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The Noun International Journal of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution is a product of the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria. The vision behind this academic journal is to:

- i. promote sustainable research culture among the academia for the enhancement and development of the intellectual capacity of both the authors and the readers.
- ii. aid the promotion and assimilation of the values of Peace and Conflict Resolution in our societies.
- iii. provide a platform for espousing writers and well researched academic works for reference and teaching purposes.

The journal will also aid the promotion and assimilation of the values of Peace and Conflict Resolution in our societies. The Journal is published twice a year, first publication in March and the second in August and may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time.

The articles in this journal have been carefully selected, effectively reviewed and edited by the Editors who are tested and proven in their various fields of study and practices as seasoned academician and practitioners and I believe it will be a worthwhile reference material.

The journal has an online presence, thus making it a reference material which is easily accessible at any point in time and has become widely acceptable within the academic world both locally and internationally.

I must of necessity appreciate my colleagues in the Department who has continued to work tirelessly for this vision to be sustained. I specially appreciate the person of **Dr. Basil Ibebunjo - the Managing Editor**, who has been a worthy partner in the

sustenance of this vision. I appreciate the persons of; **Dr. Olabamiji Oyebode, Dr. Mathias Jarikre, Dr. Adeola Adams, Dr. Taiwo Orebiyi** and **Mrs. Anthonia Okonye** . I also appreciate my Administrative members of staff in the persons of; Mrs Adeola Olaniyi Ojo, Mr Umar Aliyu and Miss Oyintarela Abarugu.



Dr. Samuel Opeyemi Iroye
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NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]

CALL FOR PAPERS

The **NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]** is a peer-reviewed journal publication of the **Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution**, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja, which publishes twice a year but may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time. The Editorial Board of the journal welcomes well-researched original papers, for publication in the Journal which is released in the Months of March and August every year.

Paper submissions are welcome in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution any relative areas and they should adhere to the following guidelines.

1. Length of paper: Paper submissions should not be more than 5,000 words including footnotes and references.
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4. Abstract: Manuscripts must contain an abstract of not more than 250 words, which explains the content of the paper. The abstract must be expressed in clear words in the following format: the background of the research; description of the research problem; explanation of the research methods adopted; explanation of the findings, conclusion and recommendations.
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FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AND SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is a practice that is prevalent around the world with an estimate of about two hundred million women and girls being affected globally, and among which are about twenty million women and girls in Nigeria alone thus, constituting about 10% of the global total. FGM has been recognized as a major factor for the sustained oppression of women and girls in Nigeria in view of its huge impact on the development and economic growth of girl-child and women in the country. This study aims to examine the practice, attending crises and probable prevention of female genital mutilation in Nigeria. A systematic review method was employed in this research and the findings show that the procedure is very prevalent in Nigeria, it is driven largely by socio-cultural factors and has adverse effects on the physical, psychological, and social wellbeing of the victims. Although, several efforts have been made towards eradicating “FGM” in Nigeria, its success is being hampered by several factors among which is the non-uniformity of the application of relevant laws within the nation which thus creates a lacuna in the enforcement procedures. Thus, the high prevalence of FGM, and the dire consequences of the procedure on the girl-child and women in Nigeria made the writer to underscore the need for a strategic community sensitization on the dangers associated with the practice and to also advocate that the government should ensure the vigorous application and enforcement of relevant laws against such practices generally in Nigeria.

KEYWORDS: Female genital mutilation, cultural beliefs, consequences, Prevention

INTRODUCTION

The burden of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is disproportionately high in the developing countries of the world (WHO, 2021). In essence, FGM has become one of the most common forms of Gender Based Violence (GBV) or violence against women and girls in the developing countries. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), an estimated three million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year, and majority of them are forced to undergo the procedure before the age of 15 years (WHO, 2021). FGM is a traditional practice that has been found to be very harmful, and it involves the partial or total removal of external female genitalia or other injury to female genital organs for non-medical reasons (WHO, 2021). The Subjection of girls and women to this archaic traditional practice is very common in Nigeria; and it has become widely recognized as a violation of human rights. Unfortunately, FGM is deeply rooted in cultural beliefs and perceptions which have passed from one generation to the other and lasted for many decades and has become very difficult to eradicate (UNICEF, 2001).

In Africa, FGM is practiced in twenty-eight countries, with some of the highest prevalence rates in West African countries such as Sierra Leone, Gambia, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (Sipsma, Chen, Ofori-Atta, Ilozumba, Karfo, and Bradley 2012; WHO, 2011). Children between the ages 0 and 15 years are most at risk, and it is estimated that in Africa alone, 91.5 million females aged 10 years and above have been mutilated (WHO, 2011; WHO, 2012). Certain societies carry out this act on their girls as infants while others do so during childhood, often as a rite of passage to adulthood or during marriage. In some other cultures, FGM is performed on pregnant women or on corpses of dead women (Nour, 2008; Garba, Muhammed, Abubakar, and Yakasai, 2012). As of 2013, Nigeria, with a population of over 169 million women, had a national prevalence of 25% (Nour, 2008). Majority (82.0%) of these mutilations occurred before the age of five years, a period when these children can neither give informed consent nor understand why they are being cut (NPC and ICF International, 2014).

There is still considerable support for the practice in areas where it is deeply rooted in local tradition, and this is of serious concern (UNICEF, 2001). Although, several attempts have been made to eradicate the practice through legal and other means, it has remained over the years.

The ramifications of FGM affect the girl for the rest of her life and result in many health problems (i.e., extended bleeding, problems with urination, cysts, infections, and complications during childbirth). Aside from health-related, ethical, and moral consequences of FGM, it has been estimated by the World Health Organization that the annual cost of obstetric complications is more than \$3.7 million. However, rationalization of genitalia mutilation persists; the people conducting the procedure do not believe they are doing harm. The eradication of FGM as a public health initiative is imperative to ensuring that newborn females and youth do not undergo this traumatic ordeal. Moreover, immigrant populations arriving in developed countries, particularly the United States (U.S.), present a particular obstacle in the full-global abolition of female genital mutation as many seek to continue their cultural traditions (Goldberg, et. al., 2016).

Analytical method of research using systematic review was employed in carrying out this work, and it negates the operation of the “theory of promiscuity” upon which such contentious cultural practice is built and based. The belief behind the “Theory of promiscuity” is that women are likely to be motivated to live immoral lifestyles if their genitals are still intact and not ruptured by circumcision. Thus, this process known as Clitoridectomy is believed to help diminish sexual sensation for women. It is often posited that FGM reduces sexual urge in a girl and uncircumcised girls are believed to be promiscuous, will initiate sex early and will have high rate of sexual activity (Odimegwu and Okemgbo, 2000; NPC, 2008). It is also believed that this practice reduces the female sexual demands on her husband and thus the men can guaranty the paternity of their children most especially from their wives.

Cultural beliefs regarding female genital mutilation

The origin and significance of female genital mutilation (FGM) is shrouded in secrecy, uncertainty and confusion (Odoi, 2005). The ritual has been so widespread that it could not have risen from a single origin, and people generally regarded it as a tribal traditional practice that has to be protected; and as a superstitious belief being practiced for preservation of and purification, family honor, hygiene, esthetic reasons, protection of virginity and prevention of promiscuity, modification of sociosexual attitudes (countering failure of a woman to attain orgasm), increasing sexual pleasure of husband, enhancing fertility and increasing matrimonial opportunities (Odoi, 2005).

The cultural and traditional components of FGM vary between ethnic enclaves. The procedure is routinely carried out between the ages of six and eight with a few cultures preferring to cut at birth, menarche, or before marriage (Islam and Uddin, 2001; Morison, Dirir, Elmi, Warsame and Dirir, 2004). Mutilation is more often undergone alone, but can occur in groups, using same instruments on more than 40 women (Islam and Uddin, 2001; Morison, Dirir, Elmi, Warsame and Dirir, 2004; Odukogbe, Afolabi, Bello, and Adeyanju, 2017). In the Somali culture the procedure is almost always performed in a ceremonial manner accompanied by music, food, and gifts. The operators can range from “circumcisers” (religious leaders) with no medical training to midwives and birth attendants. The tools used include knives, clippers, scissors, or hot objects (Nour, 2015). A sterile environment is not feasible to attain in the cast majority of cases, and no medical anesthetics are available; the wound is sewed with crude instruments such as thorns. When infibulation takes place, thorns or stitches may be used to hold the two sides of the labia majora together and the legs may be bound together for up to forty days (Population Reference Bureau, 2013; Abu Dai, 2000). The healing process is aided by ointments and compounds made of herbs, milk, eggs, ashes, sugar, or animal excrement, which is thought to facilitate healing.

Girls undergoing the procedure have varying degrees of knowledge about what will happen to them. Girls are encouraged to be brave and not to cry during the procedure lest it

will bring shame onto their family (Morison et al., 2001). Only women are allowed to be present at the ceremony. In some cultures, girls will be told to sit beforehand in cold water to numb the area and reduce the likelihood of severe bleeding (Morison et al., 2001). However, no steps are taken to reduce the pain (Morison et. al., 2001).

Female Genital Mutilation in Nigeria

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is widespread in Nigeria. Some socio-cultural determinants have been identified as supporting this practice. FGM is still deeply entrenched in the Nigerian society where critical decision makers are grandmothers, mothers, women, opinion leaders, men and age groups (WHO, 2007). FGM is an extreme example of discrimination based on sex. Often used as a way to control women's sexuality, the practice is closely associated with girls' marriageability (Mackie, 1996). Mothers chose to subject their daughters to the practice to protect them from being ostracized, beaten, shunned, or disgraced (Yoder and Khan, 2007). FGM was traditionally the specialization of traditional leaders' traditional birth attendants or members of the community known for the trade.

There is, however, the phenomenon of "medicalization" which has introduced modern health practitioners and community health workers into the trade (WHO, 2007). The term medicalization of FGM is used to describe the practice of FGM by health care providers, whether in the private, public or home setting. While most of the practice of FGM is perpetuated by traditionalists (circumcisers, barbers, birth attendants), the involvement of medical professionals has also been noted. In 2011, 17% of all FGM in Nigeria was carried out by medical personnel, especially nurses /midwives (Population Reference Bureau, 2014). The perception of FGM as being harmless, 'good' or less risky when performed by professionals have been put forward as reasons for the practice of medical FGM (Onuh et. Al., 2006). Medical FGM has come under severe criticism by the WHO as the involvement of medical professionals may serve to justify the practice, as well as contravene fundamental medical ethics. The WHO is strongly against this medicalization and has advised that neither

FGM must be institutionalized nor should any form of FGM be performed by any health professional in any setting, including hospitals or in the home setting (WHO, 2016).

FGM practiced in Nigeria is classified into four types (WHO, 2008, Okeke, et. al., 2012) as follows:

- i. Clitoridectomy or Type I (the least severe form of the practice): It involves the removal of the prepuce or the hood of the clitoris and all or part of the clitoris. In Nigeria, this usually involves excision of only a part of the clitoris;
- ii. Type II or “sunna” is a more severe practice that involves the removal of the clitoris along with partial or total excision of the labia minora. Type I and Type II are more widespread but less harmful compared to Type III and Type IV;
- iii. Type III (infibulation) is the most severe form of FGM. It involves the removal of the clitoris, the labia minora and adjacent medial part of the labia majora and the stitching of the vaginal orifice, leaving an opening of the size of a pin head to allow for menstrual flow or urine;
- iv. Type IV or other unclassified types include introcision and gishiri cuts, pricking, piercing, or incision of the clitoris and/or labia, scraping and/or cutting of the vagina (angrya cuts), stretching the clitoris and/or labia, cauterization, the introduction of corrosive substances and herbs in the vagina, and other forms.

In Nigeria, of the six largest ethnic groups, the Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Ibo, Ijaw, and Kanuri, only the Fulani do not practice any form of FGM varies from country to country, tribes, religion, and from one state and cultural setting to another, and no continent in the world has been exempted (Odoi, 2005). In most parts of Nigeria, it is carried out at a very young age (minors) and there is no possibility of the individual's consent. In Nigeria, there is greater prevalence of Type I excision in the south, with extreme forms of FGM prevalent in the North. Practice of FGM has no relationship with religion. Muslims and Christians practice it, but it is more widely spread in Christian predominated parts of Nigeria (UNICEF, 2001).

The practice of FGM in Nigeria is widespread and varies from one geopolitical zone, state and ethnic group to another. The highest prevalence of FGM is reported from the Southern geopolitical zones of the country, among the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups. Although the commonest types practiced in Nigeria are types I and II, the other types of FGM (types III and IV) are also carried out, particularly in the northern parts of the country (NPC and ICF International, 2014; NBS and UNICEF, 2017).

According to the 2013 National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), Nigeria has a national prevalence of 25%, an improvement from the 30% reported in the preceding 2008 survey (NPC and ICF International, 2014; NPC and ICF International, 2009). The Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) [NBS and UNICEF, 2017] also show a gradual decline from 26% reported in 2007 and 27% in 2011, to 18% as reported in 2016. While there are difficulties in the direct comparison of data across surveys due to differences in the methodology applied during the data collection processes, these results still remain valid clues to the fact that positive change is taking place. This decline is further evidenced by the fact that girls 15- 19 years of age are less likely to have undergone FGM than older women (NPC and ICF International, 2014; NPC and ICF International, 2009). The reasons for the reduction in prevalence may not be unconnected to the global push for the elimination of FGM, noted to have begun in the late 1990s (Adeokun et. al., 2006; UNICEF, 2013). These efforts were driven by several international debates on the topic occurring about the time, notably the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979, World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 and the World Conference on Women in 1995 (Adeokun et al., 2006; UNICEF, 2013).

Consequences of Female Genital Mutilation

Violation of fundamental human right

FGM is recognized worldwide as a fundamental violation of the human rights of girls and women. It reflects deep-rooted inequality between the sexes and constitutes an extreme form

of discrimination against women. It involves violation of rights of the children and violation of a person's right to health, security, and physical integrity, the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and the right to life when the procedure results in death. Furthermore, girls usually undergo the practice without their informed consent, depriving them of the opportunity to make independent decision about their bodies. In essence, FGM has become one of the most common forms of Gender Based Violence (GBV) or violence against women and children. An estimated 100–140 million girls and women worldwide are currently living with the consequences of FGM (WHO, 2000). In Africa, about 3 million girls are at risk for FGM annually (WHO, 2008). Despite the increased international and little national attention, the prevalence of FGM overall has declined very little (Yoder and Khan, 2007).

Effect FGM on health and childbirth

The consequences of FGM have both physiological and psychological complications; including short- and long-term complications (Chibber et al., 2011). The method in which the procedure is performed may determine the extent of the short-term complications (Morison, 2011). If the process was completed using unsterile equipment, no antiseptics, and no antibiotics, the victim may have increased risk of complications. Primary infections include staphylococcus infections, urinary tract infections, excessive and uncontrollable pain, and hemorrhaging (Ivazzo et al., 2013). Infections such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), *Chlamydia trachomatis*, *Clostridium tetani*, herpes simplex virus (HSV) 2 are significantly more common among women who underwent Type III mutilation compared with other categories (Ivazzo et. al., 2013). As the short-term complications manifest, mortality risk increases because of the limited health care available in low-income economies. While data on the mortality of girls who underwent FGM are unknown and hard to procure, it is estimated that 1 in every 500 circumcisions results in death (Reyners, 2004). The belief that the procedure produces protective factors against sexually transmitted infections (STIs), much like male circumcision, was disproved in a case-control study conducted in Sudan (Ivazzo et.

al., 2013). After the area heals, victims suffer the long-term consequences of the abuse through both physiological and psychological complications and substantial complications during childbirth (Bishai et. al., 2010).

One of the most common long-term complications is the development of keloid scar tissue over the area that has been cut. This disfiguring scar can be a source of anxiety and shame to the women who had FGM. Neuromas may develop because of entrapped nerves within the scar leading to severe pain especially during intercourse. First sexual intercourse can only take place after gradual and painful dilation of the opening left after mutilation. Other side complications include cysts, haematocolpos, dysuria and recurrent urinary infections, and possible infertility. Childbirth for infibulated women presents the greatest challenge, as maternal mortality rates are significantly higher because of complications that arise during labor. During delivery, infibulated women (i.e., genitals have been closed tightly) are cut in the perineum area so that the baby can be delivered safely (Chibber, et. al., 2011).

Effect of FGM on psychological wellbeing

FGM is often a very traumatic experience for victims. Traditional circumcisers typically use crude implements with questionable levels of sterility such as knives, razor blades, scissors and shards of broken glass (WHO, 2012). There have been reports of inhumane treatment such as being held down and cut without any form of anaesthesia and having the legs and thighs of the circumcised bound for a long time to ensure proper healing of the wound (Nour, 2008). Self-esteem issues sometimes manifested by a 'feeling of incompleteness' have also been documented (Ezenyeaku, 2011). Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, neuroses, and psychoses are common delayed complications that are associated with FGM (Rushwan, 2000). In developing countries, these conditions regularly go unrecognized and if left untreated, may lead to mental concerns later in life.

FGM as a cause of marital conflict

One of the dire consequences of FGM is its being a cause of marital conflict. As girls grow up and marry, the sexual disfunction caused by FGM may put stress on their marriages; and over

the long term, FGM can leave serious psychological scars. Girls and women who experience it may suffer anxiety, depression, memory loss, sleep disorders and post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) (Bishai et al., 2010). These have serious consequences on the ability of the women affected to perform their marital functions, particularly not being able to have intimate relationship with their husbands as a result of the pains they experience anytime they tried to do so. This could cause serious marital conflict which could result to domestic violence or intimate partner violence (including economic violence, psychological violence, emotional violence, sexual violence and physical violence (which could result to serious physical injuries and even death). Other common consequences include separations and divorce, particularly if the source of the conflict is not identified and addressed early enough, because in many instances the couples concerned of feel shy let other people (including their family members) know that the frequent conflicts they are experiencing in their marriage are majorly due to issues related to intimate relationships.

Effect of FGM on the economy

The financial burden posed by FGM is huge, as medical costs, especially that related to management of the complications weigh heavily on families and health care systems. A study in South East Nigeria (Ezenze, et. al., 2007) estimated the cost of managing the post mutilation complications per girl child in a pediatric clinic to be about US \$120; a huge amount for Nigerian families considering that many live on less than the national minimum wage of 18,000 naira (US \$50). In a study to estimate the obstetric cost of FGM in some countries including Nigeria, it was shown that the number of years of life lost per incident case of FGM in 15-45 year-old women increases progressively from type 1 to 111 (Adam et al., 2010).

5.0 Prevention of female genital mutilation

It is true that tradition and culture are important aspects of any society in helping to mold the views and behavioral patterns of the society. Few treatment options exist for victims of FGM (Behrendt and Moritz, 2005; Foldes, et. Al., 2012). Psychological and emotional support is available from therapist and support groups that specialize in PTSD (Behrendt and

Moritz, 2005; Foldes et. Al., 2012). These support groups are often located in urban areas or near ethnic enclaves that have high risk of FGM. In addition, defibulation, a surgical process that attempts to reconstruct the labia by undoing the initial mutilation, is available at specialty hospitals throughout the world. However, many times the procedure has mediocre results and can result in additional complications. Additionally, the cost of the surgery is not always covered by insurance, thereby causing a financial deterrent (Behrendt and Moritz, 2005; Foldes et. al., 2012).

Foldès et. al. (2012), conducted a study at St. Germain Poissy Hospital, France, from 1998 to 2009, assessing the immediate and long-term outcomes of reconstructive surgery (Behrendt and Moritz, 2005). Employing a prospective cohort study design, they followed 2938 women who had been operated on, from surgery to one-year follow-up. Prior to surgery, all patients filled out a questionnaire about their demographic characteristics and preoperative pain at the mutilation site (Behrendt and Moritz, 2005). Subsequently, patients underwent surgery to restore both clitoral anatomy and function. In addition, for infibulated patients, defibulation preceded surgery in order to restore vaginal function. Patients were all discharged two days following surgery, returned for a two-week follow-up, and told to return in a year's time; a follow-up rate of 29% was achieved (Behrendt and Moritz, 2005).

