permit once granted may be an adequate disincentive for compliance (Kwaja C. and Bukola I., .2017:13).

On the status and revocation of lease and Ranching Permit, section 11 and 12 of the Law state that: the lease and permission granted under this law is a privilege and not a right, title, interest or estate to the land as the land shall remain vested in the Governor in accordance with the Land Use Act. The permit may be revoked by the Department of Livestock at any time subjects to the approval of the Governor without the payment of compensation to the rancher for the following reasons: breach of state security; interest of peace; breach of any term or condition of the leasehold or overriding public interest as stipulated by the Land Use Act. Section 12 prohibits the sale of leased land to the rancher or his agent for the purpose of ranching, residence and other related purposes.

The preceding analysis of the Law has revealed four key issues here that the nomadic herdsmen are very uncomfortable with. First is the stringent conditions stipulated by the Law for acquisition of land for establishment of ranches by non-indigenes of Benue State. The second issue is the one year permit granted on land to the rancher which is also renewable annually. The third issue is that of termination of leasehold without compensation if certain provisions of the Law are violated and also the prohibition of sale of a piece of Benue Land to the rancher or his agent for the purpose of ranching. These four major issues among others may have led to the fierce attack on the Law by the *Miyetti* Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN) and the *Miyetti* Allah *Kautal Hore*, the two most prominent Fulani and herder socio-cultural associations.

Matters Arising from the Implementation of the Law

Following the passage and commencement of implementation of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law in Benue State in 2017, many issues have arisen out of the implementation process. Many analysts have said a lot about the law concerning its legal, economic, social and political implications on Benue and the Nigerian society. However, in this paper, the intention is to look at some specific matters arising from the implementation of the law. These include but not limited to: the response of the Miyetti Allah, the Fulani socio-cultural groups; the Federal and Benue State Government relations; the increment in the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Benue State; and the effect of the implementation of the Law on the outcome of the 2019 General elections in Benue State.

The first major issue that arose after the passage of the Law was the call for the suspension of the Law by the Miyetti Allah, the Fulani socio-cultural groups. Both the *Miyetti* Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) and the *Miyetti* Allah *Kautal Hore*, the two most prominent Fulani and herder socio-cultural associations had expressed different public positions on the Open Grazing Prohibition Law. On the one hand, the MACBAN expressed its willingness to obey the law, but requested that the implementation date be shifted to allow sufficient time for sensitization of herders on alternative to open grazing (Orowayino Warami, 2017). On the other as earlier mentioned, the Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore openly opposed the Law and threatened to prevent its implementation on the ground that it contradicts the constitutional provision for freedom of movement (Silas D., 2017). The president of association, Alhaji Abdullahi Bello described the Law as 'wicked, obnoxious and repressive'. They therefore vowed to mobilize herdsmen in the country to resist the Law as it was a deliberate attempt to enslave their members (Lawrence Onoja, 2017). Similarly, at the end of its North Western Zonal meeting in Kaduna, in November 2017, the group resolved that:

> We are completely opposed to the anti-grazing law and we are worried on the possible crises that may emerge, if such laws are allowed to take effect. It is a negative law because it attempts to expel Fulani herdsmen from areas they have been grazing for ages…the grazing law agenda is destroying herders' means of livelihood and we are appealing for immediate intervention to save Fulani Pastoralists from the total destruction of their means of livelihood (Ben Agande, 2017).

In one of its reactions, the Benue State Government held a press conference anchored by the state commissioner for information, Hon. Lawrence Onoja Jnr. on the June 2nd, 2017, warning the herdsmen over their threats to disobey the law as well as calling on

the Federal Government and all other Nigerians to support the State in its bid to resolve the farmers/herders crises in the State amicably. In response to Miyetti Allah's assertion that the Law violates the constitutional provision on free movement, the State government submitted that the Law does not restrict human free movement neither does it prohibit grazing of cattle but only seeks to confine the rearing and grazing of cattle to confined ranches which is in line with international best practice for animal husbandry.

In the midst of these arguments, accusations and counter accusations were going on the implementation of the Law commenced on November 1st, 2017 and a large number of herdsmen moved out of Benue State especially between November and December, 2017, as if they were peacefully complying with the Law. Unfortunately on the 1stand 2nd of January, 2018, the herdsmen began massive attacks on the Benue communities and these attacks left over 70 people dead. Since after these attacks, Benue State has continued to receive several attacks from herdsmen across many local government areas in the state in a manner that signify their resistance to the Law. One of such attacks that deserve to be mentioned here is the one that took place on the 24th of April, 2018 at St. Ignatius Catholic Church, Ukpor-Mbalom Parish, Gwer East Local Government Area of Benue State, killing two Catholic priests and 17 parishioners. Reverend Fathers Joseph Gor and Felix Tyolaha, who were holding the morning Mass, were gunned down in cold blood, while many sustained injuries, including bullet wounds

Another important issue that arose from the implementation of Open Grazing Prohibition Law in Benue State was the strained relationship between Federal and Benue State Government. Following the coordinated herdsmen attacks on Benue communities on the 1st January, 2018 and a huge number of casualties (over 70 deaths) that were recorded, the entire Benue state was thrown into mourning and confusion. The Benue people were asking among themselves 'where do we go from here?' Eventually, the Government and people of Benue state decided that the best thing to do at that moment was to send a high powered delegation of Benue elites to the president to convey their feelings and frustrations to him. Consequently, the delegation that comprised of political leaders, traditional rulers, and elders of the state led by the state Governor arrived the presidential Villa Abuja on the 15th of January, 2018 to brief President Buhari over the recent killings in the state. After narrating their ordeal to the president, his major response to the Benue delegation was a plead to the delegation to 'go home and try to accommodate your countrymen' (Olalekan Adetago, 2018). The President further promised that all those involved in the conflict

that culminated in the loss of lives would not escape justice, including any illegally armed militia in Benue state. He concluded by appealing to the Governor of Benue state and all members of the delegation to make sure they restrain their people to avoid further crises (Olalekan Adetago, 2018). The delegation then left Abuja feeling very disappointed with the unconvincing response of the president which instead of condemning the attacks in very strong terms, rather chose to encourage the Benue people to accommodate their killers. This very incident marked the beginning of rapid deterioration of relationship between the Federal and Benue state government.

Similarly, the minister of defence Maj. Gen. Mansur Dan-Ali (retd) on the 5th of June, 2018 at a meeting president Muhammadu Buhari had with Service Chiefs said, the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law passed by Benue and other states in the country was responsible for tension in Benue and other states accounting for the endless killings and called for its immediate suspension (Clifford Ndujihe, 2018). The Minister further said that apart from the open grazing prohibition Law, the attacks being perpetrated by the herdsmen against the farmers is due to the unwillingness of the affected communities to accommodate their fellow Nigerians and blockage of cattle routes which he said were available at independence. Less than 24 hours after the comment of the Defence Minister, herdsmen invaded Tse Zongu of Mbagwen, in Guma Local government of Benue state and killed nine people including two students who were at the village to sit for NECO examinations. In his response, the Benue state commissioner for information condemned both the killings and the comment of the Minister and said that: "From the timing of these killings, the militia herdsmen must have been encouraged by the unfortunate statement of the defence Minister who had just less than two days ago suggested the suspension of the open grazing prohibition law of the state government" (Wale Odunsi, 2018).

In a related development, the Inspector General of Police, Ibrahim Idris in his reaction to the January, 2018 series of attack on some communities in Logo and Guma Local Government Areas of Benue State which left over 73 people dead dismissed it as just communal clashes and later attributed the attacks to the Benue Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017. Idris said: "Obviously, it is communal crisis; herdsmen are part of the community. They are Nigerians and are part of the community, are they not? "(Ndujide, 2018). The comments by the Minister for defence and the Inspector General of Police trying to justify the killings on account of the blockage of the cattle routes and the passage of the Open grazing Prohibition Law attracted condemnations from different people across the country including the Benue state government.

From the foregoing, it is very clear that the Benue state government and Federal Government were interpreting the herdsmen killings and the implementation of the Open Grazing Prohibition Law from opposing positions. It shows clearly that the security agencies were treating the trigger herdsmen with kid gloves giving them an undue advantage over the defenseless farmers who were being killed mostly at night in their sleep. It became very difficult for the people of Benue State to situate these killings in the contexts of the Nigerian Federal structure whereby there are states and local governments and every Nigerian is form a particular local government and a state.

The third major issue that arose following the commencement of the implementation of the Open Grazing Prohibition Law in Benue State is the unprecedented increase in the number of IDPs arising from sustained herdsmen attacks from the beginning of January, 2018. According to the Benue State Executive Secretary, Benue State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Mr Emmanuel Shior, about 100,000 IDPs were received at four different camps in Benue state following the 2018 New Year attacks in Guma and Logo Local Government Areas of Benue State. The four Government approved camps are located at: Daudu, Tse-Ginde, Gbajimba all in Guma and Ugba in Logo Local Councils. It should be noted that more than half of the displaced people did not even go to government approved camps but to their relations in different parts of the state (Shior, 2018). After the New Year attacks on Benue communities, the herdsmen sustained series of attacks on different communities in the year leading to continues increase in the number of IDPs in different camps across the state. Consequently, in January, 2019, an investigation by Sahara Reporters revealed that the Benue State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) confirmed that there were as at January, 2019, 483,699 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) in various camps across Benue State. This huge number of IDPs according to SEMA has overwhelmed the state government and it is resulting into a humanitarian crisis (Shior, 2019).

The last issue to be discussed in this paper is the effect of the implementation of Prohibition of Open Grazing and Ranches Establishment Law in Benue State on the 2019 general election in the State. The outcome of the 2019 General election in Benue state was completely in favour of PDP, a state that was controlled by APC since 2015. In the 2015 General elections, APC won Benue State but between that period and 2019, a lot of development took place in the state that gave PDP an overwhelming

advantage in the 2019 General elections. Although there could be other factors but the decisive factor is the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law promulgated by the Benue state Government in 2017 and the ripples that its implementation generated throughout the country.

Until July, 2018, the Executive Governor of Benue State Samuel Ortom was a card carrying member of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) party of Nigeria. His official resignation of the membership of the Nigerian ruling party in July, 2018 marked the dramatic beginning of the dwindling fortunes of the APC in Benue state leading to their loss of the 2019 General elections in the state. However, the decamping of Governor Ortom to PDP did not happen very sudden. It was the climax of the frosty relationship that characterized the Benue State Government on one side and the presidency and the national Executive of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC). As earlier stated in this paper, Governor Samuel Ortom and the entire people of Benue state supported the implementation of the Open Grazing Prohibition Law, it appears from all indications that the Federal Government and the APC as a party were not favourably disposed to that hence the exchange of hot words between them culminating to the resignation of Governor Ortom from the ruling party. It was also discovered that APC as a party was no longer willing to give the gubernatorial ticket for 2019 general elections to Governor Samuel Ortom and the Governor decided to fight for his political future by moving back to the main opposition party, PDP, his former party. The implication of this development was that PDP now received a boost as the Governor returned to the party with many followers and more resources to prosecute the 2019 General elections campaign (Terngu Mfe, oral interview, 2019). This was a great advantage to the PDP that led to their victory at the general elections.

Another effect of the implementation of the Law in Benue state on the 2019 General election was the rift between the Political god father and the leader of APC in the Benue State, Senator George Akume and his political son, Governor Samuel Ortom. While the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law was still a bill at the Benue State House of Assembly, all prominent Benue sons and daughters supported the bill to be passed into law including Senator Akume. However, as soon as the bill was passed into law and was waiting for assent at the table of the Executive Governor of the State, Senator George Akume started cautioning the Governor not to sign the bill into law. His sudden withdrawal of support for the law was believed to have come from the threats from the powers that be at the federal level. Unfortunately

for him and fortunately for the state Governor, the entire Benue citizens wholeheartedly stood firm that the bill must be signed into law. The Governor eventually signed the bill into law in July, 2018. As soon as George Akume withdrew his support for the law, he began to lose many supporters and he eventually lost his bid to return to the senate for the fourth time. His opposition to the Law was interpreted as aligning with the pro-herdsmen groups to fight against his people and as such, he met his political waterloo at the 2019 General elections (James Okoh, 2018).

Similarly, the foot dragging approach of the federal government toward halting the ruthless attacks on defenseless Benue farmers by herdsmen was interpreted by the average Benue citizen as a deliberate attempt by the Buhari led federal government to aid the herdsmen to take over their land. This thinking continued to gain prominence in the state especially as many comments coming from the security and other prominent appointees of the federal government continued to be more favourable to the herdsmen. If the Federal Government was very decisive in condemning those attacks and drastic majors were taken toward preventing them, especially those that occurred on the first and second of January 2018, that could have portrayed the APC as a political party sympathetic to the course of the Benue people.

Towards Resolving the Controversies Surrounding the Implementation of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law in Benue State

It is not an overstatement to say that the lukewarm attitude of the Federal Government of Nigeria towards resolving the Farmers/herders conflict in Benue State and Nigeria at large is responsible for the controversies surrounding the implementation of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law in Benue State. The first thing to note is that, in the 8th National Assembly (2015-2019), National Assembly members from Benue state at the Senate and House of Representatives sponsored bills on the prohibition of open grazing and establishment of ranches in the country. At the senate it was Senator Barnabas Gemade and in the House of Representative, it was Hon. John Dyegh (both APC members) representing Benue North Senatorial District and Gboko/Tarka Federal Constituency respectively. The bills could not go beyond the second reading in both chambers. But this imitative was a way of trying to find solutions to the incessant killings Benue people and other Nigerians have been going through in the hands of herdsmen several years. In view of this development, Hon. John Dyegh (2017) stated that; "Powerful Nigerians are frustrating the Open

Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment bill pending before the National Assembly. The Federal government itself is placing more emphasis on the protection of cows and other livestock rather than human lives…".

It should therefore be noted that Benue state government did not just wake up and started the Open Grazing Prohibition Law at the state level. Efforts were made to get the bill passed into law at the National Assembly. It was the lack of support for it at the National Assembly that left the State with no choice but to submit a similar bill at the State House of Assembly which was eventually passed it into law.

With the foregoing background, it is not out of place to argue that the Federal Government is at the centre of the controversy surrounding the implementation of the Law in Benue State. First, they frustrated its passage at the National Assembly. Secondly, the Federal government did not want to give support to its implementation in Benue Sate when it first came into effect as can be seen from the comments of the president himself and some of his key appointees as earlier analysed in the paper. Similarly, the lack of sincerity on the part of the herdsmen concerning the history of the geopolitical area called Benue Valley is also generating some serious controversies on the issue of acquisition of land for the establishment of ranches in Benue State. The Miyetti Allah, the Fulani socio-cultural groups have addressed many press conferences alleging that they were in the Benue Valley before the Tiv people migrated into the area (Oladele, 2017). Unfortunately, this is a complete historical fallacy that cannot be substantiated in any historical account, be it archival or oral except the Miyetti Allah's imagination. In fact, the first incidence that brought the Fulani close to the Benue Valley was the Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad of 1804 but they met a very stiff resistance from the Tiv people in 1806 and were not able to conquer the Benue Valley area. Meanwhile the Tiv and other Benue tribes have been living in the Benue Valley for over 300 years before the 1804 Jihad started. In as much as this claim by the Fulani is not true, it raises a lot of questions thus: All these killings that are being perpetrated against the people of Benue State by the herdsmen, is it because they are claiming that the Benue people have settled on 'their land'? Secondly, if at all we sell or lend our land to the herdsmen, would they not wake up one day and claim the whole of Benue state as their own to justify their claim of ownership of the Benue Valley? Thirdly, the way this people kill and destroy property using the scotched earth method, is it not a way of eliminating the entire aborigines so that they will come and settle on their lands? These and more questions are on the

minds of many Benue people. These are probably some of the questions that have informed very stringent conditions spelt out for acquisition of land in the Prohibition of Open Grazing and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017 in Benue State.

In order to properly resolve controversies on the Open Grazing Prohibition Law, the Nigeria Federal Government must learn to respect the principle of comparative advantage in the practice of agricultural system in the country. Some far Northern states are very fertile ground for rearing of castles, such states should be encouraged and more facilities provided in those states including irrigational facilities, ranches and the rest for herdsmen to practice their trade in peace. Benue is a highly agrarian state so it will be very difficult for herdsmen and farmers to live together without conflict, even if there are ranches.

Conclusion

The conflict between farmers and herdsmen is an old phenomenon in human history. However, modern and civilized societies have always found a permanent solution to this conflict. Finding a lasting solution to this type of problem that involve a fundamental change in the culture of a people (herdsmen) is something that should be taken very serious by the Federal Government of Nigeria by involving the entire country to look into it. Unfortunately, the federal government is highly unwilling to take this matter to the National Assembly to legislate on it. We need to be reminded that the National Assembly is the representation of the entire Nigerians as far as democracy is concerned. It is worrisome that the issue of finding solutions to farmers/herdsmen conflict in the country is being discussed at the (National Economic Council NEC) meetings, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and some committees set up by the Federal government instead of taking the matter to the National Assembly. Irrespective of the foot dragging attitude of the federal government in finding solutions to these crises, it is very clear to every Nigerian now that the only solution to farmers/herdsmen conflict in the country is the establishment of Ranches just as it is done in other civilized climes. Any attempt by government to force a solution on the people over this issue will fail. It is either the National Assembly legislates on this for the entire country or the various State Houses of Assembly will do it at the state levels like Benue state has done. Nigeria has gone beyond where a particular tribe will want to force its will and wishes on the entire federation. Those who are contemplating to have choice areas of land in each

state of the federation for grazing of cattle should shelve the idea. Those states that want it should be allowed while those that do not should not be forced to accept it. This is what democracy is all about.

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AN INTERROGATION OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS POLICIES ON FARMERS-HERDERS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This research examines the intervention policies of the Nigerian government on the farmers and herders conflict. It also reviews their success and failures as the violence between the two agrarian farmers continued unabated in the southern and north-central region of the country. The study used a descriptive research methodology using mixed research design of both primary and secondary data. Adopting a social conflict theoretical framework, the study in its scope covered the entire nation of Nigeria with emphasis on the Benue States in the north-central geopolitical zones of the federation. The findings of the study show that incessant violent conflict between herders and farmers is a major outcome of policy inconsistency, and poor resource governance and management by the government at all levels, as all intervention programme has been poorly implemented. While the salient cause of the conflict includes lack of political will, resource depletion, and climate change factors among other things. The study suggests the need for a wide-ranging short and long-term policy to tackle the crisis; by the introduction of a modern ranching system speared headed by the private sector, regulated and supported by the government for sustainable development.

Introduction

Violence between farmers and herders has become a defining feature of inter-group relations among farming communities and herders in most parts of Nigeria in recent times. Resource depletion, environmental degradation, social manipulation of ethno-religious sentiments has altered relationships that were historically inter-dependent and mutually beneficial. Conflicts between farmers and herders exist on a large scale, both within Nigeria, the greater Lake Chad Basin, and other areas such as **Mali, South Sudan, Kenya, and Congo DR.** However, Nigeria's North-central and some Southern states have witnessed an increase in casualties as consequences of these broken relationships. The frequency of violent competition for land resources such as water, grazing fields, land for the cultivation of crops, and the **uneven distribution and management of these natural resources also heightened ethnic rivalry, which** further exacerbates conflicts which make it appear unconnected to natural resource competition. Unfortunately, poor governance and ethnic manipulation of public opinion have elevated minor issues to destructive dimensions whereas they had internal or inter-ethnic mechanisms for resolving cases that are not life-threatening.

Scholars (Chris and Bukola, 2018, Nformi et al., 2014, Okoli et al., 2014; Odoh and Chigozie, 2012; Abbass, 2012) attributed the antagonistic behavior between the herders and farmers to multidimensional factors. Among which are environmental degradation, the high rate of depletion of natural resources occasioned by climatic changes, the persistent shift in the pattern of rainfall leading to drought, deforestation, desert encroachment, and the grazing of cultivated farmlands, (Ijioma 2019). Other factors are cattle theft and rustling, the high increase in population as against available resources, and modernization in agriculture that encourages environmental degradation; land tenure legislation, and social manipulation of difference. All these have generated more conflicts in recent times and efforts to resolve them have proved ineffective. Despite the numerous policies rolled out to mitigate the conflict, the violence has continued unabated as herders migrate from the north to other parts of the country in search of fodder, grazing field, and freshwater. Given the identified issues that exacerbate the conflict between herders and farmers, this study highlights and discusses the numerous government policy interventions, both at the state, and federal level to tackle farmers and herder's and their pitfalls and success. Thus, this study is meant to ascertain the; the salient causes of herders and farmers conflict in Nigeria, examine the past and present policy interventions to address the farmer's and herders' conflict and assess the challenges of the intervention policies

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Conceptual Clarifications:

Migration: It is indeed problematic to define and conceptualize the meaning of migration that will be widely accepted across disciplines because of migration that is environmentally induced and the consequent displacement of people because of acute environmental degradation (Assan, and Rosenfeld, 2012). The concept of migration is explained from different approaches. Geographers conceptualized it from the perspective of time, and space significance of mobility, while sociologists emphasize the social consequences of mobility. The economists stress the economic relevance of migration, (Ijioma, Uzuegbu, and Ijioma, 2012). Smith (1960) conceptualizes migration from the angle of change in physical space. Despite the challenges in framing a uniform and precise definition of 'environmental migration', the concept has become an issue of concern in contemporary time as policy-makers, environmental experts, and social scientists struggle to unravel the potential societal effects of climate change and general environmental degradation(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_migrant). To categorize an individual or group of persons as a climate refugee, natural occurrence or environmental-related hazards must be responsible for the dislocation or could be considered the persecutor. Thus, "**climate refugees"** / "environmental migrants" are individuals whom involuntary abandoned their home region due to abrupt or long-term changes to their local habitation and environment (Gemenne, 2006; Assan and Rosenfeld, 2012). For this study environmental migrants or refugees are people who are forcefully displaced from their traditional places of abode because of sudden natural occurrence in their environment which constitutes a threat to their existence.

Conflict: The word "conflict" is applied in different contexts; hence, it requires some clarification for better understanding. Accordingly, Chaplin (1979: 109) defines conflict as "the simultaneous occurrence of two or more mutually antagonistic impulses or motives". However, Deutsh (1973) views it behaviorally as an action that interferes, injures, prevents, obstructs, or renders ineffective another action considered incompatible. To Stedman (1991: 269), conflict "emanates from the tugs and pulls of different identities, definitions of what is right, fair, and just". Wilmot and Hocker(2011) described the conflict as a felt struggle between two or more independent individuals over perceived incompatible differences in beliefs, values, and goals or differences in desires for esteem, control, and connectedness. Conflict can be seen as competition over resources, contradiction over value systems, physiological needs of the people, and manipulation of information (Albert, 2001:4-

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5). It has both positive and negative consequences. From a positive perspective, it leads to constructive change, better understanding, cordial relationship, clarity of purpose, and development. While negative perspective elicits destructive reaction and outcome, pains, violence, and war. From the foregoing, conflict can be said to denote the incompatibility of subject positions as such can be regarded as a tussle between people with opposing needs, goals, interests, ideas, views, and values over shared resources, position, and power (Ibeh, 2019: 209).

Herders and Farmers in Nigeria

The herders and farmers' conflict in Nigeria has a very long history. And it has been more of occupational and cultural. The majority of herdsmen in Nigeria are Fulani (Mohammed Bello Tukur, 2004). They are an ethno-linguistic group that cut across about fifteen countries in Africa. Over 13 million Fulani are occupying a landmass of about 3000 square miles, stretching from Mauritania to Cameroon, Sudan, and Senegal (Miller 2007, *Mark and Aniuska, 2009:2*). Though a majority of them engage in pastoralism and the marketing and exchange of animal products, there are few that trade in other areas of distribution and marketing of essential commodities. Nevertheless, the majority of the people are quick to associate the Fulani with herding which has remained strong in the thoughts of many Africans, and Nigerians in particular. Herders migrate from one location to the other in the search of quality fodder, freshwater, and access to the market for their cattle and could be regarded as nomads. Though a majority of them are educated in Islamic education, they are regarded as illiterates when considered from the perspective of western education, because they can barely read, write or communicate well in English or French except in their own native language.

Conversely, farmers in Nigeria are mostly traditional farmers, who are either laborers or owners of small farms. They consist of peasants who cultivate the ground and engage in small-scale farming for subsistence as well as for sell other products in the market. Though there are large scale farmers who consist of retired military officers, politicians, and retired civil servants, since the 1970s, the majority of the farmers are rural dwellers who claim indigene status and traditional custodian of lands and their natural resources; this is always defined to preclude later settlers and her lies the violent crisis that has dominated the recent history of Southern Kaduna.

Theoretical Framework

There are numerous theoretical explanations for the causes and nature of the herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria, however, the conflict is best described with the use of social conflict theory. The theory sees social life as a competition and focuses on the distribution of resources and power which are not evenly and equitably endowed by nature. Advocate of the theory view society as comprising people of diverse goals, needs, and interests with limited resources to meet their needs. This creates inequality and fierce unhealthy competition that generates social conflict and social change. Social conflict theory looks at struggles for power and control in society as a major causal factor of conflict. Conflict occurs when two or more actors oppose each other in social interaction, reciprocally exerting social powers to attain scarce or incompatible goals and prevent the opponent from attaining them. The quest for dominance and power becomes the currency rather than consensus. Based on this premise, governments at local, state, and federal levels have not been able to address the contending issues between herdsmen and farmers or assist them in reaching some consensus.

Previous Studies

Christopher (2018) carried out a study titled a **critical analysis of conflicts between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria: Causes and socio-religious and political effects on national development**. The study examined various areas in Nigeria where the pastoralist herders have engaged in a violent confrontation with the farmer and have unleashed mayhem on the people to ascertain and analyzed the causes, socio-political and economic effect of the attack on national development. With the **adoption of** qualitative and phenomenological approaches, the findings of the work revealed that the illegal and forceful encroachment on farmlands and damages to crops, fallow lands left to replenish the nutrients after many years of continuous use are among issues that have caused serious conflicts between the farmers and herdsmen in recent time.

The herders most often deliberately allow their cows to wander into the farmlands to destroy crop nurseries or full-grown crops, which the farmers depended on, and hope to harvest and sell shortly. Furthermore, the study shows that continuous climate change is one of the major contributing factors which cause conflicts between the two groups. This is obvious because whenever the weather condition becomes

unfavorable for herding, herdsmen will be forced to move out of their original abode to a better environment where fodders are available. Also, the study revealed that the persistence of the crisis between herders and farmers is because of a lack of strong political will to deal decisively with perpetrators of the violence.

On the social negative effect of the herders and farmer's violent conflict on national development, the researchers observed that several people have lost their lives and means of livelihood, while the unquantifiable property has been destroyed. It also contributes to animosity among the ethnic groups that made up the country. The study further asserts that the situation has become a threat to human security, besides this, the situation has robbed the country of the much needed foreign direct investment and contributed to the economic stagnation experienced in the nation's economy, as more resources that should have been allocated for the development of critical infrastructure or productive sector are diverted to security to forestall the escalation of violence.

Anastasia S. A (2018) increasing Farmer-Herder Conflict in Nigeria: An Assessment of the Clashes between the Fulani Herdsmen and Indigenous Farmers in Ukpabi-Nimbo Community of Enugu State. This study examined both the structural and processual perspective of the farmers-herders conflict in the Ukpabi-Nimbo community, with a qualitative method of data collection which sampled sedimentary farmers and non-farmers, indigenes, and settlers within the community for a better understanding of the sort of historical relationship that existed between the indigenous farmers and Fulani herdsmen and what marred the cordial relationship which existed between the two groups and the factors that escalated the conflict to violence. The study observed that the interaction between the two groups was mutual in the early and late 80's when the herders first arrived in the community up till 2003; though there were records of conflict and disagreement between the two, occasioned by the destruction of crops and other farm products by Fulani cattle. More often, it was resolved to the satisfaction of the two groups through compensation for the destruction of farm crops or the herders when herds are killed by the villagers; nevertheless, the misunderstanding never led to violence because there was a communal conflict resolution mechanism that both groups adhered to such as paying of compensations.

Second, according to (Anastasia, 2018), another factor that has contributed to the upsurge in the conflict between pastoralist herdsmen and the Nimbo community is the issue of underage boys who are not yet physically mature and strong to control the cattle. Most times, these little boys cannot differentiate among grasses, crops, and vegetables. Furthermore, the hired herders-cattle owners' dichotomy contributed immensely to the breakdown in the existing symbiotic relationship between the two groups that have existed over the years. In conclusion findings of the study, established that the inability of the government to tackle the endemic violence between the farmers and herders has encouraged and emboldened the two groups to take laws into their hands to defend their crops and cattle respectively, and this violence is replicated in almost all the states of the federation, with its attendant uneasy calm between all the ethnic groups in the country.

Though the causes of herders and farmer's conflict are multifaceted as identified by Anastasia (2018), the study failed to interrogate government intervention policies and how it has exacerbated the violent conflict between herders and farmers in Nigeria.

From the discussions so far, the conflict caused by the scarcity of fresh water seems endless. Thus, there is a complex relationship between the scarcity of freshwater, and conflict, because it interacts with several factors such as occupational features, ethnic divide, religious inclination, educational background, and the income level to ignite conflict. Situations such as this put the pastoralists in a disadvantaged position and force constant movement in search of fresh water and grazing field for their herds of animals. On the other hand, the quest to increase the output of farm produce, and raise more income to improve their living standard also motivated the sedentary farmers to expand their farms, encroachment on grazing fields, stock routes, and blocked access to water, are points that were designated traditionally for the herders. To assert their rights of access to those resources, the pastoralists drive their animals into croplands, which they either consume or destroy. In other words, the findings of the study imply that contrary to the opinion that ethnic and religious factors are the salient triggers of farmer's and herders' conflict in Nigeria, the need for survival and satisfaction of their basic needs contributes to farmers and herders violent conflict in Nigeria. Freshwater scarcity, combined with persistent conflict destabilizes the farming communities and impedes food production, and this threatens food security. It is evident from the study that conflict, for whatever reasons undermines the social order and is a threat to

peace, human security, and national stability.