A multidisciplinary approach is needed to tackle this deep-rooted legendary practice of FGM. There is a need for legislation in Nigeria with health education and female emancipation in the society. The process of social change in the community with a collective, coordinated agreement to abandon the practice “community-led action” is therefore essential. With improvement in education and social status of women and increased awareness of complications of FGM, most women who underwent FGM disapprove of the practice and only very few are prepared to subject their daughters to such harmful procedures (Odoi, 2005). The more educated, more informed, and more active socially and economically a woman is, the more she is able to appreciate and understand the hazards of harmful practices like FGM and

sees it as unnecessary procedure and refuses to accept such harmful practice and refuses to subject her daughter to such an operation.

Several actions have been taken at the global level and the national level in Nigeria to eliminate female genital mutilation. In 2008, the 61st World Health Assembly called upon member states to institute actions aimed at preventing and eliminating FGM, as well as provide support for victims (WHO, 2008c). The WHO is working with professional organizations as well as the United Nations (UN) system to achieve this goal. Several UN agencies, notably the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), have been in the forefront of the fight against FGM. In conjunction with UNICEF and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the WHO in 2010 launched a global "de-medicalization campaign" strategy; aimed at coordinating the efforts of policy makers in government, parliamentarians, international agencies, professional bodies, associations, community leaders, religious leaders and Non-Governmental Organizations in the fight against medical FGM. In 2007, the UNFPA and UNICEF together launched the 'Accelerating Change'; a partnership which is the main tool of the United Nations against FGM (UNFPA and UNICEF, 2014) This collaboration has recorded tremendous progress in fast-tracking the elimination of FGM across several African countries using cultural and rights sensitive strategies.

Other UN agencies have issued joint statements geared towards the elimination of FGM (United Nations, 2014). At the 47th World Health Assembly more than two decades ago, Nigeria resolved to eliminate FGM. This was further reinforced in 2012, when the country joined other African nations to sponsor the Anti-FGM Resolution at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly (United Nations, 2012). In 2013, the National Policy and Plan of Action for the Elimination of FGM in Nigeria was also formulated and approved. The Nigerian government has also sponsored the conduct of various surveys on FGM, and a federal law against FGM was passed in May 2015. Several Nigerian states such as Edo, Ogun, Cross-River, Osun, Bayelsa and Rivers have also outlawed the practice. National ministries,

departments and agencies involved in the anti-FGM war include the Federal Ministries of Women Affairs and Social Development, Information and Communication, Justice, Health, as well as the National Human Rights Commission.

However, despite the increased international and little national attention, the prevalence of FGM overall has declined very little (Yoder and Khan, 2007). FGM is not required by any religion and there is no scientific evidence that women who have been mutilated are more faithful or better wives than those who have not undergone the procedure (WHO, 2007), as it is very clear that there is no single benefit derived from FGM.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Female genital mutilation is a practice deeply rooted in the Nigerian society, especially in the Southern geopolitical zones of the country. The Northern zones of the country paradoxically have an abundance of the severe forms of FGM being practiced. It is an act that violates womanhood, with negative, far-reaching health, social and economic implications. Despite the reported reduction in prevalence in the country, a lot more needs to be done to fast-track its elimination, particularly in the area of attitudinal change towards the discontinuation of the practice. Being a practice deeply rooted in culture, change may be slow; but with concerted and well-directed efforts it will surely come.

Eliminating FGM requires a sustainable, community- targeted approach, involving all relevant sectors of the economy such as women affairs, finance, justice, health; and relevant organizations such as religious, health professionals, women groups, professional bodies, policy makers and Non-Governmental Organizations. The involvement of the various women's and religious groups cannot be overemphasized; especially as such groups have shown to be very effective agents of cultural change in the grassroots as evidenced by a study on widowhood practices in Nigeria.

Engaging community and religious leaders through helping them understand the need for change is imperative in generating a transformation within the culture. Communities need to develop, strengthen, and support specific actions directed at ending FGM. Sustainability is

an essential component of any such approach since the process of culture-change is a gradual one. In addition, there is need for increased and sustained support of the government, key policy/decision makers, general public, developmental partners, media and healthcare workers towards curbing the practice; likewise, cultural and religious-sensitive awareness, health education and public dialogue with relevant stakeholders in the communities on the harmful effects of FGM, with emphasis on the rights of women and the illegality of the practice. This will help to foster attitudinal change and encourage discontinuation.

There is also a need for the institution and enforcement of appropriate ethical guidelines for medical professionals by the relevant professional organizations, and legal action where and when necessary. This will provide an official platform for other activities against FGM and serves as a discouragement to circumcisers and families fearing prosecution. There should be provision of medical, psychological and social support to the victims of FGM. More research into the perception and practice of FGM in Nigeria should be done. This will provide necessary data to monitor trends as well as ensure that resources are appropriately channeled to areas where they are needed.

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**THE PHENOMENON OF AMBIGUOUS MANDATE IN CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF ECOMOG'S INTERVENTION IN THE
LIBERIAN CIVIL-WAR**

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ABSTRACT

There are two precise dimensions to post-Cold-War international relations in Africa: the prevalence of intra-state conflicts and the unwillingness of non-African actors to spearhead conflict management on the continent. Adopting a secondary source of data collection and employing content analysis of qualitative data collected, the paper investigates the motivation for the sudden inclusion of politico-military focus to the regional economic mandate of the ECOWAS. Arguably, the pressing need to restore peace in Liberia and, by extension, ensure sub-regional security encouraged the conflict management adventure of the ECOWAS in Liberia. However, the ambiguous, unclear and unenforceable mandate of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) took the shine off the noble intentions of the ECOWAS. In the final analysis, the war prolonged and led to the avoidable human loss of lives and civil and social dislocation. The article, therefore, concludes that while the ECOMOG machinery was put to good use in the second attempt in Sierra-Leone) with corresponding positive results.

KEYWORDS: Mandate, ECOMOG, Conflict, Peace, Civil-War

INTRODUCTION

Territorial propinquity is a critical factor in consideration of national security conditions. Instructively, the snowballing effects of the crisis in a single state, especially the influx of refugees, and the possible political instability, coupled with socio-economic disruptions, could have damaging consequences on neighbouring countries. Hence, states are compelled to be wary of crises in their immediate environments. In the quest for regional peace, state actors are wont to intervene in intra-state conflicts when it is presumed that all internal conflict management mechanisms have failed. The civil war in Liberia in the early 1990s provided the appropriate platform for intervention by a third-party actor.

The indecision of the United Nations and the United States (a special relationship between the US and Liberia) and the security implication for the sub-region prompted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to rise to the occasion and intervene in Liberia's internal crisis. The article provides a conceptual clarification for the various forms of peace-initiative mechanism to highlight the lack of clarity and focus of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group charged with the responsibility of peacekeeping in Liberia. Through the summary of the conditions that led to the Liberian civil war and the complex nature of political and diplomatic interactions within the West Africa region, the work analyses the role of the ECOMOG against the dynamics of political and military development in civil-war Liberia. Finally, the work highlights the consequences of the ambiguity in defining the ECOMOG's mandate in Liberia.

International Conflict Management: The Route to Enduring Peace

By the nature of the international system, state actors are susceptible to conflict situations. The constant quest for the projection, promotion, and protection of national interests induces the possibilities of inter-state conflicts. Hence, the character traits of all international disputes in human history are symptomatic of clashes in advancing the national interests of a particular state or a group of countries. Whereas interstate conflicts are in the strictest sense related to the pursuit of national interests, intra-state conflicts are mainly driven by the desire to protect

and advance group interests (political, economic, religious or class). The results have been devastating in cases where the contest for dominant political power drives intra-state conflicts. Under such circumstances, it is not uncommon that the issues of genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, murder, religious persecution, among others, become the order of the day.

Consequent to the breakdown of law and order, and by extension, the collapse of domestic institutional mechanisms for managing conflicts, third-party intervention (solicited or otherwise) has emerged as an effective tool for providing the enabling environment for conflict management processes. Conflict management refers to the whole gamut of "limitation, mitigation, and containment of violent conflicts" (Golwa, 2009: 279). As a tool for achieving peace, conflict management connotes the application of "both forcible (coercive) and non-forcible (non-coercive) instruments to stop violence and avoid humanitarian emergencies" (Golwa, 2009: 279). In acknowledging the role of parties to a conflict in the process of conflict management, Bercovitch and Regan (1999) regard conflict management as "an attempt by actors involved in a conflict to reduce the level of hostility and generate some order in their relations." In other words, "conflict management is a rational and conscious decision process whereby parties to a conflict, with or without the aid of outsiders, take steps to transform, deescalate or terminate a conflict in a mutually acceptable way" (Bercovitch and Regan, 1999). While the role of the third party in a conflict cannot be disputed, the influences of the third parties in ensuring the de-escalation of conflicts are similarly crucial.

For a normal conflict management situation, the philosophy behind the third-party intervention is for a neutral actor to facilitate the processes of a return to peace in conflict environments. According to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001):

Above all, the issue of international intervention for human protection purposes is a clear and compelling example of concerted action urgently being needed to bring international norm and institutions in line with international needs and expectations International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001: 3).

This process is carried out through the interveners' unambiguous legal mandate. In principle, the content of the mandate must be acceptable to at least one of the parties to the conflict. The mandate could either be the activation of one or more peace measures at once, or sometimes, the components of the mandate could emerge in a gradual process based on escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. The third-party mandates at the various peace process levels should include discussing issues concerning peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Theoretically, peacemaking efforts may be the first step taken when the conflict environment becomes hugely volatile for both the belligerents and the neutrals.

Peace-building is primarily meant to consolidate the fragile peace that has been achieved at the level of cessation of hostilities. At this stage of the peace process, salient issues of political, humanitarian and human rights conditions, among others, are discussed. Other problems such as disarmament, demining, re-integration of internally displaced persons, economic and social rehabilitation, and rebuilding infrastructures can be undertaken in an atmosphere of relative safety. However, to forestall the possibilities of new hostilities, the peace already "built" must be kept. Peacekeeping is fundamentally concerned with efforts to keep the fragile peace and prevent the likelihood of a relapse into crisis. Essentially, peacekeeping refers to ... "operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict" (Field Manual, 1005-5).

Invariably, peacekeeping operations are calculated to enhance diplomatic efforts in achieving the objective of restoring or maintaining peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Therefore, the essence of peacekeeping is to keep a negotiated truce and facilitate a diplomatic resolution of disputes. The functions of peacekeepers include:

- Expanding the axis of the demilitarized zones.
- Encouraging civil engagements.

- Helping to establish deeper contacts among warring parties and continue working to consolidate the peace already achieved, which ultimately leads to political stability through democratic processes and the establishment of institutions.

A peacekeeping mission has to ensure the withdrawal and disengagement of the belligerents from hostility. It also guarantees ceasefires, exchanges of prisoners-of-war, arms control, demilitarisation and demobilization.

Accordingly, the essential ingredients of a peacekeeping operation include:

- Success based on the willingness of belligerents to abide by truce;
- An interim step towards resolution of conflict;
- Peacekeeping force must be perceived as neutral by all disputing parties.

After achieving its objectives, the peace-enforcement force should be evacuated from the conflict environment, because according to the Handbook, "the peace enforcement force is not suited for the transition to a peacekeeping force primarily because it can never be considered neutral again". Thus, a new contingent must be mobilized for the peacekeeping mission of the conflict-prone zone. It is, therefore, apposite to emphasize that:

Political and military decision-makers must understand and specify the nature of the mission of forces deployed to restore peace. Further, they must continuously review the circumstances under which the force was committed to ensuring it remains suited to that mission (Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other Than War).

The absence of a clear mandate would typically result in incorrect responses for the peace mission and most likely a hostile reception from the belligerents. In effect, an intervention mission must be organized around an immediate and adequate peace response theme, such that the dynamics of conflict situations are handled appropriately. Interventionists must weigh the pros and cons of their action before deciding on the mandate to be pursued to a logical conclusion. The ECOWAS did not measure up to the demand of avoiding unambiguous mandate in its mission to Liberia. The consequence was a prolonged war, with devastating effects on the citizens of Liberia and, to some extent, on the West-African sub-region.

Revisiting the Liberian Crisis

Liberia has a unique history shared only with Sierra Leone. Incidentally, the two African countries emerged from the "philanthropic" movements in Europe and America in the wake of the abolition of the slave trade" (Sesay, 1992: 29), which granted the opportunity to "free men of colour" to be repatriated to their ancestral homes in Africa where they could start life afresh. On the strength of the efforts of the American Colonisation Society (ACS), the first set of free African-Americans and formerly enslaved people from the US, totalling eighty-six people, were safely settled in today's Monrovia (previously called Christopolis) on February 6 1820. After that, various other settlements within the area were signed off to the new arrivals through a treaty by six tribal kings (Umoden, 1992: 14).

The ranks of the settlers were swelled by the arrival of immigrants from the West Indies, and most significantly, by the arrival of newly-freed enslaved people headed for Europe rescued by the British and American navies. The immigrant population became a combination of the Americo-Liberians and the freed-slaves, mainly from Congo. However, the relatively enlightened but minority Americo-Liberians gained prominence in the socio-economic and political terrain, giving the group an undue advantage over other groups, as Liberia evolved into a modern State. The emergent Commonwealth of Liberia was regarded as a colony of the ACS, especially by the European colonial powers. In its bid to reaffirm its independence, the Liberian Declaration of Independence, fashioned after the American version was signed on July 26, 1847, made Liberia the oldest Republic on the African continent. The reaffirmation of the independence and sovereignty of Liberia opened up the opportunity for political dominance by the minority Americo-Liberians. The formation of the True Whig Party (TWP) in 1869 and the subsequent take-over of political power by the party in 1870 gave further impetus to the dominance of the Americo-Liberians.

The TWP was the only recognized political party and governed the country for over a century. Between the late 19th century and about the mid-twentieth century, the Americo-Liberians consolidated their hegemonic dominance over Liberia's political, economic, social,

and civil spheres. The Americo-Liberian minority ensured a conscious institutionalized process and structure of marginalization, alienation, segregation, and dominance of both the majority indigenous Liberians and other immigrant groups. Sesay (1992: 30) alludes to this much in a submission that the Americo-Liberians at best represent only 5 per cent estimated at 1.8m in 1980 of the total population of Liberia they nevertheless controlled political and economic power in the country almost to the exclusion of the majority citizens. Of the country's 19 Presidents before the April 12, 1980 coup, none was an indigenous Liberian.

Not too long into the administration's life, it became evident that the hopes of Doe's government were misplaced because the regime ended up as a monumental failure. The initial populist stands and the accompanying accolades withered away on the altar of crass opportunism, indifference to the plight of the people and brutal and repressive conduct. Arguably, Doe's atrocities make irrelevant the combination of atrocities committed by the various Americo-Liberian regimes. There were charges of nepotism, corruption, murder, suppression of opposition, human-rights abuses and gagging of the press.

In an unprecedented barbaric move, not known to a war-free postmodern political entity, the Doe government publicly executed thirteen cabinet ministers of the previous regime in a day. Subsequently, the Doe regime moved beyond its undisguised hatred for the Americo-Liberians and the need to make the group pay for its perceived injustice against the indigenous tribes but also engaged in an open display of favouritism for his Krahn group against the other indigenous tribes. The government's act of nepotism was evident in the appointment of people of Krahn origin into the government's sensitive positions and the Army. Sesay (1992: 44) notes: "Thus, with time, the regime assumed an embarrassing ethnic colour to the dislike of the other ethnic groups who formed the majority. What followed was massive and blatant violations of human rights as Doe began to "see" many imaginaries as well as "real" enemies in almost every nook and corner in the country."

Within six months of the first attack, Taylor had rattled the ill-equipped Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and was indeed believed to have taken control of ninety-eight per cent of the

country (Nass, 2000: 67). Monrovia, the seat of government, and specifically the highly fortified Executive Mansion, provided the only haven for Doe. In the chaos generated by the conflict, a splinter group named the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by Yormie Johnson emerged from Taylor's NPFL. At this point, three main groups had appeared; the NPFL, INPFL and the AFL. There was a breakdown of law and order leading to the looming powerlessness of Samuel Doe. Surprisingly, the US refused to lend support to the embattled former President or any other two factions.

However, it is believed that on the strength of the widely publicized friendship between Nigeria's former military President Ibrahim Babangida and Samuel Doe, the Nigerian government agreed to settle the Liberian imbroglio, but under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As the Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union), President Babangida suggested that the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government set up the ECOWAS Mediation Standing Committee approved in Banjul Gambia in May 1990. The member-states of ECOWAS unanimously agreed to send a peacekeeping monitoring team (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) to Liberia, thereby providing a third-party intervention to manage and settle the Liberian conflict.

The ECOWAS Regional Economic Agenda and Conflict Management

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional economic community set up in 1975 through the prompting and exertions of Nigeria and with the active support of the Republic of Togo. The strategic inclusion of a French-speaking African state in Nigeria's dream of an economic community for the region was intended, on the one hand, to douse the tension raised by the unproved perceptions of Nigeria's hegemonic ambitions by leading Francophone West African states. Furthermore, Nigeria's determination of incorporating the French-speaking area of West Africa rests on the platform of Nigeria's commitment to the policy of "Good Neighbourliness", which abhors discrimination because of language, cultural or political differences. Eventually, the Community emerged as a sub-

regional economic community that covered 6,141,153 square kilometres and 122.7m people at inception in 1975 (Akinyemi and Aluko, 1984: 3-4).

Nigeria's efforts in forging the establishment of ECOWAS found expression in the thinking of the UN at the time, which encouraged the formation of such economic community groupings in developing countries, especially in Africa. Accordingly, ECOWAS" establishment is partly in response "to the repeated recommendations of the United Nations bodies, more particularly, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, to stress, among other things, sub-regional cooperation as a means of fulfilling the aspirations of developing nations" (Afolabi, 1984: 46). Baring all the hindrances resulting from the mutual suspicions among members, ECOWAS emerged as the August regional economic community in West Africa. The organization's driving principle at inception rests on the integration of the economies of West African states by terminating all trade barriers. Furthermore, the organization hoped to link the peoples of the region by allowing travelling access, integrating banking and transportation services, including industrial development and harmonization, cooperation in all spheres of socio-cultural endeavours and the freedom of residence of citizens, amongst other laudable ambitions. The whole idea is to achieve economic integration and collective self-reliance. As Akinyemi and Aluko (1984: 4) put it, ECOWAS "is the structural embodiment of the peoples' belief in a collective attack against the enduring problems of underdevelopment in tropical Africa." Chapter 1, Article 2(1) of the Treaty of ECOWAS states thus:

The Community shall aim to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transportation, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions. And in social and cultural matters to raise the standard of living of its peoples, increase and maintain economic stability, fostering closer relations among its member, and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent (Kwaja, 2017: 53-71).

From the preceding, it is apparent that the founders of ECOWAS never contemplated the nature of security challenges that would confront the sub-region in the international politics

of the late 1980s and 1990s. Thus, the original Treaty only focused on the issues of "Settlement of Disputes", which they envisaged could arise from the interpretation or application of the Treaty and not as a result of deadly intra-state conflicts that gained prominence afterwards. Accordingly, Chapter 13, Article 56 of the Treaty states: "Any dispute that may arise among the Member States regarding the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be amicably settled by direct agreement". It further entrenched that if there is a failure of settling disputes, such matter was to be referred to the Tribunal of the Community for final decision.