Salient causes of herders and farmers conflict

i. **Climate Change:** Climate is a critical factor in the activities of herdsmen and farmers. The changing climatic condition, generally referred to as global warming, is no doubt taking a toll on the survival of herdsmen and farmer's businesses. The desert encroachment from the Sahara towards the Sahel region and other associated climatic conditions have continued to affect the livelihood of herdsmen as they push further south in search of available space, pitching them against farmers and host communities. This global phenomenon is currently affecting many parts of the world with attendant consequences – including the herdsmen-farmer conflict.

ii. **Depleting Space for Farming**: Constant urbanization and demographic shifts in the present-day world has increased the tendency and likelihood of farmers to move further afield for farming activities. At independence in 1960, the Nigerian population stood at about 35 million people.[5] However, 58 years later, it has leaped to over 180 million people and the growth is expected to persist in the near future.[6] Population increase of this magnitude also means a geometric increase in the demand for food products as a basic human need. This also implies an increase in the quest for farming space for farmers. Conversely, industrialization and urbanization have continued to claim all available land, leaving little or nothing for farmers' survival. The continued movement of herdsmen southwards in search of pasture for their animals has pitched them against farmers, eventually leading to conflict and destruction. For example, farming along the Benue River accounts for over 20000 tons of grain annually. This same area is also fertile ground for herdsmen to feed their cattle. Thus, farmlands within the riverbank areas are the most affected by the movement of the herdsmen – resulting in several clashes.

iii. **Lack of Political Will**: The government at all levels has demonstrated a near absence of needed political will to proffer lasting solutions to the conflicting claims of different actors in the ongoing conflict between the herdsmen and farmers. Political leaders have failed to invoke appropriate legislations to be

backed by action that would define rules and limits for parties involved in the conflict. At the regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has a Protocol on Trans-human Movement, though the framework is yet to be fully implemented at national levels. Lack of political will remains a hindering factor among member states. The political will to implement this protocol and other frameworks remain an enabler to the conflict. The Federal government, in the past, has made efforts to regulate and control pastoral activities, but it appears that adequate political will is needed to enforce laws. For instance, the government is perceived from some quarters, especially by opposition parties, as being sympathetic to the activities of the herdsmen. This perception is likely because the President is Fulani, the same ethnic group that dominates the cattle business. Citizens, especially from the most affected states expected the federal government to deal with the herdsmen-farmer conflicts in all parts of the state with the same vigour and determination it showed in similar internal security issues in other parts of the country.

Other identified salient causes of the clashes between farmers and herders include lack of respect by the herders for the host's culture, deliberate violation of laws, and interference in the host community's means of livelihood and other cultural factors.

Government Intervention Policies
The Grazing Reserves Programme
The issue of grazing reserves according to Bako and Ingawa (1988) in Nigeria was initiated before the arrival of the British colonial administration by the Fulani that conquered most parts of the north. But the formal documentation, gazette, and proper demarcation of grazing land and cattle routes from farmland started during the colonial era in the 1940s (The Peace and Security Forum, 2017). However, the scheme faltered because the Europeans imposed land use controls divorced from economic and demographic dynamics in the pastoral system (Frantz 1981).

Hamisu Kano proposed the idea that led to the official reintroduction and establishment of grazing reserve in northern Nigeria while he was working with pastoralists on livestock vaccination. He anticipated a shortfall in grazing land in Northern Nigeria, in the future, hence the need to address the issue. After a proper study of the proposal which was anchored as "Fulani Amenities Proposal", with the

support of the northern Nigerian government; he initiated the grazing reserve scheme from the abandoned government resettlement schemes (Fulani Settlement Scheme) **(Ismail, http://www.gamji.com/fulani8.htm, 2019)**.

The pilot scheme for grazing reserve started in 1954 after a study of the Fulani production system contained in the "Fulani Amenities Proposal." By 1964, the government of the northern region intensified efforts to realize the objective and gazette about 6.4 million hectares of the forest reserve, of which over ninety-eight percent was located within the savanna region. Twenty-one percent of the land was situated in Sokoto Province, followed by Kabba, Bauchi, Zaria, Ilorin, and Katsina, with 11-15 percent each (Awogbade 1982).

The objectives of establishing grazing reserves are the improvement in the well-being and welfare of the Fulani, and to transform the management of the herd system in the country. It was also meant to protect pasture-space for the national herds, and remove disharmony between agronomists and herders living in the same geographical location. Furthermore, separating the herders from the farmers would allow the government to nurture peaceful coexistence between the two groups (Laven 1991). It was expected that the grazing reserves will serve as the center of agro-pastoral intervention, a guarantor of land security, a nucleus for nomadic Fulani settlement, a zone for crop/livestock systems integration, and a place for small-scale rather than large-scale holder-oriented production (Bako and Ingawa 1988).

From the way grazing reserve was conceived and partially implemented, there was no long time plan for afforestation to curtail the foreseen depletion of the grass that serves as forage to herds, nor to cushion the encroachment of the desert. Attention was on providing a place of abode for the herders, rather than addressing the climate change effect on natural resources depletion. One of the key informants in Agatu Benue State asserts that:

> The government in the First Republic carved out grazing routes and even built some grazing reserved exclusively for Fulani migrant herders to settle in some parts of the then northern region. The herders are meant to live inside the settlement, schools, mosques, dams, veterinary

services and electricity are to be provided inside the grazing reserves, but government policy inconsistency and, frequent change of government through military coup de-tat imparted negatively on the program. *December 8ᵗʰ, 2019*

Also, another respondent avers that:

Former Governor of Benue state in second Republic, Aper Aku constructed ranch in the state, with nearly all the facilities installed, but successive administration could not maintain it, or even leverage on that to build more in the state. We would not have been in this complete mess of senseless killings and destruction of property. *December 4ᵗʰ, 2019*

The assertion of the respondents above on the previous policies to address the challenges in the past by the government corroborated Bako and Ingawa's (1988) view that the idea of grazing reserves is not new in the country. It was initiated before the coming of the British Colonial administration by the Fulani's that conquered and ruled Northern Nigeria who demarcated grazing reserves in most parts of the north (The Peace and Security Forum, 2017). However, formal grazing reserves in Nigeria started accidentally in the 1950s when Hamisu Kano, working with pastoralists on livestock vaccination, foresaw the shortages of grazing land in Northern Nigeria, and with the support of the government, he initiated the grazing reserve scheme from the abandoned government resettlement schemes (Fulani Settlement Scheme) **(Ismail, http://www.gamji.com/fulani8.htm, 2019)**.

Grazing Area and Cattle Routes
With the increasing intensity of the farmer-herders conflict, the necessity to enact laws that would guide the day-to-day interactions between these two classes was conceived. To ameliorate the unpleasant situation, the federal lawmakers proposed to introduce a Grazing Commission Bill in 2008 to address the crucial issue. The Bill empowered the commission to acquire land in any part of the country to establish grazing reserves and cattle routes but unfortunately the empowerment of the commission to do so is tantamount to violation of the subsisting Land Use Act and

traditional means of landholding if enacted (Guilbert 2016). The International Crisis Group (2017) mentioned that the Afenifere (a socio-political Pan-Yoruba movement) disagreed entirely with this proposed bill alleging that the bill was to favor the business of the Fulani herdsmen at the expense of the farmers whose farms were destroyed continuously by the Fulani cows. Furthermore, they believe this bill is an offensive one. According to this group, what this attempts to do would be to rob citizens of their rightful possessions and award these possessions to those who do not own these properties, which of course, negates the tenets of natural law.

Ranching Option
The federal government has, over the years, explored various responses: In April 2014, the former President Goodluck Jonathan's government inaugurated an inter-ministerial technical committee on grazing reserves, saddled with the task of proposing strategies for ending the conflicts between farmers and herders. Concurrently, the government set up a political Committee on Grazing Reserves, chaired by then Benue state Governor Gabriel Suswam. The report issued by Suswam's committee called for the recovery and improvement of all grazing routes encroached upon by farmers and recommended that the Central Bank of Nigeria release a total of N100 billion ($317 million) to the country's 36 state governments for ranch construction.

The National Executive Council (NEC) approved these recommendations but Jonathan's defeat in the March 2015 elections interrupted its implementation. Although the central bank released N100 billion to state governments, they failed to construct any ranches. However, on 19th January 2017, the House of Representatives set up a committee to investigate accusations that the funds had been looted and report back within four weeks. The committee's findings have remained unpublished to this day.

The National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016
The National Assembly in 2016, proposed a bill to address conflicts between farmers and herders through the controversial *National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016,* which ultimately was not passed. This was possible because the *Land Use Act of 1978* vests all powers related to the regulation of ownership, alienation, acquisition,

administration, and management of Nigerian land with the state governors.

Research also establishes that the Federal and state governments have drawn up policies and interventions that would stem the tide of violence between herders and farmers. Some of these policies were the grazing reserve programme which officially re-introduced and established grazing reserves in northern Nigeria from 1954.   This was aimed at improving the well-being and welfare of the Fulani and transforming the management of the herder system in northern Nigeria. The grazing area and cattle routes were conceived as an intervention to ameliorate the unpleasant farmer-herders' conflict. This was conceived by setting up a grazing commission bill in 2008. This bill empowered the commission to acquire land in any part of the country to establish grazing reserves and cattle routes. The federal government also toyed with the idea of setting up ranches in April 2014 and resolved to release N100 billion to establish ranches in the 36 states of the federation but this laudable intervention died with the change of government in 2015.

Research also revealed that the Federal government proposed the bill to re-introduce the National Grazing Reserve in 2016, but the bill was not passed in the National assembly due to the Land-use act of 1978 which vested all powers related to the regulation of ownership, acquisition, administration, and management of land with the state governments. With this unresolved situation, the bill was abandoned. Findings further revealed that state-level legislation prohibiting open grazing was viewed as an intervention to curb herder-farmers' violence and in 2017, the Benue State House of Assembly enacted a law in this direction, prohibiting open grazing and this was followed by the Taraba State House of Assembly in 2018. These legislations exacerbated violence because they were interpreted in different ways by the ethnic groups involved. However, they have tried to a large extent yielded positive results in these two states.

Finally, findings revealed that the Federal government through the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development formulated a livestock development plan described as Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) to be established in the 36 states of the Federation to settle herders and promote a healthy relationship between herders and their host. This attracted condemnation from North Central and southern Nigeria and the action was perceived as another form of using land belonging to indigenes to settle

Fulani cattle herders who are President Muhammadu Buhari's kinsmen. This almost caused a national crisis and the government-backed down. These clashes have defied all these strategies and what it means is that the country has been unable to tackle adequately its herder-farmers', ethno-religious and ethno-occupational crises and violence.

State-level Legislations Prohibiting Open Grazing:

Benue State Government enacted the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017, on May 22, 2017, to address response to the lingering conflict between farmers and herders in the state. Implementation of the law began on November 1, 2017. The Benue State legislation was a precursor to other states' which considered similar legislation to respond to lingering conflicts between farmers and herders within their states. For instance, the Taraba State Governor also signed the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Bill 2017 into law on July 24, 2017, with formal implementation on January 24, 2018. Ademosun (1976) lists some of the gains from the grazing reserves as easing seasonal migration, improving the quality of herds, multiplying outlet for bovine product, and enhancing access to extension and social services. The grazing reserve also encourages the uniform deployment of the cattle.

Summary and Conclusion

Data gathered revealed that the causes of herders and farmer's conflict are multifaceted and manifested in several ways. Firstly Climatic change made land scarce for herders and the only alternative is to stray on farmers' farmland and feed the cow with crops which results in violent clashes. Also findings of the study revealed that ethno-religious differences which manifested in occupational differences are exploited by politicians to promote herder-farmers' crisis. Findings further established that the Fulani who are mainly herders complained that legally approved and gazetted grazing routes have either been blocked or occupied by farmers and this occasionally results in clashes. All these were corroborated by Ijioma (2019) in his examination of the triggers of the socio-economic and occupational ethnic crisis in northern Nigeria. In his study, he revealed that the consequences of these clashes would be evaluated in the number of lives and property lost including economic losses. The greater part of these losses is the psychological

implication it has had on farmers who are afraid of going to cultivate or harvest their crops due to insecurity. The long term effect is what the country faces in terms of food insecurity, with the scarcity of food, hike in prices of food, poor income generation, unemployment, and high incidence of poverty among citizens.

Recommendations

Given the serious nature of this crisis and its consequences on economic development and Nigerian people, a host of strategies can be adopted and these include; the making of policies tackles clashes without undue favoritism, the making laws which adopt modern practices livestock businesses as this will help to avoid unnecessary rivalries. Furthermore, farmers must be made to respect the rights of herders by not cultivating areas reserved for herders by law and the government should encourage private firms to be producing fodder for the production of healthy cattle that would promote the livestock industry to curb the conflict between herders and farmers in search of fodder.

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PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND THE CHALLENGES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract
Personnel administration relates to the overall organizations planning process by which the organization tries to ensure that it has the right number of persons and the right kind of people, at the right time and at the right place performing functions, which are economically useful and which satisfy the needs of the organization and provide satisfaction to the individual involved. This study interrogates the challenges of development of local government in Nigeria from the purview of personnel management. The work examines recruitment process into local authority, statutory provisions for training and retraining, staffing, amongst others, as it based its theory on decentralized development as framework of analysis. It concludes that local government personnel management is frost with nonchalance, poor staffing and challenges of re-entrants of trainees.

Keywords*:* Personnel, Management, Local Government, Development, Recruitment.

Background to the study

Agba *et al* (2014), reference Malami (2008), as they maintained that, government is a great responsibility and only persons who have carefully prepared themselves and have a high sense of self-discipline and responsibility should aspire to lead. For indeed, government is an awesome responsibility and trust which if abused or betrayed, holds untold political, economic and social consequences, loss of lives and sufferings for the people of the country as a whole.

Thus, local government is recognized as the third tier of government in Nigeria and it is the closest government to the people at the grassroots providing essential services to the people. It is the most accessible to the people out of all the other tiers of government (Aibieyi, 2011). Local government as a third tier system of government in Nigeria was established to bring government closer to the people at the grass-root level. It is a way of coordinating and managing the affairs of government at the local level (Ola and Tonwe, 2005). Mawhood (1993) defined local government as bodies separated by law (and have) local representatives (and) formal power to decide on a range of public matters. Their right to make decisions is entrenched by the law and can only be altered by a new legislation. They have resources, which is said to be subject to the stated limits, and are spent and invested at their discretion. As noted by Ajayi (2013) he posits that this class of people cut across ethnic, religious and regional divides.

Local government can be defined as a political sub-division of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs, including the powers to improve taxes or to exact labour for prescribed purpose. To this extent it is also interesting to know that local government is a legal entity which could sue and be sued. Decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations

It has often been argued and questioned by many political scientists regarding the reason why we need a local administration in the mist of central and state governments. The question is, why the need for local government administration at all? As this question puzzle many renowned scholars, some has relentlessly tried some justifications by affirming that local administration involves the training of local people for high political responsibilities and the provision of social services.

However, the objectives of local government are far from being realized for several reasons. Thus, the study intends to look at personnel management in relations to local government performances in Nigeria.

There is a classical relationship between the capacity of local government and their statutory roles of developments in their locality. The quality of personnel equipped for the local government will determine the extent to which the arm of government will be able to respond to its statutory responsibility. A local authority that is frost with unqualified and unethical personnel will frustrate the expectations of the government in the pursuit of grass root development.

One of the cardinal limitations of local authority is the pursuit of local developments in contemporary time is lack of well equipped, sound and ethically driven personnel in the management of local authority. This is evident in the prevalence of lackadaisical attitude to local policy of developments, indiscipline and unethical practices such as gross mismanagements of local fund, corruption in its entirety, absenteeism, poor attitude to work, etc.

Thus to effectively deal with personnel management and the challenges of local developments it is pertinent to begin with the recruitment process, training and retraining of staff for capacity building, and the ethical discipline required to function in the capacity so required to drive home the goal of local developments.

Theoretical Discourse
Theory of Decentralized Development

This study relies on the theory of decentralized development as a framework of analysis. Resler (1968) defines decentralization as the ideological dimension of state apparatus. This means that as a state apparatus, decision making system is designed to have a parameter to reflect and influence the structure; it depicts how resources, authority, information and decision process flow. Decentralization simply means, in this perspective the concentration of decision making in a supreme authority in any polity.

Development is all pervading. In other words, it is the ultimate goal of any society or humanity. It is the ability of government to meet or rather satisfies the basic human needs like food, shelter, education and health as well as the psychological need of man.

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The provision of roads, transportation, communication etc, is all part of development which government must meet. The major instrument for achieving development in any given society is local government. To do this end, the central government creates room for accelerated development.

Therefore, there is need for aerial distribution of power amongst the three levels of government (federal, state and local). The aerial distribution of powers should be all embracing, that is, vertical or horizontal. The participation of local administration in the development process in any country on the nature of the polity in such country under democratic governance, participation of local administration is more attained as democratic values are promoted.

Egonmwan (1984) states that "the 1976 Local Government Reforms" was rooted on the ideology of grassroot democracy which the political leaders saw as not only important and desirable in itself, but as crucial element in the political programme of the Federal Military Government to return to the democratic rules. This tendency is to ensure the participation of the people in the democratic process which surpasses the democratic process representation.

Community - Politics Approach
This approach of decentralization sees equality of citizens on group participation in politics, in which participants are subject to the rule of the game. In effect, participants must abide by all the conditions of the system. There are bound to be demands from different groups on the micro-political system (local administration) and this may result to conflict on how to perform the function of an impartial adjudication. In the course of performing this function, the local government council has to regulate access to it according to the disparities in the political, capital resources, power, status and strategies of these competing groups. The council must possess the capacity to regulate the demands on it by these competing groups so as to avoid conflict in the area. This is what Egonmwan (1984) referred to as "assumed shifting equilibrium of power."

Community politics approach is centered on the location of community power. Although there is confusion about decentralization, but it is equal to community autonomy or democracy in a nation. The critics of the community politics approach to decentralization have warned that decentralization should be seen as participation in terms of intensity and scope in modern system rather than democratic characteristics.

Administrative Structure of Local Government

For the purposes of effectiveness and efficiency in service deliver, local Government councils are expected to have six mandatory departments. These are; i. The Department of Personnel Management; ii. The Department of Finance, Supply, Planning, Research and Statistics; and iii. Not more than four "Operations" department reflecting the basic functions and area of concern to local government, namely:- Education; Agriculture and Natural Resources; Works, Housing, Land and Survey; and Medical and Health. Any other expansion of departments can be accommodated under divisions and branches which can further be separated into sections to reflect specialized activities within a sub-professional/professional/divisions/ branches/sections of department. Local governments have their heads, each bearing a functional title reflecting his/her profession in the area of specialization.

The Recruitment System of Local Government

The rules and regulations guiding the personnel management system in the local government service are embodied in a document, referred to as unified Local Government Staff Regulations. The statutory body charged with the onus of the recruitment promotion, transfer, discipline, welfare and training of personnel in the local government system is known as the Local Government Service Commission. There are two categories of staff in the Local Government service. The first category of staff ranging from Grade Levels 07 and above are recruited by the Local Government Service Commission and posted to Local Government Councils. These categories of staff are referred to as the unified staff. The lower level of staff from grade levels 01-06 are to be recruited by the Local Government Council. The onus of recruitment, discipline and promotion of these categories of staff is incumbent upon the Junior Staff Management Committee (JSMC). This committee is a mandatory requirement for all local government councils to establish. Matters of promotion considered by the Junior Staff Management Committee are expected to be conveyed to the Local Government Service Commission not later than the 30th of the subsequent month with the minutes of the relevant meetings of the committee. This is because, most country's local government are bereft of basic life sustaining infrastructure, which would attract professionals to their domain.

Apart from the financial problem of local governments, there is lack of executive capacity, particularly in the technical fields, like agriculture and estate evaluation. Egonmwan (1984) stressed the point that the dearth of skilled manpower to execute major programmes in these fields is a major problem militating against the efficiency and effectiveness of local government. This position is reinforced by the notion held by most professionals, including seasoned administrators that the unified Local Government Service is not an ideal place to work in because of its rural nature and more importantly, the level of notoriety associated with the local government system in Nigeria. There is the fervent desire of people, especially professionals to choose to work in cities festooned with all the paraphernalia of modernity. This local brain-drain has brought about the lack of well- trained professionals in most rural local government areas in Nigeria. According to Ayuba (2012), he asserted the disparity in the rural and urban development in Nigeria can be said to be attributable to the apparent neglect by government for not discouraging the rural-urban drift. Ayuba referenced Ballara (1981) and Oyaide (1989) as he agreed that one of the factors responsible for the rural-urban migration is the absence of basic social facilities in the rural areas. Ani (1999) added that it has also been equally argued that most problems of large cities are caused by rural-urban migration.

Ola & Tonwe (2006), expressed the opinion that the poverty of personnel was worsened by the poor planning for educational development. Poverty was not restricted to the personnel alone, but was reflected in the availability of funds for implementing the planning of educational programmes. The problem is more acute in the areas that are very critical for effective service delivery such as engineers, doctors, accountants, auditors, estate surveyors, architects, town planners and pharmacists etc.

This could be the reason why Oaikhena *et. al.* (2013), posits that, the effective development of the human resources of an enterprise is one of the most vital contributions to the future and long-term growth of development and survival of any establishment.

There is no gainsaying the fact that manpower is the most essential of all the resources required for the translation of the lofty objectives of rural transformation into reality. Man is the engine room of development. It is an established fact that the value of any

organization would improve as qualified employees are attracted, trained and developed in the organization. The asset value of the organization would decrease as skilled staff leaves the organization. This could be the reason why Agbato (2010) assert that, the best or ideal organization is achieved when the individuals see how their activities contribute to the dominant objectives of the organization. Organizations, whether public or private, are prone to jeopardy when there is no adequate human resource and manpower administration. Consequent upon the available premise, the disturbing need arises for manpower management and development as a sie-qua-non for improved performance which ensures optimum productivity and reproduction of a near perfect society. A sustainable use of our natural resources largely depends on the societal capacities of citizens and communities for inter-sectorial and long-term intergenerational responsibility (PDHRE, 2006)

Despite the available human capital, civil service in Nigeria has neither been properly managed nor the available human resources administered effectively and efficiently. Nwanolue (2012) opined that, this ugly trend has fetched the service a bad name over the years. In most cases, staff development is neglected or overlooked entirely. This is usually due to the corruption in the service. Cases abound where funds ranging into millions and billions of naira, meant for staff development have been embezzled by individuals and groups in charge, without any serious actions taken to that effect. This could be the reason why Agbato (2010) posits that, there should be a complete change in value and attitude of upper and middle level management. This he said, are likely to lead to poor and ineffective communication since, more often, there is a deliberate filtering of information passed by the powers that be.

On the other hand, there have been situations where some staff are never given the opportunity for years to undergo training at all. It is now a simple understanding that staff training in the public domain has become a matter of "face-looking" (Nwanolue, 2012). Alluding to this fact was, Oaikhena (2011) when he referenced Tonwe (2004), that systematic training in habits of industry is an effective system of cooperation between workmen and foremen, as it is a faster method to produce not only the work but, better quality work, with fewer mistakes and less scrap, this method he said, increases attention and concentration in the work place.

The local government system in Nigeria has been widely acknowledged as one tier of government that has been grossly marred by ineptitude. While some see it as a result of political interference, leadership style, corruption etc, others see it as a result of weakness, un-readiness and unwillingness of the staffers of the institution to do their job. However, in either ways these opinions are expressed, the underlying and undeniable facts are that something is fundamentally wrong with the system that has left us where we are today. Ekpo (1989) stated that the lack of adequate emphasis on manpower development as a tool for development in Nigeria on the part of government as well as the organized private sector could not be farfetched from the lack of understanding of both the concept and methods application of manpower development in a post-colonial Nigerian State, in which the process of human resources development for national growth was distorted by colonialism with the attendant negative orientation that was injected into political leadership. Nwanolue & Iwuoha (2012) emphasized that the challenges of manpower development in Nigeria's Local Government System are myriads. These challenges according to them include; colonial experience, leadership style, poor human capital planning, corruption.

In the local authority, there are too many square pegs in round holes. The helpless and confused structural contradictions and general malfunctioning of public businesses and institutions are mainly the reason why things are not moving smoothly in the public circle. Meritocracy has been thrown overboard in the nation's public institutions. Those issues such as promotion and even recruitment and staff welfare are now done on preferential basis. Anazodo (2008) stated that there has continued to be the unlikelihood of the attainment of the purposes for which the public sectors in Nigeria were established, reasons being that some senior public servants lack professional depth and often fail to provide any chain of continuity in government over the longer term. From the above, it could therefore be argued that there were distortions in both the concept and methods of application (i.e. utilization) of manpower development in the Nigerian Local Government System as it was oriented towards serving capitalist interest which was consequently left in the hands of self-serving political leaders. In view of the numerous weaknesses associated with the local government system, successive governments had embarked on a number of manpower development reforms to address these problems. The various reform efforts have focused on the search for a more responsive, reoriented, restructured and effective manpower development and its attendant utilization. In spite of these

numerous reforms, it is sad to note that in reality the efforts have not yielded the desired result. For instance, the Nigerian local government system has often been accused of being short sighted, inefficient, incompetent, insensitive and conservative; and lack of imagination.

A comparative institutional reforms analysis conducted by Nwanolue & Iwuoha (2012) showed that the Nigeria's Local Government System has enjoyed more reforms than any other tiers of government in the history of Nigeria, yet the system is still marred by ineptitude. For instance, in the ministries, the permanent secretary who is a career professional is supposed to be the back bone of the politically appointed minister and this continued even to the local government system where we have the head of service. But in return what happens is that at the local government level most of these civil servants are illiterates whom either by any means found themselves in the system without the requisite qualifications. The pertinent question therefore becomes how well we can in the midst of these problems, better enhance and strengthen our local government system through adequate manpower utilization.

Manpower Development and Manpower Utilization
Indeed the importance of manpower development and its corresponding utilization especially at the local governments has become more obvious given the growing complexity of the work environment, the rapid change in organizations and technological advancement which further necessitates the need for training and development of personnel to meet the trend challenges. Manpower development helps to ensure that organizational members possess the knowledge and skills they need to perform their jobs effectively, take on new responsibilities, and adapt to changing conditions. It is important to note that, when properly utilized; i.e. ensuring that skills developed are placed in the exact areas of specialty, will consequently help in improving quality of work performance, customer satisfaction, productivity, morale, management succession, business development and profitability.

Manpower/human resource training however, can be defined as training of people in developing their capability on their hobs. Beach (1980) defined training as the organized procedure by which people learn from a definite purpose. The purpose of training according to Beach is to achieve a change in behavior of those trained. Training is a vital aspect of organizational needs. Appropriate and regular training

equips the staff with organizational values, goals and norms, impact new skills, techniques and knowledge of one's jobs, increases problem-solving capabilities, and hence raises the level of workers performance. Above all, training keeps the staff abreast with the demands of a fast changing society.

The issue of utilization of developed manpower is aptly and unavoidably important if the sole objective of manpower development is to be achieved (Ozigbo, 2010). The concept of Manpower embraces the totality of human resources within an organization and it determines the level and extent of development of such organization. It is important to note that all the activities of any organization are initiated and determined by the persons that make up the organization. In other words, offices, computer equipment and all that the organization uses are unproductive and useless except they are put by human effort and direction. Human resource development and utilization in both public and private organization has become extra ordinarily important, especially in the changing world, that one (an employee) who was productive sometime in the past may loose meaning (become unproductive) sometime in the future due to the changing time and/or environment. Sometimes, it happens that the changes that occur in an organization or the job, which an employee may be required to carry, demands a kind of knowledge so strange that the employee could not produce. In other to change, with the changing environment and work requirements, organizations must develop their manpower very well so that right the person is at the right place at the right time in order to meet organizational goals and changes.

One serious problem according to Chukwuemeka (2003) confronting public personnel managers is the most effective method of matching people with job. Experts, over the period have grappled with the problem of whether job should be designed to suit the individual or get the individual to fit into a job position. This calls for taking strategic steps or actions and this action is manpower training for development. An effective, human resources according to Ojo (1997) is central and vital to organization effectiveness. It requires an understanding of a range of factors involved in the manpower planning processes and specific roles of the various factors involved in the planning in line with the organizational, goals and objectives. More so, human resource development and utilization should be a critical concern of organizations particularly, the personnel officers, who should bear in mind while

planning for human resource, that only intelligent, capable hands could successfully achieve the organizational goals.

The human resource of any organization holds the key to its survival, advancement and future development. This is why Renesis (1967) pointed out the importance of manpower and the need for its planning in an organization cannot be over emphasized. Accordingly, the development of a concept of executive action embodies the skills, of influencing and controlling the nature and direction of change. It also involves persuasive and continuous executive function of complex process of perceptions, analysis, conceptual thought, communication, decision and action. Nwachukwu (1988), notwithstanding viewed manpower development and utilization, as referring to the projection of future requirements for a given number of people, that is, people with specific skills to meet the demand of various sections of the economy.

In other words, the authors tried to emphasize that in an organization manpower development programmes must be in accordance with the organization's broad objectives. In most organizations, developing human resources strategy becomes a search for those candidates, who can contribute to the realization of the organizational objectives.

The Issue of Merit as a Criterion for Manpower Development in the Local Government System
Various governments in Nigeria have facilitated the training of personnel for both the public and private sector. According to Onasanya (1999) the Industrial Fund act of 1971 was aimed at funding a training system that would create a pool of trained indigenous manpower for the economy, providing a sort of consultancy on training needs to the various employers and encouraging them to establish their own training centers. While, Agbator (2010) posits that knowledge can come to us through several avenues – personal experience, perception or even through the experience of others. To achieve this thrust of the interrelatedness, the mechanism in which trainees are selected should be one devoid of corrupt tendencies. This is because if it is not justiceably made, it may amount to the popular saying"… as one bad apple in a basket…", that is to say that if any of the policy areas is devoid of merit in the selection for training, it would undoubtedly bring to futility each of the others. For example, the

development of incentive or reward systems affects the ability of an organization to respond to rapid change.

Similarly, communication between administrators in local government ensures that all other policy areas are linked to one another through building and reinforcing the appropriate organizational culture around the organizational mission. Onasanya (1999) reiterated that, identifying and assessing training needs should depend upon the corporate plan of the organization. The functions of local government according to Nwata (1995), is classified as obligatory and discretionary, such functions include agricultural programme, animal husbandry building and communication, education administration, fishery, forestry, small scale industries, medical services, security disposal etc. As a result manpower development has become an important emphasis for all governments' components especially the local government in an age of global competition in which all large-scale organization must compete for resources whether they are in the private or public sector (Adamolekun, 2011).