The realization of the impossibility of achieving economic integration in an environment laden with security challenges prompted the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to sign the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978. To further state its readiness for collective reliance and collective security, the ECOWAS highest authority signed the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence into force in Freetown in May 1981. Though the Freetown Protocol was more elaborate than the Protocol on Non-Aggression, it was legally and logistically powerless in the face of serious internal conflicts. To buttress the point of the weakness of this Protocol to meet the challenges of internal conflicts, we outline the circumstances under which it can be authorized. It was only possible to activate the legal instruments under the following circumstances (Akindele, 2012: 5):

- An armed conflict between two or several ECOWAS members states;
- An external armed threat or aggression directed against a member of the Community; and
- An internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported actively from outside is likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community.

Akindele (2012) opined that to create and strengthen the credibility for ECOWAS's collective profile and facilitate quick response to calls for security assistance, the 1981 MAD Protocol established the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). This body consisted of units from the national armed forces of member states. The latter had specially trained, earmarked and agreed to place at the Community's disposal for use in the event of a request for military assistance and armed intervention.

ECOWAS was forced to rise to the occasion in the face of sub-regional disaster, instability and humanitarian challenges. This decision was even more compelling because of the rest of the international Community's unwillingness to assist in arresting the Liberian chaos. Less than a year into the start of the Liberian carnage, ECOWAS, through the prompting of the Nigerian President, Ibrahim Babangida, instituted its plan for resolving the conflict.

ECOMOG - ECOWAS' Response to the Liberian Crisis

The processes of ECOWAS' involvement in the Liberian crisis were perfected through the following four significant summits (Okeke, 2012: 40);

1. The 13th session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS convened in Banjul, the Gambia, from May 28-30, 1990;
2. Standing Mediation Committee Meeting in Freetown, Sierra-Leone, from July 5-20, 1990;
3. The National Conference in Banjul, The Gambia on August 30, 1990; and
4. The First Session of the Standing Mediation Committee, held at the Kairaba Conference Centre in Banjul, The Gambia, from August 6-7, 1990.

In readiness for active involvement in the Liberian crisis, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee's Peace Plan was anchored on the necessity for direct intervention by member-states through troops-deployment under the aegis of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). According to Goolwa (2009):

The mandate of ECOMOG was to serve as a ceasefire monitoring group that would create an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of a broad-based interim government and eventual democratic election under international supervision and the disarmament, demobilization and encampment of the warring factions (Goolwa, 2009: 282).

There was no ceasefire agreement before the ECOMOG contingent deployment; therefore, it was preposterous to mandate ECOMOG to monitor a non-existent ceasefire. Draman and Carment (2001: 9) note that: "The "peacekeepers" went into Liberia without any ceasefire on the ground and, without any peace to keep, yet they were assigned peacekeeping duties". In

effect, ECOWAS ought to have ensured its peacemaking efforts through diplomatic means bore fruits, through the cessation of hostilities before troops deployment. Therefore, it is not unexpected that some belligerents, specifically the Charles Taylor-led NPFL, were hostile towards ECOMOG. The situation became intriguing as the AFL loyal to incumbent President Doe and the breakaway INPFL led by Prince Yormie Johnson expressed their willingness to allow ECOWAS' intervention through ECOMOG.

On the other hand, the NPFL, led by Charles Taylor, warned of the dire consequences for any foreign troop that interfered in the Liberian crisis. Nass (2000) asserted that Charles Taylor, leader of the leading and original rebel faction NPFL insisted that the Liberian crisis should be regarded strictly as an internal problem of Liberians and should allow them to sort it out without external interference. Taylor believed that any force coming to interfere was an occupation army and would not operate freely.

It was a disservice for not taking Taylor's threat seriously as his group was already in control of approximately 98% of the country at that stage of the crisis. He was on the verge of running over Monrovia, and the prospects of taking over the Executive Mansion where President Doe was holed up looked real before ECOMOG came calling. The rebel leader did not hide his resentment against ECOMOG when on August 24, 1990, attacked ECOMOG troops that landed in Monrovia. While the INPFL controlled the seaport through which the contingent arrived, Liberia welcomed the troops. The NPFL showed its discontent for their mission by attacking "the incoming ECOMOG naval vessels with multi-barrelled rocket launcher missiles and mortar fired from a safe distance" (Nass, 2000: 68).

In effect, the damage done to the ECOMOG mission with an unclear mandate deepened the antagonism of one of the belligerents against the contingent. Despite Taylor's obvious reservations, the ECOMOG contingent managed to settle in. Still, the group's task became more compounded because Liberia had become a highly fragmented country, faced with the reality of imminent collapse- disorder had become the order of the day. In quick succession, various rebel factions began to emerge by taking advantage of the progress made

by the NPFL and using the opportunity to become relevant actors and thus negotiate for stakes in post-civil-war Liberia. The contingent's peacekeeping role became quite daunting with the emergence of quite a handful of other rebel groups. Other groups that sprang up include the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) led by George Bolley and the United Liberation Movement for Liberian Democracy which subsequently devolved into two wings, headed by Roosevelt Johnson and G. Kromah (ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K) respectively. The NPFL's principled hostility towards ECOMOG made the contingent's peacekeeping role quite daunting. Against the tide of a peacekeeping mandate, according to Draman and Carment, (2001: 5), ECOMOG launched sporadically but "limited offensive" ostensibly to overpower the NPFL and ensure restoration of social order. This show of force only portrayed ECOMOG presence as an unwanted intrusion in Liberia's debacle.

The action of the "peacekeepers" only prolonged the crisis and had damaging consequences on the image of the group as neutral and impartial. The undisguised anti-NPFL stance of the ECOMOG further compounded the challenges faced due to the unclear and ambiguous mandate to be pursued by the mission. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001: 60) explained that "Mandates" are often adjusted incrementally in reaction to new demands in the course of an intervention which may not be inevitable given the importance of human protection during an intervention of this nature where much depends upon the attitude and level of cooperation received from the targeted state. While the initial mandate may reflect a preoccupation with human protection, political and security concerns sooner or later predominate. The more limited the initial vision concerning the real problem at hand, the more likely the mission creep will occur.

In the final analysis, the Report urges, and rightly so, that from the word go, the mandate of peacekeepers must be clearly defined, stating the aims of the intervention in the various phases of it. It should also spell out that the desired end state is the restoration of good governance and the rule of law. However, in contrast to the suggestions of the ICISS Report, ECOWAS failed to articulate the ECOMOG mission's mandate in Liberia adequately. Draman

and Carment (2001: 11) note that, although ECOMOG was a peacekeeping force, the NPFL's resistance to its action indicated the absence of its (NPFL's) consent, a key ingredient in conventional peacekeeping arrangement. As earlier mentioned, the inability of ECOWAS to initiate a resounding peacemaking effort as the initial attempt at intervention made setting up a clear and enforceable mandate agenda an impossibility. Nass (2000: 340) comments are very instructive as to the challenges of deciphering the role of ECOMOG in Liberia. Nass, in retrospect, revealed that after several years of ECOMOG mission in Liberia, debate continues as to whether ECOMOG in Liberia could be viewed as a neutral peacekeeping military intervention. The question remains that all parties did not agree as conventionally required before ECOMOG moved in and, of course, engaged in attacking a particular party to the conflict.

The consequence of the indiscretion is that the peacekeeping mission, which never engaged in peacemaking, became embroiled in peace-enforcement challenges. According to Francis (2000: 179, cited in Golwa, 2009: 283), given the circumstances and the complexity of the civil conflict, ECOMOG had no option but to engage in peace-enforcement, which inevitably compromised its neutrality. This situation was observed by NPFL as partial on the part of ECOMOG and seen as a way of limiting NPFL military superiority. ECOMOG further lost its neutrality by occasionally cooperating with and even assisting with logistical support other warring factions such as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) against the NPFL.

Meanwhile, Adisa and Aminu (1996) argue that the tenets of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement measures were seen as fundamentally incompatible. The consequences of ECOWAS' naivety in muddling up the role of ECOMOG was disastrous for Liberia and the sub-regions peace efforts as a whole. The situation led to the prolongation of the war, the concomitant losses of lives, civil and social dislocation, among other unfortunate conditions. From the benefits of hindsight, there are arguments to the effect that had ECOWAS committed

more resources to peacemaking through diplomatic efforts, the sub-regional body's involvement would have paved the way for the end of the war much earlier than it happened. Under such circumstances, the ECOMOG contingent would have been deployed to monitor and secure a truce and prepare the enabling environment for diplomacy and negotiation to consolidate on the ceasefire. As noted by Draman and Carment (2001: 6), "peacekeeping offers temporary relief; in fact, it is more a palliative, rather than a cure."

ECOMOG was deprived of the platform that an impartial, neutral and trusted third-party intervention mechanism should enjoy. There was, however, a dramatic turn of events in the quest for peace in Liberia when the relationship between the Nigerian authorities and Charles Taylor's NPFL changed positively. The Nigerian government under General Sani Abacha reached out to Taylor, who graciously accepted an invitation to Abuja. After that, Taylor consented to participate in the peace process. The Abuja Accord of August 1995 may not have ended the Liberian crisis at once, but it paved the way for the subsequent revised Abuja Accord that signalled the end of the war in 1997. One of the most critical factors necessary to end the crisis was to ensure that all belligerents were made to participate in the peace process. Invariably, peace may have been achieved earlier if ECOWAS had taken cognizance of Taylor's clout and ensured his participation in the peace process.

This line of action would have endeared ECOWAS to the belligerents as an impartial intervener, rather than the suspicions generated about ECOWAS' role and intentions for the most period during the crisis. Eventually, a return to normalcy through the peace process initiated by ECOWAS with the participation of the warring factions got underway, signalling the peacebuilding process's commencement. The crisis officially ended with the swearing-in of Charles Taylor as the President of Liberia on August 2, 1997. This predictable outcome could have happened much earlier on two grounds; firstly, if the plan of Taylor's NPFL to run over Monrovia and take over the government by force had not been truncated by ECOMOG's intervention. Secondly, if ECOWAS had managed its relationship with Taylor's NPFL

correctly, a democratic election would have been organized much earlier and without the bloodshed that characterized the process.

Conclusions

Indeed, ECOWAS' regional security initiative was central to the dynamics of the Liberian crisis. After Liberia, ECOWAS' regional conflict management mechanism was also activated to resolve the Sierra-Leone imbroglio. But, according to Golwa (2009: 286): “The question often asked is why should an economic integration grouping assume the role of conflict management?”. Simply, it is because the aims and objectives of ECOWAS, which includes collective self-reliance, economic growth and development, cannot be realized in the absence of peace and security within the sub-region. Though the Liberian adventure may not have been clinically executed yet, the creation of ECOMOG placed ECOWAS in a new dimension as a sub-regional body that has taken its regional security responsibilities thoughtfully (Bekoe and Mengistu, 2002). However, the ECOWAS' attempt at resolving the Liberian quagmire was a noble effort, which went sour because of its less than inspiring prosecution and execution as a fall out of the non-existence of a clear, unambiguous and enforceable mandate. This situation is coupled with the lack of confidence in ECOMOG's mission, perhaps the most powerful group among the belligerents. The reasons for the below-par performance of the group is, however, not far-fetched, if one draws from the advice of the Report of ICISS (2001), which argues that the conditions for intervention should meet four primary objectives, as follows:

- to establish more explicit rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and how to intervene;
- to establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and after all other approaches have failed;
- to ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for the purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper concern to minimize the human costs and institutional damage that will result; and

- to help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace.

The ECOWAS learnt some eternal lessons from its intervention in the Liberian crisis. The intervention led to the signing of the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The ECOWAS leaders amended the 1999 Protocol to reflect some of the salient features excluded from the 1978 and 1981 Protocols dealing with the issues of security and conflict management and prevention in the sub-region, submitted that this new framework does not limit its purview to inter-State conflicts. Instead, it has the mandate to intervene in internal disputes that threaten human rights and the general security of the sub-region. Specifically, Chapter V, Article 25 of Protocol 10 states that interventions would be necessary when the following occur:

- Cases of aggression or conflict in any member State or thereof;
- Cases of conflicts between two or several Member States;
- Cases of internal conflict (i) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, (ii) that poses a severe threat to peace and security in the sub-region;
- In the event of severe and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law.

The 1999 Protocol effectively tackles the significant aspect of the challenges that ECOWAS had to deal with in the sub-regional organization's response to the Liberian crisis. With relative success in other areas of focus, it is, therefore, safe to say that in the over three decades of ECOWAS' existence, the sub-regional Community has matured steadily by responding adequately to the challenges facing the complex West African sub-region. In its three decades of existence, ECOWAS has shown that it is a crucial instrument for enhancing socio-economic and political development in the sub-region. By its numerous achievements in conflict resolution, peace and security, and economic integration, West Africa has been put at the forefront of Africa's economic integration.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF TRADITIONAL METHODS AND STRUCTURES OF CRIME CONTROL MECHANISMS IN WUDIL, KANO STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract

In spite of the exploits of modern institutions of crime control, traditional mechanisms of security management still find relevance in various quarters in contemporary Nigeria. This paper thus examines the traditional crime control structures and mechanisms in Wudil LGA of Kano state, north western Nigeria. The rising trend in extraneous crimes and vices like kidnapping, banditry, drug peddling, religious radicalism among others seems to be overwhelming for modern crime control mechanisms. This has lent credence to myriads of scholarly suggestions targeted towards making the north western Nigerian region a sane society. Suggestions include community policing, use of community vigilante and calls to integrating traditional and modern social/crime control mechanisms. Findings establishes the functionality and relevance of traditional structures and methods in controlling crime in Wudil LGA of Kano State and its preference over the use of the alien modern crime control structures. And the impact of those methods against prevalence of crime and insecurity in contemporary times. This study therefore recommends the re-introduction of these traditional methods and their systematic integration with modern and traditional crime control methods, for holistic security in Wudil and Nigeria in general.

KEYWORDS: Security, Traditional crime control, Community Policing, Wudil, Radicalism

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, Nigeria has been plagued with frightening crimes and often than not the consequences are devastating and appalling. This unsavoury development has generated a lot of concern amongst scholars, religious clerics, non-governmental organization and government (Iheajemuzu, 1997). This concern also has been expressed in the media (print and electronics), seminars, conferences, and symposia all in attempts to meet a common ground on its control. However, what constitute crime varies not only from society to society but from time to time as well as from strict enforcement to none. Traditional African communities used mechanisms of crime control, reformation, and moral purification that functioned as instruments to rectify and serve justice before the arrival of Western civilization and the criminal system to Africa, including Nigeria. As a result, Hausa society's traditional political system has constructed its security mechanisms and crime control since time immemorial to serve their common goal of socio-economic development as a whole. This is because issues of peace and security affect the entire community.

It is well known fact that before the advent of colonialism, Africa had a system of justice and adjudication hinged on fear of deities which attracts instant sanctions and punishments. Hence, making the people conform to the ethos of the community, but the coming of the Europeans has altered/changed the peoples cognitive mapping of what constitutes social order and control through the introduction of new methods leading to the abandonment of the traditional social control patterns, systems and mechanisms that was instant, efficient and effective.

This relegation of traditional crime control mechanisms in favour of modern crime mechanisms has done more harm than good in Nigeria. For instance, Transparency International ranked Nigeria as “one of the most corrupt nations in the world” (Ajayi, 2012: 1). According to the researcher, armed robbery, banditry, kidnapping, rape, occupational crimes, drug peddling, and other crimes of varying magnitudes are on the rise in Nigeria, particularly in Wudil LGA. Residents in Wudil have been more concerned as a result of these

crimes, which frequently result in jungle justice mostly with occupational crimes. The issues of crime and deviance have become a topic of conversation among today's citizens. The western criminal system, which is currently the primary method of crime control, has done little to solve this cultural divide. Worse, modern technical advancements in communication have assisted crime because it is often impossible to express what is unlawful. The modern methods of crime control are typically lengthy and costly, with judgments and verdicts always being delayed, and with the tendency for justice to be denied and criminals to be released.

This has adversely affected the society, by hampering the quality of life to be lead and threatening human rights to freedom. No community has remained unaffected, by the negative consequences of crime, although the level and intensity of the problem might vary from community to community. The traditional mechanisms of crime control of various cultural groups like the Igbos, the Tivs of Benue, the Yoruba's of the West, the Fulani's of Adamawa amongst others and their positive impact were thoroughly discussed in related literatures. But nothing was written about the traditional crime control mechanisms used and preferred due to its relevancy by Wudilawa (indigenes of Wudil LGA of Kano State) as opposed to the western system, as well as the political structures put in place to compliment the crime control mechanisms. In view of the foregoing, it becomes necessary to investigate traditional methods of crime control, in this case, using Wudil in Kano state. this is carried out using primary, and secondary data.

Conceptual Clarification

Security

It is beyond reasonable doubt, that security is very vital issue in the survival of any society be it small or big and nation at large. This is because without provision of security there could be no protection of life and property, the whole society will be rife with lawlessness, engulfed with enormous social milieu such as conflict, violence, chaos and eventually the state collapse. Security is an enduring yet elusive quest. There is a consensus that it implies freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups) but there is a major disagreement about

whether the main focus of inquiry should be on “individual”, “national”, or “international” security (Baylis and Smith, 2001: 300). Some security experts argued that the concept of security has always been associated with the safety and survival of the state and its citizens from harm or destruction of dangerous threats. This conception generally holds that the state is the only institution with the primary responsibility and power for the safety of its territory and its people (Zabadi, 2005: 3).

As Ozoemena (2009) argues, security is all about national interest and involves "the total of actions and measures, including legislative and operational procedures, adopted to ensure peace, stability and the general well-being of a nation and its citizens". According to Adebayo (2011), security could be referred to as a measure that ensures peaceful co-existence and development at large. It is implied from Adebayo's view that with the existence of security, there is the absence of fear, threat, anxiety, tension, and apprehension over the loss of life, liberty, property, goals, and values, among others. Security has been defined as the degree of protection against danger, damage, loss, and crime (Dwyer and Osher, 2000).

Crime

Crime is inevitable as such has been and will continue to persist to be a crucial momentum in the affairs of human existence. Crime is not a new phenomenon to but has been in existence since the time man began to utilize available resources around for his survival. With the scarcity of these resources, man struggled for his survival leading to social vices which become alarming also threatening to lives and properties. It is beyond disputable reality that when man came into being developed some crimes for his selfish objectives against other goals and it exists till date in all human societies (Adegoke, 2012). Crime has no zone as it penetrates all strata of human existential. It has no known class of status as separate entity which can be noticeably identify. Crime is not only belonging to specific society or group of people, but also has forces within local, national and international variants of operations (Shehu, 2016).

Like most societies, a number of crimes of characteristic prevalent. This is usually a function of many variables including socio-cultural and economic factors. For the people of

Wudil, notable courses of insecurity include: hunters clashes, fishermen intra group conflicts, butchers'/herders clashes, farmer/herders clashes, armed robbery, banditry, rape, early marriages, Almajiri culture, drug peddling, theft, kidnapping, witch craft, marital discord, amongst others.

Crime control mechanisms

Methods used to reduce crime in a society by preventing individuals from engaging in criminal activities/behaviours are referred to as crime control mechanisms. The modern (formal) and traditional (informal) crime control mechanisms can both be used to control crime. To promote lawful behaviour, informal crime control focuses on moral and social structures such as the family and society. Fines and Compensation, Ritual Cleansing, Trial by Ordeals, Ridicules and Gossips, Masquerade institutions, Confinement, Ostracism, Banishment, and Capital Punishment are some examples of classic criminal control techniques that have existed for a long time.

To combat criminal activity, formal or modern crime control relies on government authorities. They are related with the complex developed western/ European world that has been adopted and disseminated around the world, and they take the shape of commissions of inquiry, police, constitutions, and a judicial system comprised of attorneys and judges. As a result of their colonial invasion of Africa and drive to modernize Africans, these European crime control measures have been extended to Africans. Modern crime control mechanisms in Nigeria are manifested in legal bodies established by law to enforce laws and punish violators, such as the police, the court and prison system (CJS), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and the Traffic Warden, among others.