Capacity Building of Personnel in Local Government
According to Beesley and Shebby (2010), capacity building can be defined straightforwardly as a process for strengthening the management and governance of an organization so that it can effectively achieve its objectives and fulfill its mission. From past experience, it is common knowledge that the local government has the weakest capacity to initiate and manage rural development programmes. This is due to the fact that the quality and quantity of human resources available at the local government level is seriously insufficient. Capacity building, becomes an intervention that strengthens an establishment's ability to fulfill its mission by promoting sound management, strong governance, and persistent rededication to achieving results. Most official who perform their functions without the relevant qualifications, perform poorly. As a result, available resources for accelerated and sustainable rural development are inefficiently utilized for the purposes intended, thus leaving the local governments today without a reasonable number of qualified Accountants, Engineers, Medical Doctors, Property Valuers or even Economists. This could be the reason why Onasanya (1999) agreed that education is the systematic and continuous way of instructing a person with a view to imparting knowledge into such a person so as to develop him mentally, physically and spiritually.

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Strategies for Capacity Building in Local Government

It has become imperative to adopt urgent measures aimed at raising the executive capacity profile of local governments if they are to fulfill the rural development role which has been assigned to this level of government. There have been annual staff development plan in line with the local government capacity development plan. This has become imperatives due to some urgent measures such as; staff development at local government and community level must be intensified, training in planning and management of rural development must be hastened as this will form the basis upon which the local government human capacity will be strengthened, training to be undertaken through on-the-job, in-service and academic methods through joint collaboration between the federal, state and local governments etc, conduct of a staff audit as a first step with a view to determining areas where there is excess capacity and shortfalls which are to be addressed, utilization of critical expertise that is available from the pool of retired professionals and carry out recruitment of suitably qualified persons to improve the quality of staff available at the local government level.

Thus, capacity building is not limited to training personnel or the provision of technical assistant (TA), but may include overhauling systems, remodeling physical infrastructure, recruiting new personnel, and improving the efficiency of the use of existing resources (Wing 2004). Consequently, for capacity building to improve at the local government to ensure accelerated and sustainable development certain measures must be adopted as a way forward and these includes; capacity assessment/profile, analysis of the existing capacity problems, assessment of past approaches to capacity building, strengthening the existing system and technology transfer.

Perennial Problems of Local Government Personnel Management

1. **General Indiscipline**

According to Okhakhu, (2012), indiscipline refers to the deliberate non-conformity with the rules, regulations and values of any given society. In Nigeria for instance, the problems of indiscipline continue to rise in geometrical proportion in spite of the many years of independence. Indiscipline is rampantly perceived and well pronounced among the workers in local government. The senior officers who travel to their families away from their offices on Friday, return very late the following Monday or may decide to stay back till Tuesday, and the junior members of staff who directly or indirectly observe this more often than not are in the habit of playing truant with the jobs. Little or no commitment to duty has become a rule rather than an exception.

Offices have been turned to market places were officers hawk their goods freely. The rules that guide moral conduct and professional ethics seem to have, at worst, become cobweb that is too weak to tame the monstrous activities of the workers. Indiscriminate lustful desires are noticeable among the workers. The official relationship between super ordinates and subordinates has been stained. Strict instructions handed down from top echelon to the bottom are either not followed or treated with levity, as a result of the immoral relationship between the boss and subordinates. Official duties are seen as an extension of private leisure. Laisse faire attitude to work has arrested the efficiency of local government and has drastically affected its performance.

Undue Interference

The degree of external influence and intrusion in the local government affairs by the higher levels of government is worrisome and needs re-evaluation. Situation where the state governor unconstitutionally dissolves the entire elected council's officers without proper investigations on spurious allegations is not good for the future of local government administration in the country. Such external interference indeed subverts democratic process and undermines constitutional authority at the grassroots level. The crux of the matter is the 'almighty' power and misuse of i.e. enjoyed by the state government over local governments. Practically, and in the true sense, local government in Nigeria lacks autonomous financial power. Local government is now considered an extension of state's ministry. The inherent nature of this problem has caused subservience, a situation where local government waits for the next directives from state government before the former could think of, let alone embarking on development projects.

Conclusion

Personnel is a critical factor in the attainment of the goals of an organization, hence good organizational structure does not by itself, guarantee good performance. Personnel is life to the existence, survival and development of an organization as food is to man; since all the activities of any organization are initiated and determined by the persons who make up that organization. Plant, offices, computers, automated equipment and all else that a modern firm uses are unproductive except for human efforts and direction. This is why personnel have been defined as persons employed in an organization to perform some kind of work or task including the management of

them. However, the ability of personnel to contribute to the attainment of the goals of an organization such as the local government depends to a large extent on how well they are managed. This is because all the task of managing the human component is central and most important task because all else depend on how well it is done. Simply put, the personnel of an organization have to be properly managed for them to be able to make maximum contribution to the organization. Such organization may be the local government council.

Local government is a unit of government below the central, regional and state government, established by law to exercise political authority through a representative council within a defined area. It is also a system of public administration at a local level, charged with the responsibility of bringing the people at the grassroots closer to the government. It involves a philosophical commitment to a democratic participation in the governing process at the local level. The expediency for the creation of local government stems from the need to facilitate development at the grassroots. Its importance, however, is a function of its ability to generate sense of belongingness, safety and satisfaction among its populace. To achieve these important changes, the seeming impediments, in the context of problems of personnel management, such that have infringed on its performance of functions, duties and responsibilities, should be dealt with.

Recommendations
a. It is important to note however that while the government deals with the environmental problems confronting the people, the individual should make adequate efforts to imbibe a high-spirit of discipline and patience which is the hallmark of civilization and this will make our local government fair better in areas of efficiency and effectiveness.
b. The elite at the local government level should show sufficient commitment to making the local government system work in the interest of all in the society.
c. Local government administration should place more emphasis on staff training, retraining and developments. This will enhance employee performance and productivity irrespective of their quality/qualification on entry point. In this era of globalization, competition is the order of the day and local governments cannot be left out.

d. It is important to emphasize the role and support of top management personnel, which is also critical and important in ensuring a robust and good employee relation management system in the local government.

e. Adequate funding should be made available for local government administration. As public accountability and transparency is encouraged amongst administrators.

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THE STATE IN POST – COLONIAL SOCIETY: PARTY SWITCHING AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

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Abstract
Democratic governance particularly the one patterned on elections under the platforms of political parties is increasingly becoming a global phenomenon. The journey of Nigeria's political development has been rough. Successive fourth republic elections with increasing lack of confidence in the electoral process have witnessed several instances of inter – party switching with attendant consequences. Even the electoral reform that began shortly after the 2007 general elections has not been able to redress this development. The introduction of Smart Card Readers for the purpose electronic accreditation of voters in the 2015 general elections made it the most credible elections in Nigeria's fourth republic. This achievement however plummeted in the 2019 general elections. The study adopted the qualitative method of research with occasional use of simple statistics. Documentary evidences such as published materials namely textbooks, journal articles, official documents, and the internet were used. The paper adopted the neo – Marxian theory to examine the nature and dynamics of Nigeria's electoral democracy. It finds out that the character of the post – colonial state in Nigeria has greatly imparted access to political leadership and the dynamics of power relations. It therefore recommends a re-negotiation of the Nigerian state so as to spell out an acceptable pattern of political succession and an agreed legal framework to guide elections, which will make party switching difficult in Nigeria.

Keywords: Party Switching, Democratic Governance, Democratic Consolidation, Elections.

Introduction

Party switching has become a major discussion in the practice of democracy across the globe. It is central to the notion of the degree of consolidation or otherwise of democracy in many countries of the world. Nigeria is not an exception to this development. In fact Fashagba (2014)'s study, which focusses on party witching in the Nigerian upper legislative chamber maintains that party switching has become a common denominator of new democracies in Africa. This scenario has occurred most frequently in Nigeria's fourth republic than any other in Nigeria's democratic journey. This is probably attributable to the fact that Nigeria has experienced the highest sustenance of democratic governance in this forth republic with nearly twenty one years of unbroken democratic democracy and at least four successive general elections.

Despite the fact that party switching has become an established development in the Nigeria's political development, the highest dimension of it was experienced in the build – up to the 2015 general elections. This development tampered greatly with the political permutations of the electoral fortune of the two major political parties, namely; the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC), which was a new political party formed out of a merger of about three former opposition political parties. There are multitude of reasons given by politicians for the indiscrimate practice of party switching in Nigeria such as re-election concern, the ambition to pursue other career paths, lack of clear – cut political ideology, among others combined to spur party switching in Nigeria.

Political parties serve as the core element of a democracy. Party politics is indispensable to democratic governance (Katsina, 2016). Democracy according to Hoffman and Graham (2009:103) is perhaps "the most promicuous word in the world of public affairs." The promiscuity in it is equally reflected in what happens to its core element noteably poltitcal parties. The fuidity of political parties necessitated the incessant cases of party switching in emerging democracies. An appraisal of the party system of a state and other accosiated developments is necessary for the understanding of the circumstances ocassioning inter – party mobility in the state.

Party switching is a relatively understudied phenomenon" (O'Brien and Shomer cited in Knott, 2017:3). However, "a recent study shows that party switching occurs more frequently and more broadly than the literature suggests" (Knott, 2017:3).

The stability of the party system is undisputably essential for the sustainability of a democracy. The instability in the party system of Nigeria is predicated on the nature and purpose for forming those political parties. Political parties in Nigeria were not formed to help address and solve the political problem of the country. Instead, as Fashagba, Davis, & Oshewolo (2014:251) note, many of the political "parties were formed for power seeking purpose." To this end, the failure to secure power or potential threat to sustaining power becomes an automatic basis for party switching. However, this instability of party systems decrease the possibility of having a stable and sustainable democracy necessary for political development (Ames, 2001; Bowler, Farrell, & Katz, 1999; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Fashagba, Davis, & Oshewolo, 2014). A critical as effective political parties are for political development and the functioning of moderrn representative democracy, particularly with special focus on transitional and consolidating democracies, Norris (2005:3) asserts that "far less emphasis, however, has been placed on developing *effective political parties" in transitional and consolidating democracies.*

Knott (2017:4) argues that "legislative scholars interested in party unity typically ignore party switching behaviour in their research". The predominance of party switching among legislators is often dismissed as merely an indicator of weak or absence of party discipline or existence of political parties that are weakly institutionalized. The benefits of party membership are emormous. Some of them according to Knott (2017:6) include "financial and human resources during a campaign, access to government funds and power over its distribution, and the ability to engage in the policy-making process." When these benefits are threatened, party switching could become the inevitable consequences.

As long as this continued, stability of political parties is not guarrantted, a situation which unavoidably tampers with the sustainability and consolidation of democracy. It is on this note that this paper interrogates the implication of party switching for the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria's fourth especially within the context of the character of the post – colonial state in Africa.

The problematique of the extant literature focussed on party switching in the parliament. A few others concentrate on general party switching. The point of departure therefore is the merger of the two perspectives vis – a – vis democratic consolidation with emphasis on the neo – Marxian theory of the state in post – colonial

society. Apart from this introduction, the other sections of this paper are; methods, theoretical framework, discussion, conclusion and recommendations.

Methods
This paper adopts the qualitative method with occasional use of the quantitative method in form of descriptive statistics. The qualitative research is a situation where a researcher attempts to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them in natural settings (Gabrielian, Yang, & Spice, 2008). The quantitative method on the other hand deals with numeric and statistical data (Peter, 2018). The data for the paper were collected from secondary sources namely, published texts and journal articles, unpublished thesis. The primary information used in this paper came from personal observation and interview of some stakeholders who are knowledgeable on the challenges of party switching in the consolidation of democracy particularly in emerging democracies. The opinions of some politicians on the subject matter was also incorporated. The paper made extensive use of the internet in sourcing the information that are useful for the study as could be seen at different sections of the paper.

This paper used the *ex post facto* research design. It involves the "control on a variety of variables measured in the post-test" (Leege & Francis, 1974:79). It refers to a situation whereby a researcher examines the effect of a naturally occurring treatment after it has occurred. In other words, it is a study that attempts to discover the pre-existing causal conditions between groups. It is an examination of the X and Y variables. The X variable is the independent variable whereas the Y is the dependent variable. The independent variable in this paper is party switching whereas the dependent variable is consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. These variables were discussed within the framework of the neo – Marxian theory of the state in post – colonial society.

Theoretical Framework
The paper adopts the neo – Marxian theory of analysis to examine the nature of the state in post – colonial society, which explains the inherent contradictions bedeviling the Nigerian state. This theory is relevant in explaining the character of the post – colonial state in Africa. The state in post – colonial society is an agent used by the ruling class for primitive accumulation of values. In doing so, political elites do everything necessary to ensure continual control of the state through both legal and

extra – legal means. Ake (2003) rightly notes that, the challenge in Africa is not that development has failed, but that African leaders do not have development in their agenda. This justifies the stiffening political development of the Nigerian state as Nigeria has not been able to conduct a generally acceptable elections from independence to date. This justifies Fashagba, Davis, & Oshewolo (2014) assertion that political parties in Nigeria has not been able to champion political development.

This character of the post – colonial state in Africa as evident in Nigeria is manifested in diverse areas of Nigeria's national life. In Ibeanu (2006)'s primitive accumulation of votes analogy presupposes that this fraudulent practices have stifled free and fair elections and denied the people of good governance which is essential for development. The contemporary dimension of it is likened to the commodification of electorates in the Nigeria's electoral space (Peter & Peterside, 2019). The situation in post – colonial society is the mimicking of the classical Marxian analogy of commodification of labour and the primitive accumulation of wealth. The Nigeria's scenario is typical of a post – colonial society where the only commodity available for buying and selling is the state. Access to state power provides the automatic avenue for amassing of wealth. This makes the contest for political power fierce and equally explains the prevailing sit – tight syndrome in Nigeria and other African countries (Peter, 2011).

This brings to mind the need for critical view of the Marxian theory of the state. The position of the Marxists about the ideology of the state is quite unique. The state to them is synonymous with class, hence existing to keep class antagonism in check. This equated the state to the bourgeois class with the status of harassing and exploiting the people. To understand society, what we should look at are "the processes through which society produces and distributes the means of its material existence and the struggles, usually among social classes, that are integral to the process" (Ibeanu, 2011:7). On the contrary, the post – colonial state in Nigeria and many post – colonial states takes a different posture with respect to the Marxian postulation on primitive accumulation of wealth. The capitalist in the classical Marxian discourse depends on the exploitation of the workers in form of the surplus value to increase their wealth. The state itself represents the source of wealth in the post – colonial state as rightly evident in Nigeria and other post – colonial states. This makes ascendancy to seats of power tough and well contested because of the opportunities it affords people to *accumulate wealth* (Peter & Ocheni, 2015). The argument is that whereas the classical

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Marxian analogy privilege the accumulation of wealth by the capitalist on the exploitation of the workers, the neo – Marxian scholars assert that the petit bourgeoisie accumulate wealth through the exploitation and emasculation of the state. Like the dictatorship of the proletariat in the classical Marxian parlance, the massive revolts against the state cumulating into the bizarre spate of violent conflicts in different parts of the country that has threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian state is a consequence of years of maladministration, wasteful spending, fiscal indiscipline, lopsided political structure, and other atrocities of the ruling elites (Peter & Ocheni, 2015).

The utility of this theory on the current study is predicated on the assumption that the nature of the state in post – colonial Nigerian society reflects on the character and behaviour of political parties and political elites. The incessant cases of party switching also responds to the core concern of the theory. In the nutshell, selfish interest of politicians reflected in their desire to maintain political office constitute a major driving force for party switching especially in transitional, emerging or consolidating democracies. To this end, question such as 'which political party is most likely to give me what I want'? Accordingly, some switch parties to seek re-election or a new political office, while others do so in order to secure a political appointment. All these reflect the fact that people do everything to switch party to a platform that will afford them those opportunities. This has continued to shape the Nigeria's political development.

Discussion

Party switching is not a new phenomenon in the Nigerian political space. It is generally called defection or decamping in Nigeria and is traceable to the pre – independence era. It began with the disintegration of the Lagos Youth Movement in 1941. The spirit of national character of the party bowed to ethnic pressures when Samuel Akinsanya and the Ijebu Yoruba are pulled out of the Movement. The reason was that the non Ijebu Yoruba's and other ethnic groups, mainly the Igbos, supported the victorious candidacy of an Ijaw, Ernest Ikoli, to the vacant seat in the Legislative Council over that of Akinsanya. The Igbo Union in Lagos, whose members were booed by the Yoruba's prevailed on Azikiwe to form a new political party. This scenario led to the formation of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroun (NCNC), with Herbert Macaulay as the first leader. The second case of party defection was the early morning cross-carpeting of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens

(NCNC) elected members, to the Action Group (AG) on the floor of the Western Nigeria House of Assembly in 1951 (Ogbonna & Emefiena, 2015). Party switching has continued unabated with the fourth republic having the fairest share partly because it has experienced the highest number of years in democracy more than any other republics in post – independent Nigeria.

For instance, former vice president Atiku Abubakar, a founding member of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) switched to the Action Congress (AC), where he contested for the president in the 2007 presidential election and lost. He later returned to the PDP and unsuccessfully attempted to actualise his presidential ambition. The emergence of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in 2013 necessitated the migration of the former president to the APC, where he contested for the ticket to fly the flag of the party in the 2015 presidential election and lost. The inability to achieve his ambition coupled with internal political crisis within the APC made him to switch back to the PDP in the build up to the 2019 general election. He secured the party's ticket but lost the presidential election to his erstwhile political party. This is one among many cases. Most of the members spread across the over seventy political parties in Nigeria where former members of the original three political parties (Peoples Democratic Party, All Peoples Party, and Alliance for Democracy) that contested the 1999 general election. In fact, among these three political parties, only the Peoples Democratic has not changed name between 1999 and 2020. The remaining two have undergone changes, merger, alliances among others at different point in the Nigeria's political development.

Figure 1: Percentage of Votes of Each Political Party in Nigerian Presidential Elections, 1999 to 2019

Sources: Africa Election Database, 2011; Africa Practice (2015); Alonge (2015); BBC (2019); THISDAYLIVE (2019)

For instance, there was massive defection in 2014 of prominent politician from the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) over some irreconcilable differences in the build-up to the 2015 general election who formed an alliance with the then opposition All Progressives Congress (APC), which itself was a coalition of the defunct Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). This scenario affected the fortune of the PDP in the 2015 general elections, as the party lost the 2015 presidential elections (see figure 1) to the opposition APC and lost control of the National Assembly to the opposition APC (see figures 2 and for details). The scenario that played out between

1999 and 2011 justifies Bogaards (2008:114)'s submission that "a dominant party system exists when one party wins an absolute majority in parliament over at least three consecutive elections and captures the presidency."

Fashagba (2014) argues that re-election concern, the ambition to pursue other career paths, and patronage are found to spur the party defections. For instance, the political re-alignment in the build – up to the Nigeria's 2015 general elections was occasioned by;

a.   The perceived reneging of the unwritten power rotation agreement that edged out the Northern region following the death of Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in 2010.
b.   The escalating onslaught of the Boko Haram terrorist group on the Nigerian state.
c.   International conspiracy against Nigeria
d.   The perceived escalating tendency of corruption in Nigeria.

Senatorial Seats won by Political Parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Figure 2: Senatorial Seats won by Political Parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic
*The parties changed within the years.
** Generally categorized as others but realistically undetermined immediately after the election. Subsequent supplementary elections addressed some of those issues.
Sources: Africa Election Database (2011); THISDAYLIVE (2019); Wikipedia (2015); Wikipedia (2019)

The same scenario played out in the build up to the 2019 general elections, when many of those gladiators who left the PDP in 2014 returned to the party, apparently to wrestle power from the party they helped to install in 2015. Surprisingly, the reverse became the case as the APC still retained power at the federal level and controlled clear majority in the two chambers of the legislative arm of the government (see figures 1, 2, & 3 for details), though the election was allegedly fraudulent (IRI & NDI, 2019). The APC is the one unravelling and the PDP is trying to hold together disparate strands and personalities, hoping that the objective of replacing Buhari is enough to hold the assorted whole together (Ajakaye, 2018; Akinloye, 2018). There may be a change of dominance status from the PDP to the APC, at least going my Bogaards (2008) assertion of dominant political party. The percieved fraud in the conduct of the 2019 general election if not checked by an Act of Parliament, political will of the political elites, and a conscious civil society may ocassioned the perpetuity of the APC in power even beyond the sixteen years of PDP's dominance.

Federal Constituencies Won by Political Parties in Nigeria, 1999 to 2019
*The parties changed within the years.
Sources: Africa Election Database (2011); THISDAYLIVE (2019); Wikipedia (2015); Wikipedia (2019)

Motivations for Party Switching in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

The scenario of party switching has continued unabated in post – independent Nigeria. The highest dimension of it is in the Nigeria's fourth republic. One of the clogs in the wheel of democratic system in Nigeria which has affected the country's desire to practice a 'true' multiparty democracy is party defection (Aleyomi, 2013).

The character of the state in post – colonial society, where access to state resources is the source of wealth is essentially responsible for party switching. This is contrary to the Marxian analysis of the European capitalist society, where the economic base determines the socio-political and cultural superstructure (Igwe, 2005).

Akinnaso (2018) identified some of the motivations for party switching to include; (a) ethical reasons, which states that members who feel that their views are no longer in alignment with those of their political party may feel ethically obliged to leave the party, (b) factionalisation within the party, (c) if politicians wish to seek some political advantage, such as elective office or a "juicy" appointment, which the current political party may not provide, (d) selfish interest, which has to do with the question 'which political party is most likely to give me what I want?' to this end, some switch parties to seek re-election or a new political office, while others do so in order to secure a political appointment. Conclusion in extant literature suggests that politicians of newly democratising, transitory and consolidating democracy use party switching as a strategy to pursue their goals. This is reinforced by Kreppel and Hix (2003:79)'s assertioon that "parties will be willing to go into office with any other party in the party system to secure the benefits of government office.

Reasons for Party Switching in Nigeria's Fourth Republic
The unproductive character of the Nigeria's political elites is a core reason for party switching. The elites do not have any other occupation outside politics. So to avoid redundancy, they move at will from one political party to the other. This position was emphasised by former president Olusegun Obasanjo. As a guest speaker at the parliamentary support institute's programme in 2009, the former president made it abundantly clear that Nigerian politicians do not have second address. The implication of this is that politics becomes the only business they have. This has made politics do or die in nature. The attempt to perpetrate themselves in office made them to jump from one political party to the other.

Immature democracy characterised with political parties that lacked clear – cut ideology. This is corroborated by Fashagba, Davis, & Oshewolo (2014:251)'s assertion that "political parties in Nigeria and especially in the fourth republic lack clearly defined ideology." This has made party switching which is popularly called decamping a recurrent decimal in the Nigeria's political landscape.

Absence of internal democracy in political parties. General consensus among the respondents to the interview question on one of the reasons for the proliferation of party switching in the Nigeria's fourth shows that many politicians were manipulated out of their original party due to the candidate imposition syndrome and other

undemocratic practices. Such politicians find solace in other political party(ies) that is willing to offer them their platforms. This corroborates with Michels' iron law of oligarchy' (Michels, 1962). In a study of the virtually most outspoken pro – democracy political party in Germany (the Social Democratic Party), Michels (1962) concludes that despite the party's democratic ideology, its internal affairs are conducted in a seemingly undemocratic manner. His conclusion therefore is that for the purpose of decision – making efficiency, all large organisations have to be run by a handful of officers. This makes democracy virtually impossible.

The lopsided nature of the enabling laws and the non – provision for independent candidacy have continued to serve as a purveyor for party switching in Nigeria's fourth republic. Over 80% of the interview respondents are unanimous that ambiguity in the extant laws are responsible for the reckless and unprincipled party switching among Nigerias politicians.

A good number of respondents agree that politicians do not bother about the future of the people and their constituency. This has to do with the selfish interest of politicians, who apparently are greedy. This is corroborated by Magaloni (2008:715)'s assertion that, "dictators can minimize the risk of being overthrown when they are able to co-opt potential rivals by offering credible power-sharing deals that guarantee a share of power over a long run."

Implications of Party Switching for the Survival of Nigeria's Democracy

This systemic behaviourism by so called self-styled politicians in Nigeria has reduced the quality of opposition and regional balance affecting the capacity and ability for checks and balances which is compromised hence weakening the process and system of governance. Over 90% of my respondents are unanimous that party switching weakens opposition politics. Ideally, "there is always a thesis, which is the original idea, followed by antithesis, which is the opposition to the original idea. These two are then combined to form a synthesis of the two ideas for progress to be made" (Muse & Narsiah, 2015:412). That is obviously not the case in an atmosphere of reckless party switching.

Party switching is a deiliberate act of emasculating opposition. However, strong and viral opposition is indispensible to the existence and entrenchment of good

governance. Good govemance is a "*sine qua non* of development" (Gberevbie, 2009:170). The implication according to him is that "the more democratic a society is, the more likely that society would experience good govemance" (Gberevbie, 2009:170).

The existence of a viral opposition is necessary for good governance. This is because, a vibrant oppostiton serves as a check on the power of the ruling party. The implication is that anti-people policies of the government are easily challenged and possibly reversed when opposed by the opposition political party and a conscious civil society. For instance, the strong opposition to the removal of subsidy on Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) in 2012 lead to its reversal. A similar hike in the prices of PMS by the Muhammadu Buhari's administration was not opposed, hence the untold pains and harship unleased on the Nigerian populace.

The existence of a functional opposition political party is essential for the sustainability of democracy. The existence of a viral and ideology driven opposition political party provides the people an alternative platform and policy option in a multi-party democratic structure.

Conclusion and Recommendations
Drawing from the views of Katsina (2016) earlier presented, party leaders and other critical stakeholders within the country's democratic space must continue to work towards mitigating the factors that make party switching inevitable. The need to respect the principles of rule of law, internal democracy, and adoption of coherent policy blueprints for the development of their societies should occupy the front burner in their activities.

Democratic governance that allows for free, fair and credible election is essential for the entrenchment of good governance. Nigeria has embraced democracy that is patterned on elections under the platforms of political parties. However, the Nigeria's fourth republic has experienced a plethora of party switching occasioned by absence of ideology, lack of internal democracy as a result of imposition of candidates, fragility of the institutions and absence and/or weakness of enabling laws.

The journey of Nigeria's political development has been tough and rough. Successive fourth republic elections are characterized with increasing lack of confidence in the electoral process. The negative perception of the Nigerian people of absence of fair

play and transparency has necessitated the gay of party switching with attendant consequences. Even the electoral reform that began shortly after the 2007 general elections has not been able to redress this development. The introduction of Smart Card Readers for the purpose electronic accreditation of voters in the 2015 general election made it a fairly credible election in Nigeria's fourth republic. This achievement however plummeted in the 2019 general election. The conclusion therefore is that the character of the post – colonial state in Africa as explained by the neo – Marxian theory examines the nature and dynamics of Nigeria's electoral democracy. The character of the post – colonial state in Nigeria has also imparted access to political leadership and the dynamics of power relations.

It is established that party switching may neither necessarily guarantee victory for the person switching party nor achieve its intended purpose. For instance, the massive party switching in the build up to the 2015 general election achieved its intended purpose by the defeat of an incumbent but a similar mass party switching from the new ruling party (APC) failed to achieve its intended purpose. This calls to play the possibility of some intervening variables that could be responsible for this reverse consequences.

It is therefore recommended that a re-negotiation of the Nigerian state so as to spell out an acceptable pattern of political succession is not only necessary but urgently inevitable so as to avert and/or minimise party switching. This will remove the unnecessary tension that usually accompany elections in Nigeria.

There is an urgent need to have an agreed legal framework that can guide elections and make party switching difficult in Nigeria. This also includes enabling laws that govern the existence and operation of political parties. Since political parties are essential components of a democratic machine, it is imperative that they be democratic in their internal operations as one cannot give what he does not have. This, therefore, makes internal (intra-party) democracy a crucial feature which political parties must possess in order to be able to make fundamental input to any democratic arrangement and speed up democratic consolidation.

All activities and systems within parties should be guided by internal rules and procedures in agreement with the expectations of party members and the legally established statutory organs. This will address all perceived injustices and ensured the stability of members in their political parties.

Holding of democratic, periodic elections of party leaders, and a non-personalized leadership that willingly submits itself to these periodic elections is essential for forestalling party switching. To this end, issues such as life chairman, life patron, automatic ticket or automatic second term will not be the case. The implication of this therefore, is every member has the potential of becoming anything within the hierarchy of the political party. As long as this is not done and people consistently feel alienated from their political parties, the possibility of switching party will continue to persist.

Without prejudice to the 'iron's law of oligarchy, deliberate efforts must be made to ensure decisions – making are as democratized as possible. When decision – making is democratized with equal and open participation of all members in the process in such a way that various interests are more or less equally represented; the possibility of party switching will be minimised.

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A RETROSPECTIVE APPRAISAL OF THE 2014 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION IN EKITI STATE, NIGERIA: LESSONS IN DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

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Abstract

Electoral and political developments in the Southwest Nigeria, where Ekiti State is situated have always attracted considerable attention in extant scholarship. Most existing studies have concentrated on the manifestation and changing scenes of electoral and political conflicts in some parts of the Southwest. Nevertheless, the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State has not attracted much systematic academic attention despite the peculiar events and developments that characterized that election in the historical anal of Ekiti State in particular, and Nigeria in general. Therefore, employing primary and secondary sources of data collection, this study attempts a retrospective appraisal of the intricate dynamics of the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State with a view to systematically analyzing the concomitant implications for democracy and good governance in the polity. Findings revealed that despite some acclaimed capital projects although carried in some parts of the state by Governor Kayode Fayemi, unpopular policies of his administration, declining public trust in the ruling party and lack of internal democracy in the APC provoked "protest voting" by the electorate in favour of the PDP during the election. Thus, the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State marked a landmark development in the political history of the state arising from victory of Ayo Fayose of the PDP over the incumbent. The study submits that credible electoral framework, intensive democratic education,

deliberate people-oriented delivery of democracy dividends and purpose-driven internal democracy in the political parties are of capital importance for effective democratic process and productive governance in Ekiti State.