Traditional crime control methods

The empirical studies of traditional informal mechanisms of crime control have evolved in various terms from scholarly views such as “traditional,” “customary,” “indigenous,” “informal,” “non-state,” “local,” “community,” as well as “popular,” and “participatory,”

often complexity in both discourse and practice. In some cases, they capture the same social phenomenon, while in others perspective their meanings are quite momentum (Adegoke, 2008; 'Yandaki, 2015). The concept has been clarified by Reuben in an attempt to give distinctive differences used the word informal justice system to distinguished the two terms of state-administered formal mechanism systems and that of non-state administrated informal mechanism.” (Reuben, 2001; Richard, 1982). The term informal mechanism is used to refer to its basic attributes. It is defined as unofficial (dissociated from state power) non-coercive (dependent rather than force), non-bureaucratic, decentralized, relatively undifferentiated, and non-professional; its substantive and procedural rules are imprecise, unwritten, democratic, flexible, ad hoc, and particularistic (Richard, 1982).

Traditional crimes control techniques are informal mechanisms or ways used by communities, with particular reference to Wudil Local Government Area of Kano State from time immemorial and are still relevant for crime control and checks and balances. Traditionally, they controlled crime through a variety of means including family members, peer groups, community associations’, elder councils, emir, and village heads, vigilante, among others, whose roles included interpreting the subsisting community's code of conduct and behaviour as passed down from generation to generation. Traditional societies, unlike western society, did not have written rules to regulate behaviour, but they did have well-established systems for managing crime and maintaining social order.

Theoretical Framework

A reasonable explanation of crime control in modern society has always emerged through the synthesis of two or more ideas, two theories are synthesized in this work to capture the substantive difficulties. The first is structural functionalism, which is used in this study since it is widely held that for society to be peaceful and orderly, all of its organs must work together to support the system's structural running. The police force is a crime-fighting organ, and the traditional system is also a part of the crime control system; if they do not work together, the entire system of crime-fighting machinery would be inefficient, if not completely destroyed.

To put it another way, the old system of crime control is extremely beneficial to societies overall peace and order.

The second is the social bond theory also known as the social control theory which was propounded by Travis Hirschi (1969). It's linked to a criminologist in America who's known for his social control approach to adolescent delinquency. The basic theme of this theory is to figure out why people obey the law. Hirschi claimed that delinquency is caused by a lack of social relationships and attachments. Attachments (parents, teachers, and peers), participation in traditional activities (sports, social groups, and many others), acceptance of social norms (such as the norm that criminal acts should be avoided), and recognition of the moral validity of laws are the factors that are most likely to prevent delinquency and crime. These ties are often referred to as social connections. Hirschi (1969) claims that when a person has no social relationships, the risk of participating in aberrant actions increases. These controls are fear of punishment, feelings of integrity and desire to be a good person (Hirschi 1969, in Mcshane and Williams, 2007). This theory of Hirschi related the understanding of bonds to the informal mechanisms of control (traditional mechanisms of crime control). According to the theory the bonds that control our behaviours are typically ones that have been achieved through the traditional process rather than that of formally adopted laws.

Traditional crime control strategies use social links to govern behaviour. In a traditional African setting, a deviant or criminal is seen to be insane or someone who has secretly angered the gods or has been cursed. According to this view, conventional crime control can only be successful when residents have specific relationships with the processes and structures of control, as was the case before to the Europeanization of nations. The traditional crime control methods used in Wudil LGA demonstrate a variety of social relationships that function as criminal checks in the society, and when these are combined with modern mechanisms, we would have a more effective complex crime control system in Nigeria.

Historical Perspective of Traditional Crime Control

In the precolonial African societies precisely the Igbo society of south eastern Nigeria, social/crime control patterns were based on no written laws but oral laws that greatly influenced people's life and attitude towards the society (Onyeozili and Ebbe, 2012). Traditional methods of controlling crime and maintaining security is not of universal acceptance as it is culturally relative. These ways to a great extent have to deal with pattern of organization and belief system of the people (Box, 1987). When people are bound together by strong cohesive bounds of community consciousness, well tribal transaction, crime can be reduced to a barest minimum (Box, 1987; Dambazau, 1994). Traditional crime control, indeed the prevention and control of criminal behaviour in Nigerian communities has its roots in kinship and extended family system. This is significant in understanding crime prevention and control in the traditional Nigerian setting. Control of member of a family was simple, but effective and in most cases, democratic. The family which was the source of stability and social control was united under the control of the oldest person.

However, modernity has affected the kinship and extended family system, and social control is no longer the same. Religion (especially Africa traditional religion) was also regarded as one best way in controlling crime in the society (Africa). Religion has also been seen as a source of strength and consolation, and essential for moral education, moral endeavour and moral achievement (Akiba, 2012). Irrespective of the means used, certain agents and means of crime control have come to be commonly identified by this direction. Among the widely used in Africa (Nigeria) are association like age – grades, social clubs and vigilant groups who act as police in the various communities they subsist. They are watchmen, guards, members of the communities are organized to suppress and punish crime summarily as when the process of law appears inadequate as the case with Nigeria.

Evolution of Traditional Politics and Security Structures in Wudil

Records show that the early beginning of Wudil dates back to the 9th Century AD when Abagayawa from the present-day Gaya, 16 kilometres away from Wudil on their way to the

foot of Dala Hill to excavate iron ore, briefly settled in Wudil near the river bank. Abagayawa settled at the place now referred to as Kukar Dafi, 90 years before Bagauda came to Kano in 1060 AD (Musa and Osi, 2011; Dankawata, and Malamin, 2011; Garba, 2011). This went on to show that for more than 10 centuries inhabitants of Kano province in which Wudil is an integral part were capable of producing riches because of the mastery of skills to technologically invent farm implements, defence arsenals, grow food and extract minerals iron deposits from the soil. Wudil is a flourishing town and a leading commercial centre. Weaving, Embroidery, dyeing, tanning, pottery was improved a great deal. Embroidery and tailoring were remarkably enhanced. Other chief articles in the market were hoes, leather products, mats, hide and skin exported to faraway lands in Bornu (North-Eastern Nigeria), Adamawa province, Cameroon Republic and to the North as far as Tripoli (Musa and Osi, 2011).

As Abagayawa left Wudil for Kano, historical traditions assert that a community of hunters camped at Garin Dau and later on, moved into the present Wudil town. These hunters grouped themselves into communities of farmers, fishermen, and blacksmiths. Hence, the emergence of political structures of Gidan Sarkin Noma (Residence of the head of farmers), Gidan Makera (house of blacksmiths) and later Unguwar Makera (Blacksmiths' Ward) Unguwar Magina (Pottery Ward) (Musa and Osi, 2011). From then on blacksmithing became one of the famous technological expressions of Wudilawa (Wudil people) practised by early residents which continue to date. Fishing is one of the prominent professions in Wudil. These fishermen use local fishing materials such as birgi, yan zube, tanka, gora, kalli, and koma (Musa and Osi, 2011). Fishing is an ancient economic activity that gave rise to remarkable profitable value in the pre-colonial period.

Trade in fish became popular among the people in pre-colonial Wudil, stimulated migration attracting many fishermen from their original settlements for better opportunities. Prominent among the group that permanently settled in Wudil were Daudu, Disai and Kwaiwa. Daudu became an informal leader uniting and integrating the already settled groups within the framework of justice and equality based on shared common traditions in order to prosper and

rise to eminence, making great impact in both political and economic spheres (Musa and Osi, 2011; Dankawata, and Malamin, 2011; Garba, 2011). The Dan Daudu (descendent of Daudu) became a figure evolved by the laws and customs of the people and was, therefore, part of the people's cultural heritage. Leadership practised by traditional Wudil community can be defined as a hereditary system of government in which an individual performed executive, legislative, and judicial roles. The powers exercised by the monarchs were absolute, constrained by the customary or religious institutions, which performed roles such as appointment, removal of office holders, and superintending within the system.

Traditional structures and Agencies of Crime Control in Wudil LGA.

Primary Structures

The Wudil people popularly known as the Wudilawa of the west northern Nigeria, though a traditional society have laws defined in terms of authority and court, such as found in today modern judicial system as it is a centralized society. There existed several agencies and structures that played significant roles in maintaining social order and crime control in their domain at the primary level. These agencies are:

- ***Family court:*** The kinship and extended family system is the first agency of crime control in all human society. It is presided over by family heads and elders. They mitigate crises, settle rifts, and adjudicate in criminal cases. Wife battery, inheritance disputes within the family and petty theft, among others, are handled within this court. The duties of this court are essential because any event in the family may have direct consequences for the larger society. Within the lineage group (zuriya), the leader of the group, usually the eldest male person led by example as he is the model of conduct. As the head of the family, he has moral and legal rights and obligations for keep the members' crime free. He conducts ceremonies (naming and wedding ceremonies) which affirms the corporations of the whole family and has the power of sanctions against offenders. Each lineage system (zuriya) is made up of a number of territorially kin-based units and each household is headed by a recognized authority mostly the father

(maigida). The compound head has numerous rituals, moral and legal rights and obligation. He offers sacrifices for the welfare of his compound members, whom he helps to extricate from the ritual, social and legal problems (Dambazu, 1994). Control of member of a family was simple, but effective and in most cases, democratic. The family which was the source of stability and social control was united under the control of the oldest person.

- ***Samari (Age-grade)***: Omagu (1979) observed that, age grade organization played very significant role in the socio-cultural life of the people. It performed both social and political functions; and inculcate healthy ideas and objectives in their members and further act as a disciplinary body for erring members. Talboth (1999) buttresses this assertion and noted that age-grades are very essential in the chain of government and without them the administrative function could hardly be carried out. Specifically, age grades are involved roads, other developmental projects, as well as community policing. In Wudil LGA, they play the role of social conformers to the rules, values and cherished traditions of the society. They checked on deviants, non-conformers and juvenile delinquents as punishment for offenders and reward conforming members with recognised positions in their circle. Their leader is called the *Sarkin Samari* (Youth Leader) who is democratically elected and endorsed by the Emir and recognised by the Local Government Council. They also partake in festivals, traditional activities and held periodic meetings where important issues concerning politics, societal progress and most crucial issues on security and peace.
- ***Dattijai (Elders' Council)***: The role of the elders in a traditional Wudilawa family is significant. They are usually the most senior members of the family, and preside over matters within their families. The family unit is the first point of call whenever a conflict arises within the family in Wudil. Issues like domestic or communal conflict situation is first reported to the most senior member of the families or elders, usually a male. They collaborate and assemble the disputing parties where the conflict is resolved amicably.

- ***Malaman Mata (Old Women Councils)***: The Malaman mata were mostly respected of old women of community. Their functions were aimed at sustaining discipline and rejecting immoral acts, irresponsible behaviour and utterances. They control crime especially of marital conflicts by intervening at an initial stage through counselling and mediation between the couples whenever required to do so. They serve to protect the integrity of women by training them in moral and domestic responsibilities and upholding the moral value/virtue of the Wudil people and the society (Hart, 1964). This group does not tolerate crimes against women such as disrespect and abuse, as they report such to the higher authority without delay, when all their efforts to redress such issues failed at family level. They assist in no small measure in crime control in the Wudil traditional society.

Secondary Structures and Agencies of Crime Control in Wudil LGA

These structures and agencies of controlling crime are not universal rather culturally relative based on the political legitimacy and authority of the concern community. These cultural patterns are dynamic because when people are bonded together, by strong cohesion, by bounds community consciousness, well tribal transaction, crime can equally be reduced to a barest minimum (Ayuk, 2013). The traditional Hausa land security during the pre-colonial and post-colonial period was very unique in the sense that, the core values of ruler ship is to provide enabling environment for business to thrive. The rulers had a desire for security of life and protection of peoples' properties from within and external aggression, because that was one of their cardinal principles as a constituted authority to lead their people for peace, security and societal development.

The Wudil people who are part of Hausaland or Qasar Hausa were examined by scholars of history because they have commonality with other Northern states in their cultural practices such as language, norms values, social control mechanisms, political organisations, religion amongst others. The Hausa states were bound to each other by a common language and culture, and linked by trade routes which led from the Sahara Desert in the north to the

forest zone in the south cutting across all boundaries, great caravans moved from place to place and the markets of Kano and Katsina were famous (Shehu, 2018) was of the opinion that Hausaland means traditional land of the Hausa language where it developed and it was being used as mother tongue. The argument based here is that the people of Hausaland were hegemonic society in tradition and culture, as such they share common ancestors in historical epoch, and proximity in their geographical locations. Hausaland comprising of Zaria, Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, among others with Wudil as one of the towns in Kano state.

The Hausawa with particular reference to Wudilawa have various political structures and measures of crime control and these suit the purpose of the time and help in the maintenance of social order and peaceful co-existence in their domains. These measures are culture based with collective efforts of all agents in the political structures in the community. A well-defined and highly-structured political system of security administration was put in place introducing roles and positions to control crime and criminality taking into cognisance the dominancy of occupational crimes in the study area. Few among them are in the form of Sarkin Kogi (head of the river basin); Sarkin Ruwa (head of water resources), Sarkin Kasuwa (Head of Market); Sarkin Fawa (Head of the Butchers); Sarkin Kira (Head of Blacksmiths); Sarkin Aska (Head of Barbers).

These administrators respected each other's function with no interference in duties and responsibilities assigned to any of them (Garba, 2011). They operate as independent entities in controlling or minimising crimes under their respective occupational domains' before alerting the Emir if the criminal act committed supersedes their power. For example, petty and serious crimes committed in the market such as pick pocketing, theft, robbery, burglary, assault, arson, are all reported to the Sarkin Kasuwa (Head of Market) for settlement and prosecution. This is the same with all politically appointed heads of occupational groups in Wudil LGA. Their appointment is by the Emir (Sarki) with the consent of their people through a democratic process, though hereditary. Their roles and mode of operations in crime control are discussed below:

Sarkin Baka (Chief of Hunters)

The function of Sarkin Baka is to look after the affairs of hunting and the hunters (*yan farauta*) as hunting is one of the prevalent occupations in Wudil LGA. Hunting occupation entails the use of locally made weapons, such as bow and arrow (*kwari da baka*), curved dagger (*barandami*), knives (*wukake*), dane guns (*bindiga*) to hunt animals from forests as source of food and income. Hunters are regarded as '**yanfarauta**', in Hausa language and live on the edges and within the communities. All hunters irrespective of their categories are under the control and surveillance of 'Sarkin Baka. He ensures their safety and security as well as serves as their crime/ social controller. Crimes committed by *yan farauta* among themselves and to other members of the community are reported to Sarkin Baka, who in turn serves the judge, mediator, reconciliators and prosecutor with his lieutenants. Their role is pivotal as in several occasion they engaged serious encounter with arm-robbers, kidnapper and bandits successfully.

Sarkin Daji or Maidaji (The Chief of Forests)

Maidaji played the prominent roles in maintenance of security and safety of the forest, both the fauna and flora, as well as human beings living within the forest or conducting any business in the forest. Maidaji is the custodian of forest resources, their preservation and proper utilization. Both the animals, hunters, bandits in the forest are being under surveillance of Sarkin Daji. In Hausaland and particularly Wudil with its large forestry, whoever wants to inhabit and utilize the forest for whatever reason, a permission must be seek from the chief of forest (Sarkin Daji). Even the hunters seek permission from him before embarking on their hunting activities. For security measures the chief forest guards spiritualized the forest so that it become difficult for invaders or enemies to attack as entrances into the forest have become closed (Yandaki, 2015; Maidaji, 2019).

Thus, any crime committed in the forest is reported to the Mai daji, for example crimes like armed robbery or robbery (*fashi da makami*) committed by *yan fashi*, are checkmated by *sarkin daji* either with the use of spiritualism or his volunteers known as *yan bangan daji*.

Today, these forests have become home to bandits. This is the call for reawakening of indigenous crime control and accepting their relevance to counter crimes and criminality especially those that are culturally relative (Shehu, 2016).

Sarkin Ruwa (Chief of River Basins and resources)

Sarkin Ruwa is the custodian of water ways, rivers, Sea and all the resources in them of Hausa land. One of the major economic activities of Wudil people is fishing as the town borders with Hadejia River. The major river provides water resources for fishing and dry season irrigation activities. All waters were spiritualizing to serve the main purpose of security and safety. It is mandatory for Swimmers, divers, and fishermen to seek permission from the Sarkin Ruwa before they utilize and conduct fishing activities in his domain. Prevailing conflicts here are usually between rival fishermen groups which translate in crimes of manslaughter, corruption, and piracy, drug trafficking and peddling among others. The Sarkin Ruwa controls these crimes by rules and regulation ordained spiritually to be observed by all utilizers of his domain, and attached to their deviations are curses by the water spirits. This serves as a deterrence to future criminals. Additionally, crimes that requires settlement, prosecution, and reconciliation are all handled in his court which is mostly under the tree by the riverside along with his lieutenants.

Sarkin Noma (Head of Farmers)

Farming is vital and backbone of Hausaland economy since time immemorial. This is why the title of Sarkin Noma is found in every community in Hausaland. The duty of Sarkin-noma is to represent farmers' wishes and safeguard their farm and farm produce against external attack, regulate prices of farm produce and when conflict engulf with their counterpart Fulani. Sarkin-Noma, indeed, report any security breach that will course social mayhem in his community to the Sarki or Emir (Sani, 2000). Petty crimes among the farmers or done in the farms like stealing of farm produce, destruction of farm produce by cows among others are settled by him inform of equitable settlement between the farmer and the herder as compensation commensurate to the loss suffered in his palace. But when serious crime is committed as

bloody clashes between herders and farmers leading to death and serious injuries and loss of properties, the Emir would be dually notified.

Sarkin Fawa (Chief Butcher)

The Chief Butcher is the head of all butchers in Wudil LGA with the responsibilities of maintaining peace and order among them and their relationship with herders, who are their partners in trade but with a highly antagonistic relationship due to mistrust in business. Crimes in this instance are bloody due to the implement they use in their daily activities, can be as a result of rivalry among them, also with their economic partners (fulanis) due to stolen cows finding their ways to markets and been purchased illegally by butchers. The Sarki settled most of these conflicts in form of fines and compensations.

Sarkin Fulani (Chief of Herders)

Sarkin Fulani as his counterpart sarkin noma, is in charge of all the herders of Wudil LGA. As their leader, all the clan heads of various Fulani groups residing in the area are under his domain and are accountable to him. His position is bestowed by the Emir after democratic selection among the various clans, thus his power and authority cannot be questioned. Notable crimes in this domain as studied in Wudil LGA are the farmers/herders clashes, banditry, armed robbery, drug addiction, and butchers/herders conflict. The sarki in collaboration with either sarkin noma (if its farmers'/herder clashes) or sarkin pawa in case of herders/butchers clashes, handled reported criminal activities in form of fines and compensation called Burtali, to the affected party for peace to be restored in the area.

Sarkin Barayi (The Chief Thieves)

This is a common phenomenon among Hausa society in traditional epoch. The title plays a pivotal role in checkmating frequent handpicking, stealing and bungling of people belonging and whereabouts. The position of *Sarkin Barayi* is champion by a former popular thief who decided to retired from the professional criminal act. He is well respected among the thieves in the community and has great influence due to his linkage with them in recovery of stolen items. Repenting before traditional constituted authority made him to earned respect as he

made public confession voluntary. *Sarkin-Barayi* serve the function of identifying stolen properties through his vast network of information msharing with the underworld, also apprehend and mandate the culprit to return the stolen goods. Usually what transpire in this process is that once a case of missing item is reported before the *Sarkin Barayi*, without much difficulty and delay, the stolen properties will definitely be returned to the owner, but at compensatory cost usually money, though less than what will be spent in the police station.