Introduction

After many years of military intrusion in politics, Nigeria experienced democratic rebirth with the emergence of the Fourth Republic in 1999. However, electoral disputes, among other variables have remained an enduring image of the electoral process, thereby constituting potential threat to the democratic consolidation in the country. The Southwestern Nigeria, where Ekiti State is situated, has being an epicenter of scholarly discourse considering its intricate dynamic influence on Nigeria's democratic experimentation (Ademoyega, 1981; Babarinsa, 2003; Osaghae, 2002; Adebanwi, 2003; Albert, 2011; Olukotun, 2007; Egwu, 2007).

Nevertheless, emerging trends characterizing the 2014 gubernatorial election in the history of Ekiti State have not been well captured in the literature despite the unprecedented implications these have had for the democratic experimentation in the country since the inception of the fourth republic. Therefore, this study attempted a retrospective appraisal of the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State with a view to filling the obvious historical lacuna in the study area, and by so doing, putting the chronology of democratic developments in Nigeria's fourth republic in proper perspective.

Employing primary and secondary sources of data collection, the study seeks to identify the variables that influenced the electoral behavior of the electorate across party divides in view of the implications for grassroots democracy and post-election social integration in the state. The study examined the socioeconomic and political events that characterized the tenure of Dr. Kayode Fayemi and related pre-election intraparty and interparty activities in the state and determines how these had influenced the electoral behavior of the Ekiti people on the Election-Day.

Without undermining the impact of other political parties that participated in the 2014 gubernatorial election in the state, the study attempted to lay specific emphasis on the three major political parties in that election, namely All Progressive Congress (APC), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Labour Party (LP). The reason for this is simply because these three invariably represented the overall characteristics and dynamics of the political events in the election under consideration as displayed by the political parties, and for the purpose of coherent collection, analysis and interpretation of data.

The study examined the intriguing trajectories that characterized the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State in view of the implications for governance and democratic experimentation in Nigeria. The study beamed investigation searchlight into the activities of the political parties with a view to determining how electoral violence, monetary inducement for vote buying and other forms of electoral malpractices compromised the credibility of the exercise that seemed to be free and fair on the face value. The organizing thrust of this study is that undemocratic tendencies in the 2014 gubernatorial election constituted potential threats to good governance and grassroots participatory democracy in Ekiti State in particular, and Nigeria in general.

Conceptual Issue: Liberal Democracy
Election has remained an indispensable component of democracy in modern times. This is because it is considered as an important criterion for political representation in a democracy (Heywood, 2003). Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of human Rights describes election as the very basis of legitimate governmental authority. For any leadership to command popular acceptability, credibility and legitimacy in a democratic environment, the electoral process under which such leadership emerges must be conducted in a free, fair and equitable atmosphere.

However, election is just one of the major preconditions for the entrenchment of democratic culture in a political system because democracy has both electoral and non-electoral components (Heywood, 2003). Any political system that observes the electoral components of democracy at the expense of its non-electoral components is regarded as "electoral democracy", or 'electoral fallacy' (Johnston, 2001; Green & Luehrmann, 2003). On the other hand, any democracy that fulfills both the electoral and non-electoral conditions of democracy is commonly known as 'Liberal democracy'. Democratic election which is a major corner stone of liberal democracy has certain characteristics as identified by Alemika:

- *Universal or inclusive suffrage, including right of all adults to vote or to run for office;*
- *Independent electoral institutions and tribunals;*
- *Adequate and timely funding of electoral institutions and tribunals;*
- *Explicit electoral rules;*
- *Efficient compilation of comprehensive and accurate voters' register;*
- *Adequate information on voters' registration and polling centres;*
- *Free and fair administration of polls –devoid of monetary and other forms of corruption, fraud and intimidation;*
- *Accessibility of polling centres to registered voters;*
- *Adequate, but non-repressive and non-partisan deployment of security agencies and measures to ensure safety of polling and collation centres and of voting materials; and*
- *Accurate counting of votes and declaration of results (Alemika, 2007: 148-149).*

Suffice it to submit that liberal democracy is "*a political system in which the citizenry enjoys a number of basic civil and political rights and in which their most important political leaders are elected in free and fair elections and accountable under the rule of law" (Alemika, 2007: 148-149).* Criteria for liberal democracy are encapsulated in the 2007 World Bank reports in which it published indicators of good governance

comprising six broad dimensions, namely:
  i.   Voice and accountability;
  ii.   Political stability and absence of violence;
  iii. Government effectiveness;
  iv.   Regulatory quality;
  v.   Rule of law; and
  vi.   Control of corruption.

An often-neglected aspect of Liberal democracy is the socio-economic rights of all citizens. Adejumobi (2000:9) highlights this when he stated that "liberal democracy especially as it canvassed for Third World countries weighs high in the claim for civil and political rights, but very silent, if not against socio-economic rights".

Most democratic states in the third world are categorized at the bottom billion because they seem to have reflected shallow indices of liberal democracy and with considerable indices of political violence (Collier, P. 2010). This is because they treat democracy as an event rather than a process by observing the rituals of conducting periodic elections without deepening the tenets and practice of consolidated democracy (Johnston, 2001; Green & Luehrmann, 2003). Given the experience of the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State, it could be argued that the democratic process has not satisfied the basic criteria for liberal democracy in Nigeria.

Ekiti State in Historical and Sociological Perspectives
The state of Ekiti was one of the six new states that came into being on October 1, 1996. It was carved out of the Old Ondo State during the military administration of General Sani Abacha, as part of the memorable events to mark Nigeria's 36th independence anniversary. During early era of the Nigeria's first republic, Old Ondo State was part of Old Western region and Old Western State. Old Ondo State emerged in 1967as a distinct state entity in Nigeria's federalist structure. For administrative convenience, the state is divided into four divisions, namely: Ekiti Central, Ekiti North, Ekiti South and Ekiti West. With Ado-Ekiti as the Seat of government, the state has 16 Local Government Areas.

The name of the state was derived from the geographical characteristic of the area where the ancestors of the people had chosen to settle: a hilly place, which in their mother tongue is referred as *"Ile Olotiti, and* was coined into *"Ekiti"*, which becomes a suffix attached to almost all the names of towns and villages in the state. One unique characteristic of Ekiti State in comparison to all other states of the federation is its nature of homogeneity. Unlike some other states of the federation, the state of Ekiti is not dichotomized along majority/minority groups because everyone in Ekiti is Ekiti (Akinwale, 2001). This homogeneous composition is clearly expressed in the identical suffix (Ekiti) attached to the names of almost all cities, towns and villages in the state, and from which the name of the state is derived. Examples are Ado-Ekiti, Ikere-Ekiti, Iyin-Ekiti, Aramoko-Ekiti, Ikogosi-Ekiti, Ijero-Ekiti, Oye-Ekiti, Ikole-Ekiti, Ifaki-Ekiti, Isan-Ekiti, Isan-Ekiti, Ifishin-Ekiti, Ilawe-Ekiti and so on.

Ekiti State is endowed with numerous mineral resources including granite, gold, iron ore, phosphate, and limestone, among others. The state is also blessed with many tourism attractions including Ikogosi warm spring, Ipole-Iloro Water Falls and Olosunta Hills. For instance, Ikogosi warm spring is unique natural characteristic comprising cold and warm water gushing out from one source.

Moreover, despite the fact that the state is disproportionally predominated by Christianity and Islam, religious factor does not play a domineering role in the electoral process in the state. However, the combination of homogeneous ethnic identity and religious tolerance, coupled with evidence of enviable concentration of political and educated elites in that land of honour has not made it more democratically mature than the rest parts of the southwest in particular, and the country at large.

The 2014 Gubernatorial Election in Ekiti State
The result of the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State as declared by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) revealed that Ayo Fayose of the main opposition parties-PDP was the winner. Although this was not the first time that electoral success of the opposition would lead to change in government in the state. What is unprecedented, however, in the history of Ekiti State was the electoral victory of a former governor who aspired for a second term. What is also new in the scenario

is that no executive civilian governor who, having left office for some years has had the privilege of being re-elected for second term in office at staggered or non-consecutive intervals. What is commonplace even in the historical anal of Nigeria is the re-election of an incumbent governor into office for the second term on a consecutive basis, which coincidentally has not been experienced in Ekiti State. Although history seemed to had repeated itself in the re-election of Dr. John Kayode Fayemi (JKF), who, coincidentally lost to Ayo Fayose in 2014, the historic re-election of the latter was that such a scenario was first of its kind in the political annals of the State.

This section appraised the electoral and non-electoral developments that surrounded the 2014 gubernatorial election process in the state of Ekiti with a view to determining the effect on governance and democratic processes in the state.

Pre-Election Periods

Out of all the parties that participated in the 2014 governorship election in Ekiti State, it was only the PDP that conducted primary election, albeit in controversial circumstances. The said primary election in which a total of 14 aspirants participated took place on Saturday March 22, 2014 at the Party Secretarial in Ado-Ekiti. The aspirants under the umbrella of the PDP included Ayodele Fayose, Navy Captain Caleb Olukolade, Prince Dayo Adeyeye, Mrs. Cecilia Dada and Mrs. Margaret Ogundipe. Others were Ambassador Dare Bejide, Senator Gbenga Aluko, M. Bodunde Adeyanju, Chief Abiodun Aluko, Chief Ropo Ogunbolude, Wale Aribisale, Mr. Deji Ajayi and Peter Obafemi.

Dr. Peter Odili, former Governor of Rivers State was the chairman of the five-man delegation of the PDP National Working Committee (NWC) that supervised the election. The NWC maintained that the resolution to conduct primaries became imperative in the interest of internal democracy in the party, such that level playing ground would be provided for all aspirants without preferential treatments. A total of 544 delegates from across the 16 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the state were accredited to vote in the election. Meanwhile, some of the aspirants had raised alarm to the effect that the process of the said primary election in the party was anything short of democratic transparency. Substantiating their anxiety, the aggrieved aspirants alleged that:

(i)   Fayose was not legally competent to contest considering allegations of fiscal recklessness and abuse of office leveled against him in respect to his first term in office as executive governor of the state between 2003 and 2006;

(ii)   ward delegates congress conducted on Wednesday preceding the primary did not hold in some local government areas including Ikere, Ado, Gboyin, Emure, Kelorun and Efon-Alaaye, whereas results were declared; and

(iii)   The NWC delegates were alleged of partisan disposition and so were not trusted for holding a free, fair and credible primary election (Tribune March 22, 2014. Retrieved online).

Thus, in the course of the screening exercise, 13 aspirants including Olubolade, Adeyeye, Abidun Aluko, and Mrs. Margaret Ogundipe boycotted the congress and mobilized peaceful protest in Ado-Ekiti. Protesters carried placards with various inscriptions including "all we are saying, no more primaries in the PDP" (Tribune March 22, 2014. Retrieved online).

Nevertheless, despite the protest, the NWC went ahead and conducted the election. At the end of the exercise, it was announced that Fayose won with 462 votes out of the 477 valid ballot papers. Based on their earlier insinuation, the aggrieved aspirants vehemently rejected the result and recommended that it should be nullified by the NWC to pave way for a fresh election that would be guided by the tenets of internal democracy and principles of equal representation.

However, in his acceptance remarks following his victory in the primary election, Fayose claims that he has become a new person who understands the game better on the basis of which he was not going to run a government of vengeance if elected as governor. He submits that:

> I served as a state governor 11 years ago and I want to assure everybody that this is a better Ayo Fayose, more nurtured, more responsive and one that will accommodate all … It is going to be well with this state. --- I understand the game better and I will do the needful with all of them. I will work with them. They should give me the opportunity ---. They know what I stand for and they know that this is the beginning of the end of Fayemi's

administration in Ekiti State. I brought Fayemi to government, I gave him the support and I am the man that will take him out ---- I will be the man that will take him back to where I brought him from--- (Tribune March 22, 2014).

Apart from the PDP, all other parties fielded their candidates by any means other than the conduct of primary elections. This development apparently contributed to the failure of his second term bid in 2014. The imposition of JKF as the anointed candidate of the APC was the major factor that led to the defection of Michael Opeyemi Bamidele (MOB) to the Labour Party, which eventually weakened the potential capability of the APC during the election. The argument is that had the party leadership in Ekiti State allowed the conduct of primary election, the tendency for JKF to win was still there, and which might endear the support of MOB in the interest of the party in particular, and the state in general. The argument of the leadership of the APC was that evolving a consensus candidate would enhance healthy relationship within the party as primary-inclined intra-party rancour would be avoided. Eventually, "the consequences of candidate imposition turned out to be more than the rancour that the APC leaders envisaged to avoid in the primary" (Akinaso in the Punch, Tuesday, July 1, 2014. Pp. 60). This was a gross violation of a core principle of internal democracy in political parties.

During the electioneering process, three major campaign styles prevailed across party divide, namely issue-based campaigns, non-issue-based campaigns and provocative campaigns. A combination of these campaign styles featured in electioneering process of each of the three parties- PDP, APC and LP- albeit in obviously varying degrees. The electioneering campaign period was inundated with much more violent-induced pronouncements than issue-based.

Like most campaign scenario in Nigeria, political gladiators most times demonstrated shallow ideological roots that would have inspired issue-based campaigns which in turn would have guided the expectations of the electorate. An analysis of Fayose's campaign showed that emphasis was not laid on issues of good governance, or policy responses to socio-economic problems of the state despite being a former governor of the state. His poor pedigree might be as a result of premature end of his first tenure which was condemned to systemic corruption and abuse of office.

Nevertheless, Fayose endears himself to the ordinary people and the elite through his peculiar style of grassroots politics. He mobilises fans and supporters across the state from among artisans, Okada riders, taxi drivers, civil servants and market women. He continued to claim that he was a reformed and "born again" politician who had become more democratically matured. Indeed, some defectors from other parties into PDP acclaimed that Fayose was the determinant factor for their decision. Eye witness account by the lead researcher revealed how Fayose's fans and stunt supporters expressed their feelings and endorsement of his candidacy in political chants out of resounding enthusiasm during electioneering campaigns thus:

Fayose ooo; Fayose ooo,

nitori re ni mo see pada si PDP, Fayosee,

nitori re ni mo se pada si PDP, Fayose….

This literally interpreted as:

Oh Fayose, my man,

Oh Fayose, my man,

it is because of you that I defected back to PDP.

What the foregoing simply suggests is that party candidates and not political parties were the deciding factors in the 2015 gubernatorial election in the state. It is, however, instructive to note that massive support for Fayose in the name of his style of grassroots politics might not be unconnected with the distribution of rice and other material goods to prospective voters in the course of electioneering campaign.

On the part of the APC, JKF, who was the incumbent governor and the standard-bearer of the APC employed some measure of issue-based campaigns by announcing the achievements of his administration and promised a leadership of consolidation if re-elected. However, opposition parties undermined Fayemi's claims by arguing that he was running elite rather than populist government. For instance, the N20 million bond raised by JKF administration from the capital market was condemned on the grounds that it put the state into long-term debt which would outlive his administration (Akinaso in the Punch, Tuesday, July 1, 2014. Pp. 60).

It is further revealed that Fayemi's unpopular policy actions and undue involvement of his wife in the power matrix within the party structure and in governance domain refrained some party stalwarts from giving useful insights concerning his campaign strategy (The punch, Friday July 1, 2014. p. 60). For instance, Fayemi's strategy of

awarding contracts to contractors from outside the state, particularly Lagos and the Diaspora was said to have impacted negatively on the voting behaviour of the electorate against Fayemi (The punch, Friday July 1, 2014. p. 60).

Another major factor that worked against JKF during the election was the arbitrary increase in the tuition of Ekiti State University and enforcement of "no payment, no examination" which was considered as insensitivity to the prevailing chronic socio-economic realities in the state in particular, and the country in general (See Jide Ojo. The Punch, Wednesday, June 25, 2014. P. 29). Hence, despite the fact that Fayemi delivered some measure of democratic dividends particularly in terms of infrastructural and human capital developments, he was not endearing to the people compared to Fayose.

On his own part, the electoral campaign of Michael Opeyemi Bamidele (aka MOB), standard bearer of LP was a mixture of issues with anger. MOB claimed that he had to defect from APC because the party leadership did not allow openness in the context of internal democracy particularly in the primary elections. Attempts to reverse the decision taken by MOB failed partly because none of the two principal actors was ready to compromise his political ambition.

The pre-election period was inundated by violence across the state. For instance, on Monday, November 4, 2013, one Foluso Ogundare, a supporter of MOB was shot dead, at Ward 3 in Emure, Ekiti State by unknown gunmen (The Punch, Tuesday, November 5, 2013. P.13). Similarly, election-inspired frictions among the Ekiti State branch of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) resulted in the killing of Omolafe Aderiye. Aderiye was a staunch supporter of Ayo Fayose apart from being a former Chairman of NURWT, Ekiti State branch (See the Punch, Tuesday, September 30, 2014. P.9). Moreover, the campaign of MOB was disrupted at Efon-Alaye when hoodlums attacked the venue of the rally, injuring his party supporters and vandalizing campaign vehicles and personal belongings (The Punch, Monday, April 14, 2014. P.19). On April 7, 2014, the convoy of JKF, the then incumbent governor and APC candidate also came under attack in Ado-Ekiti by those believed to be political opponents of JKF (The Punch, Monday, April 14, 2014. P.19).

Election Day

On Saturday 21 June, 2014, governorship election in the Ekiti State was conducted. Out of the 18 political parties that fielded candidates, the PDP, APC and LP were most competitive. The electoral umpire, INEC took a number of measures to ensure the credibility of the election which included the following:

- Customized result sheets on the basis of each local government across the state;
- Customized ballot papers on the basis of each local government area across the state;
- All ballot boxes were serially numbered according to each polling unit such that intra- and inter- Local Government transfer could not be possible;
- Recruitment of ad hoc staff to complement the efforts of permanent staff of INEC;
- Proper preparation and logistics that was capable of enhancing the professionalism, competence, integrity and impartiality of INEC.

At the end of the exercise which took place across the state, Ayo Fayose of the PDP was declared winner by the returning officer, Prof. Isaac Azuzu Azoma having had the highest number of votes cast, and having won in all the 16 Local Government Areas of the state. He was seconded by the incumbent, JKF and MOB the LP candidate took the third position. Despite the moral support JKF enjoyed from past Ekiti State governors since the inception of the 4th Republic (with the exemption of Fayose)– i.e., Chief Niyi Adebayo and Mr. Segun Oni– it did not influence the electoral behaviour of the electorate in favour of Fayemi.

Results of Ekiti State Governorship Election, June 21, 2014

S/N	CONTESTANT	GENDER	PARTY	VOTES RECEIVE	PERCENTAGE (TVC)	REMARK
	NAME OF STATE: EKITI				**CODE: EK**	
1	VINCENT BANKOLEAIAYI	MALE	ACCORD	268	0.07%	
2	OPEYEM1 FOLAYEMI AJONYEMI	MALE	AA	146	0.04%	
3	PRINCE PETER A. BAMIGBAOE	MALE	ACPN	1,822	051%	
4	OSEKITA OLUSEYI VICTOR	MALE	AD	843	0,23%	
5	OROKO BOU	MALE	ADC	S42	0.15%	
6	MUSA AOEBAYO AYENI	MALE	APA	L224	034%	
7	**JOHN OLUKAYODE FAYEMI**	**MALE**	**APC**	**120,433**	**33.41%**	**Second position**
8	AYOOELE SAMSON OLAYINKA	MALE	CPP	967	0.27%	
9	PST. OGUNKOLADE A. JOSEPH	MALE	KOWA	222	0.06%	
10	**BAMIDELE MICHAEL OPEYEMI**	**MALE**	**LP**	**18,135**	**5.03%**	**Third position**

11	AJIBOLA JOSEPH AKINWALE	MALE	MPPP	137	0.04%	
12	ILESANMI B. EMMANUEL	MALE	NCP	322	0.09%	
13	PRINCE BANJO GBOYEG A	MALE	PDC	921	0.26%	
14	**AYOOELE PETER FAYOSE**	**MALE**	**PDP**	**203,090**	**56.34%**	**ELECTED**
15	ANIMASHAUNGOKE	MALE	PPA	1,050	0.29%	
16	EVANG. GBENGA AOEKUNLE	MALE	PPN	82	0.02%	
17	ADEKOLAADELEYEA YO	MALE	SDP	95	0.03%	
18	HON. ADENIJI A. PHILIP	MALE	UDP	67	0.02%	

a	TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED	733,766
b	TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCREDITED	369,257
c	TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID VOTES	350,366
d	TOTAL NUMBER OF REJECTED VOTES	10,089
e	TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST	360,455

Source: INEC (2014)

Analysis of the results of the candidates from the three closest parties shows that the number of votes cast in favour of the winner was more than those of the other two combined. It is also revealed that there was a low turnout of eligible voters because those who did not participate in the Election-Day voting outnumbered those who actually participated. Out of 733,766 registered voters, 373311 did not participate compared to 360, 455 of those who did. This low turnout was partly connected with the electoral apathy developed by the citizenry arising from a sense of insecurity that characterized the pre-election period across the state. This was coupled with the high concentration of security operatives across the state a week before the election.

Post-Election Period
The results of the election were received with mixed feelings by various political divides across the state. While some sections described it as victory for democracy, some argued that transparency was not displayed. There were allegations that the crackdown on APC leaders by security agencies prior to the Election Day had devastating consequences on the voting proper. It was also alleged that the arrest of some APC leaders and members on Election Day in Egbe-Ekiti, Ikere-Ekiti, Ilawe-Ekiti and Ado-Ekiti, among others amounted to Violation of the Electoral Act, thereby undermining the credibility of the election.

In any case, the incumbent governor, JKF conceded defeat in the spirit of sportsmanship. In a mid-morning broadcast to the people of the state, Fayemi submits thus:

> Yesterday, Ekiti State decided following the gubernatorial elections held in the land of honour, Ekiti State, Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has officially returned the candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as the winner of the election. ---. If the result of the elections is an expression of the voice of our people, we must all heed your voice. --- Elections tend to be highly divisive affairs that often see brother rising against brother. Despite our diverse party affiliations, and regardless of which way we voted on Saturday, we must remember that we are all sons and daughters of Ekiti State. Ekiti State is ours to build together (The Punch, Monday, April 14, 2014. P.19).

A critical analysis of Fayemi's speech shows that his timely declaration of concession of defeat was in the interest of peace in the state, and not on conviction in the credibility of the whole exercise. In other words, by that singular act, JKF restrained his supporters from possible post-election violence in the state.

Election Impact Assessment in Ekiti State
From all indications, the nature of voting behaviour of the people could be described as "protest voting" against JKF and in favour of Fayose. It was protest voting simply because although Fayose was not ordinarily considered a better candidate to Fayemi, but the people of Ekiti wanted to push JKF out at all cost. The people were disappointed in JKF because he could not sustain the leadership trust and confidence reposed in him particularly considering his pedigree as a human rights activist. The electorate decided to "dethrone a 'king' they fought tooth and nail to enthrone on October 15, 2010 after three years of fierce legal battle (Jide Ojo, the Punch Wednesday, June 25, 2014. P. 29).

On the whole, the pattern of voting in the state was specifically demonstrated in four ways:
(i)   those who voted specifically for Fayose not necessarily on the basis of his political pedigree, but because they were against Fayemi's style of leadership;
(ii)   those who voted for Fayose for his street wisdom and navigational skills demonstrated in his so-called stomach infrastructure as a means to meet the peoples' immediate needs;
(iii)   Those who voted for Fayemi on the conviction of his performance in office; and
(iv)   Those who voted for Opeyemi Bamidele either on the basis of their conviction or simply because they did not have a preferred candidate between JKF and Fayose.

Thus, despite all compromising tendencies that questioned credibility of the election including poor turnout of voters, the votes cast demonstrated that Fayose was the most popular even if he might not be the most preferred candidate. The voting behaviour of the electorate was inspired by a number of factors including allegations of elite governance on the part of the incumbent governor, JKF. The administration of JKF was also alleged of lack of transparency in governance and unlawful accumulation of

wealth by the governor. For instance, it was being speculated that JKF was having capital-intensive investments including a private university in Ghana, which he did not possess before assuming office as governor of Ekiti State. JKF was also accused of formulating and implementing unpopular policies and programmes of no value-added to the socioeconomic and welfare of the people. Such programmes included beautification of some roadsides and locations, destruction of traders' shops in some parts of the state such as Ikere Road, post-office road, Opopo Gbooro/Secretarial road, among others in the name of infrastructural development without prior consultation with the affected shop owners, and without providing alternative locations for them ahead of the exercise.

During the post-election period, while the Ekiti State Seventh Assembly still lasted, there was attempted impeachment of Governor Fayose by the APC-controlled House of Assembly (The Punch, Wednesday, April 8, 2015. P.2). The impeachment attempt was informed by the controversy over Fayose's eligibility for contesting for the 2014 election considering cases of fiscal impropriety and abuse of office leveled against him during his first term in office. This development provoked mass protest in some major towns across the state. The affected towns included Igede-Ekiti, Itawure, Efon-Alaye, Iworoko, Ikere-Ekiti, Aisegba-Ekiti, Ise-Ekiti, and Igbemo-Ekiti (The Punch, Wednesday, April 8, 2015. P.2). Also, on Wednesday 1, 2015, the secretariat of Ekiti APC was attacked by hoodlums resulting in vandalism of vehicles and other items. It was alleged by APC members that the attack was perpetrated by PDP loyalists (The Punch, Thursday, April 2, 2015. P. 8).

The victory of Fayose during the 2014 gubernatorial election actually altered 2015 electoral calculus as the PDP made a major inroad into the south-west, the stronghold of APC. Following Fayose's victory, the number of states under the control of APC in the South-west reduced from 5 to 4, namely Ogun, Osun, Oyo and Lagos states. By implication, Ekiti and Ondo States are under the umbrella of PDP, following the defection of Ondo State Governor, Segun Mimiko to PDP from LP under which political platform he won elections in 2007 and 2013.

Since he assumed office, Governor Fayose has been fond of distributing money and food items to the people of the state in the name of addressing their needs through "stomach infrastructure". In his inaugural address on Thursday, October 17, 2014,

Fayose attested to the fact that "stomach infrastructural" was going to be part of his administration's approach to meeting the needs of the electorate. Justifying this style of governance, Fayose argues that:

> If you tar the roads, you must also tar peoples' stomach. Whatever the length of road you construct or reconstruct, stomach infrastructure is compulsory. I am a governor of your imagination. I am a governor who eats boli (roasted Plantain) with you; I am the governor who drinks agbo jedi (herbal mixture) with you. I am working for you (The Nation. Friday, October 17, 2015. P.7).

Fayose's attempt to substitute "stomach infrastructure" for effective democracy and governance process implies that such a superficial social scheme will not have long-term impact on social security and sustainable development in Ekiti state. This is because it does not have well-grounded social policy response to capacity-building and human empowerment.

Another major post-election development that manifested as a result of Fayose's victory during 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State was the change in the political direction in the state during the 2015 general elections. The PDP won the presidential as well as National Assembly and House of Assembly elections. For instance, the PDP won the presidential election in Ekiti State with 176,466 as against APC's 120331 (The Punch, Wednesday, April 1, 2015. P.1).

Conclusion

This study made a retrospective appraisal of the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State in view of the implications for governance and democratic process in the state. Findings show that although Fayemi embarked on certain transformative projects across the state, unpopular policies of his administration and lack of internal democracy in the APC that provoked "protest voting" by the electorate which aided the victory of the PDP during the election. Thus, the victory of Fayose in the 2014 Ekiti State gubernatorial election punctured the predominant assumption by the political elite and supporters of APC at home and in the Diaspora that the transformative project and social security initiatives embarked upon by the JKF administration would automatically translate into his re-election on a platter of gold.

However, it is revealed that Fayose's popularity at the grassroots politics of the state is not as a result of any exemplary quality of service delivery while he was governor between 2003 and 2006. Rather it is as a result of his informal interaction and association with people of the grassroots- farmers, artisans, market women, youths, and so on- majority of whom could not carefully dissect between politics and governance. It is also established that compromising tendencies of state institutions; systematic abuse of Electoral Act by stakeholders; and poor democratic orientation of the electorate undermined the process and outcome of the election with the concomitant implications for the entrenchment of liberal democratic values. This simply suggests that while electoral victory of opposition had brought about regime change in the state, it could be a counter-force for a working democracy and distorts continuity in governance if the process is replete with centrifugal forces against liberal democracy.

The so-called stomach infrastructure popularized by Ayo Fayose as part of his democratic delivery strategies is antithesis to authentic development and does not encourage accountability and transparency in office. Extending a true sense of commitment to good governance and displaying passion for social security must go beyond making caricature of democracy through stomach infrastructure and hobnobbing with the people. There is need for effective policy framework for credible electoral process and democratic education for the citizenry. This will enhance overall quality of democratic process in Ekiti State in particular and Nigeria in general.

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AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 1648 WESTPHALIAN PEACE TREATY: SOVEREIGNTY, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND BALANCE OF POWER.

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Abstract

In 1648, the Peace Treaty of Westphalia ended Europe's Thirty Years war, which was sometimes referred to as the last of the great wars of religion. Yet state actors, years after the Treaty, subsequently introduced those concepts of necessity - Aliance system, balance of power and collective security, as prerequisite for peace building. However, developments in the global system, though in line with the ideals of the Treaty, are faced by contradictions, with over-emphasis on the doctrine of sovereignty. The concept is being abused in the absence of a central government with coercive powers. This study uses secondary sources of data and the theory of an International Government, canvassed by Asirvatham and Misra, is invoked. This study reveals that the doctrine of national sovereignty is a great hindrance to the effective realization of a broadly based international policy, for good governance and checkmating physical, structural and psychological violence. The poor governance styles, especially in Africa, have heightened genocide and pervading electoral fraud, where dubious victories are often celebrated with impunity. Since the doctrine of sovereignty regards the rules of international law as the product of independent wills of sovereign states, no state is considered bound by any rule to which it has not given its prior consent. This paper, therefore, recommends the invocation of an International Government, such as the United Nations Organisation, which will be converted, into a genuine world federation, by the possession of coercive powers, over its constituent units.

Keywords: Balance of power, Collective Security, International Government, Sovereignty.