Through his informants and by virtue of the spiritual powers he possessed, all criminal case perpetrated in the community example burglary, stealing, robbery amongst others are all known to him as he has knowledge of all the gangs of thieves operating in different areas of the community and their mode of operations, and has the authority to ask them to surrender themselves or their stolen goods. He also settles disputes between the gangs whenever the need arises. There is a kind of incentives given to chief thieves for whoever their stolen belonging is recovered and returned (Maidaji, 2019; Shehu, 2016).

Yan Banga (The Vigilantes Group)

This category of traditional gang of people tagged ‘Yan-Tauri’ are found virtually in every society in Nigeria not only in Hausaland. They have their dogs, a locally made guns, swords, arrow and bow and fortified by charms. They encounter all sorts of criminals whether in the night or during the day, dealt with severely. Their sole functions and duties are to exercise within traditional limit and constitutional power confide on them to arrest and prosecute before the local court or palace court. They engage themselves in spiritualism an aesthetics one against all odds. Vigilantes are found in every city, towns and villages with support of community for greater control of crimes, insecurity menace and social evils. Their role in fighting insecurity and crime control among society is beyond quantifiable considering their active performance in the fight against Boko-Haram, Banditry and Kidnapping among social milieu in the country (‘Yandaki, 2015; Tauri, 2019; Shehu, 2016).

Sarkin Dogarai (Chief Police Officer)

He is the traditional chief security officer (chief of police). He is in charge of all the local police officers (dogarai) in the community. The Dogari (Dogarai in plural) is law enforcement personnel equivalent to contemporary police officer. The functions and duties of Dogari is to maintained internal security by ensuring law and order among people in a community, also between interacting communities. Crime is controlled through intelligence gathering as the Sarki usually send the Dogarai on daily surveillance round the community. They are seeing everywhere checkmating the compliance of people to rules of the land in Wudil LGA such as mosque, market places, sport arenas, social gatherings, amongst others. Criminals and deviants are dealt with severely and swiftly with long and fortified traditional whiplash called bulala, before taken to the Emir palace for prosecution and further punishment. Dogarai (the local police) are stationed at the Sarki palace but exercise their powers throughout the domain (Sani, 2000).

Ward Head (Mai anguwa) is appointed by village head and recognised in the ward as the leader. He assisted in collecting taxes, settlement of disputes and report to the village head any incident of violence or crimes committed by or to the residents for proper action.

Village Head (Dagaci) is in-charge of village leadership and is appointed by the Sarki, thereby, serve the functions of settling disputes and remitting taxes collected to the Sarkin palace. He is the overall overseer of the community, thus his importance in crime control cannot be over emphasised.

District Head (Hakimi)

This is the paramount ruler and final authority in Wudil LGA. The Hakimi serves as both political, religious and spiritual head of the community. He performs the role of the highest executioner and judicial officer to his community in matters relating to crime and criminality assisted by his council of chiefs and the various appointed heads of occupational groups to settle and prosecute relevantly. Only serious crimes that supersede the authority of the

forementioned occupational heads are taken to the Hakimi's palace for settlement. Worthy to note is most of the primary agencies of crime control are at family level.

Traditional mechanisms of crime control in Wudil LGA.

In Hausaland there are various mechanisms used to control crime. These methods are hinged to the cultural and religious practices of the Hausawa, passed on from one generation to another and are very relevant in containing crime to the minimal level. With specific reference to the people of Wudil, the following methods are used.

Islamic religion: Religion to Nigerians with particular reference to Wudilawa who are predominantly Muslims, is one of the best ways of controlling crime and deviant behaviours in the community. Durkheim (1961) viewed religion as unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, (things set apart and forbidden) beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community. While turner (1993) sees religion as the control of men by the establishment of rules which create mutual obligations in order to cement social relationship. The argument that religion is an important tool for the moral well-being of the community has been advanced in many forms. One of such is that, religion is useful as a cohesive factor, holding the society and its morality together in such a way that whoever attacks the society's religion is deemed to have attacked the society.

It was religious ties that created propitious leverage for strong community ties and less crime in Africa traditional societies due to fear of the sacred and hereafter since all religions believe in another life after death, which is more rewarding (heaven) against that of punishment (hell). In relation to criminal behaviour, religion seek to solve these problems, because it legitimizes our values and provide reasons why certain values should be preferred to others (Ayuk, 2012). For instance, Oba (2006) argued that the use of curses to compel people to respect their taboos and laws served as a control. Curses were generally feared because of the belief that defaulters or their generations would be inflicted with protracted sickness, sudden death or other calamities. The use of some Quranic verses like Yasin, invocation of God almighty (Allah ya isa, Allah tsine, Allah wadai), using thunder

(kwarankwatsa) by people to swear or lay curse on criminals normally serve as a deterrent to others.

Tara (Fines and Compensation): The imposition of fines on offenders, usually in the forms of compensation to victims and at times as ransom to the entire society. Furthermore, in most traditional African societies, it was a popular method of crime control. According to Bascom (1960), he noted that this method played a key role in the maintenance of order and social control in traditional societies and was essentially necessitated by the fact that social control and behaviours were tied to an individual's sense of reciprocity with the group to which he belonged. In this respect, groups were largely responsible for enforcing restitution orders against offenders in favour of victims. It must be emphasized that apart from serving as an instrument of social control. This method was a veritable tool of conflict resolution especially between offenders and their victims. Unlike formal resolution in criminal courts, this method ensured that offenders and victims lived in peace and harmony after the former had duly compensated the latter.

Sulhu (mediation): Restoration of peace, order and strained harmonious relationship characterized crime control method in traditional African societies. This stance was eked out by the need to keep the society in one union drawing together every individual towards cooperation and compromise. This was aimed at promoting discipline, mutual understanding and the elevation of harmonious living among the people. In Wudil LGA, sulhu is used as a mechanism of crime control, where elders mediate on crimes committed by calling the parties together and give them fair hearing. The process of negotiation and reconciliation are embarked upon applicably to ensure justice is meted out.

Mari (confinement): The idea of confinement or what is today known as "imprisonment" was used as a method of punishment and indeed had become established among many traditional African societies long before the colonial era. Opara (1980) had reported that many traditional Nigerian societies had evidence of the use of places where offenders had to concur to a sentence of confinement (imprisonment) as an admission of guilt. Oral evidence also abounds

to suggest that among the Wudilawa of the North Western Nigeria, there is a special house (Gidan Mari) or room (dakin mari) for keeping deviants and suspects for punishment, the rope used in tying their feet is called Mari, which keeps them in one place. Even incarcerated they are fed but not allow bath and partaken in any social activities until they complete the sentenced period. They are mostly given traditional herbs to drink, believing it will cure them from committing further crimes. The use of confinement as a method of crime control was often restricted to juvenile delinquents to correct social ills for a short period, also dangerous criminals who were often considered as "security risk".

Rantsuwa (oath taking): This is another important and recognized method of social control in traditional African societies. This involves oath taking by swearing with the holy Quran, which is the sacred book of the Muslims faithful. Suspects were made to swear by holding the holy book after performing ritual cleansing called ablution, to ascertain their innocent of guilt of serious offences beyond any reasonable doubt. The swearing was so potent and effective that people were scared to commit crime because of the resultant effect which can be as swift as sudden death, madness and latent negative consequences to the culprit's generation. According to Adewoye (1973) the use of ordeals in the administration of justice in pre-colonial days in Nigeria attracted no moral opprobrium. Because, it was a legitimate (and a swift) means of arriving at the truth.

Murabus (banishment): Banishment is the act of sending an offender away from his/her community either for a short or long period. According to Ugwuoke (2005), this method was also used for getting rid of dangerous criminals in traditional societies. It provided either a permanent or temporary avenue for expelling a miscreant from his community. This method was significant because, it prevented immediate action or retaliation by the victim's family and facilitated their acceptance of an indemnity and peaceful settlement with the family of the offender. Furthermore, offences that attracted short term banishment in most traditional African societies, included: persistent stealing, repeated cases of Adultery, and manslaughter.

Wariya (Ostracism): Ostracism refers to the deliberate decision of isolating an offender in a traditional society. This method was and is still effective because it meant severing social contacts of friends and relatives which entails a lot of social and psychological pains. Every case of ostracism generally had a fixed period of time and the expiration of such periods was usually accompanied by some fines which were either in cash or in kind in traditional African society. Offences that attracted this type of punishment in Wudil LGA include, adultery, witchcraft and habitual stealing, Clifford (1974) had observed that social ostracism in the African traditional context was usually much worse than any physical punishment or any obligation to compensate the victim.

Conclusion

This research noted the significant role of African Traditional Crime Control among Wudil community in maintain law and order. It however, stated the emphasis and attention should be made towards African Traditional Methods of conflict resolution and crime control mechanisms. African Traditional Methods were not primitive at all. In fact, they acknowledge the importance of culture, values and cherished traditions in solving societal problems and encouraged the public to believe in the positivity of such approaches as they are fair, just, not judgemental or expensive and aimed at restoring peace and harmony in the society. There is need to integrate the modern and traditional methods of crime control with the sophistication of crimes in the present day Wudil LGA, for complimentary purpose.

Recommendations

- There should be a regular public awareness for re acceptance and recognition of useful traditional crime control mechanisms.
- Government should go back to drawing board on integrating traditional mechanism of crime control with the modern one for holistic and effective approach.
- The community leaders should not have relented on their efforts towards preserving culture of peace.

- Other relevant stakeholders like the National Orientation Agency should engage on rigorous campaign on the need for value re-orientation at federal, state and local government levels aimed at respect, recognition and the adaptation of relevant customary and traditional practices by Nigerians to reduce crime in the country.

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IMPLICATIONS AND THREAT OF POLITICAL THUGGERY TO SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY: A PERSPECTIVE ON BAYELSA STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper deliberates on the ugly occurrence of political thuggery in the politics of Bayelsa State, Nigeria. It censoriously examines the causes for the prevalent incidences of political thuggery before, during and after general elections and even re-run elections in most cases. The paper recognized unemployment, seat tight syndrome, weak internal democracy, poor political education and socialization, godfatherism, and money politics, as major causes of political thuggery, and the fact that they pose negative implications to democratic sustainability in Bayelsa State. These reasons have mainly reinvigorated authoritarianism amongst political leaders at different heights. This has resulted in the imposition of candidates for several elective offices by powerful cabals within political parties, using thugs to force and instill fear in the majority of party members. Political thuggery is a serious threat to development of democracy in Bayelsa State in particular and Nigeria in general; as it frightens credible candidates from active participation in democratic process leading to the breeding of unqualified and thugs to occupy positions they don't deserve or qualified for. This has also increase militarization of the political space with the consequent proliferation of small and sophisticated arms, ammunition and other dangerous weapons purposely for acts of thuggery. This has also resulted into many unresolved politically motivated assassinations across the state and nation at large, which diminishes the country's evolving democratic culture.

KEYWORDS: Democracy, Godfatherism, Political, Sustainability, Thuggery

INTRODUCTION

Political thuggery in Nigeria politics is a devastating phenomenon (Kristine, Keith, Jose and Simrin, 2014). It has brought about the loss of lives and properties with socio-political and economic consequences. This phenomenon is characterized by crisis, conflict, dispute, rebellion, violence and even war which affect political developments especially democratic sustainability (Mbaya, 2013; Okpako and Okolo, 2020; Okolo and Etekpe, 2014). The phenomenon has become detrimental to democratic sustainability in Nigeria Bayelsa State inclusive. These thugs move mostly in organized groups victimizing, terrorizing, intimidating, and injuring not only politicians but also innocent individuals (Njoku, 2012; Allen and Okolo, 2018). The menace is responsible for poor political culture as it results to death or poses deadly threats by deterring individuals from actively per-taking in political processes and routine socio-economic activities within the country (Egwu, 2011).

Political thuggery and election violence has been defined differently by different scholars. As observed by Abubakar (2015), political thuggery refers to the activities of thugs connected with stealing, killing, kidnapping, rudeness, victimization, intimidation, and harassment. These manners affect peace, harmony and mutual co-existence among groups in their respective communities (Chemers, 2002; Okolo, 2021). If politics is criminalized through thuggery, right people who are the observers of good values tend to be scared and keep away from political processes. This suggests that political thuggery and election violence is a violent behaviour affecting political culture and other political processes in Bayelsa and Nigerian politics.

Similarly, Mbaya (2003) maintains that thuggery is a process of using extra-judicial means in the course of the contest for or in exercising political power including intimidation, harassment, assassination, blackmail, and arson; for Mbaya (2003) physical and psychological attacks could not help to ensure sustainable peace and security within any democratic system like Nigeria. He further believed that attributes of sponsoring thugs are due to the fact that the Nigerian politics is characterized by rigging, and violence under the manipulation of the few

leaders to get and continue holding political powers by all means which could not assure sustainable democracy in the State and the country at large (Okpako and Okolo, 2020). Hence, this work sees political thuggery as the act of intimidating, victimizing, terrorizing, kidnapping and robbing the targeted or innocent individuals on the streets, at homes and in the shops by thugs on political grounds during political, social and economic activities in their various communities.

The secondary source of data collection was adopted in this work. Official reports, online publications, magazines, journal, books, newspapers, articles and publications were consulted from various online libraries and centres of documentation and archives; these included the Department of Political Science; Niger Delta University; Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, National Open University of Nigeria. The literature review is basically relevant to political thuggery its implication and threat to democracy in Bayelsa State in particular and Nigeria at large.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopted the Ted Gurr's relative deprivation theory. It is preferred over other theories because it tries to combine the element of frustration-aggression thesis and the social learning thesis (Gurr, 1971). It is both economic and psychological in its approach. The central argument of relative deprivation emanates from the elementary psychology that if individuals perceive a gap between what they get and what they ought to get or deserve, they will become frustrated (Brown, 2001). Given the opportunity, such individuals are likely to become aggressive and therefore rebel.

Socio economic conditions of individuals and the society deteriorated because of economic policies of government such as the SAP. As a result, the welfare of youths became difficult leaving them in abject poverty and misery. Gradually the youths felt relatively deprived as citizens and this creates a gap between the deprived group and the state. Hence, Gurr suggests that 'the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence' (Gurr, 1994). This perceived gap made the youths frustrated. In order to demonstrate

their discontent to the community and the authorities, some youths align with thugs to participate in protests, riots, crimes, etc (Gurr, 1994).

It argues that human beings justify their actions by calculating means and ends. In other words, humans freely choose their behaviour-whether conforming or deviant based on their sensible calculation but choice is directed towards the maximization of usefulness and gain. Also, this theory implies that the state is responsible for maintaining order and preserving lives and the common good through a system of laws. Thus, the states' rapidity, strictness or hesitation of punishment influences the choice or behaviour of the individual(s). Youths choose to involve in thuggery after considering personal factors such as joblessness, financial, poverty and material gains as well as situational factors such as influence and protection, power and authority (which includes protection from the arms of the law) of godfathers. The repercussion of this is that there is an increase in political thuggery because the gain of engaging in political thuggery is high and the cost is low and the youths are increasingly getting involved. The politicians' main target is the goal of winning elections and remaining in office, power and affluence simply for the sake of money and status and they do all it will take even with the use of thugs. The youths on their part, deliberately get involved in political thuggery so as to obtain the needs of life such as money, food and shelter, as well as other needs like status and excitement.

Thus, the candidates, the political office holders and political contenders, through the help of their godfathers are able cruise to political victory while the thugs use participation in political thuggery to gain money and their personal desires which were previously lacking or eluded them. Nigeria environment with increasing rate of poverty, hardship and unemployment this connection of usefulness and gain has developed into a lucrative business for the godfathers and eye-catching to the youths of this state and the nation at large. The Ted Gurr's relative deprivation theory, lays much emphasis on individual's involvement in criminal activities basically based on deprivation therefore, become frustrated and take to

political thuggery for expression of anger or goal-oriented purposes. They consider the price (risk) and profit (financial) gains and act accordingly.

Causes, Implications and Threat of Political Thuggery to Sustainable Democracy in Bayelsa State

This section addresses the causes alongside with implications and threat of political thuggery to democratic sustainability in Bayelsa state. Some of which include the followings:

Weak internal democracy

Weak internal democratic structures and processes within major political parties in the state results into the imposition of an unpopular candidate. This in most cases leads to decamping from one party to another in order to compete with the other perceived inferior aspirant. In addition, the masses rejection of the unpopular candidates often culminates into a “do-or-die” politics (Falana, 2009; Okolo and Inokoba, 2014).

Fabowale (2011) accurately observed that: In Nigeria, politics is not a game. It is war. The blood-stained pages of the nation’s political records, its do-or-die character demonstrated by thuggery, violence, and blackmail describes political behaviour of stakeholders (Fabowale, 2011). The do-or-die politics of the country is mainly responsible for the series of politically motivated assassinations across the nation of which many of them could not be effectively investigated and resolved.

The activities of thugs which are born out of weak internal democracy have not left state without a number of consequences. These include the following:

a) Breach of peace with attendant loss of lives and properties. Just recently, the nullification of the candidate of APC in the state lead to loss of lives and destruction of properties by the thugs, causing panic in the streets of the state, only for the intervention of the Nigerian Police Force that imposes curfew, the outcome would have been disastrous. Although it is on records that other miscreants’ sometime highjacks so called peace demonstrations, yet their activities in the state had claimed many lives and properties worth millions. This instilled a general fear and insecurity in the society.

b) Emergence of unpopular and incompetent leaders. Weak internal democracy has been instrumental in disrupting the processes of free and fair election in so many parts of the country, Bayelsa State in particular; this at several occasions has led to the emergence of unpopular and incompetent candidates who could use thugs to his/her advantage. Political thuggery activities contributed immensely towards the weakening the democratic process of the state and the nation, as they lead to weak and incompetent candidates to attain or maintain their power in order to rule and govern the affairs of the state (Falana, 2009).

c) Another implication of weak internal democracy is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons such as machetes, cutlass, pistols, etc. In this regard, Wunti (2012) observed that, “increasing level of poverty led to the formation of armed groups in the name of thuggery in order to actualize the interest of the ruling class. It is against this background that use of small arms proliferated in conflicts and violent acts perpetrated by political thugs, which really undermine peace and security in the state”.

Poor political education and socialization

Poor political education and socialization is one of the most important causes of political thuggery. It is a desideratum for enhanced political skills, knowledge and participation in a democratic setting. Political education and socialization are used in mobilizing the cognitive capacity and efficacy of individuals to process complex political event or information and engage actively in political activities. It is obvious that the absence of proper enlightenment of citizen on the tenets of the electioneering process and the need to avoid political thuggery (Groth and Monteiro, 2010).

Notably, educating potential voters, is however not INEC’s responsibility alone; political parties, civil societies, religious and traditional institutions, as well as the National Orientation Agency should also collaborate with the electoral body in this regard. The government should be willing to fund such organizations in the voter education campaign, from the grassroots level upwards. Jennings (2007) noted that the process of complaints where one’s name is omitted, the dangers of violence and rigging, how to protect their votes and how

to make votes count generally will be avoided. All information related to the elections should be made known in advance for the betterment of the exercise. The implications of poor political socialization and education thus is multidimensional, as it is not limited and/or restricted to political thuggery but also causes political violence and other political vices in the state (Groth and Monteiro, 2010; Mbaya, 2003).

Godfatherism

Godfatherism is another phenomenon that has given rise to political thuggery in Bayelsa State. The scope of this phenomenon is fairly high in Nigeria. Godfather politics has manifested in Kwara, Borno, Oyo, Anambra and Bayelsa states and even at the federal level. At the state's level, godfathers have installed their godsons into political offices and have literally held these states hostage. The import of these godfathers installing their godsons into political offices is that those the people want to represent them may not have a chance in electoral contests. A few of the self-importance of these godfathers will bear this position out. For example, self-acclaimed godfather of Anambra politics once postured "I am the greatest godfather in Nigeria because this is the first time an individual single handedly put in position every politician in the state" (Olarinmoye, 2008).