Introduction

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia and Osnabruck (1648), which established the legal basis of modern state-hood, and by implication, rules or constitution of modern politics has its pronounced consequences for International Relations. "But it was only in the twentieth century, as global empires collapsed, that sovereign statehood, and with it, national self-determination, finally acquired the status of universal organizing principles of world order" (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017:23). When wars are fought, they have their underlying purposes. The Thirty Years war, 1618-1648, in Europe which was a confessional-political conflicts, between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Leaders, witnessed very catastrophic consequences, in population losses and material destructions. Understandably, wars often lead to killings, famine and gnashing of teeth, as well as mass destructions, far beyond what could be adequately recorded, but what is usually germane, after the devastation, must be those lessons garnered there-after. In short, the germane question could be thus: what were the legacies or derivatives for both the combatants and their heirs, in a war that had wantonly, consumed generations? The legacy from the treaty, for the global society, is anchored on a major principle of Sovereignty of States. The eventual concepts of necessity, balance of power and collective security. These three principles, which have contradictory interpretations for International Relations, have been the focus of global politics since the seventeenth century, which this paper intends to examine. Essentially, how international relations is affected by these developments will be reviewed, but first, the angle which an International Relations' theory of "International Government, in a United World Society" poses, will first be examined.

Theoretical Discourse:

Scholars of International Relations have long been deeply interested in the interplay between the Great Powers and the reasons why even the most powerful have, in the end, disappeared from the stage of history. These reversals could be gleaned from what happened to the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after the First World War, the European Colonial empires, after the second World War, and finally to the Soviet empire itself, between 1989 and 1991. But history also demonstrates that when empires fall, this is not always followed by stability and prosperity. The collapse of Soviet Communism, did not spare Russia from facing new challenges (Baylis, et al, 2017:71). If, after the formation of the United Nations Organization, the international community is still experiencing the symptoms of why there were First and Second

World Wars, it becomes imperative to tinker with a global hegemon, for a strong platform to situate global peace. On this terrain, the theory of an international government, as canvassed by Asirvatham and Misra (2013:575), becomes ideal.

From the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 onwards, states have been regarded as, by far, the most powerful actors in the international system. They have been the universal standard of political legitimacy, with no higher authority to regulate their relations with each other (Baylis et al, 2017). On that platform, security issues are now the priority obligation of state governments, which make states assume their own protection, in what has become a self-help world. Sovereignty is a loaded concept. Under this regard, each state starts viewing the international system as a hostile arena and that the only avenue of protection open to a state, for its security, is only at the expense of its neighbors. Under such an atmosphere, as permanent peace becomes impossible, attempt at achieving a balance of power, becomes the alternative path. That is where international politics, full of intrigues, acrimony, as well as palliatives, could be discussed. For Neo-realist writers, such as Mearsheimer (1994), international politics may not be characterized by constant wars, but nevertheless, security competition takes place, with war always a possibility. Although, they accept that co-operation among states can, and does occur, but such co-operation has its limits. It is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of co-operation can eliminate.

As a panacea, and in further enhancing the necessity of an international government, in a United World Society, Asirvatham and Misra (2013), take us through a historical path, by tracing the advent of the rise of internationalism, beckoning to its gains and the likelihood of its challenges. The scholars remind the global society that just as the nineteenth century was an epoch of triumphant nationalism, the twentieth century could be regarded as an epoch of new resurgent internationalism. However, in Laski's theoretical attempt, at elucidating the idea of an international government, he laments that

> the inadequacy of the sovereign nation-state has been demonstrated by the tragic occurrence of two world wars in a period of three decades. The emergence of the League of Nations, after the First World War and the establishment of the United Nations Organization, after the last war, are the

steps in a right direction of a world federation, based on complete abrogation of the sovereignty of nation-states, as the only remedy of the myriad ills, caused by the existing anarchy in international affairs (Asirvatham and Misra, 2013:574/575).

Reinforcing this view, and while wondering about the rot in the acrimonious interactions of nation-states, Laski argues that the emphatically territorial character of the sovereign nation-states, enables a small section of its members to utilize its power for their own ends, even against the interests of their fellow citizens. Against such a danger, international government represents the most solid protection we have" (Laski, 2008:234).

In his further disdain for sovereignty of a nation, Laski (2008), submits two observations to support his proposition of an international government. The first is that the state is, in daily administration, the government, and that the government may lie at the disposal of a special interest, and second, in order to enforce obligations upon it, an organized consultation with other groups is essential, if the 'will' realized is to represent a just compromise between competing 'wills'. Balancing his proposition, Laski enthusiastically avers that the territorial supremacy of government is made more sancrosanct, by making it work through functional organs. He insists that by adopting the practice of an international government, it enables us to make its "will" responsive, not merely to the political state but also to group interests, which, if the political states stand alone, may well receive inadequate recognition.

In a clear contrast to the adherents of sovereignty, on the possibility of the doctrine's easy detection and suppression of conflict, we are of the strong view that since conflict is a product of interaction, unless we can find the institutions which can make possible the abrogation of conflict, in the domestic life of a state, as it stands now, we shall not find them in the sphere of international affairs. Under this sphere, an international government is a good alternative.

The need for an international solidarity in a United World Society
Discussions on the future of International Relations have become expedient because of the cumulative events of over three centuries, since the proclaimed Westphalian Peace Treaty in 1648.Many of the reactions call for an overview of the concept of

sovereignty, for a better and a harmonious international world order. These concerns included, but not limited to wars, economic resources, border/ boundary conflicts, racial prejudice, suspicion, distrust, discrimination, as well as religion, and blatant electoral fraud, with impunity, on account of sovereignty, amongst many others.

David Mitrary (2017), a pioneer integration theorist, argues that transnational co-operation is required, in order to resolve common problems. World politics is no longer an exclusive arena for states, as it had been for the 300 years of the Westphalianstate system (Baylis, et el (2017)). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1972) cast their lot for an international government, by submitting that the centrality of other actors, such as interest groups, transnational corporations, and international non-government organizations (INGOs), have to be taken into consideration. Here, the overriding image of international relations is that of a web of diverse actors, through multiple channels of interaction, that are capable of promoting global peace and concord. With that spirit in vogue, invocation of obstructive aggrandizement, citing sovereignty, will be eliminated.

Ake (1981), expresses optimism about the possibility of embracing the idea of an International Government, starting with economic integration. However, he sounds a note of caution, on account of the basic problem with the strategy of collective self-reliance, which requires a considerable degree of regional economic co-operation and integration. This caution is based on the fact that Africa has tried in the past to promote, political integration, with very limited successes. He cites some foreseeable difficulties, such as political differences, the fear of metropolitan powers, as well as the disparity of the size and economic development of members. Although, the main structural features of African formations are behind this inertia, the prospect of giving a working interpretation to the gains of an International Government, is actively at work. The idea was mooted by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in 1963, but it was killed by acrimonious display of international politics. Revisiting the call for an International Government demands a review of the Westphalian constitution, which came to colonize the entire planet.

A Perusal of Westphalian Constitution
Constitutions are important documents because they establish the location of legitimate political authority, within a polity, as well as the rules that inform the exercise and limits of political powers.

In codifying and legitimating the principle of sovereign statehood, the Westphalian constitution created the "modern state system. It welded the idea of territoriality with the notion of legitimate sovereign rule. By extension, the 1648 Wesphalian proclamation situates the supreme legal and political authority within territorially delimited states. As strong as this intention assumes, the opposite is the case, particularly, with weak states in the developing nations of Africa. That idea is what informs Krasner (1999) to state that the Westphalian system has, for many states, been little more than a form of organized hypocrisy. Besides that, many schools argue that contemporary globalization presents a fundamental challenge to the Westphalian ideal of sovereign statehood, which, under a very close scrutiny, is transforming the world order, in its complexity. This notion is empirically discernible because the political and economic interactions between the developed and the developing nations, exemplify this development.

Castigating the concept of an absolute and independent sovereign state, which demands an unqualified allegiance to government, from it members, International Relations scholars see the practice as incompatible with the interests of humanity. "In a creative civilization, what is important is not the historical accident of separate states, but the scientific fact of world-interdependence. The real unit of allegiance is the world and that the real obligation of obedience is to the total interest of our fellow men" (Asirvatham and Misra 2013:575).Equally, a group of Realists, particularly Hedley (2002), emphasizes that the international system exists in a state of anarchy – a term that implies, not a complete or absence of structure and rules, but rather the lack of a central government that can enforce rules.

Sovereignty, constitutionally speaking, means that a government has the rights, in principles, to do whatever it wants, in its own territory. This, in principle, means that states are equal in status, if not in power. Sovereignty equally depicts that states must not interfere in the internal politics and decision processes, of other states. More controversially, some states assume that sovereignty gives them the right to treat their own people in any fashion, including such actions that other states call genocide (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2011). These, and many more adversarial applications of the use of sovereignty, represent the objections and why some people are emphasizing that only a world government can solve those problems of impunity and aggravated arrogance.

A Perusal of Sovereignty, Balance of Power and Collective Security.
The linkage between sovereignty, the major principle from the Treaty, and other eventual doctrines of necessity, balance of power and collective security, is very complex. Since the post-Westphalian era, the nature, evolution and pattern of interactions, in the global system tend towards a potentially problematic and obfuscating sense of international relations. The be-all-and-end-all of these concepts, result in a world of bewildering contradictions and are promoting global discontents because no nation can, on its own, challenge a neighbour, no matter the enormity of her actions within her borders. We start off by looking critically at the definition of sovereignty, defined as the power of the state to make laws and enforce them, with all the means of coercion it cares to employ. It is the distinctive mark of the state, distinguishing it alike from individuals and associations, within the state. It has two aspects, internal and external. Internally, it means the power which the state claims to make and enforce law, upon individuals and associations, within the area of its jundiction. Externally, it means independence of foreign control (Appadorai, 2004, Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011).

As the definitions of sovereignty are many and varied, Bodin (1998) defines it as the supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law. Yet, Duguit (2004), sees it as the commanding power of the state; it is the will of the nation, organized in the state; it is the right to give unconditional orders to all individuals in the territory of the state. Furthermore, Burgess (2004), describes sovereignty as original, absolute, unlimited power, over the individual subjects and over all associations of subjects. The Question is-if a group or an individual is so empowered, how can one prevent its misuse and how will it not generate conflict? This question and many more provoke Giddings (2013),to lament that in all the dictionaries, there is no other word that has more disastrously been conjured with, by metaphysical juggler, Jurists and political theorists as sovereignty had been. On that verbosity, it has lost sight of concrete fact, and has given people's minds to abstractions. Viewed from that account, sovereignty has become, for political science, a thing that never was on sea or land (Giddings, 2013).

In a rather scornful contribution, Soltau (2013), describes the concept of sovereignty as the exercise of a final legal coercive power by the state. In line with the views of philosophers, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction-(Isaac Newton). This array of definitions attracts various criticisms, which drew the attention of

Asirvatham and Misra (2013), to the views of the scholars in the school of Political Pluralism, who criticize the doctrine of sovereignty, as parochial. They aver that the concentration of power at a single central source results in a tyrannical social order. It is their views that the dispersion of power to peripheral points of the body politics, should be the basis of free societies. The pluralists further contend that the state should not monopolize power in society. Instead, power should be equitably shared with other groups and associations. In their further vituperation against sovereignty, the Pluralists suggest that instead of threatening force to secure the total acquiescence of all dissenting groups states should respect their reasonable autonomy and regard social diversity as the conclusive proof of a really healthy community. Barker (2013), a great critic of sovereignty, submits that no political common place has become more arid and unfruitful than the doctrine of the sovereign state. In a further reaction against the ills of sovereignty, another scholar, Krabbe, cited by Airvathanand Misra, pleads that the notion of sovereignty must be expunched from political theory. The submissions of these scholars, based on empiricism, are sufficient to assume that there must be grave reasons that motivate the reasoning of the pluralists, against the doctrine of state sovereignty.

Having discussed sovereignty, sparcely though, being the main focal principle derived from the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia, the other two, which are doctrines of necessity; Balance of Power and Collective Security, must also be examined, to bring out those contradictions in them, and review those tentative ways for ameliorating their ill-effect on governance.

BALANCE OF POWER
What is power, what determines it, and how can it be balanced?
"Power is a central concept in international relations – the central one for realists – but it is surprisingly difficult to define or measure"(Michael and Duvall2005; David, 2002,cited by Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011:45). Power, in the most general sense, is the ability of a political actor to achieve his or her goals. In the Realist approach, it is assumed that possession of capabilities will result in influence, and so, the single word 'power', is often used ambiguously to cover both(Baylis, et al, 2017). "Power is the ability to achieve one's purposes or goals. More specifically, it is the ability to affect others, to get the outcomes one wants. Another problem is determining which resources provide the best basis for power, in any particular context" (Nye, 2007:60-1). At this juncture, what are those determinants of power? State power is a mix of

many ingredients. Elements that an actor can draw on, over or long term include total GDP, population, territory, geography and natural resources. These attributes change only slowly. "Less tangible long term power resources include political culture, patriotism, education of the population and strength of the scientific and technological base. Not left behind among the elements of power for a state, are the credibility of its commitments, in terms of its reputation for keeping its words, otherwise called trust. This is equally a long-term power base, while at the same time, the ability of a state's culture and values, in consistently shaping the thinking of other states, often classified as being in possession of power of ideas, are also strong elements of power" (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011: 47).

However, the phenomenon of misuse of power, which has engulfed the global community, takes different forms. As for those scholars in the Realist school of thought, the main actors on the world stage are States, which are legally sovereign states. By a simple definition, sovereignty simply means that no actor in the global system can compel a sovereign state to act in specific ways, because all the states are equal and autonomous. With this system in vogue, conflict, which is a product of interaction and inevitable, could pose a danger to the society, where all proffer equality. Other actors in the international system, such as multinational corporations or International Organizations have to relate within the framework of interstate relations. If states propagate the doctrine of sovereignty, as expected under the sphere of international politics, Realists attribute it to a struggle for power, in each state's attempts at maximizing her national interest. In order to resolve any logjam envisaged, a mechanism, known as the balance of power, is often adopted, whereby states often struggle to prevent any one state from dominating. As international politics is all about conflict resolution, an adoption of techniques of bargaining, alliances, as well as diplomacy are often the key mechanisms for balancing various national interests.

Little wonder why Baylis, et al (2017: 529) submit that balance of power, in realist theory, "refers to an equilibrium between states; Yet, Historical Realists regard it as the product of diplomacy (contrived balance), but, Structural Realists regard the system as having a tendency towards a natural equilibrium (fortuitous balance). It is a doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states".

In the international system, there is no higher authority to counter the use of force, and that is the problem. Therefore, security can be obtained only through self-help. This means states often rely on internal mechanisms to achieve security. Evidently, while a state is gunning at her own security, she will, inevitably be propagating the insecurity of other states. When a situation, such as this emerges, it leads to a security dilemma. This leads to the assertion that one state's desire for security, is often the breeding ground for another state's sources of insecurity. When the state clamoring for security, and other states in the society, feeling threatened react, the tendency is there that the threatened states will be undertaking measures to equally enhance their own security too. In order to checkmatethe risk of a hegemon, alliances will be formed, to effect a balance against the power of threatening states. It must be known that since balance of power is not natural or inevitable, it must be constructed. On this terrain, this paper submits that although stateleaders and diplomatsplay a crucial role in maintaining the doctrine of balance of power, yet, in the anarchy of the international system, the most reliable foundation for enhancing the principle of 1648 Westphalian Peace Treaty is the development of an International Government, which will attract respect from global nations.

Collective Security: We need to have an idea of the invocation of doctrines of necessity, to checkmate the unevisaged adversarial impact of sovereignty. Woodrow Wilson concluded that the causes of the First World War were not only in the wickedness of German Leadership but in the European balance of power system as well.

In 1917, he attacked the reigning international order, which preceded the war, as a system of organized rivalries. He then raised some questions, upon which the global future peace and policy should traverse:

> Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power?... There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common place.

What Wilson meant by community of power was an entirely new concept, that later became known as collective security. (Kissenger, 1994).

Collective Security is the formation of a broad alliance of most major actors in an international system, for the purpose of jointly opposing aggression by any actor; sometimes seen as pre-supposing the existence of a universal organization (such as the United Nations) to which both the aggressors and its opponents belong" (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011:502). Equally, Collective Security is a means of maintaining peace, in which a collection of states agree on an institutional framework and legal mechanisms, to prevent or suppress aggression. Two examples of collective security actions, under the auspices of the United Nations, were the Korean war and the Persian Gulf war (Nye, 2007:286).

Basically, "nations must agree to the principle that, in matters which touch more than one nation, they will be bound by the decision arrived at, by a common international body, in which all nations are, in some way, represented. Such matters are: territorial boundaries, international migration, armaments, tarrifs, privileges of national minorities, international communications, and foreign capital (Appadorai, 2004:147). These peace building ethos, against seeking self help on the aforementioned matters, demand that the external sovereignty, being claimed by nation-states, must be restricted in these matters, and there must be a commitment to the rule of law between nations, as there is between individuals, within each state.

Shaw (2003), in his own treatice, states that, international law, unlike mutual laws, derives, not from actions of a legislative branch or other central authority, but from tradition and agreements, signed by states. It also differs in the difficulty of enforcement, which depends, not on the power and authority of central government, but on reciprocity, collective action, and international norms. Although, there may be no central government to enforce them, but international institutions are put in place by consensus, to monitor developments. Any nation that refuses to obey an international law, and is declared a recalcitrant state, risks being declared a rogue state. Any nation so pronounced, as having no respect for international norms or agreements, will be decisively dealt with, through a coercive and collective action.

But if human-kind could learn from history, the experiences from the First and Second World Wars must have revealed that a system of national security is an impossibility for all nations, at the same time, even for a few, for all time. The coordination of the

United Nations, although needing an overhaul, reveals that might cannot be the basis of right. In line with the aforesaid necessity, and in conformity with a civilized way of International Relations, one tends to ask for an alternative, to the global anarchy, as a result of the perceived insecurity attached to national security of a state. Under an international government, the respect for a Central Administration, as an umpire, will significantly curtail global violence.

The Global Security Architecture, Since After The Second World War
This has been largely shaped, with some cosmetic modifications, in line with the ideas of the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia. They have been predicated on the principles of sovereignty of each independent state and collective security, that was protected and reshaped by the Great Powers, with little or no regard to the contradictions inherent in the concepts of sovereignty and collective security, respectively.

It is the contradictions presented in International Relations that are of great concern to international relations' Scholars and Practitioners. These have to do with the misapplication of the concept of sovereignty by many world leaders, particularly in the Third World nations, where much harm could have been done before beaucracy allows an intervention. The global community will not forget the episodes of Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone in a jiffy. Nevertheless, the fundamental principle of collective security is that all Great Power States are encouraged to unite their policies and forces, against any aggressor state: translating to standing against the state which violates the boarders of another one. Yet, the principle of sovereignty implies that other states have no legal right to interfere into the internal affairs of any other state, at least without legal permission, by an authorized supranational organization, such as the United Nations Organization or any of its organs, so empowered.

However, where failed states exist, or genocide is threatened, some analysts believe outsiders should ignore sovereignty. In 2005, the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, endorsed the "norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect civilians from the effects of war and human rights abuses." According to the UN panel, this responsibility is "exercisable by the Security Council, authorizing military intervention, as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large – scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law, which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling

to prevent." (Nye, JR, 2007:161). The case of the NATO's aggression on Serbia and Montenegio in 1999, was a good preaching point, to put a stop to the flagrant violation of the principle of sovereignty.

While there are indeed, many observations in the concept of sovereignty, especially, as it concerns the principles for identifying legal independence and territorial integrity of each nation, there is an aspect of the above submissions that has an endless appeal for a redress in contemporary thinking. This has to do with the earlier referenced genocidal killings and maiming, which could occur before the basis for homogeneity has any success. Laconically, a revisit to the suggestion of a federal union of nations, is inevitable (Appadorai, 2004; Griffs, O'Callaghan and Roach, 2008)..

Sensing that blood-letting and acts of impunity, in the absence of an umpire, could be reduced or eliminated, Appadorai is of the view that the citizens of each member state will have to obey a government, other than their own government, in which, no doubt, they will have some, but not the sole voice, in determining policy. Federation, essentially, means a division of powers and double allegiance. It means in effect, nothing less than the surrender by the nation – state, of part of its sovereignty. The minimum federal subjects are defense, and foreign affairs; Other common affairs may or may not be transferred to the federal authority (Appadora; 2004:157).

Conclusion
This paper has examined the core principle generated by the Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which is sovereignty, and the eventual concepts of necessity, balance of power and collective security. Equally, the consequences of these principles for International Relations, which are pronounced in their incompatible operations, were also highlighted.

First, the framers of the 1648 Westphalia Peace Treaty deserve a very high commendation, because over three centuries have lapsed, and besides peripheral adjustments, the Peace Treaty remains largely germane to the practice of International Relations, till date. However, what is of an urgent concern is the use to which sovereignty, as a concept, by each nation, is being subjected. Much as the United Nations Organization is trying to prevent bad governance and human rights abuse, individual states, have clandestinely clamped down on their citizens, basing their

action on sovereignty and non interference. Although, the United Nations Organization has gone ahead to make pronouncements on these abuses, major destructions, both human and material, would have occurred before any partial intervention. This paper is of the view that conceited actions by the privileged and first world nations are not in conformity with the tenets of sovereignty, and this will be checkmated by an international government. Yet, when violations, on the pretext of sovereignty, are especially egregious, and the states could be identified, collective action, by an "international government", could be taken. Hence, the call for an international government, where states' sovereignty will only be partially torched but with a federal government at the top of world affairs.

Since a common abuse of power, and a discredit to the application of balance of power and collective security, is electoral system, especially in the developing economies, institutionalizing an international government will promote sanity and sustainable development will follow.

Some of the prerequisites of an international government are that:

a. the nations of the world need to collaborate and accept the principle of co-eistence, in order to obviate the subsisting suspicions between and among the nations of the world, big or small;

b. sources of international friction, though inevitable, will be identified, for the promotion of racial harmony and equality among citizens of each nation;

c. there is a great need to reduce the deep rooted disparities in the economic sphere, between the developed and the under – developed countries, because economic inequalities are inimical to a peaceful co-existence;

d. while each state must retain the security outfits on ground, the setting up of global security outfit must be agreed upon, and an enforceable universal law, will be required;

e. it is disheartening that in this 21st century, there are nations where unrestrained kidnapping, armed banditry, slaughtering and beheading of human beings, are happening, with impunity, particularly in the developing nations. Where an international government is in vogue, such a head of government or state, could be made to account, as crimes being committed under sovereignty, will disappear or reduce drastically.

In order to compliment the United Nations Organization, and to check the excesses of bad governance and human rights abuse in the global society, the idea of an international Government must be given a trial. It will make international relations less turbulent and will be a peaceful building block, for the global society.

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CAN RESOURCE CONTROL ADDRESS THE MINORITY QUESTION IN THE NIGER-DELTA REGION?

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Abstract

The struggle for resource control constitutes a central issue in minority agitations in the Niger Delta. This paper argues that resource control struggle in the Delta is the culmination of decades of minority discontents against political domination and marginalization in the distribution of power and resources. While there is some level of ambiguity in the conceptualization of 'resource control', the idea is not necessarily about absolute control of petroleum resources. Rather, it is about inclusion and equitable share of oil resources, development and environmental justice. Furthermore, the character and ethnic composition of the Niger Delta suggests that there is no guarantee that 'absolute' resource control will address minority agitations in the region. It throws up further debate about 'majority minorities' and 'minority minorities' relations within the region. Minority agitation in the Delta cannot be addressed in isolation but as part of a wider search for solution to the National Question. The solution lies in political and constitutional reforms capable of advancing social justice, equity in resource distribution, good governance and nation-building.

Keywords: Natural resources, Resource control, Minority agitation, Niger Delta, Nigeria

Introduction

Much has been said and written about the minority question in post-colonial Nigeria and how the problem of ethnic minorities has beset the country since inception (Osaghae, 1991; Suberu, 1996; Sagay, 2008; Nyekwere, 2020). Yet there appears to be no durable solution to minority agitations in Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the minorities themselves have experienced some sort of political emancipation over the years. Through a series of constitutional and political engineering, minority groups have emerged from being the 'regional marginals' in the 1960s into more important stakeholders in the political process. In particular, the creation of new states and introduction of the 'federal character' principle not only doused minorities' fears of majority domination, it also improved their representation in government and governance. In spite of these advancements in the status of minority groups in the federation, majority discrimination, marginalization and domination persist.

An important aspect of minorities' discontent relates to the manner in which the State's distributive system is skewed in favour of the majority groups in terms of access to power and resources. It is believed that minorities still have no real influence, access or control of power and resources at the center. It is their shared view that Nigeria's excessively centralized federal system mainly benefits the majority groups, which in turn has negatively impacted the minorities' share of national resources. This is so, especially when discussed within the context of state capture by dominant ethno-regional forces who have exploited the control and greater access to federal power to mobilize resources along ethno-regional cleavages. Hence, a major complaint of the minorities is the absence of equitable distribution of power and resources and the resultant inequalities and uneven development.

Nowhere else has minority agitation been more profound than in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria—a region home to many minority ethnic groups. It also occupies a strategic position as the live-source of the nation's economy due to the presence of crude oil. While there is a point of convergence among minority groups in the various regions in their demand for a fair distribution of resources, there are also areas of differences in their agitations. For example, minorities in the Middle Belt area have largely agitated for greater representation in the federal government and its agencies and equitable distribution of resources to improve local development. In the Niger

Delta area, the minorities have linked their ultimate socioeconomic development to resource control and their ability to control, access and utilize the resources of the region for the development of the region with little or no interference by the centre.

Consequently, the Niger Delta, since the early 1990s has witnessed violent and destabilizing conflicts between local community actors and the Nigerian security forces and oil companies arising from oil exploitation. What began as a demonstration against environmental degradation and State/oil companies' neglect of the developmental needs of the region later turned into a state of militancy and a widespread ethnic and regional struggle for self-determination and resource control. These issues arose from what the Niger Delta minorities consider as exploitation, exclusion, deprivation and, marginalization in relation to resource contribution, allocation, political representation and developmental response (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye & Okhomina, 2008). To this end, minority agitation in the Niger Delta has gravitated from being essentially about environmental remediation and development towards the demand for constitutional reforms, resource control and self-determination.

The 2009 Presidential Amnesty Programme introduced by the Umaru Musa Yar'Adua administration, which proclaimed forgiveness for Niger Delta militants, achieved limited success in reducing the hitherto unrelenting attacks against oil workers and assets and heralded considerable peacebuilding investments in the region. While the amnesty initiative brought relative stability to the region, it did not adequately address the core issue of local involvement and control of mineral resources (Omokhoa & Ikelegbe, 2016). In fact, in the last five years, the relative peace in the region induced by the programme has come under strain as a result of perceived bias in the Nigerian government's management of diversity issues and mineral resources in the country (Siollun, 2019; Aiyede, 2020). In 2020, fresh Niger Delta agitation was triggered by perceived inequality in the implementation of the law regulating ownership and exploitation of solid minerals, especially gold in the country. Niger Delta indigenes have queried why indigenous artisans in northern states like Zamfara were allowed to exploit and sell gold and other solid minerals within their territories while such privileges were historically denied to the Niger Delta people (Odiegwu, 2020; Ndujihe, 2020).

There are pertinent questions that need to be asked therefore. For example, how has the Niger Delta minorities fared as part of the Nigerian federation? What are the critical issues of collective discontent? What attempts have been made to address these discontents? Why the persistent demand for resource control? Can resource control address minority agitations in the region? This paper attempts to provide answers to these questions and contribute to the debate on oil resource management in Nigeria's oil belt.

Conceptualizing Resource Control
There is some level of ambiguity when conceptualizing 'resource control' especially within the context of the Niger Delta struggle. Osaghae et al (2008: 19) view it as the '"ownership and control" of all resources which signify the freedom to willingly dispose of these resources, to negotiate its alienation or extraction without reference to a violent and or an undemocratic state.' For Sagay (2008: 380), there are two main components of resource control. First, it implies 'the power and right of a community to raise funds by way of taxation on persons, matters, services or materials within its territory…' Secondly, it is the 'exclusive right to the ownership and control of resources, both natural and created within its territory'.

While aligning with the above views, Ako (2012) introduces what he describes as the 'local variant' of resource control. That is, enabling the local populations in the Niger Delta to access and enjoy the benefits of oil resources located in their ancestral land. Ako emphasizes the point that while the regional political elites have displayed lack of effective management of accruable oil revenue and the militants enjoy the 'benefit' of their agitation, the local people, on whose behalf the political and militant resource control struggle have occurred, rarely feature in the distribution of crude oil benefits. Resource control could therefore be broadly defined as the access and participation in the control and management of all land, water and forest resources by the resource-bearing communities or states. This also includes the natural and political rights to access and adequately enjoy the benefits of such resources.

Arguably, the most popular understanding of resource control particularly as it relates to minority agitation and resource conflicts in the Niger Delta can be found in the 1998 Kaiama Declaration (KD) of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). The notion of

resource control expressed in the Declaration has become the benchmark for current debate on the issue. There are a number of views on resource control expressed in the KD. First is the expression of absolute ownership of all resources by inhabitants of the resource location. This is found in Article I of the Declaration which advocates ownership of 'all land and natural resources within the Ijaw territory as belonging to the Ijaw communities'. This implies that every community, state or region has the right of ownership over its resources. Secondly, it talks about direct access, control and management of the resources by the people including exploration and exploitation of the resources.

Article VIII which calls for the 'restructuring of the Nigerian federation' based on the outcome of 'a sovereign national conference of equally represented ethnic nationalities' effectively linked resource control with self-determination and the need to resolve the National Question. This has influenced the current debate on restructuring the federal system by governors of the states in the region and others in the southern region. In the discourse, resource control is linked with 'true federalism' and the ability to the states to control and exploit their resources while contributing a fraction of the revenue to the national purse. This notion of resource control does not appeal to the federal government and many of the political and ethno-cultural elites especially in the core north who view it as separatism and an invitation to the balkanization of the country. The intolerant and confrontational response of the federal government to the resource control and self-determination struggle in the Niger Delta flow from its contentious perception of resource control.

The Minority Question in Historical Perspective
The minority question predates the Nigerian federation. Like every other plural societies, Nigeria has had to grapple with problems associated with majority-minority relations. Minorities are a culturally-distinct group of people who in relation to other groups are numerically inferior (Thornberry, 1980) or occupy a real or perceived position of socio-economic and political subservience vis-à-vis other culturally cohesive groups (Osaghae, 1991). The minority groups in Nigeria are often defined in relation to their ethnicity. Arguably, ethnicity and religion are the most widely discussed forms of identities in Nigeria even though others exist. The general view is that apart from the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, all other ethnic groups in

Nigeria fall into the minority category. Yet, among the minorities, there are 'majority minorities' such as the Ijaw, Edo, Tiv and Kanuri with considerably larger populations and they wield substantial political and socioeconomic influence in their regions. The specific number of ethnic groups in Nigeria is unknown. The popular figure being mentioned is 250 but Otite (2000: 38-58) presents a list of 389 ethnic groups and their locations in Nigeria even though he recognizes that the list is not definitive.

The minority question did not become a problem in Nigeria's political history until the decade preceding independence when the political elites rooted for a regionalization policy. What had existed before in the form of local jurisdiction, Native Authority or the Indirect Rule system promoted some form of local autonomy which eliminated any idea of superordinate-subordinate relationships among the ethnic groups. The decision to jettison this policy for regionalization kick-started the travails of minority groups in Nigeria to the extent that Osaghae (1991: 238) argued that if the previous policy 'was not replaced by that of regionalization, the majority-minority group distinction would probably not have arisen'. The regionalization process in the 1950s had the effect creating new ethnic categories by forging a common consciousness among micro identities that in the past lacked such consciousness. Thus, Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba emerged as the dominant identities within the regional contexts while others inexorably became minorities, largely concentrated in the present-day geopolitical regions of the South-South, North Central, North East and the southern peripheries of the North West.

ware of the new political reality and especially ethnic nationalism among the majority groups, the minorities expressed concerns about political marginalization, exclusion and domination by the majority groups prompting the establishment of Willink Commission in 1957 to look into their concerns. While rejecting their agitation for the creation of separate regions, the Commission in its report provided constitutional guarantees in the form of fundamental rights including prohibition of discrimination against minority groups. It also granted a special developmental status to minorities in the Niger Delta area in the form of a Development Board (Ikelegbe, 2005). This however did not prevent the majority groups from dominating the political space neither did it inhibit further agitation by the minorities for state creation, inclusion and greater participation.

There was a feeling of relief among the minorities in 1967 when the Yakubu Gowon regime abolished regionalism and created twelve states as replacement. Subsequent states creation between 1987 and 1996 as well as the establishment of the 'federal character' principle and 'quota system' further empowered the minorities giving them a sense of belonging and direct access to national resources. Though these political reforms satisfied some of the issues in minority agitations such as the demand for separate states, they have been unable to eradicate the feeling of marginalization by the minorities. The crux of minority agitation today is fair representation in national affairs and the distribution of national resources among all groups on the basis of equality and justice.

Minority Agitations in the Niger Delta
Although with a well-documented history of resistance against any form of external or internal domination that dates back to the precolonial period (see Ogbogbo, 2004 and Tamuno, 2012), it was the discovery, commercialization and subsequence ascendance of crude oil as the chief source of revenue for Nigeria that accentuated minority agitations in the Niger Delta. The restiveness and agitations in the region are linked to perceived marginalization by the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria who have dominated the political and economic life of the country. First, it was a protest against marginalization, neglect and the politics of exclusion by the majority ethnic groups before it metamorphosed into a struggle for control of oil resources. The expectation that oil exploitation will improve livelihoods and redress infrastructural imbalance in the region was replaced by the despicable effects of oil exploitation. Environmental degradation and other negative externalities of oil exploitation are widely regarded as a major source of agitation in the Niger Delta (Obi, 2008; Omokhoa & Ikelegbe, 2016).

Beyond the unimpressive role played the multinational oil companies in the emergence and exacerbation of conflict in the region, the grouse of the Niger Delta minorities is that they have been unfairly dispossessed of their resources and accompanying benefits through a highly politicized fiscal formula and other political measures instituted especially by the majority ethnic groups in what has appeared to be a conscious or unconscious conspiratorial act. The Petroleum Act (1969), Land Use Act (1978) and the 1999 Constitution are particularly implicated as they vest

ownership and absolute control of all natural resources on the Federal Government, in the process stripping the oil-bearing communities of the rights to the resources on their land. Furthermore, is the highly contentious derivation principle used for sharing oil revenues which has, since independence, been to the advantage of the majority groups. The subsequent adjustments and increase from 2% in the early 1990s to 13% under the 1999 Constitution, ostensibly to placate agitations in the region, fell below the expectations of the people.

Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco (2011) showed that the region and its people remain poor and the underdevelopment level worse than the national average. The development indexes show a gross lack of health services, limited access and unaffordability of quality education, large-scale unemployment, infrastructural deficits and widespread criminality and deviant behaviour among the youths (Odobo, 2017). If this is analyzed alongside the grievous environmental degradation of the land, water and forest areas of the region resulting from the extractive industry, it becomes easier to appreciate the basis of the Niger Delta agitations.

An important point in Ogbogbo's (2011) study is that recourse to agitation for resource control and self-determination was a last resort triggered by local frustration, threat to their survival and existence, and utter neglect, levity and indifference with which the government and the oil companies attended to local communities demand for socioeconomic emancipation. These same issues were responsible for the March 1966 Adaka Boro secessionist attempt, the Ogoni uprising in the 1990s and the emergence of several resistance movements such as Egbesu, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Avengers. The Delta has become the symbol of oil-related violence characterized by forceful occupation of oil flow stations, vandalization of pipelines, hostage taking and kidnapping and the site of struggle for resource control.

While the nature and dynamics of conflicts in the Niger Delta, as Ikelegbe (2005) argued, demonstrate the triumph of greed over grievance, the consciousness is not lost among the people of the region that the absence of good governance and development, and a feeling of marginalization, domination and injustice perpetrated against them are the real drivers of agitations in the region. What they have to show for

the enormous resources that they have—which have sustained the nation for decades—is human and infrastructural underdevelopment and a region racked with violent conflicts. A corollary of this is the displeasure with the federalist option as currently practiced by Nigeria believed to be structurally flawed, unbalanced, problematic, and biased against minorities' states. These issues have been a source of controversy in many parts of the country now coalesced into the demand for reform of the federal system; and in the Niger Delta, a demand for resource control.

The State and Institutional Response to Minority Agitation in the Delta
The Nigerian State is uncannily notorious for its avoidance strategy as well as its reputation of intolerance, confrontation and excessive use of force against dissents. However, it has also shown a willingness to adopt a non-adversarial approach to issues even though it is sometimes compelled to do so. The State has a reputation of ignoring group grievances and agitation in the Niger Delta only to issue threats against dissenters when such agitations gain traction. Often times, this is followed by actual use of force by agents of the State against the agitators. It demonstrated this strong-arm tactic against Ogoni agitators in River State in the early 1990s in the process proscribing youth activism in the region, labelling it a treasonable offence. The same conquest strategy was repeated in Odi community in Bayelsa State in November 1999 leaving a massive death toll and destruction of properties—tragedies that have remained indelible in the psyche of the local population of Odi.

Decades of neglect of the Niger Delta and further military response by the State such as *Operation Restore Hope* (2003), *Operation Flush Out III* (2004) and the more recent *Operation Crocodile Smile* (2016) inadvertently served to exacerbate conflict and militancy in the region. It buoyed restiveness and elevated the youths as vanguard of militant agitation for self-determination and resource control in the region. Same adversarial conflict intervention response has been deployed in communal, ethno-religious conflicts in other minorities' states and beyond as in Zaki Biam in Benue State, Jukun-Kuteb communal clash in Taraba and the many ethno-religious conflicts in Southern Kaduna. Thus indicating, as Ake (1996) argued, in relation to the post-colonial State in Nigeria that it is in the character of the State—contrived in nature—to be excessively repressive and with inadequate commitment to minorities' dissatisfaction.

Clearly perturbed by militant agitations in the Niger Delta, and the consequences on national security, the State decided to tone down its confrontational approach; offered to dialogue and proposed amnesty to agitators in the region. It requested the militants to disarm and renounce violence in return for State pardon and rehabilitation. Its failure to address the underlying grievances that triggered the agitation in the region, especially issues of infrastructural development limited the successes of the government's amnesty programme. Hence, the government's amnesty initiative was nothing more than a framework employed to placate militant agitations and ensure uninterrupted production of crude oil, rather than being a holistic plan that would address the entire range of the Niger Delta problems and grievances.

Besides the amnesty plan, the State had earlier indicated its willingness to explore the non-violent approach to resolving the minority question in the Niger Delta or at least, some part of it. This is reflected in the legal and regulatory measures it instituted to deal with oil-induced environmental degradation, a major aspect of the peoples' grievances. Some of these measures include the Petroleum Regulations (1967), Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulation (1969), Petroleum Refining Regulations (1974), Oil Pollution Act (1990) and more recently, National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA, 2006). But most of these environmental laws are outdated, reactionary and inadequate while the oil multinationals have quite easily flouted them with little or no sanctions imposed on them by the regulators. Government's permissiveness and a desire to maintain an unencumbered production of oil and profit-making have been adduced for the flagrant disregard of environmental laws and continued degradation of the Niger Delta environment (Isumonah, 1998; Siollun, 2019).

Although not borne out of a genuine desire to develop the Delta, the government set up intervention agencies to address the developmental needs of the Niger Delta beginning with the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) created in 1961 to the existing Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). Collectively, these agencies have more or less been conduits for corruption and contracts' scam, grossly underfunded, redundant and offering very little development projects that have repeatedly fallen below the minimum expectations of the local populations. Beset with lack of accountability, transparency and proper management, the NDDC, for all the desirability of its objectives as stated in its establishing Act, is widely perceived as a 'house of corruption' that serves the interests of politicians, government officials and

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cronies of incumbent administration. The uncovering of 1,691 contracts' scam and 22 illegal accounts operated by the NDDC (*This Day,* October 27, 2016) amidst other shortcomings prompted one commentator to observe that 'corruption…is the major factor that has hindered NDDC's performance since its establishment in 2000. And this is responsible for the inability of the Commission to attain its core mandate of ensuring a total, holistic and sustainable regional development' (Jegede, 2017: not paged).

Perhaps, one area where the minorities in the Niger Delta have felt powerless, marginalized and unjustly treated the most is in the area of oil revenue management. Revenue distribution has always been subject to the whims and caprices of the majority groups with near total disregard particularly to the southern minorities whose environment yields the bulk of the nation's revenue. It was more convenient for the State to promote fiscal autonomy and a healthy, competitive derivation principle in the 1960s when the major ethnic groups produced the major cash crops. Yet, it increasingly tightened the noose of fiscal autonomy and squeezed the derivation principle as crude oil became the mainstay of the nation's economy. The trajectory of the derivation principle shows a decline from 50% in 1960 to 45% in 1969, 20% in 1975, 1.5% in 1982, and 1.0% in 1990. It was marginally increased to 3.0% in 1992 and 13% in 1999.

This has disenchanted the Niger Delta minorities who felt shortchanged knowing that their resources hold the economy of the nation and as Osaghae (1991) pointed out, with the exception of Lagos, all the major ports—Port Harcourt, Warri, Koko and Calabar—that sustain the nation's economy are located in the Niger Delta area—. Hence, as the goose that lays the golden egg, the region's minorities insist that revenue allocation and resource distribution be based on each region's contribution to the national coffers. This understanding partly propelled the Southern Minorities Movement, with widespread regional support, to submit a memorandum to the 1994/1995 constitutional conference organized by Abacha's regime demanding, among other things, a minimum of 50% derivation formula. Not only were these demands rejected, coercive agents of the State were deployed to execute a campaign against high mobilization in the region. With no real access to federal power which is necessary to alter the course and increased their stake in the federation, the Niger Delta minorities have felt embittered, disillusioned, powerless and conquered.

The Resource Control Debate

Inevitably, the resource control debate has to begin with an examination of the federalist option as practiced in Nigeria. Ideally, federalism guarantees the political and economic independence of the federating units. It is also a reason why minorities are often in favour of federalism as it provides considerable protection for such groups (Simeon & Conway, 2001). This is also the case in Nigeria as the minorities have historically been staunch advocates of federalism. What however has disappointed them over the years is the exclusive character of Nigerian politics that often tend to sideline them. This exclusion politics ultimately tainted the federalist system in Nigeria from the late 1960s, producing a somewhat unitary system in federal disguise. Worst affected is the fiscal aspect of federalism to which resource control is vital. With the bastardization of fiscal federalism and the derivative basis of revenue allocation, the struggle for resource control was elevated to the front burner of politics especially among the southern minorities' states.

The struggle for resource control among the Niger Delta minorities manifests in the demand for a (re)negotiation of the stakes and context of their participation in the Nigerian federation. It is evident in the clamour by politicians, sociocultural associations and ethnic militias in the southern states for federal restructuring and convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) of ethnic nationalities to discuss the future of the Nigerian State (Ndujihe, 2020). The primary agenda promoted by the various agitations is fiscal federalism and the ability of each state or community to control and manage its resources at it deems fit.

Yet there is some confusion as to how resource control is viewed in the region. Is it really about the right of control and management of all land, water and forest resources for the development of the area? A question of local ownership of these resources located in the people's ancestral land? Or better still, the agitation for greater involvement as stakeholders in the exploitation of the resources and increased derivation. Osaghae et al (2008) claim that these competing perspectives are all part of the notion of resource control in the Niger Delta area. However, in a way, the southern governors and other citizens of the geo-political zone often equate the notion of resource control with the practice of 'true federalism' in which the federating units possess the constitutional rights to control and manage the resources within their areas and pursue their individual development as the basis of national development.

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A component of this perspective on resource control includes the demand for an upward revision of derivation and a return to the revenue sharing arrangements that existed under the Independence and Republican Constitutions of 1960 and 1963 respectively. The 1960 and 1963 Constitutions made provision for a 50% derivation formula in the sharing of proceeds from mineral resources. This and many other unique features of the Constitutions that reflected the federal principles guaranteed the economic independence of the federating regions thus allowing them to develop at their own pace. The delegates from the oil-bearing states to the National Conference held in 2014 made similar proposal for a 25.5-50% increase in derivation funding which was rejected by the other conference delegates.

Nonetheless, a case can be made that agitation for resource control is deeper than increased revenue allocation to the Niger Delta states, but directly relates to the survival of the Niger Delta people. It entails actual involvement, control and management of the resources by those who feel the brunt of environmental degradation originating from the greedy, reckless and socially irresponsible nature of the extractive industry. It is about the right of the communities to have direct access and control in the whole gamut of oil exploitation in their territory (Aiyede, 2020). This decisive role, Sagay (2005) observes, would inform a planned and control production that will lead to a progressive and ultimate replacement of the non-renewable resources with renewable ones as the main drivers of development and an economically prosperous society free of environmental degradation and other externalities of oil exploitation. To this end, the struggle for resource control is about remediation of the Niger Delta environment and the establishment of a sustainable economic base that is less reliant on petroleum resources.

In other words, the resource control struggle is about sustainable development based on a socially responsible use of ecological resources. It implies that the business of crude oil exploitation would not only be about profit-making but also about investing on the people and the environment. Thus, unlike the manner in which the State and corporate entities exploit the resources with the main focus being on uninterrupted revenue generation, the 'real' owners who are the inhabitants of the land where the resources are deposited would pay equal attention to issues of sustainability and the need to invest in the present without jeopardizing future development. They are less likely to endanger their future survival with reckless plundering on natural resources

as in the case of Oloibiri and many other oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta that were literarily exploited, desecrated and left desolate by the State and oil multinationals.

Contentiously, the seeming emphasis on 'absolute' or 'total' control and management of resources is partly responsible for the misconceptions and considerable opposition to minorities' agitation for resource control in the Niger Delta. In particular, the continued resistance by the Nigerian government and some conservative groups in the country against resource control is predicated on the fears that the demand for absolute control of resources by each state or communities encourages separatism and further polarizes the country along ethnic or regional lines. Nevertheless, the debate is not about the oil-bearing communities or states appropriating all the proceeds of crude oil resources or an unwillingness to accommodate others in the sharing of benefits accruing from oil exploitation. Rather, it is about environmental and social justice and a recognition of the natural rights of the resource-rich communities and states to justly and adequately benefit from such resources and to use same for economic and social advancement of the area. However, the reality is that the Niger Delta peoples lack the political might to surmount the various ethno-cultural and legal encumbrances to their agitation for resource control due to their minority status in the federation. It is the case that the minority status of the Niger Delta peoples remains a hindrance to their struggle for equity in petroleum resource management.

A neighbouring opinion is that had crude oil been domiciled in territories of the majority groups, it is difficult to argue that they would have permitted the institutionalization of the constitutional provisions and other legal instruments that have copiously stripped the Niger Delta minorities of the rights to environmental resources in the region and denied them the full enjoyment of such resources. This implies that the minorities remain situated in the margins of decision-making with less significant influence on resource allocation and distribution.

Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that absolute or principal control of environmental resources will effectively address minority agitations in the Niger Delta considering the unintended consequences of state creation which produced a 'majority minorities' and 'minority minorities' situation within the region. In other words, the new 'marginals' could become the main agitators for inclusion and representation within

the region. Consequently, minority agitation for resource control cannot be addressed in isolation but as part of a wider search for solution to the National Question.

Relying on Maiese's (2004) PIN (Position, Interest and Need) model of conflict analysis, it could be argued that agitation in the Niger Delta is not necessarily about absolute control of petroleum resources. That is more or less, the position or stance of the minorities in the region. Their interest on the other hand, is about inclusion, fair representation in governance and a proportional share of proceeds of petroleum resources. This means that the minorities in the region are making a case for greater involvement in the entire process of oil exploitation. More importantly is the needs which are intricately linked to the peoples' survival. The key issues are safety, security, development, environmental remediation, improved human capabilities and general socioeconomic wellbeing. In essence, the resource control agitation is about meeting these important needs; the absence of which constitute the underlying triggers of agitations in the Delta.

Concluding Remarks

Oil resource management, with its negative externalities, is at the heart of minority agitation in the Niger Delta. Beyond that, the agitation is largely about social and political exclusion, economic impoverishment, environmental degradation as well as the right to control, manage and benefit from natural resources in the Niger Delta. Addressing these and erasing the feeling of political exclusion, marginalization and domination, requires that the State redresses the long years of environmental injustice in the region and promote equitable distribution of resources. To adequately accommodate these segments of the federation, there is the need to redefine existing fiscal arrangement and amend the extant legal frameworks that appear suppressive, offensive and injurious to the people of the region. Particular focus should be on the laws that implicate land use, oil exploitation, oil revenue sharing and environmental justice issues. These could be achieved through a sincere and comprehensive reform of the federal system that will lead to considerable devolution of power and resources to the constituent units and the institutionalization of an effective power-sharing framework that promotes inclusiveness, good governance, nation and state-building.

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VOTING BEHAVIOUR AND ITS NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study examines voting behaviour of Nigerians and subsequently shows its security implications for the country. The study finds that voting pattern in Nigeria is based on cash/ other rewards, religious affiliation, ethnicity and regionalism, rather than issue-based polity. The paper also finds that that voters exhibit voter's apathy, electoral violence, irregular and unlawful behaviours which includes stuffing of ballot box, changing of result and other forms of electoral malpractices. Conclusively, these negative behaviours have such national security implications as **militarisation of the civil society, electoral violence, military intervention and ethno-religious divisions.** *The paper recommends political education, broader legislation and punishment for electoral offenders and the articulation of the entire electoral process along the lines of party ideology, competence and reputation of candidates and not ethnicity and religious affiliation.*

Keywords: Election, Voter Behaviour, Violence, Voter **apathy and Poor Governance**

Introduction

Regular elections are important exercises for nations that practice democracy as a system of government. Election is a major component of the electoral process that allows citizens or the electorates to cast their ballot for the candidates they feel can adequately represent them. The process has thus become the most acceptable means of changing leadership in any given political system. Vital to every election is voting on the day or days of the election by registered voters (or electorates). Voting takes centre stage and is all important in the electoral process because, as Onah (1997:289) argued, "voting is perhaps the simplest, cheapest and the most obvious form of participating in politics".

Similarly, the importance of the understanding of the behaviour exhibited by voters is of great importance because it has far-reaching implications on the life of the voter and others. This is because by casting a vote, the individual voter takes a course of action to engender a government. By so doing, leaders are elected into offices, and, thus, for the socio-political and physical organization of the country he or she inhabits. Through elections, leaders have risen to power who dramatically changed the course of world politics and instigated policies affecting the daily lives of millions (Visser, 1996).

No matter how rational a person may be, he or she must choose a candidate based on sentiments influenced by his or her political socialization. According to Edita (2015), voting behaviour provides insight into the sociology of the voters, factors that influence their voting patterns and the direction of their votes. He also referred to voting behaviour as the factors that determine the manner in which a particular group of people vote for a specific political party or candidates that are up for elections. Kini (1967: 35) summed this up in the following regards as: (a) a mode of legitimizing democratic rule; (b) Instancing "participation" in the political process involving integration into the political community; (c) instancing an act of decision-making; (d) a role-action involving definite political orientation imbedded in a particular type of political culture; or (e) a direct relation of the individual citizens to the formal government.

It is therefore obvious that voting behaviour is the result of the total impact on voters by a number of forces operating in the society which the voters form a part. Voting behaviour concerns itself with why voters vote the way they do. No voter has ever voted without being influenced by one force or another. These forces include: personal identification of the individual voter with one of the political parties, candidates or major issues of the day and a sense of civic obligation to vote in conformity with the group interest.

There are a number of studies on voting behaviour in the Nigerian scholarship. For instance, Babayo, Azizuddin and Bakri (2017:1-13) examined political behaviour and voting pattern in Nigeria using the 2015 presidential election as a case study. Similarly, **Nnabuihe, Aghemelo and Nwosu (2014:159 –178) examined** ethnicity and electoral behaviour in Nigeria. Also, Lawal and Adeleke (2015:90–99) studied perceived godfatherism, political awareness and voting behaviours in Nigeria; A Clarion Call to All Prospective Electorates. However, the implications of these undesirable behaviour from voters and their national security implications for Nigerian is yet to be adequately investigated. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine the voting behaviour of Nigerians with special focus on its security implications.

Conceptual Underpinnings
In this section, some of the concepts that may help give a clearer understanding of the empirical directions of this study are discussed.   They include: electoral system, democracy and p*olitical participation.*

Electoral System: According to *Nnoli (2003**: 230) electoral system is the "complex of rules and regulations that govern the selection of officeholders". He further opined that the existence of a viable electoral system is key to the survival of any democracy. This is more cogent in a country like Nigeria where access to the State and its resource allocating powers is viewed as the means of guaranteeing one's economic security (Nnoli, 2003).*

Democracy: For a government to be said to be democratic, it must meet *three basic conditions: competition among individuals and political groups (political parties); inclusive system of leadership recruitment; and existence of a regime of civil-political rights (*Diamond, Lin, and Lipset, *1989: xxi).*

Political participation: This simply involves the voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers. These activities may be direct or indirect in the formation of public policy (McClosky, 1968: 252).

Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the Rational Choice Theory (RCT). RCT is a theory that could be used by social scientists to understand human behaviour. It was early popularized by a 1992 Nobel Memorial Prize Laureate in Economics Science, Gary Becker, who was one of the first to apply rational actor models more widely (Becker, 1976:7). The theory has deep roots in economics and has become useful for the development of a cognitive theory of choice in psychology. The theory has made important impact in political philosophy and in political science as a whole (Oppenheimer, 2008). The role of Rational Choice Theory in political theory is built on dual foundational presumptions that explaining individual behaviour is the key to understanding the functioning of political institutions and that these behaviours can be aggregated to understand the behaviour of the group (Oppenheimer, 2008).

Rational Choice theorists argue that all individuals act in ways that would benefit them more; every individual is most likely to undertake courses of actions that they perceive to be the best possible option and one that would immensely be to their own advantage. RCT is relevant to our discussion because it can be applied to explain voting behaviour (**Ogu, 2013:94). As a matter of fact,** RCT best explains the voting behaviour of Nigerians.

The Concept of Voting
Conceptually, the word 'voting' is not new. In ancient Greece, voting was not used much for elections into official positions, which were based on the jury principles or arbitrary selection. Voting was however used for decision on propositions put before democratic assembly, which as usually based on the fate of individuals or other

matters of State such as the decision to go to war. To Lipset (1960:34), voting refers to aggregating individual preferences into collective decision in an election, the action of formally indicating one's choice of candidate or political party at an election. Kleppner (1982:27) defined voting as a form of political participation that is characterized by being highly accessible to the average citizen and requiring low resource expenditure (time, money and motivation). Gerber, Green and Shachar (2003:544) from their own perspective sees voting as aggregating individual preferences into a collective decision in an election, the action of formally indicating one's choice of candidate or political party at an election.

According to Adeleke (2016:29), voting denotes the means whereby a number of persons are enabled to indicate their agreement or disagreement with some prepositions or their preferences as between two or more proposals or between two or more candidates for some offices. He also defined it as a means of aggregating individual preference into a collective decision. He went further to generally define voting as the process by which citizens choose candidates for public office or decide political questions submitted to them. To Oriavwote (2000:40), voting is a means of aggregating individuals' preferences into collective decision in an election; it is the action of formally indicating one's choice of candidate or political party at an election. Oriavwote (2000:40) offering his own definition, defined voting as a method of expressing the approval or disapproval of the policies, programmes and decisions of the administrative authority. Balogun and Olapegba (2007:5-7) conceptualized voting as a means of aggregating or indicating one's choice of candidates of political party at an election.

Voting is one of the cardinal principles of the democratic system of government (Adeleke, 2016:29). This is because voting constitutes the basic decision-making process in a democracy. It provides a wider avenue through which people make preferred choice of their candidates during election. As a matter of fact, the most fundamental aspect of citizen's participation in decision making of his country is voting. The heart of election is voting on the day of election by registered voters. Without voting, the term, election is meaningless. It is for this reason Nnoli (2003:227-228), stated "the voting process raises a lot of issues that bother on the fairness and freeness of the elections".

In Nigeria the constitutional right to vote for every Nigerian citizens who has attained the age of eighteen (18) years are contained in sections and sub-sections of 77 (2); 117 (2), 132 (5) and 178 (5) of the 1999 constitution (Ejue and Ekanem, 2011). This right also exists in the universal declaration of human right and the entire body of international human rights law. The right to vote is widely recognized as a fundamental human right, but this right is not fully enforced for a large number of people in Nigeria. Basically, and consistently disenfranchised groups in Nigeria include non-citizens, minors (0-17 years old), minorities, criminals, the homeless, disable persons and several others that lack access to vote for different reasons that include poverty, illiteracy, intimidation, violence, unfair electoral processes.

Voting Behaviour
Behaviour is the conscious interest of individual in his decision to his leaders (Rufai, 2014:44). Voting behaviour is one of the major forms of political socialization (Ibrahim, Liman and Mato, 2015:9), that is always discussed in relations to elections. It refers to the exhibition of a particular voting practice by the citizens of a country (Rufai, 2014:44). Edita (2015) defined voting behaviour as the scientific study of the voting patterns of the electorates of the constituency in an election.

In a political approach to voting behaviour, Goldman cited in Ibrahim, et. al., (2015:9) believed that it determines decision making process especially with public decision makers, who are voted into offices by the electorates. But in the work of Deiner (2000:38) voting behaviour is largely related to democratic principles and individualism. In this assertion, the behaviour of voters is determined by the level of individual freedom to vote in a society (Ibrahim, et. al., 2015:9). Where such individual's right is guaranteed, democracy will definitely take place (Rufai, 2014:44).

Voter's Behaviour in Nigeria
Even a cursory look at Nigeria's elections in the past, especially since 1999, it becomes clear that elections characterised with voter apathy, electoral violence, irregularities and unlawful behaviours which includes stuffing of ballot box, changing of result and other forms of electoral malpractice. Olayode (2015:17) and Adams, and Agomor (2015:367) observed that elections in Nigeria are marred with voting behaviour of

rigging, the manipulation of religion, ethnicity, regionalism and nepotism. The abnormal behaviours mentioned above are perpetrated by most Nigerians who are supposed to be voters on the election day. The voting behaviour of Nigerians has thus been responsible for post-election election violence witnessed after elections in Nigeria. Again, It is also responsible for the crop of corrupt leaders Nigeria has produced over the years.

Ojo (2018) sees the voters or electorates as the chief actors and stakeholders in the electoral process. The electorates constitute all the people in a country or area who are entitled to vote in an election (**Ojo, 2018). In an election, t**he best of preparations by every other stakeholder devoid of the electorate otherwise known as voters renders the entire electoral process a nullity. This is because without voters there will be no voting, sorting, counting, collation, announcement of results and the declaration of winners (**Ojo, 2018).**

Voters are therefore the real 'kingmakers' as they choose who will govern them at different levels. They enthrone the Presidents and the Governors, the Local Government Chairmen and Councillors, the Senators, House of Representatives Members and Members of the State Houses of Assembly (**Ojo, 2018).** However, voters in Nigeria are known to exhibit certain unhealthy behaviour towards the country's electoral process. Such attitudes are multiple registrations, especially during revised voter's registration exercise, over-voting and voting by under aged (Awofeso and Odeyemi, 2014:22). **T**ill date, the role voters play in the electoral process, especially during election falls below expectation. This necessitated the emphasis on the need for the electorate to play an active role in the electoral process (Admin, 2018).