Similarly, the late strong man of Ibadan politics once delightedly postured; "Predominantly, I dominate the political affairs of this state. All the governors that have won never did so without my contribution and influence, it is a known fact and it has always been so before now that if you pass through me, you would get anything you want in politics. So, if I say I dominate politics, I do" (Adedibu, 2007). As argued elsewhere in any polity where godfathers hold sway, the first casualty is free choice (Egwemi, 2007; 2009). This is to the level that the masses are not in a place to determine who represent them since this is at the impulses of the godfather. For the avoidance of any uncertainty, the godfather has a lot of resources which he can use to impose his will on the masses (Efebeh and Okolo, 2016). These include, according to Ayoade, political connections, security, antisocial behavior and money or access to money (Agbaje, 2006). As we have stated, these resources give the godfathers the

feeling that they are above the law and so they become daring and unrestrained (Egwemi, 2007).

It is to be noted that, corrupt politicians, in most cases sponsored by mafia-like “godfathers”, openly mobilized gangs of thugs to terrorize ordinary citizens and political opponents and to stuff or steal ballot boxes. The police were most at times present during such instances but frequently turned a blind eye or, at times, participated in abuses. In other places elections basically did not take place, yet the electoral commission reported ruling party victories with high voters’ turnout.

Money Politics

The love of money in Nigeria’s politics is one of the major causes of political thuggery in the state and the country. A lot of money is been invested to secure political offices, the purchase of forms, the hiring of crowds, transportation of hired crowd to and fro the party secretariat, hotel bill, feeding and other untold expenses, they also employ the services of thugs to guarantee the realization of their political desires either by fair or crook means. A veteran politician once said “what is bad within the political system that we operate today is the criminal use of money; people are paid these days for coming to a party convention”. This, according to him, is a sad development (Ogunkua, 2011).

Anifowose cited in Salarni (1984) has stated that violence has been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding power, and by groups in the process of losing power. Indeed, politics appears to be the most lucrative business in contemporary Nigerian society. In view of this, some persons who occupy political offices make extensive use of thugs to sustain their power irrespective of the wishes of the majority of the people. The political godfathers as well sustain their influence and demands on their sponsored candidates through the use of thugs. In Anambra state during the era of Governor Chris Ngige, his disagreement with his political godfather, Chris Uba resulted in unprecedented destruction of government properties by thugs allegedly sponsored by Chris Uba. Achife, Maduforo and Mumeh (2004) reported that as a result of bad blood between the two men, and the failure of Abuja to reconcile them, thugs

laid siege to the state for more than a week and continued their mission of terror and destruction unhindered, and eventually taking the mayhem to the country areas. They noted that the governor's office, the seat of power was not spared in the orgy of violence unleashed by the rampaging thugs.

Nigerian political figures employ socio-economically susceptible youths as thugs to disseminate the anti-social, undemocratic, criminal and illegitimate culture of violence, killing, kidnapping and ballot snatching. The political fathers or godfathers supply the thugs with guns, illicit drugs, political backing in most cases presence of conventional law enforcement agencies and failure of a thug to carry out their command or disloyalty by a thug, can earn him or his family members a very serious trouble, pain or even death. During the recruitment and training process, drugs and rituals are often involved (Ali, 2014). The political thugs are often offered/given financial and material gratifications with protection which includes protection from punishment by the law. These gratifications can be life-time promises which are sometimes extended to thugs' family members. On the basis of these fulfillment which the thugs have weighed above the risk of being caught and punished by the law, they then engage in thuggery. The political elites play the role of political godfathers who control power, wealth and influence, most of whom are state elites.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Political thuggery has been a part of the Nigerian political process especially before, during and after elections. This is because of the self-centeredness, greediness for money and power, and materialism of the political elites who have constituted themselves into godfathers. As a result, there is usually a breakdown of law and order, loss of lives and destruction of properties before, during and after elections. Also, election results especially that of governorship elections have been seen not to be free and fair even when declared to be so. The presumed criminal activities of this politicians, majorly through the use of thugs has yielded success for them, therefore, many Nigerians have come to believe that it is only the use of political thugs or criminalized form of politics that can bring about access to economic power and political

positions/offices. On the other hand, the youths become willing tools in other grab the opportunity through they being used by the politicians or godfathers irrespective of the risks and changes involved because of indissoluble situation of unemployment, poverty and hardship.

The Nigerian Bureau of Statistic recently revealed that unemployment moved from 1.9 million to 9.9% in the third quarter of last year 2019. The Nigerian youths have lost sureness in the state and are taking to violence and political thuggery as means of livelihood better still as a career. They longer have no trust in the state and so cannot leave their future in its hands. As a consequence, political thuggery which ought to be an unlawful success opportunity construction is seen and increasingly accessed as a legitimate means or structure. The desperate political godfathers who initiated this phenomenon in their voracious selfishness, greed and covetousness for political positions and offices, power and wealth, continue to encourage and tolerate the illegitimate culture of thuggery as an institutional goal to success. The ever-increasing culture of political violence in Nigeria's democratic political process is partially credited to lack of enforcement of the electoral law which forbids people from engaging in electoral malpractice or disruption of the electoral process through application of unlawful force or any other criminal act. To further buttress the conclusion of this paper, Iriekpen observed that most of the Election Petition Tribunals set up to consider cases arising from General Elections most times wind down their sittings, yet most tribunals did not exercise the power conferred on them to order for the trial of electoral offenders in elections.

In view of the above, most electoral offenders, including thugs were not prosecuted. This may encourage such offenders and inspire them to engage in such acts more boldly in future elections. Also, given the preceding, this paper recommends a more crucial, frantic and aggressive work to mitigate youth unemployment that will go beyond youth empowerment and skill acquisition. The government and private sectors should concentrate more on job creation, political education and socialization. Finally, we recommend that the political offices

be given less relevancy, the immunity clause and other priority shielding them from public scrutiny be further reviewed. Salaries, take home allowances of this political office holders is one of the major cause of the problem in our society today, if political offices are given the same salaries and allowances given to the civil servants and independent institutions are put in place to checkmate and prosecute corrupt office holders political thuggery will become the thing of the pass, less take home allowances and salaries will discourage hiring of thugs, godfatherism, sit tight syndrome and politics for political gains.

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**CRITIQUING THE NEXUS AMONG DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF PARTY SYSTEM IN
NIGERIA: 1999 - 2021**

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ABSTRACT

The fundamentals of true democracy include good governance, fair and legitimate elections, equity, justice, transparency, accountability, political education of the common people, respect for the rule of law and cooperation among different branches of government. It is pertinent to note that the Nigerian media and general speeches of the state often focus on the assertion that Nigeria is “consolidating its democracy”. Hence there is a need to examine nexus between the two major political parties – All Progressives Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria from 1999 to 2021. An elite theory was used to analyze the situation that led to good governance considering the two versions applicability of the theory. The earlier versions of the theory emphasized personal attributes of leaders, which aided their hold or dominance in power positions. Later versions dwelt more on the institutional framework of society. It is observed that APC did not present any strong ideological manifesto that is patently different from what PDP had to offer. Both parties promised the good life not on any sound economic or political framework. The study concluded that, the undemocratic posture of the party primaries in Nigeria goes a long way in creating and recreating itself endlessly not only in the security politics but in the insecurities politics which no doubt culminated in challenges to good governance in the country.

KEYWORDS: Democracy, Good Governance, Conflict Resolution, Party System

INTRODUCTION

Democracy is no doubt the most suitable system of government in the modern-day political system and development world over. Political parties, election and conflict management skills on internal conflicts are vital tools necessary for the achievement and advancement of good governance in Nigeria and world at large. The paper, therefore, seeks to examine the impact of good governance and democracy on effective conflict resolution, using Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressives Congress (APC) as focus of analysis. The history of the country's governance, conflict resolution and democratic experience shows that elections and electoral process have generated so much tensions in the country. Take for instance the just concluded Anambra State gubernatorial election held on the 6th November, 2021 where so many losses of lives and property were recorded especially before and after the election. These and more electoral violence have in some cases threatened the corporate existence of the country. By implication, this will help in consolidating good governance in the country.

Conceptual Clarification

Democracy

Democracy alongside political parties with vibrant ideologies and manifestoes are very important tenets that ensure good governance world over and Nigeria in particular. They remain pillars of democracy, and channel through which effective services, and good governance could be delivered to the people. As observed by Pwanagba (2015), without ideologically-based, strong and independent political parties, good governance is likely not be deepened. This is because, political parties should not be an avenue only for capturing political power but should provide a platform for delivering good governance by ensuring good living conditions to the people by instituting viable policies that will improve on the quality of life of the populace. The word democracy is derived from two Greek words "demo" which means "people" and "cracy" which means "rule". That is, rule by the people or government by the people, however, all attempt by extant literature in defining the term is centered on the people (majority) in the governance of the state (Obi 2018). According to Ademola (2011), for

democracy to consolidate, it involves a process of alteration from totalitarian system to a democratic system, which is vital for a lasting democracy and stable institutions to be established. This author implies that; democratic consolidation is a change from authoritarian system of government to a democratic system of government. However, this view appears shallow, because majority of nations in the world have adopted democracy as a system of government, but can we say that their democracies are consolidated if citizens cannot enjoy the dividends of democracy.

Good Governance

Governance involves the entire processes and methods adopted by a government in managing the resources of a society in order to address socio-economic and political challenges in the interest of national integration and political stability. According to Kaufmann (2005), governance embodies “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good”.

The concept of ‘governance’ came into use with the inception of globalisation, “reflecting the fragmentation of political authority among public and private actors on multiple levels of governance – national, sub-national and international – which accompanies globalisation” (Hänggi, 2003). Thus, governance being more encompassing than government; aids in understanding the complex reality of the contemporary world in which governments remain the central actors in both domestic and international relations though they are more often seen to share authority with non-state actors on multiple levels of interaction. The term ‘governance’ became popular in debate on the development crisis in Africa with the World Bank’s description of the African problem as “a crisis of governance” (Aiyede, 2001). According to Johnson (1991) good governance involves investing in projects that has the general interest of the people, and operating a system that punishes corruption but guarantee fundamental human right and accountability of public office holders. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation - UNESCO (2010) identified eight (8) major characteristics of good governance, to include: participation, rule of law, transparency and

responsiveness. Others are consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, as well as accountability. Governance as a concept has gained popularity as nations and international institutions seek better approaches to enhance the role of government by making it more transparent, accountable, responsive and responsible to the constituencies. Rhodes (1996:652) posits that “*Governance* signifies a *change* in the meaning of government, referring to new processes of governing; or changed conditions of ordered rule; or new methods by which society is governed”. Thus, the term *governance* emanated as a result of the desire to bring about change in the society and a departure from the antiquated methods and in turn bring about positive transformation of human lives.

Conflict resolution

Conflict resolution is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict and retribution. Dimensions of resolution typically parallel the dimensions of conflict in the way the conflict is processed. Cognitive resolution is the way disputants understand and view the conflict, with beliefs, perspectives, understandings and attitudes. Emotional resolution is in the way disputants feel about a conflict, the emotional energy. Behavioral resolution is reflective of how the disputants act, their behavior. Ultimately, a wide range of methods and procedures for addressing conflict exist, including negotiation, mediation, mediation-arbitration, diplomacy, and creative peacebuilding. The term conflict resolution may also be used interchangeably with dispute resolution, where arbitration and litigation processes are critically involved. The concept of conflict resolution can be thought to encompass the use of nonviolent resistance measures by conflicted parties in an attempt to promote effective resolution. In the recent times, issues like Boko-haram, Kidnapping and Fulani herdsmen has been on the front burner of Nigeria's political history and it is due to inability to manage internal conflicts.

Theoretical Framework

The Elite theory has various versions and has been popularized by different scholars ranging from Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto to Wright Mills, Raymond Aron, Roberto Michels

and Floyd Hunter. These different versions are however; combined in a bid to serve as framework of analysis. Two Italian sociologists first developed this theory, namely: Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. The earlier versions of the theory emphasized personal attributes of leaders, which aided their hold or dominance in power positions. Later versions dwelt more on the institutional framework of society (Haralambos and Heald, 1999: 107). According to Pareto, elite means the small number of individuals who, in each sphere of activity, have succeeded and have arrived at a higher stratum in the professional hierarchy. He further divides the elite class into two: a governing elite and non-governing elite.

Pareto's focus of inquiry was on the ruling elite, which, he believed, rules by a mixture of force and cunningness (Varma, 2006). This position exposes the characteristics of some Nigerian leaders, particularly the retired military generals and top government officials who have joined the political scene. This typifies Roberto Michels "Iron Rule of Oligarchy." Using their Party as well as the role of a 'General' to bully others, these persons were on top of their careers from all possible signs but always cling very closely to the country's rulership. The argument here is that political parties are no longer working as planned, precisely because the few makes decisions and distribute resources. This has also hindered the development of the country's democratic process. According to Roberto Michels (cited in Varma 2006), every institution, whatever its original intentions, is inevitably reduced to 'oligarchy,' that is, the law of the few chosen. Michels maintained that most human beings are apathetic, indolent, and slavish. Therefore, they have to rely on their members to achieve their social goals. The platforms for this representation are labour unions, political parties and other organizations. According to the elite theorists, these oppressive strategies of the bourgeoisie by the democratic elites exist as the elites are more organized and have class-consciousness.

Furthermore, as a movement or party grows in size, more and more roles tend to be assigned to an inner circle of leaders and, over time, the organization's members are made less capable of guiding and managing them, as a result of which the officers achieve greater freedom of action and develop interest in their roles. They desperately cling to their current

powers and privileges, and become nearly irremovable. “If laws are passed to control the dominion of leaders, it is the laws that weaken slowly, not the leaders” (Obah-Akpowoghaha, 2013).

It is important to note that elitist classifications are not mutually exclusive in the sense that an individual elite can fall into more than one class. Such grouping also sometimes differs. For example, the military elite may also qualify as political elite during a military regime, particularly when he is involved in the authoritative allocation of state resources (Varma, 2006). The implication of the above is that because elitist classifications are not mutually exclusive, it means that the political elites may easily rely on other elitist class to elicit support for the gaining power. In Nigeria, this is evident in the context of traditional rulers manipulating support for political candidates or bureaucratic leaders controlling the electoral process in order to retain their jobs.” In addition, political elite aspiring to elective offices used money on many occasions to purchase votes and influence election results (Ayoade, 2008). “Partisan thugs and hooligans are often recruited to destroy and snatch ballot boxes to cause chaos during elections. Dudley (cited in Obah-Akpowoghaha, 2013) views instability in Nigeria as a consequence of the elite’s constitutional impropriety.”

The Electoral Reform

Elections are very essential ingredient of democracy. They also reinforce the citizens’ democratic rights to choose their leaders and in turn contribute to the policy process. Elections over the years in Nigeria have been marred by violence and massive rigging in which the candidates contesting for political posts, their parties and the Election Management Bodies collaborate in this nefarious act. Nigerians at home and in Diaspora as well as foreign governments and international organizations have called on Nigeria to make stringent reforms on her electoral system in order to curb this ugly trend. Unfortunately, former President Obasanjo could not effect this reform. However, late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua took the bull by the horns when he stated before Nigerians that the general election that brought him into the presidential seat in 2007 was marred with fraud. This declaration was followed

by his setting up of a panel headed by former Chief Justice of the Federation, Mohammed Lawal Uwais to advise the government on ways to strengthen the country's electoral processes. Yar'Adua could not implement the recommendations of the panel as a result of ill and his subsequent tragic death. However, the Goodluck Jonathan administration that succeeded Yar'Adua's government eventually continued the reform process and began implementing parts of the reform, which led to some improvements in the conduct of the 2011 general elections.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established by section 153 of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution. Its responsibility includes among others organizing referendums and elections for president, vice president, state governors and deputy governors, and the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives. The reform of INEC and the electoral system in Nigeria kicked off in the run-up to the 2011 general elections under the leadership of Professor Attahiru Jega, who was also a member of the Uwais Panel. Part of the reform initiatives taken by INEC included the open and transparent review of the voter register and the formalization of the appointment of ad hoc staff through a memorandum of understanding with the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). With this, the INEC revised its procedures for the recruitment, training, retraining and deployment of regular and ad hoc staff. For the elections, it adopted a remodified open secret ballot system and deployed a direct data capture machine in each polling station (INEC, 2012: v in IDEA, 2015: 62).

It also ensured the adoption of new security measures for protecting ballot papers and ballot boxes, such as colour-coding and serial numbering. New result collation and transition systems were also adopted, while it developed a revised framework for the collation and return of results (IDEA, 2015). This effort, of course had great positive impact on the 2011 general elections as the elections became more transparent and credible with less post electoral litigations. The reform however continued after the 2011 elections in preparation for the 2015 general elections. INEC first took stock of events that transpired during the 2011 elections. It went further to use that to plan for the 2015 elections ensuring that the mistakes of the 2011

elections are corrected. This was finally followed by the execution of the plan in 2015 elections.

First, INEC inaugurated in August 2011, a committee of experts on election issues, named the Registration and Election Review Committee (RERC) which came out with several guidelines and recommendations for proper conduct of future elections. The planning phase was conducted in the form of retreats, brainstorming sessions and workshops, and it took place horizontally and vertically within the institution, as well as among stakeholders in the electoral process. This process led to the articulation of a strategic plan (INEC, 2012 in IDEA, 2015). It embarked on the internal reorganization, rationalization and consolidation of its departments from twenty-six to nine (Punch, 2013a in IDEA, 2015). The commission recruited one thousand five hundred (1,500) new staff in 2012 (Vanguard, 2013) and embarked on aggressive training for its existing personnel, including BRIDGE training for its staff in collaboration with the EU, International IDEA and the UN Development Programme's (UNDP's), Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) Programme (IDEA, 2015).

The implementation phase included update of the voter's register, education of voters, developing biometric- chip-based permanent voter card, introduction of card readers for verification of the cards, capture of voters' fingerprint and photograph. Also, according to the Senior Special Adviser to the President on National Assembly Matters, Babajide Omowore, the National Assembly on the 25th of January, 2022 amended and passed electoral bill to allow parties adopt direct or indirect primaries or consensus as procedures for selecting candidates for elective offices and transmitted same to President Muhammadu Buhari for assent after Mr. President had withheld assent to the Electoral Bill 2021 transmitted to him on 19th November, 2021. These measures were taken to prevent all sorts of malpractices that had taken place in past elections.

APC and PDP: ‘Speed Boat’ versus ‘Gun Boat’ Approaches:

APC and the Speed Boat Mentality:

The All Progressives Congress Party (APC) was formed in February 2013, as a result of an alliance by Nigeria's four biggest opposition parties - the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) - merged to take on the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The resolution was signed by Tom Ikimi, who represented the ACN (Action Congress of Nigeria); Senator Annie Okonkwo on behalf of the APGA (All Progressives Grand Alliance); former governor of Kano State, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, the Chairman of ANPP's Merger Committee; and Garba Sadi, the Chairman of CPC's (Congress for Progressive Change) Merger Committee. It must be stated, however, that the APC was formed in anticipation of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. The aim of the founders was to form a formidable opposition party that will compete strongly with the PDP which was the ruling party and the only seemingly political party in the country even though the country operated a multi-party system.

The majority of the APC's base of political support is in south-western Nigeria and the Northern Nigeria, which are dominated by the country's largest ethnic groups, the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani, respectively. Following from its composition, the APC is generally considered to be a center-left political party that favours controlled market or regulated market economic policies, and a strong and active role for government regulation. A substantial number of its political leaders are followers of or politicians who subscribe to the social democratic political philosophy of Obafemi Awolowo and the socialist and anti-class views of Aminu Kano. Despite the party's domination by pro-devolution politicians like Atiku Abubakar, Bola Tinubu and Chief Akande, the party's presidential bearer and the CPC wing is less inclined to federalism and this basic tension is somewhat of ideological strange bed fellows accommodated in context of desire to win and combine forces in the 2015 election cycle.

On the Speedboat mentality of the APC, let us first explain what we mean by speedboat. The idea of the speedboat as used here is derived from the speedboat used by sea travelers and even pirates which runs at a very high speed when compared to a ship or canoe. The former President of the United States of America, Obama (2009) in a press conference capping his first one hundred days in office, remarked that the “‘ship of state’ is an ocean liner, not a speedboat,” and that even a small shift in direction could have far-reaching consequences even a decade or two later (Li and Lee, 2009). Again, speaking on the Hungarian economy, Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister insisted that the Hungarian economy is a “speedboat” that is unlike one of the “sluggish European Union cruisers” (Policy Solutions, 2011). The picture painted here by Orban is a comparison between a fast-moving economy depicted by ‘speedboat’ and a slow-moving economy depicted by ‘Union cruisers’. The same analogy applies to the speech made by Barack Obama as stated above.

Applying the speedboat as a theoretical model, we intend to use this to portray the mentality and attitude of the APC as a political party and its members which contributed to their success in the 2015 general elections. Unlike the PDP that believed in the power of coercion, intimidation and disregard for the electorates, the APC went down the grassroots without leaving any stone unturned. They embarked on the political campaigns with full force of all the strategies and arsenal in their possession, singing the message of ‘change’ in the ears of the electorates in Nigeria without wavering. Thus, the electorates saw the determination in them to win the election and to bring about the desired change. Though the electorates were skeptical of the ability of the party to deliver the change based on the antecedents of the key actors in the party. The approach and determination of the party made the electorates vote massively for the party and thereby giving them the votes that swept the PDP off its feet in the 2015 general elections.

PDP: The Tragedy of Gunboat Mentality

The use of the term ‘gunboat’ in the gunboat mentality model derives from ‘gunboat diplomacy’ which refers to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives with the aid of heavy

display of military power implying or constituting a direct threat of warfare if the terms of a negotiation become unacceptable to the superior force. Gunboat diplomacy derives from the period of colonial imperialism where the European powers used the display of their superior military power to intimidate other states in trade negotiations. A country negotiating with a European power would notice that a warship has appeared off its coast.

The mere sight of such power usually had a considerable effect and it was rarely necessary for such boats to use other measures such as demonstrations of cannon fire. Cable (1971) spelt out the nature of gunboat diplomacy defining it as “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.” A character of gunboat diplomacy is its reliance on coercion.

An Overview: PDP and APC

As earlier mentioned on the elements of democracy, it is therefore pertinent to observe that the Nigerian media and general speeches of the state often focus on the assertion that Nigeria is “consolidating its democracy”.

It is true that APC did not present any strong ideological manifesto that is patently different from what PDP had to offer; neither did the PDP ab initio but what is happening currently in the country under APC is pregnant and is nursing a baby at the same time! Both parties promised the good life not on any sound economic or political framework. The APC vowed to fight corruption to a standstill and exterminate the vermin, that is Boko Haram. For corruption had become an industry which fed on itself and which had become institutionalised. President Muhammadu Buhari made it clear that “If we do not kill corruption, corruption will kill Nigeria” ChannelsTv (2020).

After twenty-two years of uninterrupted thriving of democracy, governance and inability to manage conflict in Nigeria under the steer of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and (APC), in the Fourth Republic (1999-2021), Nigerians witnessed an unexpected but

desired change of political party at the centre of governance with the victory of the All Progressive Congress (APC) in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. The issues of democracy, conflict resolution and good governance in Nigeria have continued to attract the attention of scholars and researchers both local and international (Ogbeide, 2011; Nyewusira and Nweke, 2012). Scholars and analysts have been preoccupied with finding measures for achieving consolidated democracy in the Nigeria political space since 1999. One of the major factors in this search has been the ability to structure the electoral process to allow power to alternate between the ruling party and the opposition parties peacefully (Nwanegbo and Alumona, 2011). Thus, research works have appraised the democratization process in Nigeria since 1999 and focused on several issues like good governance like the way it was practiced in developed countries, conflict resolution skills to manage internal conflict and appraisal of Democratization Process in the Fourth Republic (Nyewusira and Nweke, 2012) and others.

Internal democracy within any political party has significant role to play as far as good governance and representation are concern. Internal party activities such as membership, recruitment, socialization, training, discipline and resources of the party have profound influence on good governance because political parties serve as an avenue through which political leaders emerge. When political parties are weak and ineffective, politics is reduced to unbridled opportunity and self-serving interest of individual politicians who may derail nation-building process and democratic project (Omilusi, 2016). That the main culprits of intra-party conflict are godfathers and “moneybags”. That these godfathers or “moneybags” have made it hard for any candidate who is not in their good book to emerge.

Both PDP and APC as political parties seem to have abandoned their traditional roles in a democracy, thereby constituting more of a clog in the wheel of this system. According to Momoh (2010), the lack of political education of citizens, lack of regular party congress even at the grass root, nonfulfillment of financial obligation consistently by members have led to the hijack of different political party by “moneybags” who do everything within their whims and caprices to produce their individual political outcome rather than the overall party

outcome. This behaviour manifests in almost all the political parties in Nigeria and has a negative consequence to good governance in the country.

Since the return of democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed series of political challenges such as imposition of candidates on party members by their godfathers, no defined ideology which a party is known for and no clearly spelled out manifestoes, “moneybag” politics, anti-party activities by members, and so on (Abimbola and Adesole, 2012). The absence of internal democracy in both the PDP and APC, as the two major political parties in Nigeria constitutes threat to good governance in the country. Intra-party struggle/conflict diverts the energy and the attention of government from making policies and taking actions that will improve the living conditions of the people since they are busy trying to resolve the crisis generated within the party and finding ways to calm tempers of the aggrieved members. What really happens is that government will lose control and the confidence of the people of Nigeria. This situation has no doubt affected the delivery of good governance to Nigerians, and bad governance is reflected in all aspect of the Nigerian socio-economic and political sectors.

According to Bassey (2015), Nigeria has a problem of visionary leadership to harness the country’s human and material resources for the benefit of every Nigerian. By this, one can attribute the country’s bad governance to the manner in which our leaders emerged; they came to power through faulty processes; such as imposition, manipulation and rigging of election, money politics and so on. Good governance could only flourish where leaders emerged through democratic processes right at the party level (internal democracy) to the inter-party elections.

Bishop Mathew Kukah cited in Bassey (2015):

How do we explain the fact that after over 62 years, we are unable to generate and distribute electricity, supply water to our people, reverse the ugly and avoidably high infant mortality, set up and run an effective educational system, agree on rules of engagement for getting into power, reverse the circle of violence that attends our elections, contain corruption, instil national discipline and create more humane and caring society? Bassey (2015).

The process and quality of policy formulation and implementation are critical elements in determining the level of engagement of the population and measuring the quality of governance of the society (Natufe, 2006). The degree of citizens' participation in this process is determined by the level of their education and political consciousness, as well as on the access to political elites and effective communication. This goes a long way to portray the nature of democratic governance in that state. Irrespective of the impact of donor agencies on policies and their contributions to policy failures, the success of good governance in any country depends largely on the leadership skills of the elected leaders and their attitude towards democratic practice. Any lover of democracy who lives in Nigeria is aware of the nature of governance in the country since 1999.

Though Nigeria has often been acclaimed one of the fast-developing economies, but the effect of these have not been felt by Nigerians as the standard of living has continued to deteriorate since 1999. The unemployment rate has continued to skyrocket by the day; high crime rate, and corruption by those entrusted with governance has been the order of the day to the disenchantment of Nigerians. For instance, unemployment has risen from 11.9% in 2005 to 24.90% in 2012 (Alumona and Odigbo, 2015). Politics in Nigeria has been designated as a dirty game as a result of the activities of politicians in their quest for the capture and control of the state. Terrorism, kidnapping and other forms of violent crimes have continued to grace the front pages of the Nigerian newspapers and magazines and also formed news headlines.

Politically motivated assassinations have been very rampant over the years, inter-party war or words and fight between party supporters has been very disturbing to the average Nigerian. For example, former Governorship candidates in Lagos, Ekiti, and Plateau states were assassinated between June and September 2006. Between July and October, 2021, a quite number of killings and destructions of property been carried out in Anambra State because of perceived November, 6 2021 Gubernatorial election. According to Governor Willie Obiano (in Vanguard 2021), "Ten (10) people had been murdered by gunmen within a few days prior to this dastardly act. Coming at this onset of preparations for the annual homecoming of the

Igbo people who live all over the country and in the diaspora, the mounting insecurity in the South – East due to free – roaming gunmen must be halted and investigated”.

Governance development is evaluated by the extent to which there are improvements and sustainable development on issues such as security of life and property, poverty level, accountability, transparency and corruption, party and electoral systems, rule of law, leadership, human rights, gender, political participation and both APC and PDP government lacks governance development, to the extent that security of life and property has been placed on politics and that is why the issues of kidnapping, Banditry, Unknown Gunmen, Fulani herdsmen and Boko-Haram has become commonplace on news on daily basis. The combined effect of these issues, which in several ways affect human security and social justice in any society, also makes them the cardinal points of the United Nations’ adopted Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that commenced in 2015, 15 years after the pronouncement of the MDGs scheme

Conclusion

The paper discussed the nature and character of democracy and conflict resolution as it affects good governance in Nigeria. In ability to manage conflict in the country is a great distress to good governance. Therefore, the undemocratic posture of the party primaries in Nigeria goes a long way in creating and recreating itself endlessly not only in the security politics but in the insecurities politics which no doubt culminated in challenges to good governance in the country.

An inclusive democratic process is urgently needed to foster good governance and sustainable development, the paper therefore recommended as follows:

- i. Transparent and credible party primaries should be encouraged and argued that when such is done it will be reflected at the national level, with this reflection, democratic culture will be developed among citizens and good governance will be in place. Political parties should be guided by a given ideological basis upon which any member that wants to join such political parties should be aware and guided. This will guide the

party from the hands of power-hungry elites that may use the political party for their own interest.

- ii. Members who are contesting as flag bearers of their different political parties should be allowed and given a democratic atmosphere to do so without intimidation by “money bag’ or “godfathers” in the party. There should not be any imposition of “favoured” candidates on the party members. When these are done, it will go a long way in enhancing good governance in Nigeria. Political parties should be guided by the constitution of the country, electoral act and the electoral body. Finally, political parties have structures and they should not allow the influence of the elites to contradict these structures as erring members should be properly disciplined.

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STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING CRIMES IN POST-CRIMINALITY ERA IN ABA, SOUTH EASTERN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The strategies for combating crimes in Aba between 1999 and 2010 involved a collaborative approach to curtail threats to lives and property. To achieve this, the research provided the theoretical and empirical understanding of trends and patterns of crimes, and the strategies to combat them. The: ecological and control theories guided the study. A descriptive design with emphasis on qualitative technique interviewed 15 key informants comprising all stakeholder's resident in Aba. Data were content analyzed. Findings revealed that the triggers of the incidences of crime were the state of inactivity of the Eastern Nigeria seaports, urban poverty and the affluent lifestyle of politicians. The research established also that the criminal groups were Ngwa Road Boys; PDP Boys (Omuma Road Branch); the Park Boys and the Down Below that perpetrated rape; armed robbery; kidnapping; territorial toll; and ritual killings. The research argued that some of the consequences of their activities were urban poverty, insecurity, and mass migration to Lagos and Abuja. However, the strategies for combating these crimes included the use of Bakassi Boys; the synergy between the Police and the Bakassi Boys; and informal intelligence gathering. The research recommends among others the reactivation of the Eastern seaports to boost businesses in Aba and a collaborative intelligence gathering.

KEYWORDS: Criminology; Good Governance; Security; Crime; Violence

INTRODUCTION

The rising insecurity in Nigeria and specifically the events that characterised the history of Aba, the economic nerve centre of Abia State, from 1999 to 2010, exposed some of the rot in the Nigerian system. The Nigeria Police was unable to curb the frightening activities of criminals in the City for a long time and it was evident that the Police Force had suffered systemic neglect during military rule resulting in the absence of retraining and equipment the agency. Since 1999, successive democratic governments have felt safer with their armed thugs and this attitude has affected the morale of the police, despite the creation of the Nigerian Civil Defense Corps, to man government installations and infrastructure. This situation defined the state under which the police operated, thus, exposing its lapses in managing internal security.

The Nigerian civil war which lasted from 1967 to 1970, pauperised the majority of Igbo people, who lost their property and their means of livelihood; investments and money saved in their accounts were exchanged for `mere £20. Moreover, the psychological loss became a burden they have borne for years. However, the residents and the business class who returned to Aba, re-invented a survival spirit that quickened the reconstruction of the economy of Aba. Growth of private businesses and resuscitation of government enterprises attracted patronage from West, Central Africa; and western Nigeria for spare parts and imported textiles. But the return to democracy in 1999 destroyed all the gains made between 1970 and 1998.

The factors responsible for the, unfortunately, the situation was the neglect of the seaports in Eastern Nigeria and major cargoes preferred Apapa and Tin Can. This could have been due to the distance from Europe or an unwritten policy to whittle down the development of business in the region defeated during the civil war. This situation was made worse by the neglect of existing infrastructure in the city. The consequence was great: there were loss of jobs, widespread poverty, mass movement of youths to Lagos and Abuja, who were engaged in the clearing and forwarding business and also the loss of professionals to other cities (Anyaele; Ijioma and Onyeonu, (2017). In the absence of importation of goods, the existing

industries had no regular supply of raw materials and the economy ran into a serious crisis which made criminals turn Aba into a near-Somalia, with the city fragmented and ruled by gangs engaged in specialized territorial crimes. They grew in nature and dimension in the face of the ostentatious lifestyle of politicians.

According to Eme (2009) there has been a significant growth in Nigeria's economy but this has not reflected on the masses because the political class had short-changed the citizens by not creating a conducive environment for the development of all. There was not much effort to promote good governance at all levels. Resources were mismanaged and less attention was given to adequate manpower development and resources, whereas, the economy of any society sustains growth and development but when the economy is run down, society is threatened by a myriad of factors that breed insecurity.

Security is strategic to the existence of any nation; it forestalls the disintegration of orderliness, (Odeh and Umoh, 2015). It is in this direction, that Omede (2011) argues that security is a explains the ability of a state to counter threats to the core values and interests of its existence. The neglect of people's welfare creates insecurity, and criminality often becomes a normal way of life. It is against this that the research argues that the ineffective and efficient policing of in Aba, led to the clamour for the total overhaul of policing and crime control. It is common knowledge that the Nigerian police lack the manpower and resources to function effectively in the contemporary world.

Combating crime requires strategic intelligence, well-trained security officers with modern equipment to intimidate or counteract criminality. But in the absence of all these, vigilante security was recruited to complement the police in restoring peace and security. It is against this background that this research the trend and pattern of criminality and the strategies adopted in combating them. It also advances strategies to strengthen security in the city to resuscitate the ailing economy of Aba.

Aba is one of the thriving cities in Nigeria driven by private businesses, particularly, small and medium enterprises. This was supported by imported goods through Port-Harcourt

and Calabar ports which provided job opportunities for the youth. Goods produced in Aba attracted people from Central and West Africa and this encouraged massive production of goods. However, Apapa and Tin Can ports became more attractive to importers than Port-Harcourt and Calabar ports and the cost had been great. The reasons for this could be political and economic. Small and big businesses suffered. Many people lost their means of livelihood, infrastructure was neglected and crime of various dimensions dominated the history of Aba. It is against this background that this study investigated the strategies adopted in combating criminal activities in Aba.

In order to adequately interrogate our discuss, the underlisted questions were raised.

1. What are the factors that promoted crime in Aba between 1999 and 2010?
2. What criminal activities dominated the landscape of Aba?
3. How did these criminal activities affect lives, businesses and governance?
4. What are the strategies that restored peace and security to the city?

Study Area

Aba is the dominant commercial city in Abia state and it is located between Umuahia in the North and Port-Harcourt in the South. Small and medium scale enterprises are the hallmark of its economy but neighbouring communities bring farm produce to Aba to boost the commercial nature of the city. Aba was one of the fastest-growing economies in the Eastern Region of Nigeria which attracted businessmen from West and Central Africa. Plastic, leather, clothing and entrepreneurship skills dominate business in the city. Other businesses such as banks and beverage industries have created opportunities for various classes of people in Aba. Port-Harcourt and Calabar seaports were strategic to its economy until they became redundant.

Conceptual Framework

Concept of Criminality

Crime is an offence that goes beyond the personal and into the public sphere, breaking prohibitory rules or laws, to which legitimate punishments or sanctions are attached, and which requires the intervention of a public authority ... (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology,

2009). Crime is an unlawful deprivation of the right of any person/persons by another or a group and it is seen as an offence against the state which has the responsibility of protecting the lives and property of its citizens. It must be processed through an administrative system or enforcement agency. It is also an infringement that must be reported and recorded by a security agency and forms part of criminal statistics. This could result in a court case or not, depending on the gravity of the offence, (Adebayo, 2013). Dambazzau (1994) argues that crime is an act against the public interest because it creates disharmony in the state of things. Therefore, all effort is made to assuage the feelings of the victim and punishment in this direction is meant to deter the offender. Crime creates an atmosphere of insecurity. According to Adebayo (2013) crime is a threat to the economic, political and social security of a nation and it is a major factor associated with underdevelopment, because it scares foreign investors, degrades human beings, destroys human and social capital, the damaged relationship between citizens and the states, and consequently, undermines democratic principles and development.

Crime threatens the safety of lives and property because it creates fear, intimidation, restricts movement, creates groups of anti-social forces who might have been affected by economic, political and social factors arising from government policies. In recent times, cases of kidnapping and ritual murder have dominated the history of criminality in Nigeria because of the collapse of the economic and political system. Nigeria has almost lost its social and cultural values due to bad governance. Criminality is the state of being criminal and it includes hooliganism, kidnapping, murder, deception, imitation, theft, rape and many others.

Concept of Security

McGraw (1988) argues that the security of a nation is based on two major factors: the maintenance and protection of the socio-economic order despite threat on one hand and the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimized the threat to core values and interests, as well as to the domestic order on the other hand. National security is vital to the existence of society due to the alarming and terrifying escalation of crimes. These have taken barbaric and lethal dimensions, and therefore, required drastic measures. Nwolise (2006)

argues that security is an all-encompassing holistic concept which implies that the territory must be secured by a network of armed forces; that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a democratic and patriotic government protected by the military, police and the people themselves. This concept of collaborative security ensures a comprehensive approach to peace and security.

Security is also seen from the point of view of protection of a country, persons and properties of the community against future threats, danger, mishaps and other forms of perils and it is the inability of a state to provide security for the citizenry that motivates the civil population to collaborate with the security agencies to find better approaches to tackling crime, (Krahmann, 2003).

Theoretical Framework

For the purposes of this study ecological and control theories guided will be used to situate this study.

Ecological Theory analyses violence by examining the factors that motivate a rise in crime or violence in societies. The factors include environmental conditions, population growth, family structure, residential segregation, and government policies. These factors are outcomes of human vulnerability (Kennedy, 2008 and Akinwale and Aderinto, 2014). The ecological theory examines the consequences of discrimination, ignorance and unemployment. It believes that government policies have grave consequences on humans and in this study, the neglect of Port-Harcourt and Calabar seaports in Eastern Nigeria accounted for the upsurge in unemployment and to a large extent, widespread poverty. This factor crippled importation through these ports and the population engaged in export and import became unemployed. There was a mass movement to Lagos and Abuja and those who stayed back that could not survive the new state of things resort to crime.