Many voters have been apathetic to elections. Elections in Nigerian over the years has been characterised with low voter turnout. As a matter of fact, elections in Nigeria are witnessing less and less voter's turnout. In some grave cases, election in the country witnessed less than 10 per cent voter participation. Again, many persons of voting age do not bother to register as voters. No matter the level of awareness campaign, they are simply indifferent. There is another category of voters or electorates who took time off to register but never bother to go and collect their voter cards. According to the

Independent National Electoral Commission, as of March 2018, there were approximately eight million uncollected Permanent Voter Cards nationwide. On May 21, 2018, INEC commenced distribution of additional four million PVCs of those who had registered in the on-going Continuous Voters Registration between April and December 2017. That makes it a staggering 12 million PVCs awaiting collection by Nigerians. This is worrisome and it happened because registration and collection of PVC are free unlike when one applies for banks debit cards or the driving licence which attracts fees (**Ojo, 2018).**

Some electorates collect their voter cards but do not show up to cast their ballot during elections. They often claim that their reason for collecting their voter cards is to enable them use it as a means of identification at banks, at airports when flying domestic routes, and generally when transacting business that necessitates personal identification. This set of people care less about who wins or loses at elections. As far as they are concerned, with or without their vote, winners will emerge (**Ojo, 2018).** The situation is not different during primary elections at the party level. Voters are easily lured by political godfathers and members of the party executives with their ill-gotten wealth to vote for unpopular candidates, thereby imposing such candidates on the people. Kadzamaria (2000), and Magolowonado (2003) cited in **Agu, Okeke and Idike (2013:441)** observed that primary elections had failed to produce acceptable results in many cases because they were often marred by a lot of irregularities, perpetrated by the voters.

Other behaviour exhibited by the electorates in Nigeria is the support for political parties and voting candidates from their ethnic or religious group. During election in Nigeria, voters vote according to ethnic allegiance and religious sentiments by each particular section or group in the country where their candidate emerged not minding whether he will win or lose through their votes. According to **Nnamani (2018:82), the** voting pattern in Nigerian elections followed the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages. Pappi (1996:23) also added that ethnic identities have strongly oriented the citizens towards participation in election and voting exercises. Although the 2011 general elections were described by both local and international observers as free, fair and credible, but the outcome of the presidential election exposed the ethnic and religion schism in the country. *Isiaq, Adebiyi, and Bakare (2018:110) predicted*

that the outcome of the presidential election portends the danger of ethnic bloc voting in Nigeria's future elections.

Most of the voters in Nigerian vote because they have been induced with money or gifts. **Babayo, Mohammed and Bakri (2018:25) pointed out that some** power brokers (Godfathers) with sufficient financial muscles influenced voters through vote buying to ensure that their candidates scale through and control power at all levels. According to Onuoha and Ojo, (2018), since the return of democracy to Nigeria in May 1999, vote buying has steadily grown in scale and brazenness. While electoral candidates buy, the electorates sell their votes as goods in the market. Several videos and images have emerged, showing unabashed sharing of cash, food and valuable items among the electorate by politicians and parties during elections in Edo, Anambra, Ondo and Ekiti States (Onuoha and Ojo, 2018). This has led to the apt description of Nigeria's electoral politics as "cash-and-carry democracy". This happens because political parties and candidates have demonstrated by their actions during electioneering periods that a quality party manifesto and the integrity of contestants are not enough to influence voters' choices and secure their votes; hence they engage in vote buying (Ovwasa, 2013:100).

There were widespread allegations of vote buying even in the off-cycle governorship elections in Edo and Ondo States in 2016. In the 28 September 2016 gubernatorial election in Edo, observers reported massive vote buying by the two main political parties, the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The parties were accused of giving =N=3000 to =N=4000 to the electorates for votes in several polling units (The Whistler, 2016). **Babayo, et. al., (2018:25) revealed how a popular political party in Nigeria b**ided votes for =N=500 ($ 1.3) and later increased it to =N=1000 ($ 2.8) when they sensed danger of losing. The electorates were just required to vote for them, snap the ballot paper with their smart phones, present it to them and get their share of spoils.

Apart from vote buying, electorates were sponsored by politicians through giving them meagre amount of money to engage in criminal activities during elections such as political thuggery, ballot stuffing, ballot boxes snatching, intimidation of voters and opposition **(Babayo, et. al., 2018:26).** Lack of punishment for electoral offenders

is responsible for the unhealthy attitude of voters towards the electoral system in Nigeria (Akeredolu, 2010:10). Unless and until punishments are meted out to electoral offenders, voters will continue to exhibit behaviours that are clog in the wheel of Nigeria's electoral process (Idakwoji, Paul and Alih, 2018:33).

The Security Implications of Voter's Behaviour in Nigeria

From the above, it becomes obvious that there are significant national security implications of the highlighted voter's behaviour in Nigeria. These can be manifested in various forms including the militarisation of the civil society, electoral violence, military intervention and ethno-religious divisions.

Militarisation of the Civil Society

The behaviour of voters encourages the militarisation of the civil society. This occurs especially when young voters make themselves available to be armed and used as thugs and instrument of violence to facilitate electoral victory. By this act, unscrupulous politicians inadvertently end up instilling a culture of violence amongst the civil populace. The youths are easily exploited due to their joblessness. This has led to the militarization of many ethnic militias in Nigeria. A good example was the Niger Delta militants (Chubah, 2009:24).

Additionally, arms brought into the civil society for election purposes are not easily retrieved by the political bigwigs. At the end of the election cycle, these youths are abandoned and they, being armed with such weapons resort to armed robbery, kidnapping and other vices that are inimical to the society at large.

Electoral Violence

As noted above, politicians recruit voters (especially the youths) to carry out nefarious activities such as ballot box snatching, ballot box stuffing, assassination of political opponents and kidnapping of electoral officials/candidates. In this process, opposition political parties may also mobilise their youths to respond in kind to the actions of their opponents. The ensuing armed violence may lead to security breach of high proportion with resultant security threats to the citizens and the State at large.

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The usual consequences are the victimisation of innocent citizens, burning of both government and private properties and mass killings. The post-election violence that rocked the ancient city of Kano during the 2011 general elections resulted in the loss of several innocent lives (Shuaibu, 2011:10). The above situation affects development and employment opportunities negatively. Post-election violence sends bad signal to investors and discourage them from investing in the country (Anegbode, Alonge, and Odio-Ugbesia:146). It is important to mention here that post-election violence will continue to mar elections in Nigeria until the voters adopts and exhibits right behaviours towards election.

Military Intervention

Nigeria has had a chequered democratic history due primarily to military incursion into the political sphere of the country. The first military intervention in the country was through a very bloody coup led by Major Nzeogwu in January 15, 1966 (Some five years after independence). Nzeogwu and his cohorts claimed that their coup was necessary to end the misrule, ineptness and corruption of the preceding five years of the civil rule (Osoba, 1996). Interestingly, other coups in the long history of military intervention gave the same reason for truncating the democracy of the country.

The coup failed, lasting only a few days and resulted to the Nigerian Civil War. At the end of the war, the military continued its misadventure in Nigeria's politics until the Second Republic (between 1979 and 1983). The electoral violence that ensues when voters breach electoral ethics or assist politicians to rig election has also been cited as justification for military overthrow of elected civilian administrators. It must be mentioned that those features that prompted the military to take over government from successive civilian governments are still the same features characterising this present civilian government. The massive electoral irregularities that characterised the 1984 elections was a major reason cited by the Buhari's regime for the overthrow of the Shagari's administration.

As a matter of fact, the relationship between electoral misconduct and military intervention was aptly expressed by the Major Nzeogwu when he stated that Elections are always rigged. It is impossible to vote out a Nigerian minister…. The military has

taken over power to put an end to gangsterism and disorder… (Anegbode, Alonge, and Odio-Ugbesia:146).

Gutteridge (1969:17) made the same observation when he stated that a situation which cannot be changed by constitutional means invites the use of violence measure. The above statement implies that when changes become difficult through the ballot, changes come by the bullets.

Ethno-religious Division

Due to the lucrative nature of politics in Nigeria and sharing of the spoils of politics along ethnic lines, political gains and offices are contested vigorously along the lines of ethnicity and religion. During the campaign process and elections proper, Nigerian politicians use negative political education to divide the electorate along ethnic and political lines.

Interestingly, the June 12, 1993 presidential election organized by then Military President, General Ibrahim Babangida did not have such ethno-religious sentiments, perhaps because it was organised along issue-based two-party system namely, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC). The election was unique because two political parties fielded two Muslim candidates in the person of highly influential billionaire MKO Abiola and the affable Bashir Tofa. Again, in spite of the fact that the SDP picked another Muslim, Alhaji Babagana Kingibe as running mate, questions were not raised (Olowojolu, 2015). At that time, Nigerians were not politically educated along ethnic and religious divides. This cannot therefore happen today, be it the case of Nigeria's presidential or any other elections.

As an example, during the April 2011 presidential election in Bauchi State, 32 Christians were killed and 72 churches were burnt. This occurred just from prompting from a religious cleric (Yahaya and Bello, 2020).

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it can be seen that voters exhibits negative behaviour towards election in Nigeria. These behaviours include multiple registrations, voter apathy, ethnic based voting, vote buying and selling, religious and regional affiliation,

thuggery, ballot stuffing, ballot boxes snatching, and intimidation of other voters have serious security implication for the Country.

Security implications are militarisation of the society, post-election violence and military intervention in the country's politics and **ethno-religious divisions**. For elections to be free, fair, credible and violence-free in Nigeria, voters must exhibit appropriate behaviour during and after election. However, to avoid the challenges associated with voter's behaviour during elections in Nigeria, the following are recommended.

a. The government should as a matter of urgency articulate deliberate policy to better educate her citizenry on the importance of voting irrespective of sex, ethnic, religious and regional affiliations.

b. Political education and socialisation should be taught based on party ideology, competence and reputation of the candidate but not ethnicity and religion.

c. Appropriate legislation and punishment should be spelt out and melted to persons (both voters and electoral candidates) found guilty of electoral malpractices.

d. There is the need for Nigerians to develop the culture of self-contentment. This will help to reject any political luring and intimidation. It will help voters to refuse monetary inducement on election day.

e. The government of Nigeria must pay serious attention to unemployment and poverty reduction programmes. When the youth are employed, they will not easily be recruited by politicians to cause disruption and violence on election day.

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RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND REVENUE DISTRIBUTION: TOWARDS AN INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY

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Abstract

Across the West African and other sub-regions in the continent, development of appropriate interventions for transparent, accountable, equitable and sustainable management of natural resources is necessary for sustainable national development. A major occurrence in countries with natural resources is the resource curse phenomenon which has turned the resource endowment into an ending resource conflict derived from environmental and socio-economic degradation, corruption manifesting in different forms. The land use decree and the definition of exclusive economic zones have some adverse effect on the management of natural resources over the past decade. Management of oil, the oil block, production export figures are shrouded in fraud of imaginable magnitude. How far can we go in resolving contradictions with revenue distribution without compromising intergenerational equity? This paper analyses issues in management of resources and revenue distribution to preserve intergeneration equity through sustainable development.

Keywords: Resources management, Resource curse, Intergenerational equity, Conflict and Sustainable development,

Introduction:

The management of natural resources (such as oil, natural gas, diamonds, minerals, forests and water) a major source of national income, and the role of public sector in the transparent, accountable, equitable and sustainable management of these resources could be more important than the resources themselves because these resources can constitute a major cause of conflict and instability if mismanaged unfairly. Countries like Nigeria with weak institutions often struggle to handle the potentially destructive force of corruption and attempts by various actors to capture the wealth generated through extraction of natural resources. The governance of natural resources is especially important in the context of divided societies as control of benefits from local natural resources is often a chief motivator of ethnic or identity-based conflicts as we being experienced in the in the Niger Delta. Natural-resources debate is particularly sharp not only in the context of divided societies, but in situations where uneven geographic distribution of natural resources corresponds with ethnic, religious or linguistic divides. While these issues are especially important in decentralised nations and are particularly salient in a federal context, they can arise in any state confronted with demands for increased autonomy over local resources from individual communities. Under these circumstances, the framework for the treatment of natural resources can strengthen a national compact or can exacerbate conflict.

The question of an acceptable formula for revenue sharing among the component tiers of the Nigerian nation is one of the most protracted and controversial debates in the political and macroeconomic management of the economy (Ekeji,2011). One clear fact has been that a federal system of government often rises from people's desire to constitute a union without losing their identities within the federation. This is the main beauty in the context of ethnic pluralism as in the case of most African countries, and most cohesive approach to manage the diversity in the ethnic groups.

Petroleum was discovered in Nigeria by Shell-BP in 1956 in Oloibiri in the present day Bayelsa State, following half a century of exploration activities. Oil production became important in the 1960s, but in 1967, the Biafra conflict and the civil war delayed further expansion till the end of hostility in 1970. The main reservoirs are located in and around the Niger Delta, in both on-shore mangroves and shallow off-shore basins, and since 1990 exploration has increasingly moved to deep, offshore areas (Akpbio,2010).

This is obvious to the fact that natural resources have not always been seen as important enough to require extensive treatment in constitutions or peace agreements the entire world over. In many countries where natural resources do not constitute a significant sector of the economy, it is not unusual for natural resources to fall under general provisions dealing with the treatment of revenue and fiscal and financial issues (in Western states). Similarly, many peace treaties made only passing reference to natural-resource arrangements. In more recent constitutions and legal agreements, it is, however, more common to deal with natural resources separately from other elements of the wealth-sharing framework. There are a number of reasons for this. In some developing countries, natural resources are the only or predominant source of wealth. As a result, these resources are very often seen as a national heritage to be shared equitably. However, they often generate strong feelings of local community ownership over their development and the resulting revenues. The challenge is to balance these local interests against the overall importance of natural resources to national development. Constitutions or peace treaties are often called upon to mediate this tension and the conflict that can result from it(Danjuma, 1994)

It therefore becomes important to develop conceptual clarity on the categories of issues that can arise in natural-resource negotiations. Our experience in these types of negotiations suggests that arrangements to govern natural resources can be categorised into three broad areas, as follows.

i) **Ownership of natural resources.** The rule governing ownership of natural resources is often a passionate issue that requires a matching of the rights of private ownership, communal and state ownership. The determination of ownership of resources is habitually the most disputed phase of statutory negotiation. Nevertheless, there is the misunderstanding between ownership and the intractable issue of management, control and sharing of revenue derived from natural resources. As it is, the right and benefit of ownership can vary and could be limited by regulation and treatment of the issues listed below.

ii) **Allocation of the power to manage and develop natural resources.** Constitutions are often called upon to decide what bodies at the national and provincial levels of government should have the authority to make and administer laws relating to the development and exploitation of natural

resources. This amounts to the power to control, regulate and manage natural resources and is potentially more significant than ownership rights in themselves. This allocation can have profound effects on the development of the sector and even on the overall structure of the state when natural resources are a major source of public income. In centralised states this may be less of an issue, but it can be fundamental in resource-rich or federal countries.

iii)   **Treatment of natural-resource revenues.** The transparent and fair generation, collection and sharing of natural-resource revenues can be a determining factor of the viability of a peace agreement or constitution. The handling of resource revenues may follow directly from the allocation of management and control over these resources, or it can be undertaken quite differently. The latter is possible because the objectives that motivate how a constitution distributes responsibility for the management of natural resources can be substantially different from the often political goals that underpin how the revenue from those resources should be shared (Hayson, 2009).

This work will look at the management of natural resources, its implication for socio-economic development of the nation and revenue distribution pattern a prerequisite for intergenerational equity. It will define sustainability which emphasises the ecological dimension as offered in ecological economics. Constanza, (1991) "defining sustainability as a relationship between human, economic system and larger dynamics, but normally slower- changing ecological systems in which (1) human life can continue indefinitely, (2) human individuals can flourish, and (3) human cultures can develop, but in which effect of human activities remains within precincts, so as not to destroy the diversity, complexity and function of ecological life support system.

The Resource Curse Theory
This work relies on the natural resources curse to explain the problem if mismanagement of natural resource and the detrimental impact of oil on development as peculiar to Nigeria has become a phenomenon that pointed to a strong resource curse. Africa's oil belt lies mainly along its western coast in the countries abutting the Gulf of Guinea. According to Ghazvinian (undated) One-third of the world's new discoveries of oil since 2000 have taken place in Africa; which Portray a region that thanks to its oil riches and debilitating poverty, is increasingly occupying a place in

economics and political debates in developed nations. In the theoretical economic literature, three channels of causation from natural resource abundance to lower growth have been identified (OECD,2008). First, is that natural resources generate rents which leads to rapacious rent-seeking (the voracity effect), whose adverse manifestation is felt through political economy effects as in Lane and Tornell (Hausman, 2002) and to increase corruption (Mauro, 1995) and Leite and Weidmann (1999) which adversely affects long-run growth. This effect refers more broadly to as the institutional impact of natural resources.

Second, natural resource ownership exposes countries to volatility, particularly in commodity prices, which could have an adverse impact on growth through an increase, Isham, Pritchett, Woolcock, & Busby (2003) provides an excellent summary of the mechanisms of causation identified in the economics as well as in the political science literature. In the latter, emphasis is placed on the "rentier" effects, whereby large revenues from natural resources allow governments to mollify dissent and avoid accountability, insulating governments from pressures for institutional reform; and "anti-modernization" effects, whereby governments successfully thwart pressures for modernization and institutional reform because their "budgetary revenues are derived from a small workforce that deploys sophisticated technical skills that can only be acquired abroad."Finally, natural resource ownership makes countries susceptible to Dutch Disease the tendency for the real exchange rate to become overly appreciated in response to positive shocks—which leads to a contraction of the tradable sector. This outcome, combined with the (largely unproven) proposition that tradable (usually manufacturing) sectors are "superior" because of learning-by-doing and other positive externalities, leads to the conclusion that natural resource ownership exerts a drag on long-run growth which breed poverty and under development(Zavier, et al. 2003).

Oil has profoundly influenced the political economy of Nigeria, and most observers claimed that Nigeria is 'oil-cursed'. This is due to Nigeria's very poor economic development, with very low *Human Development Index* (HDI), and persistent governance problems including unfathomable corruption and societal strife, despite sizable oil incomes over many years Sachs & Warner(2001), Karl(2003) Mehlum et al (2006), Humphreys et al(2007) has failed to make any significant improvement in the lives of the citizenry.

A growing literature from scholars across the globe is discussing the empirical robustness and modalities of this 'paradox of plenty' or 'resource curse theory', and is searching for possible explanations. Among the stronger economic explanations is that an increase in revenues from natural resources appreciates the exchange rate and makes other sectors less competitive, and that the volatility of commodity prices is disruptive. This is the so-called 'Dutch disease'. In particular, the negative price effect and a decline in investments 'crowds out' manufacturing and agriculture.

In addition to economics, there is an increasing emphasis on political and institutional explanations to the curse. It is argued that the main difference between success and failure is in the quality of institutions (Sida, 2002). Basically, rents generated from minerals (and other easily accessible resources) can either be channelled into the productive economy, or be captured by the ruling elite for personal enhancement and power purposes. Whether the rents from mineral extraction are utilised to encourage production and national economic development, or spent on consumption, waste and non-productive investments, capital flight, is basically a question of institutional value.

Rich resources have the capacity to lead to institutional decay especially when politicians are hindering, manipulating, exercising undue influence, and/or dismantling the rule of law and abuse of state institutions in the control of, and redistribution, in order to extract the rents and use them for sequestered commitments. In particular, when the state institutions are weak at the outset (when the oil boom sets in), and instability dismantle budding institutions and rendered them weak to withstand the pressures that followed with the negative impact -resources curse. This is why States with weak institutional capacity are unable to thwart group conflict over access to the resource rents, and unable to hold back economically unproductive investments that are lobbying for protection, subsidies and preferential policies.

Particularly harmful is the struggle for the rents controlled by the state, and thus the struggle for control of the state, by for instance political gladiators, top-level bureaucrats, military officials, robber barons, and militants. The presence of natural resource abundance has thus led to much conflict and even civil wars. The civil war in Angola, the wars of the Congo's, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sudan, and also the Biafra war have been explained as a conflict over access to natural resources, with an ensuing decay of the state apparatus (Collier and Hoeffler (1998); Collier (2003).

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Observers of the African oil producing States, especially Nigeria find it quite astonishing that the stupendous resources gained from oil have not been reflected in the rate and level of development in a country like Nigeria. Rather, is has become a major source of concern that such resources might, when we look at the economic indices, be classified as having been wasted. Cumulative earnings from the export of oil between 1965 and 2000 have been put at US$350 billion, at 1965 prices – with fewer payments being made to the oil companies (Xavier, et. al,(2000). Nigeria at the moment has "*An Act which delimits the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria being an area extending up to 200 nautical miles seawards from the coasts of Nigeria. Within this Zone, and subject to universally recognized rights of other States (including land-locked States), Nigeria would exercise certain sovereign rights especially in relation to the conservation or exploitation of the natural resources (minerals, living species, etc.) of the sea bed, its subsoil and superjacent waters and the right to regulate by law the establishment of artificial structures and installations and marine scientific research, amongst other things*"(EEZA,1978).

The above was followed by a Land Use Act that authorizes the public take-over of land rent which exempts the enhancements on the land from taxation. In practice, instead of the revenues including oil incomes generated from land going to the people, mostly ended up lining the pockets of corrupt government officials and their cohorts, eventually finding their way into private foreign banks. This has been the history of natural resource management in Nigeria, particularly her oil resource revenues. And the oil bearing states of the Niger Delta region, rightly feeling so cheated of the resources around them are now agitating for full control out of which they intend to simply pay taxes to the federal government. Expressing its displeasure over such agitation, the Federal Government recently set up a 24-man Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas with logistics provided by the American government to ensure the oil keeps flowing. The committee was made up of the armed forces (Abiama, 2001).

Contribution of Oil to Government Revenue
From an analysis of Annual Reports made by the Central Bank of Nigeria (2005), there has appeared to be steady progress in the amount of revenue contributed by the oil sector since 1980. While oil contributed 56 per cent in 1980, the figure for 1985 was 76.2 per cent. The figure had gone down to 70.6 per cent in 1995 And, in 2005, a breakdown of total revenue accruing to the government showed that oil contributed 78

per cent - against 15 per cent from the non-oil sector and 7 per cent from the independent sector. However, the general perception of most stakeholders is that oil contributes an average of 95 per cent to government revenue in total. This comes as a result of the total breakdown of infrastructure and a declining level of capacity utilisation in the real sector. Yet government efforts to improve contributions from the non-oil sector to national revenues have not yet had notable results (Agwara, 2007)

If oil is not the source of 95 per cent of Government revenue, why are they not allowing us to keep up to 50 per cent of the resources derived from oil? They are not, because they will starve - and we will prosper. That is why we need to suffer for God's blessing rather than enjoy it…' The contribution of oil to government revenue rose from 0.1 percent in 1958 to 26.3 per cent in 1970; and, since then, it has been on an upward swing, as illustrated in table 1, below.

It is sad that Nigeria continue remain among the 20 countries in the world with the widest gap between rich and poor. The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of wealth or income (or in some cases consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy, a complete deviation from a perfect and equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality while an index of 100 points to a perfect inequality. Nigeria has one of the highest Gini indexes in the world - for Nigeria, it is 50.6. This compares poorly with other countries such as India (37.8), Jamaica (37.9), Mauritania (37.3) and Rwanda (28.9) (UN, 2003). It is quite amazing that the stupendous resources gained from oil have not been reflected in the rate and level of development in Nigeria. Rather, is has become a major source of concern that such resources might, when we look at the economic indices.

Table 1: Contribution of Oil to total Federal Revenue and Percentage of oil Revenue

Year	Total Federal Revenue	Oi Revenue (Nm) Oil	Revenue as % of Total
1970 - 80	663280	47690	75.36
1980 - 90	241287	185231	76.36
1991	78640	60316	70.2
1992	138617	115392	83.2
1993	138874	106192	76.6
1994	201971	160192	79.34
1995	459987	324548	70.56
1996	520190	369190	70.97
1997	582957	416811	71.50
1998	463608.8	324311.2	69.95
1999	948187.9	724422.5	76.32
2000	1906159.7	1541675.8	76.97
2001	22331532.9	1797518.8	76.52
2002	1731837.5	1230851.2	71.07

Source: Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin and Annual Report (various issues) In Agwara John Onyeukwu: Resource Curse in Nigeria: perception and challenges p.9

According to Rogers and Hall (2003), poor governance leads to increased political and social risk, institutional failure and rigidity and a deterioration in the capacity to cope with shared problems. Some analysts have shown that there is a strong causal relationship between better governance and better development outcomes such as higher per capita incomes, lower infant mortality and higher literacy (Kaufmann, et al. 1999). Effective governance is thus essential to poverty reduction as it can help the poor to help themselves. Poor governance is a barrier to development and hurts the poor through both economic and non-economic channels, making them more vulnerable and unable to adapt to changes.

Current question that governance attempt to answer borders on whether a society can coordinate and manage itself. This is the essence of distributed governance. It looks at co-ordination and the various forms of formal and informal types of State/society interactions and the role of civil society and policy networks. This according to Rogers and Hall (2003) is more society-centred and less "Statist", with governance systems providing the power balance, recognising of course that political power is derived essentially from economic resources and instruments.

Strongly related to this question and concern is the sub-question of equity. Equity questions are always framed around the broader question of justice. To conceive of a just society is to conceive of two key principles namely, need and equality (Engeset, 2007).

The "needs question" border on basic and inexcusable human needs (UN-WWAP, 2003 & UN, 2007) and the principles of equality demands that people must be treated as equals in a political community in their position as citizens and they must have equal political, legal and social rights. The equality principle is mostly entrenched in constitutional provisions and it is very important if the minority question is to be effectively addressed in development and resource allocation (Miller, 1999).

HDP Health Equity and Inter-Programmatic Group Idemudia, 2006) further distinguish between vertical and horizontal equity. This distinction relates to two broad issues namely, the universality of needs (horizontal equity-that is everyone needs a particular basic necessity at some point); and special or targeted supplies (vertical equity-for example targeting a specific supply to the needs of a special group such as the poor). Vertical equity has a higher potential for redistributing resources, and therefore often faces more political obstacles.

Table 2: Okigbo Vertical Revenue Allocation

Sector	Okigbo %	GWP %	1982 %
Federal Government	53.0	55.0	55.0
State Government	30.0	30.0	30.0
Local Government	10.0	8.0	10.0
Development of the F. C. T	2.5	2.5	-
Mineral Producing Area	2.0	3.5	3.5
General Ecological Problem	1.0	1.0	1.0
Revenue Equalization	100%	100%	100%

Note: G. W. P = Government white paper.

The Aboyade's report on revenue allocation was rejected on the assumption of the civilian regime of Alhaji shehu Shagari in 1979. That formula left the nation with the following vertical revenue sharing arrangement: federal -75%, states – 22% and 3% for local council in 1980. The new government setup the Okigbo commission with the following terms of reference; to inter alia examine the existing revenue allocation formula between the three tiers of government to ensure their capacity to carry out their constitutional functions. The Okigbo commission used the total current and capital expenditure of each tier of government. From this background, the Okigbo commission came out with the following vertical and horizontal revenue allocation formula as reflected on the table below:

Table 3: Okigbo Horizontal Revenue Scheme.

SECTOR	Okigbo %	GWP %	1982 Act %
Minimum responsibilities of government	40.0	40.00	14.00
Social development factor; direct primary school enrolment.	11.25	11.25	11.25
In verse primary school enrolment.	3.75	3.75	3.75
Internal revenue effort.	5.00	5.00	5.00

Source: G. W. P: government white paper 1980

Okigbo (1982) was to satisfy the twin good of equity and efficiency, as well as strengthen the ability of the federal government to direct the national economy and to ensure that adequate financial flow to the states and localities sustained to meet with their ever-increasing expenditure demand and to be able to adjust to changing fiscal circumstances. The Okigbo's report was lampooned from the states, set aside and was invalidated by the Supreme Court. It was subsequently replaced with the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account) Act No. 1 of 1982.

Vertical Revenue Allocation Formula between the various tiers of government was as follows; Federal Government- 50%, State Government- 35%, Local Government- 10% and Special Funds- 5%. The commission proposed further that revenue going to the states and local government should be shared in accordance with the principle listed below: Expenditure responsibilities –50%, internal revenue effort 35%, and fiscal equalization 25%. On the issue of sharing of the 5% special fund; 2.5% was to be given to the special problem of mineral producing areas and the remaining 2.5% was to take care of other ecological problems.

The military overthrow of the civilian administration in December 31, 1983 created another window for a new fiscal structure through Decree No 35 of 1984. This Decree modified the makeshift put in place following rejection of Okigbo's report. In the 1984 Vertical Revenue Allocation, the federal government retained 55.0%, State governments 30.0%, Local Government 10.0%, Mineral Producing Area (Derivation) 1.5% and General Ecological Problems1.0%. 2.5% of the state's share is for the development of mineral producing areas, while, 1.5% of the revenue

National revenue mobilization allocation and fiscal commission (NRMAFC)
This commission was inaugurated 6th June 1988 through enabling Decree No 49 of 1989. This decree set up a permanent fiscal commission in Nigeria. The composition of this commission was later to be enshrined in the "third Schedule section 31 of the 1999 federal constitution". Immediately after its inauguration in 1988, the commission carried out a comprehensive review of the existing revenue allocation formula. Living up to its mandate, the produced the first vertical and horizontal revenue sharing formula proposal which was accepted, modified and approved by the military government(Danjuma, (1994).

There was the proposal that 2% of mineral oil revenue be set aside from the federation account, to be shared among the oil mineral producing areas on the basis of derivation. This proposal was modified and allocated 1%t of the entire federation account and shared on derivation basis. Also, the federal government increased the ecological fund from 0.5% to 1.0% to be shared on the vertical revenue allocation arena due to the inadequacy of the initial amount in combating those problems.

The issue of revenue distribution went to the so-called constitutional conference convened by the Federal government in 1994. While attempts were made to revert to the pre 1957 sixty-five per cent (65%) of revenue allocation to mineral producing areas; the several discussions failed to reach an agreement, until the power that be allocated 13% revenue to mineral producing areas/States. This did not take effect till the promulgation of 1999 constitution and it took President Obasanjo another review committee to look into that issue. The issue of revenue allocation or the statutory distribution of revenue from the Federation Account among the different levels of government has been one of the most contentious and controversial issues in the nation's political life. So contentious has the matter been that none of the formulae evolved at various times by a commission or by decree under different regimes since 1964 has gained general acceptability among the component units of the country.

Table 4: Vertical revenue allocation formula as proposed by NRMA & FC and approved by government in 1990.

S/NO	SECTORS	NRMA&FC (%)	A.F. R. C. Approved (%)
A	Federal Government	47.F.	A 50 fg
B	States Government	30.F.	A 30
C	Local Government	15. F.	A 15
D	Special Funds:	8. F. A	3.5 fg
i.	Federal Capital Territory	1. F. A	1. F. A. fg
ii.	Stabilization	10.5 F. A	10. 5 F. A fg
iii.	Savings	2.0 F. A	12. 5 F. A fg
iv.	Deprivation	2.0 M. R.	-
v.	Oil Producing Areas	1. 5. M. R	1. F. A fg
vi.	Non Oil Producing Areas	0.5 M. R	-
vii.	General Ecology	0.5 F. A	1. 0 F. A fg

Source: Danjuma T. Y. (1994)

Table 5: Vertical revenue allocation formula as proposed by NRMA & FC and approved by government in 1990.

S/NO	SECTORS	NRMA&FC (%)	A.F. R. C. Approved (%)
A	Federal Government	47. F. A	50 fg
B	States Government	30. F. A	30
C	Local Government	15. F. A	15
D	Special Funds:	8. F. A	3.5 fg
i.	Federal Capital Territory	1. F. A	1. F. A. fg
ii.	Stabilization	10.5 F. A	10. 5 F. A fg
iii.	Savings	2.0. F. A	12. 5 F. A fg
iv.	Deprivation	2.0 M. R.	-
v.	Oil Producing Areas	1. 5. M. R	1. F. A fg
vi.	Non Oil Producing Areas	0.5 N. O. M. R	-
vii	General Ecology	0.5 F. A	1. 0 F. A fg

Source: Danjuma T. Y. (1994)

MR=Mineral Revenue and NOMR=Non-Oil Mineral Revenue

"It should be noted that the above principles are not mutually consistent. They are difficult to apply simultaneously. Therefore, trade-offs are necessary in order to avoid conflicts. There is no doubt that the general principles of fiscal federalism appeared to have informed Nigeria's attempt at intergovernmental fiscal relations. The different principles have been dictated by a combination of historical experiences, political, cultural and social factors. After almost forty years in search of a workable fiscal federalism, there still exist challenges which policymakers must address" (Danjuma, 1994).

Intergenerational Equity
Intergenerational equity refers to the equity between generations, which includes the need of future generation in the design and implementation of current policies. It simply means a commitment of present generation towards future generation which means that present generation of human beings have obligation to take care of natural resources and ecology to enable future generation an equal chance to savour mother nature and right to life.

The theory of intergenerational equity argues that the human species, hold the natural environment in common with all members of our species that includes: past generations, present generation, and future generations. As member of the present generation, we hold the Earth in trust for future generation which the Nigerian government does not seem to recognise through all its present weak policy actions and non-existence of such policies to address issues of intergenerational equity through their stewardship of non-renewable resource activity benefits (More, 2019). Non-renewable resources cannot be replaced once extracted, they are gone forever. The central ethical principle behind sustainable development is equity and particularly intergenerational equity. Assessing the "The Brundtland Commission," that played such a prominent role in popularising the notion of sustainable development, which defined it in equity terms as: "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Ikeji, 2011)."The principle of intergenerational equity adheres to the notion that future generations should share in the resource endowments benefiting current generations (WCED, 1990). Subsequently the Commission's 1987 report, Our Common Future, was endorsed by the United Nations and its definition was adopted by nations all over

the world. Since then the rhetoric equity has been incorporated into numerous sustainable development strategies and policies (Weiss, 1990). The Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 reaffirmed the centrality of equity in its Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. Scientific knowledge about the future function of the natural ecosystem and the consequences of depleting and degrading them are quite uncertain. However, it known that depletion of natural capital is capable of leading to irreversible losses in species and habitats. While these loses are reversible, but its repair could take so many years. Scholars argue that not only can resource consumption increase the real prices of those resources for future generations; but that resources may be depleted before they are identified as useful or before their best use is discovered. She gives the example of helium-bearing natural gas. Developing substitutes may well be more expensive than conserving existing supplies (Weiss, 1990). When resources are depleted and species extinct, the options available to future generations are narrowed. Weiss points out that 'conservation of options' is a principal criterion for intergenerational equity. Current generations should not try to second-guess what future generations will need, but rather should let future generations choose their own goals by allowing them the flexibility through keeping options open and maintaining diversity (Weiss, 1990).

Conclusion

The management of the natural resources in Nigeria has continued to remain a source of avoidable crisis. It has brought more pains to the oil bearing communities and other social vices. However, we can be in no doubt here that Nigeria's present predicament is traceable to its oil wealth and to the attendant economic rent-seeking cliques that developed themselves over the years have so entrenched themselves to constitute a strong cabal at both political and bureaucratic levels. Decades of military dictatorship and transition to civil rule, civil society organisations have engaged the government on the management of the nation's resources. Through budgeting process at all levels, joining the international campaign on the extractive industries transparency initiative, pursuing government economic reform policies, and taking on board anti-corruption initiatives. Still this has not improved our situation on management nor towards intergenerational equity.

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ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR MANAGING LAND DISPUTES IN IDO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF IBADAN, OYO STATE.

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Abstract

In Ido Local Government Area, a developing metropolitan city in Ibadan, land dispute is a frequent phenomenon. This paper is an attempt to chronicle the causes and informal mechanisms used for resolving land dispute in the area. It went ahead to interrogate the effectiveness of informal resolution procedures. Both primary and secondary sources of data were utilized. The primary data involved Key Informant and In-depth interviews while secondary data were sourced from books, journal, seminar papers and internet materials. The paper identified illegal sales of land, forceful grabbing, double allocation, boundary adjustment differences and damages to land by people and animals as major causes of land disputes in the local government. Also, it identified authoritative mediation as the major third party strategy used for managing land disputes by both the elders in the community and the police authority. Furthermore, timely resolution, convenience and cheaper process were examined as factors that make informal strategies of conflict resolution effective for managing land disputes in Ido Local Government Area of Ibadan. The paper concludes that land dispute constitutes one of the commonest forms of conflict in Ido Local Government and advocates the strengthening of alternative methods of dispute resolution to aid the rapid growth and development of the area.

Keywords: Land disputes, conflict management, Alternative Dispute Resolution.

Introduction

Conflict management processes have evolved over the last three decades to compliment the traditional court system in Nigeria and elsewhere around the world. This development has gained general acceptance among institutions and members of the general public through the practice of Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms (ADR), which have proven to be effective in the management of various forms of disputes including commercial, ethno-religious, domestic, political, corporate and of course land disputes. ADR is a substitute for different measures as alternative to the tedious and sometimes costly court process of resolving disputes. It is about the search for, and application of non-adversarial peaceful methods of settling disputes and resolving conflicts using the least difficult and less expensive strategies, which are most rational and suitable to the needs of disputing parties. It's topmost goal after settlement is to ensure that cordial relationship is restored among the disputants. It also ensures that the process is convenient for the parties to work towards a win-win outcome. ADR is alternative to the conventional court system, which could take several years to resolve a case. The parties have the power to choose their own third party, produce their own laws and trade the risk of possible decision (Stražišar, 2018).

The above attributes are contrast to adjudication or litigation procedures, which are time-consuming, rigid in decision making and insensitive to the emotional needs of the disputants after settlement of disputes. The process of addressing land cases by the formal courts is relatively time consuming and further saps a lot financial resources of conflict parties while seeking justice through litigation. The consequence has always been delays in justice delivery and restrictive access to justice. There is, therefore, the need to find alternatives to lawsuits with more effective outcomes. Indeed, land is simply not abundant enough in many regions of the world to guarantee enough to all households (Daudelin, 2003). Land owners, groups, families, individuals and government are running over each other to secure land for various developmental projects. There has also been an increasing demand for urbanized space for investments and other purposes, landowners are under intense pressure to sell urban land, regardless of the social interests involved. The increasing cases of the gradual conversion of agricultural land for urban uses is also problematic, and there are frequent complaints that people are being driven off their ancestral lands arbitrarily in favour of urban development.

Land disputes are inevitable events in any social setting; hence they have become part and parcel of both the social and the corporate existence of the people. More so, people have strong cultural and historical attachment to land in the sense that it helps to define people's ancestry and descent. It is, therefore, not surprising that issues around land frequently become so contentious to point that it could spiraled into volatile conflicts. Sadly, necessary mechanisms for resolution are rarely put in place before such conflicts escalate. However, some communities in Ibadan are already utilizing informal mechanisms to address grievances, including land related matters. These informal platforms provide access to justice for the most vulnerable in the society. According to Albert, Awe, Herault and Omitoogun (1995) ADR is used as a tool to help the poor who cannot afford the financial burden of taking their cases to court. The authors assert that:

> Informal channels of justice are generally preferred by the poor because they cannot afford to hire an attorney. (Albert et al, 1995:35)

Ido Local Government Area in Perspectives
Ido local government area is a very unique area in Ibadan with its headquarters situated in Ido. It occupies a land mass of about 986km square. According 2006 census, it has a population of about 103, 261. But after 15 years, this figure should be more than double considering the rate of development and the increase in the movement of people to the area. Ido local government can be considered as developing areas. Hence, traditional institutions are still very relevant in the management of public affairs, especially in dispute resolution processes. The reality is that there is a preponderance of land dispute in the area because a lot of people are now moving into the arena to purchase plot(s) of land for different purposes-to establish industries, for farming and for residential motives. Also, the major terminus of the current Lagos-Ibadan double-track rail project in Ibadan is situated in Ido. This implies that intending passengers from different parts of Ibadan will necessary have to navigate through the hub of the terminus before they can travel to Lagos. In the present circumstances, there a number of dispute resolution practices, which authors and researchers have not interrogated or explored in the local government. This paper, therefore, focuses on the use of informal mechanisms, otherwise known as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the management of land disputes in Ido

Local Government Area. The objectives of this paper include the following: to interrogate the causes of land disputes, to find out the ADR mechanisms being used to resolve these disputes and to assess the effectiveness of ADR in the management of land dispute in Ido Local Government in Ibadan. To achieve this, the paper adopted a qualitative approach for data gathering. Essentially, both primary and secondary data were utilized. Primary data included the conduct of unstructured interviews with some stakeholders in the study area to elicit specific information on the causes of land disputes, ADR mechanisms being used and the effectiveness of ADR in the management of land disputes in Ido Local Government Area of Ibadan. Secondary data were sourced from books, journals, seminar papers and internet materials.

Conceptual Clarification

Conflict: Conflict is an innate and unavoidable part of human existence. However, violent conflict is not inevitable and as such is an anomaly. Conflict is defined as the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups. According to Best (2017) conflict is 'an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence' which means that conflict is an important part of human existence. However, Evans (2013) believes that conflict pertains to the opposing ideas and actions of different entities, which can thus result to an antagonistic state. When conflict is managed efficiently it would lead to positive outcome including growth and development in the society; but where there is inadequate platforms or absence of conflict management strategies, conflicts can would escalate into violent outcomes. This may be more difficult to resolve due to a lot of negative results.

Land Dispute: Land dispute involves conflicting claims to rights in land by two or more parties, focused on a particular piece of land, which can be addressed within the existing legal framework. Land dispute is also disagreement over the ownership, boundary of a particular area of land. (Bruce and Boudreaux, 2013). It is commonly witnessed in different parts of Nigeria and have strong effect on rural and urban socio-economic progress. It has devastating effects on individuals as well as on groups, communities and even entire nations. (Mbazor and Babajide, 2019). Land disputes have precipitated communal conflicts arising from divergences of interests, desires, goals, values, and aspirations in the competition for resources to meet imposing demands of social life in a defined socio-physical environment (Ironbar and Anam, 2018).

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Alternative Dispute Resolution: This is commonly referred to as ADR. It is a model of informal conflict resolution processes, which is different from litigation or court system of adjudication. ADR is about the search for, and application of "non-conventional" peaceful methods of settling disputes and resolving conflict situations using the least expensive methods that is most preferable to the parties or disputants involved in the conflict. Its topmost goal after settlement of dispute is to ensure cordial relationship between disputants after case has been resolved, it makes the process convenient for the parties by working towards a win-win end, and it is less expensive and less time consuming. All these attributes put a contrast to adjudication which is time consuming, rigid, insensitive to the needs of the disputants after case settlement. (Strazisar,2018).

> Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to a set of practices and techniques aimed at permitting the resolution of legal disputes outside the courts. It is normally thought to encompass mediation, arbitration and a variety of "hybrid" processes by which a neutral facilitates the resolution of legal disputes without formal adjudication.'(Mnookin, 1998:4).

It denotes a range of methods for resolving disputes that are non-combative such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and negotiation (***Bich, 2013***). Farris (1995) claims that a dispute is first in the form of a grievance and that by means of a process of "naming, claiming and blaming" grievance is turned to dispute; after which the dispute undergoes a number of changes that are directed at its resolution, and if this changes are not achievable by non-legal methods, the matter is then taken to be resolved through the legal system. (Farris,1995).

Conflict Management: Conflict management is an important process embarked upon to end hostilities, grievances or contention over scarce resources or other issues that threaten cordial relationships among individuals or groups. Other concepts that are often used interchangeably with the term include conflict prevention and conflict resolution. But they do not necessary mean the same thing. While conflict resolution attempts to permanently resolve a conflict through problem-solving approach (Burton, 2009), conflict management is based on the assumption that all conflicts cannot be readily and permanently resolved. Thus, conflict management is a process

of dealing with conflicts in a manner that prevents the situation from degenerating into violence or chaos.

Nature of Land Disputes in Nigeria
The adoption of the land use act of 1978 changed the law that governed the acquisition and usage of land in Nigeria, prior to this act, Land tenure system where land ownership could only be attained through inheritance and only to indigenes of a particular community even the land used for state purposes were on 'Crown land'. According to Mabogunje (2010):

> The only land held at the Governor's disposal was that which had been expressly acquired for public purposes as Crown land (Mabogunje, 2010:17).

The Land Use Act ensures that the ownership of all land in the urban sector of each state is transferred to the state governments (except for lands allocated and high marked for the federal government). Section (1) of the Land Use Act stipulated that a pieces of land can only be rightfully occupied with the permission of the state government and not owned by the citizens of the country. Furthermore, the right to occupancy can only last or be held for ninety-nine years after which the right to occupancy could be renewed or transferred legally to another person. (Fact Sheet, 2015). This was done to ensure a form of equality among citizens and to facilitate economic development in the country. (Ifeka, 1996).

Despite all the rules guiding the acquisition of land, there are still some problems that make it difficult to acquire land easily. The inconvenience and deferrals in obtaining statutory certificates of occupancy have prompted many land dealings among Nigerians to move to the informal market or be deceptively dated as having been concluded before March 28, 1978, the active date for the land use decree. This is because in section 36(2) of the Land use Act, it is stated that those who have been using a particular land, either for agricultural purpose or have had property on it prior to the adoption of the Land use Decree, have the grace to continue owning it. A lot of researches has been carried out concerning land dispute in Ibadan. A section in *Informal Channels of Conflict Resolution in Ibadan Nigeria* (pages 15-18) by Albert et al (1995) is dedicated to land disputes in Ibadan and it is made known that land

disputes 'rank among the most' out of dispute cases that are recorded in the city and this is due to the city's 'administrative and commercial importance'. Ibadan is a mega city that attracts people from all over the country due to its compliable living condition, the cost of living is low compared to that of Lagos. Also, due to the fact that Ibadan used to be the capital of the Western Region it has some form of age-long development ingrained in its system and an added value is the fact that it is the home to the very first University in Nigeria. Albert *et al* (1995) name it the 'economic nerve-centre of Yorubaland'. The city is experiencing a large increase in the growth of its population due to the reasons listed above. 'Landed property is a key investment in Ibadan, an asset and a status symbol, even for non-indigenes, whose 'homes' are elsewhere' (Albert et al, 1995:16).

Many people are interested in and are aiming at acquiring landed properties in Ibadan and this has led to increasingly rise in land disputes in the city. 'Unscrupulous landowners and speculators have capitalized on this desire for land and have exploited or duped buyers.' (Albert, et al 1995:16). In situations where plot(s) of land are sold to more than one individual at a time pose serious challenges to buyers. These disputes become even more complicated when the buyers in turn sell the same land in dispute to another innocent buyer, who is indirectly drawn into the dispute. Land disputes can also arise from boundary claims where a landowner A claims that landowner B has exceeded the boundary allocated to him/her and part of his/her land has been claimed and landowner B stands on the claim that there is no such thing. Another situation that cause land dispute is that of land inheritance where there is a conflict between family members over land sharing; another case under this is when one or some of the family members decides to sell the land considered the family land without the consent of the other members of the family. The buyer is then accused of not acquiring the land in the right way and he/she ends up either losing the land bought or rebuying the land. The land Use Decree of 1978 and Land use reform of 2009 were adopted to reduce the strife over the acquisition of land, improve development and ensure equity among the citizens of the country (Ifeka, 1996). However, despite all these adopted measures, it is discovered, from an interview conducted at the Ido LGA during the cause of this study, that the tussle over land acquisition has been one of the most common cases brought over to be resolved. This is mostly due to the fact that communal land tenure system that lacks proper documentation is a common practice in the area. Land disputes are common in Ido local government of Oyo State and they

are a cause of great concerns to non-indigenes of the community as several indigenous families have made it an opportunity to make money off innocent buyers. These families divide themselves with the first group selling the land and the other group also selling the same piece of land to another buyer. A situation similar to this happened in Jagada area of Ologuneru in Ido LGA whereby the buyer sets to develop the land and the process was stalled by another faction of the same family. The land was bought from due to claims that the land was illegally bought without their consent. The system of communal land tenure mostly practiced in the local government has worked against the process of acquiring land in the area.

Nature and Causes of Land Disputes in Ido Local Government Area
Disputes over land are common phenomena and their manifestations vary from place to place. Generally, an increase in population and government's uncoordinated policies towards land management largely account for majority of land disputes (Abegunde, 2011). In Ido Local Government of Oyo State, the situation is not quite different. A wide range of factors could be attributed to land disputes in the LGA. The most frequent ones in the area are identified and explained below;

Illegal sales of Land: This type of practice is one of the major causes of land disputes in Ido Local Government. This situation occurs when the same land is sold to two or more people at the same time. This is usually done by the indigenes of the communities because their claims to lands as an ancestral asset. This is further driven by the increasing urbanization, inadequate property rights. According to the Baale of Araromi and an official at the Ido Local Government Office, land ownership by the indigenes are not usually documented due to the practice of the land tenure system. This has posed a lot of frustration to non-indigenes in Ido communities in the sense that a lot of cases exit with no legal documents that show evidence of title to the land. According to a resident of Jagada area in Ologuneru, who fell victim of Illegal sales of land gave a horrific account of how he was duped:

> The land I bought was sold to me by one of the family members of the indigenes who owned the land initially. But unknowing to me that the family had jointly sold the land; four plots to be precise, to a man named the Prince of Peace who later paid an extra amount for the land he bought due to one of the family

members' claim to have not been part of the transaction. This same family member, after being paid separately, went ahead to sell the land to me. At the same time, the Prince of peace having bought the land twice, resold the land to another person. I got to know of this when I started building on the land and the workers on the land were arrested by the police who were invited by the Prince of Peace.

Complicated matters like this are not uncommon in Ido Local government area. Many dubious indigenes exploit innocent settlers and a lot of these victims either buy the land twice or lose the land. If a buyer is not careful enough to ensure he/she gets all the necessary documents that entitle to the land, he/she may lose the land. This scenario is usually common to cases where the land is left undeveloped for a long period of time. To avoid this unwholesome act, some land owners usually erect signposts on their land to warn unsuspecting victims of such illegal land sales.

Double Allocation: Double Allocation of land is a term commonly used at the Ibadan Local Governments Properties, a government owned company that supervises the management of all the landed properties and other assets in Ibadan. According to a respondent, (Mr. Rasheed Adigun a Land Surveyor and staff of the company) double allocation is used to describe a situation where a pieces of land is sold mistakenly to two different buyers. Problems of this nature are usually attributed to some administrative lapses often associated with the operations of the company. A respondent reiterated that such incidents have nothing to do with sharp practices or fraudulent tendencies of the staff of the company but are largely due to the unprofessional and analogue system of the company operates. It was also discovered that such matters do not fester for too long but are easily resolved within a short period by the company. This is because the company is a government owned firm. A new deal is usually struck to placate the parties. Such a deal can either come in form of reallocating a new plot of land to one of the disputing parties or an outright refund of one of the parties' deposit.

Boundary Adjustment Differences: This is a very common practice in Ido Local Government Area of Ibadan. Boundary Adjustment Differences simply means a deliberate attempt by a land owner to extend his/her pieces of land beyond the

specified borderline. According to the Divisionary Crime Officer (DCO), DSP Azeez Muritala, land boundaries are deliberately extended with the aim of criminally appropriating a portion of another person's land without being caught. The offender usually breaks the markers used to distinguish and mark the boundary of the lands by extending it into the neighbors' land to expand his/her own land. In his own submission, the chairman of landlord association of Heritage Estate said that Boundary Adjustment Differences constitute one of the major causes of land disputes frequently recorded in their communities. He stated that land boundaries are often overstepped in other to maliciously appropriate another party's portion of land. He went further to state that land owners, who fail to develop or neglected their piece of land for too long usually fall victim of such pranks. Those that default in carrying out the land survey and fail to get other necessary documents for their plot(s) of land are also potential victims. Such matters are often brought to the attention of the Baale and the elders of the communities for resolution.

Damage to Land and Property by people and animals
Farming is the major occupation of the indigenes of Ido Local Government area; this is further encouraged by good weather and fertile soil content of the area. Farmers usually complain about the invasion of cattle on their farmlands to break the fences and destroy their crops by suspected herders. One of the farmers in the area Mr. Ishola complained that his cassava and cucumber farms were badly damaged by some herders, who stormed his farmland with their cattle. It took the intervention of the community heads to resolve the matter. There was another case of a man, who complained that his neighbor converted his undeveloped land into a dumpster. According to him, he had warned him several times but all his warnings fell on deaf ears. He was left with no other choice than to lodge the complains formally at a nearby police station.

Land Inheritance Dispute: Land Inheritance dispute often arises when a family loses their parents or family heads to the cold hands of death without leaving behind a Will on how to share the wealth of the deceased among the surviving family members. Disputes over land inheritance are usually life-threatening as parties resort to various self-help tactics to execute the matter. In Ido Local Government, dispute over land inheritance is very common among family members. It is more frequent in the urban setting where the prices of land have escalated. Such cases usually polarize the

family; causing tension, violence and in extreme cases, destruction of lives and properties. Such cases are either handled by concerned family members or referred to the community elders. However, some of the complicated cases usually end up in the court for determination.

Forceful Land Grabbing: Another disturbing cause of land disputes in the study area is associated with the unwholesome activities of the he *Ajagungbales*, according to Mr. Badmus from the Ido Local Government Council, are the indigenous people who falsely claim ownership of lands to cause trouble. These people do not limit their extortion to non-indigenes, they disturb fellow indigenous people as well with twisted stories of how the lands are rightfully theirs. It takes elders that know detailed history of the land to resolve the issue.

Informal mechanisms for managing land disputes in Ido LGA?
Land is a free gift of nature that it is intrinsically linked to the people's history and culture. Managing land disputes is a distinct form of intervention that sometimes requires specialized skills of people who are custodian of the culture of the people. A lot of land cases may end up in the law court but majority of them are often managed through informal processes, where community leaders hold sway. To this extent, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms through the intervention of elders are common and most preferable in the management of land disputes in most western parts of Nigeria. This is because elders understand the peculiar history of the people and are usually imbued with native wisdom and intelligence for managing local affairs of their people. In Ido LGA, negotiation and mediation are the major ADR mechanisms being deployed to resolve land disputes. In negotiation, the direct parties attempt to bargain the emerging issues in the dispute themselves while mediation is the direct intervention of a neutral third party in order to help the parties reach an amicable settlement of the matter. The Police also helps to facilitate negotiation between parties involved in land disputes in the area. According to one of the respondent, who is a Crime Inspector at one of the Police Stations in Ido LGA;

> Land Dispute cases are pure civil cases and are handled with the main goal of maintaining peace among the disputants and in the society at large. Once a case is filed, all the stakeholders in the land dispute case are invited over to the station for questioning.

> The parties are advised and encouraged to settle the dispute as amicably as possible.

In other cases, where negotiation breaks down, mediation provides alternative platform for effective resolution of the land matter. The literature identified three types of mediators namely, independent mediators, social network mediators and authoritative mediators. Social network mediators are third parties, who intervene in a dispute based on their close relationships with the disputing parties. Authoritative mediators are intervenors in a dispute based on their supervisory or strategic position over the parties while independent mediators are those that rely mainly on the trust and confidence of the dispute parties; hence, their strength lies in their neutrality and impartiality in facilitating the mediation process (Albert, 2002:86). In Ido LGA, the practice of authoritative mediation among elders are predominant in land related disputes. The major actors comprise the Landlord Associations (through the Land Dispute Committee), the Police and the Baale of the communities. These three stakeholders work together for the collective peace and harmony of the area. According to the chairman of the Landlord Association for Jagada Area, Ologuneru, a Land Dispute Committee was setup by the landlord association for the resolution of Land disputes among the members of the community. Whenever a land dispute case is reported, the committee invites the disputing parties and try as much as possible to work with them in order to resolve the matter amicably.

> The land committee members are chosen based on their capability, experience, professional ethics and they should know something about land, security and things that are related.

The landlord association works closely with the police to the extent that some of the complaints that are lodged at the police station are often referred to the Land Dispute Committee for resolution. The committee acts as authoritative mediators, by combining both 'the stick and the carrot' to get to the root of the problem. In other words, the committee can chastise misconduct or recommend to the Baale and the police for an erring party to be disciplined. It can also reward a cooperative party or a party with good conduct party with compensation. Each of the parties involved in the land dispute usually have equal chance to present their own side of the story. Also, the committee attempts to help the parties explore credible means of resolving the matter.

In carrying out its mandate, the committee accepts both oral testimony and documented evidence in search for the truth and new perspectives around the land dispute. In this respect, parties in land disputes are usually required to submit oral or/and documentary evidence to proof their case. In the olden days, lands were not usually offered for sale but were either given out as freewill gift or lent out for a specified period of time. The direct parties and other people who are connected to such narratives or history are usually invited to come and give oral evidence in order to shield more lights on the matter. Likewise, those who have evidence of purchase are also expected to present their document for committee members to scrutinize. A respondent clarified that:

> Documents such as the certificate of occupancy, the documents showing the survey plan of the area of land, evidence showing transfer of ownership, purchasing receipt etc. and in cases where there are no documents due to the land's being owned by a particular family for centuries, we ask for witnesses, elders, that can narrate the story behind the land ownership.

In most cases, the elders are fond of using proverbs and folklores to explain and simplify difficult dispute situations. These proverbs and folklores are important aspect of the Yoruba culture. Elders are always in the mode of drawing lessons from traditional beliefs, classical stories and common sayings of the people to clear the air on certain complex matters. These would enable the disputants to see things in a larger context and further help them to make the best decision as they seek to permanently resolve an ongoing land dispute. Another important component informal resolution format at Ido LGA is the use of Peregun or Idiogun, which involve the planting of an old specie of a tree. This tree can survive for a long period of time. It is usually planted to mark the boundaries of plots of land to enable land owners differentiate their family land from others. According to Baale of Araromi Olude, Chief Sakariya Oludelola, some of the existing Peregun have survived for more than 80 years. Whenever a land dispute arises, especially in the forest areas, the elders swing into action to first identify the Peregun used to mark the plots. These Peregun serve as guide to understanding the delineation of the borderlines before further interrogation is conducted on the disputed area.

Effectiveness of ADR in the management of land disputes in Ido LGA

In order to measure the effectiveness of ADR in the management of land disputes in Ido LGA, certain yardsticks such as cost effectiveness, suitability, timeliness compared to litigation, voluntary compliance to settlement agreement, satisfaction of parties to the outcome and convenience of disputants should be considered. First, informal processes or ADR mechanisms are generally believed to be cheaper if compared with litigation. In most of the ADR interventions in Ido Local Government, no charges are required from disputants for handling their cases. In the words of one of the elders:

> We do not charge people here. But those that are grateful for the service we rendered, that is after the dispute had been resolved, could at times show their gratitude by giving gifts or money to the elders in appreciation. We do not bill people.

Just as Albert et al (2002) submitted, this paper affirms that ADR is generally attractive to the low income earners in the society because of inadequate funds to hire an attorney to present and argue their cases in law court. In Ido LGA, the Police, Landlord Associations and Baales have no statutory billing of parties, who lodge cases with them. However, some of them that have the means do show appreciations occasionally through the offer of gifts.

Another important factor to consider in estimating the effectiveness of ADR in the area is the speedy process of dispensing cases. Land cases are generally known to consume a long period of time. For instance, Osibanjo (2011) estimated that normal land disputes will take an average of 16 years to be resolved through the legal process. However, this study discovered that the use of ADR in land matters takes a minimum of two (2) weeks and a maximum period of two (2) years to resolve depending on the seriousness of the land case. Cases that cannot be concluded within these periods are usually referred to the court of law. Furthermore, disputing parties find ADR processes as convenience and easy. Apart from the fact that the process is voluntary, the environment of resolution is cordial and convenience for effective participation of all the parties. The parties also find the outcome easy to implement because they are actively involved in the process that lead to the settlement agreement. Finally, the success rate of the application of ADR to land disputes is on the high side. According

to a respondent, over 80 percent compliance rate to mediation settlement can be observed. This is made possible by the comportment of the elders, cooperation of the police and the tremendous supports often received from the Baales of the area. It should be stressed that the fact that the stakeholders demonstrated goodwill and have no direct interest or pecuniary gains in the whole process largely encourage the parties to exhibit high level of trust to comply with the settlement.

Conclusion

Ido Local Government Area of Ibadan has produced an enduring legacy of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the management of land disputes. The practice and the development of such informal mechanisms demonstrate the commitment of the elders to a process that guarantees transparency, accountability, speedy resolution and cheaper procedures of dispensing justice. The collaboration among key stakeholders, namely Landlord association, the Police and Baales to deliver mediation services to members of the community at no monetary cost is highly commendable. The process has proven to be cost effective, timely resolution disputes, convenient proceedings for all parties and high compliance rate. The use of ADR for the resolution of land disputes has, therefore, helped maintained cordial relationships among the members of the communities of Ido Local Government. The low income earners now have increased access to justice in a manner that offer them voice in determination of their own cases in a transparent and assured way. The sustenance of alternative dispute resolution will definitely have a positive import for the rapid growth and development of the communities in Ido LGA.

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