Control theory argues that to prevent crime, citizens should sustain a certain moral standard governing various form of acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. Social controls such as the family, peer group, workgroup, police and the role of the state are crucial. The role of the

police is very critical to this study. The state (through the police) ensures that in any potential criminal activity, the cost to the criminal outweighs any likely benefit. The theory argues that the state makes society stable by ensuring criminals are punished severely to deter them; the state should also increase the chances of a criminal being caught by having the desired number of police or security personnel to monitor and police society and to further ensure that people are encouraged to take “commonsense” measures to make crime more difficult (Hirsch 1969; Gottfredson and Hirsch 1990; and Samson and Laub, 1993).

Empirical Studies

Several pieces of literature have established the strategies adopted in combating crime in urban centres and the role of the vigilante agencies. Gani (2017) investigated A Comparative study of crime between Malaysia and Nigeria and argued that urbanization has created numerous social problems among which is a crime that became a common phenomenon to all urban areas in both developed and developing nations. The research revealed that recent unimaginable levels of world urbanization coincide with the rise in urban crimes in many parts of the world, as the rate of unemployment had been on the increase coupled with increased poverty among the urban poor.

The study argued that the nature of crime is uniform but varies from one geographical region to another. In some areas, property crime is more common while in others, crime on a person (violent) is prevalent. In Sanni, Adewoyin, Bako and Akande (2018) Urban crime prevention and adaptation measures in Ilorin, Nigeria was studied, and they argued that the current high rate of crime in Nigeria, has been attributed to high population growth, rapid rate of urbanization and a correspondingly high rate of impoverishment among the population. They argued that the police are short of capacity and urban residents should adopt safety measures to prevent.

Research design and method of data collection

The study adopted the descriptive design which utilised oral interviews to seek the views of respondents It also involved informal discussions. 15 respondents were interviewed for this

study and they comprised security personnel (both formal police and Bakassi vigilante); victims of these crimes; stakeholders, traditional rulers and landlords. Data were subjected to content analysis and cross-examination.

Findings and Discussion

Data established that there was rapid growth in business in Aba patronized by both national and international buyers before the civil war, but the residents resuscitated their businesses without much assistance from the Federal government after the war. The small-scale enterprises enjoyed a boost by the regular importation of goods through the Port-Harcourt and Calabar ports which made raw materials and other manufactured goods available. Moreover, traders from West and Central Africa came to patronize goods produced in Aba. A respondent, Ogbonnaya Njoku, argued that the export and importation of goods generated wealth and employment opportunities through the textile, plastics, leather products, paper and printing, and fashion designing in wear.

All these complemented big businesses such as Nigerian breweries, Dunlop, Pepsi and Coca Cola plants, and Aba Paper Mills. Either by direct action or inaction of the Federal Government, importers moved their businesses to Lagos as the destination of their goods. This resulted in unemployment, urban poverty and promoted urban-rural syndrome, and lawlessness, (Onyema Eze, 2017). Unfortunately, bad governance escalated the sufferings of the citizens and many youths survived on sophisticated criminality. A respondent, Kalu Ebe, argued that the years of sophisticated criminality could be described as a period of terror. He posits that the civilian government degraded the lives of the people; life became difficult, the social nightlife was hindered. He blamed politicians who armed youths to win elections and later abandoned them as the immediate cause of the high incidence of criminality in Aba.

A respondent, Augustine Eze, blamed the regime of Governor Orji Uzor Kalu for tolerating impunity which escalated to all sorts of intimidation and humiliation from several groups who created territories for themselves such as Ngwa Road Boys, PDP group, Ogbor

Hill Group known as Down Below (Water Side Precisely), Mafias known as Umu-Maf, and Park Boys.

Ngwa Road Boys: These boys operated at Ahia Ohuru, Ngwa road by East and by Mosque, Obohia road, and Iheorji. Their activities included theft, rape and abduction, armed robbery, killing and cutting of human parts. These lawless activities were possible due to the deplorable roads.

PDP Boys (Omuma Road Branch): Their area of jurisdiction included Ama-Ukwu, Eziukwu Aba, Omuma Road, Agbaraeve, Omuma by Powerline, Cemetery areas like the cemetery market, Ibeagbulam, Achia-Anu, St, Eugene, Ama Ogbonna, etc. These were who indulged in banditry, intimidating people, raping women, armed robbery and imposition of taxes on people doing business at Achia Anu, Cemetery market and Railway market. They also attacked members of St. Peter's Catholic Church, Eziukwu Aba during morning masses and attach the church after every harvest and bazaar.

The Park Boys: These were brought up in different parks in Aba. They intimidated commuters, snatched their belongings and those who challenged them had their hands chopped off. Moreover, commuters could be loaded into vehicles and taken to unknown destinations without a trace.

The Down Below Group: This gang operated at Ogbor-Hill (Waterside). They were professional assassins made up of boys and girls who lived in ghettos called York, terrorizing people. They also engaged in armed robbery, kidnapping, and territorial toll collection.

Data revealed that the nature of crime ranged from territorial toll collection, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, ritual killing for spare human parts and intimidation of citizens. Respondents agreed that some of the leaders of the groups were Jango, Kwango, Egbelu, Ekenwe-Ohia, for Obohia and Ngwa road groups and Umuassimuo for all Ahia Ohuru. Then there was the king of kidnapers, Osisikankwu, who operated at banks, kidnapped top government officials and high-profile people in Aba and Umuahia.

Augustine Eze argued that kidnapping was conducted in the presence of security personnel without any intervention. The following routes: Aba-Owerri, Aba-Umuahia and Aba-Ikot-Ekpenne roads became insecure. Armed robbers terrorized every nook and cranny of Aba. Ogbor Hill, Ngwa Road, Abayi Road, and Port-Harcourt roads were hotbeds. People's houses and banks had their walls blown up, girls were taken forcefully and impregnated and their babies sold out to prospective buyers who needed babies to fulfil their marriages and those for ritual purposes. Anyaele, Ijioma and Onyeanu (2017) blamed everything on bad governance and there was an urgent need to bring the law to bear on the various criminal elements that operated in the city.

Consequences of the criminal activities of the Gangs

Data revealed that Aba was divided into territorial toll zones by hardened criminals who collected tolls from landlords and residents. They mounted checkpoints for tolls on the roads, while others had control over motor parks and operated without police intervention. The gangs exhibited various levels of authority and power that defied government control and people were subjected to all manner of dehumanization (Eze and Eze, 2017). The respondents believed that gruesome murders and kidnappings were probably sponsored by highly placed individuals who were protected by law enforcement agents and anyone who reported them with evidence became the accused. Murder for rituals was widespread; people got missing on daily basis without a trace; mutilated bodies often littered everywhere and nobody hunted down the perpetrators. Armed robbery increased and criminals used sophisticated weapons to attack banks which led to the strike by bank workers. The criminals controlled almost all activities in the Ariara market and every form of lawlessness reached unprecedented height (Onyeziri, 2017). Thus, insecurity reigned.

Research shows that the most prominent gang known mafia created fear in its territory and this affected normal life in the city including the safety of traders from all over the country and from West and Central African countries who come to transact businesses in the Ariara market. Kalu (2017) argued that the Amalgamated Traders Association in Aba estimated that

about 200 of their people were killed by armed robbers within this period as firearms were carried freely which also motivated many adults to procure guns to defend themselves against criminals. All these affected economic activities in Aba and its environs ((Onyeziri, 2017); Anyaele, Ijioma and Onyeonu, 2017).

Strategies for combating the criminal activities

Good governance and crime prevention and control are fundamental to peaceful societies because they promote progress. Also, the security architecture of a particular area must recognize the nature of the area and the type of crime to be expected. With this consideration, attempts were made to adopt a non-conventional security outfit that would add spiritual intelligence to the existing conventional approach of policing, (Nwolise 2012); Therefore, Bakassi Boys were given the mandate to eradicate this menace from the city. Respondents agreed that there was an agreement between the State Government; local government chairmen in Aba, owners of the business, the landlords and the police, which supported the complementary role of the Bakassi Boys.

This security outfit was established in 1998 by traders in southeastern Nigeria cities to safeguard their investments and the lives of residents from criminals (SAS 2005; WAR 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2000). With the legal backing given by the government of Abia and Anambra states, traders mobilized to hunt down the perpetrators of the murder of a pregnant woman near Ariara market of giving the Bakassi Boys the necessary resources to hunt down the criminals and their accomplices. Many of them were arrested in their hometowns and villages.

Bomboi Iromakwe, a Bakassi Security personnel, argued that:

We acted according to the directives of the spiritual intelligence on our machetes, which drove us towards criminals who confessed without torture; those who were tortured had highly spiritual powers that defied the lower order. Therefore, physical torture forced them to yield just as the formal police apply physical torture on hardened criminals to extract a confession. The machete was the symbol of power and the colour red identified criminals in society. With this, our job was made easier.

This strategy showed significant results as many suspects were identified, rounded up, interrogated and punished or handed over to the police for appropriate punishment. Some police personnel proven to be culpable were given the same justice as their civilian counterparts. The gangs were chased out of Aba; the parks were rescued from them and people could travel without molestations. The strategy corroborated the argument that the nature of crime determines the methodology for tackling it. Data revealed that when this revenge violence subsided, economic activities resumed and customers from Nigeria and outside the country returned to do business (CLEEN intervention in Aba, 2001. The Bakassi Boys collaborated with other formal security agencies to restore peace in Aba. Residents and visitors could move about without molestations and businesses including banks operated full scale once more. Lives and property became safer unlike when the criminals were in full control.

Despite these successes, there were reports of extrajudicial killings by the Bakassi Boys; arbitrary arrests, and torture of suspected criminals (HRW and CLEEN May 2002; Nigeriaworld, 2005). Also, in August 2005, Bakassi Boys were alleged to have rounded up thirty-seven suspected criminals in Aba, detained them in "illegal and poorly ventilated cells" and they were reported to have died (This Day, 30 August 2005; AFP 16 August 2005). Another incident occurred in November 2005, when the Bakassi Boys were alleged to have engaged in the extrajudicial murder of twenty people in Aba (Vanguard 18 November 2005). They were other issues concerning their being used by politicians to destroy political enemies which made the outfit unpopular. These were the sore parts of their performance.

Data revealed that the second strategy involved intelligence gathering; the officers, the police and Bakassi Boys, were in constant touch with those on patrol. This strategy ensured that every nook and cranny of Aba was monitored and personnel were constantly transferred to prevent being compromised by criminals who wanted protection from the law. This strategy enabled the police to monitor the City's environs with their civilian counterparts. This strategy helped the police to foil the kidnap of a businessman, Kalu Deno Hansond, along Umuocham road. The kidnapers had abducted the man and dumped him at the back of his Volkswagen

Torres SUV, but civilian intelligence personnel alerted the police and on sighting the police van, the kidnapers abandoned the vehicle and fled. (Sunday Vanguard, 2017). The study thus established that the initiative was result-oriented. Usman Dogo (Not real name) (2017) added that there has been a synergy between the police and the traditional rulers in Aba and its environs, and also with the Bakassi vigilante ensure security of lives and property which is the primary purpose of government.

The synergy between the police and Bakassi Boys and the traditional rulers in Aba and its environs, sponsored by the landlords, strengthened the relationship and yielded quicker results. Traditional rulers complemented the security agencies through the recruitment of the young and old in intelligence gathering in their various domains. Chief Umeorji, explains that the traditional rulers recruited the youths to comb kidnapers' dens and their armoury. There were also teams of spies set up by the traditional rulers in the four (4) local governments to monitor and detect signs of anti-social behaviour and then invite the police and the Bakassi to act. Policing became more collaborative as the criminals were dislodged from their hide-outs. Positive intelligence helped foil criminal plans.

The third strategy revealed that some special forces were posted to patrol major roads leading outside the city to Umuahia, Owerri, Port-Harcourt and Ikot-Ekpene-Uyo -Calabar axis, and prevented re-entry of criminals into the city including those escaping from Aba and some of the security officers disguised as travellers. This strategy aborted kidnap and robbery attempts by vehicle owners and their accomplices. This was made possible by improved intelligence. A bank staff, David (2017) revealed that "Security was also reinforced around the banks and business malls. There were regular monitoring around motor parks, churches and even other institutions such as market centres and recreational facilities."

Data finally established that the Government initiated empowerment schemes for youths to discourage crime. They were shoe-making, graphic designing, drama and film making, music talent hunt programmes and workshops to promote productivity and discourage crime.

Conclusion

Data revealed that crime control and prevention in urban centres has come with a lot of challenges; therefore, innovative strategies for combating them are required to forestall anarchy in Aba, southeastern Nigeria between 1999 and 2010. Several factors were responsible for the reign of criminality in the city. Firstly, the study showed that the neglect of the Port-Harcourt and Calabar ports forced importers and exporters from the Eastern Region to relocate to Lagos ports of Apapa and Tin Can and this rendered several youths redundant. Unemployment exposed them to crime. The study further revealed that bad governance impoverished the lives of citizens while politicians lived ostentatious lifestyles. Findings further established that poverty and frustration led to armed robbery, kidnapping, territorial toll collection, ritual induced crime, rape and many others conducted by Ngwa Road boys, PDP Boys (Omuma Road Branch), the Park Boys and the Down Below group.

All these were corroborated by respondents. The study revealed that the consequences of their activities resulted in insecurity. There was an atmosphere of fear, widespread murder of people, incessant rapes of women and deprivation of rights to personal property, and poverty. However, the synergy between the police, Bakassi Boys and the traditional institutions restored peace and security through effective and efficient intelligence. Finally, the government of Abia State provided skill acquisition centres to equip the youth to stay away from crime.

Recommendations

Considering the sensitive nature of the causes and consequences of the high incidence of criminality in Aba during the period investigated, the study recommends that the two ports in Eastern Nigeria should be brought back to life to revive economic growth and employment. This must be supported by good governance and equip the police and its sister agencies adequately. There should also be a well-detailed synergy between conventional and non-conventional approaches to crime control and prevention. Finally, effective and efficient intelligence gathering should be made a priority in fighting crime.

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**PEACE EDUCATION CURRICULUM AND ATTITUDINAL CHANGE AMONG
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS IN FCT: A STUDY ON G.S.S TUDUN-WADA
ZONE 4, WUSE. ABUJA.**

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ABSTRACT

This paper examined the relevance of peace education curriculum towards attitudinal change among secondary school students with the study of Government Secondary School, Tudun-Wada, Zone 4, Wuse – Abuja. Therefore, the aims of this research are to find out the relevance of peace education curriculum in attitudinal changes, inculcating moral values as well as changes in curbing violent conflict among students. However, For the purpose of this research study, descriptive survey research design was adopted and a questionnaire was also designed based on Attitudinal Change among Secondary School Students (ACSSS). The data collected were scrutinized and analysed to determine the relationship between the variables. The study recommends that Government should encourage the establishment of peace clubs in all various schools around the city of Abuja for more sensitization as a medium of peace education.

KEYWORDS: Peace Education, Curriculum, Attitudinal Change, Secondary School Students.

INTRODUCTION

Most people want peace of mind in their homes, neighbourhood, schools, workplace and the society. The UNESCO in its effort at promoting the culture of peace developed what it tagged “the Manifesto 2000”, which declares “Aware of my portion of responsibility’ I make the commitment in my daily life, my family, my work, my community, my country, my region to; respect all lives, reject violence, liberate my generosity, listen to understand, preserve the planet, reinvent solidarity (UNESCO, 2000). The main message of the manifesto 2000 is the call to personal responsibility. This millennium should usher human race into a new beginning, an opportunity to turn, all together the culture of war and violence into a culture of peace and non-violence. According to the preamble to the constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 1945, ‘since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the mind of men that the defence of peace must be constructed’. This shows the importance of Peace Education in the development of peace culture and prevention of war. This study seeks to examine the relevance of peace education curriculum in attitudinal changes, inculcating Moral values among students, assess the relevance of peace education curriculum and attitudinal changes in curbing Violent conflict and evaluate the relevance of peace education curriculum and attitudinal changes for peace culture.

This study employed descriptive survey research design was adopted which is concerned with the collection of data for the purpose of describing and interpreting the existing condition. However, with this method of research design, questionnaires were used to collect data and inferential statistics would serve as method of data analysis to determine the relationship between the variables.

The Concept of Peace Education

Peace Education is the type of education designed to impact values, skills and knowledge that prepares the learner for the future. According to Loreta and Jasmin (2019), Peace Education is multidimensional and holistic in its content and process. It is sometimes referred to as peace learning and considered to be both a social process and a philosophy involving empowering

people with the skills, attitude, values and knowledge for solving conflicts non-violently and building a sustainable environment. Peace Education refers to the people's development of positive attitudes, whereas peace building integrates the aspects of economic and social justice. However the two concepts are related because they both attempt to improve the situation of human rights. Peace Education is very significant owing that it enables people to adopt a positive attitude regarding the different issues facing humanity and to develop the necessary skills to peacefully resolve conflicts, this in turn will impact positively on the society. The purpose of Peace Education is for practical manifestation of peace and peaceful co-existence. The United Nations (UN) and its agencies have recognized peace as an essential human construct and the international Schools Association Global Issues Network (ISAGIN) view education as a principal vehicle which will develop and inculcate in children the habit of peace.

Nigeria being a developing nation is faced with diverse challenges ranging from political tension to religious and tribal violent conflicts. These events constitute the factors that have contributed to a large extent the slow development of the country. As these ills are left unattended to due to some personal interests, high level of corruption and bad governance, the situation is gradually becoming part of the nation's culture. Nigeria is a multicultural and multi-ethnic nation where children are raised according to their parents' belief system, customs of ethnic groups while some have been stereotyped. Kendra, (2021) opined that observational learning describes the process of learning by watching others, retaining the information and the later replicating the behaviour that were observed.

Consequently, there is an urgent need to address and nip in the board the issues on ground. To this end, peace education programmes are appropriate at all levels of educational institutions in Nigeria as it will re-orient the children and empower them with necessary knowledge of peace and the skills to address the issues without resorting to violence. Sayed et al (2021) insisted that Peace Education is one of the most important concepts of attainment of values of knowledge and the development of capacities, limits and furthermore, practices to live peacefully with each other and within the environment.

The Operation of Peace Education

Peace education is a global issue but it can be approached through different perspectives. Nevertheless, all approaches used in interpreting peace education, lead to three main points, the first approach is knowledge-based peace education. In this approach, peace education is interpreted as an eye for the knowledge that can be taught in the school curriculum. The second approach defines peace education as a set of skills and attitudes that are explicitly and not directly taught as teaching materials for each lesson. Therefore, Peace education is a set of skills and attitudes that can be explored, taught or more subtly infused in a variety of educational contexts. The third approach sees peace education as the combination of the two approaches. To the third approach, peace education is a knowledge that should be taught in school. Peace Education activities promote the knowledge, skills and attitudes that will help people either to prevent the occurrence of conflict, resolve conflict peacefully or create social conditions conducive to peace (peace insight.org) Peace education programme is a tool to encourage and support students to discover their own personal resources. Through this curriculum, students will develop their resources regarding choice, hope and inner strength, which will lead them to the prospect of individual peace. Although the concept of peace education is new in many parts of the world, there is a need to spread this innovative educational programme with a curriculum designed for children, youths and adults. National culture, as it influences people's apprehension of peace, will be part of the curriculum. Peace Education programme help the students to develop their listening skills and to have a tolerant attitude towards others.

Because individuals disagree about how to achieve security, there are many different paths to peace. Peace Education programs take different forms because of the wide variety of conflicts that plague human existence. Each different form of violence requires a unique peace education strategy to resolve its conflicts. Peace education in intense conflict situation attempts to demystify enemy images and urges combatants to withdraw from warlike behaviour. Peace education in regions of interethnic tension relies upon an awareness about

the sufferings of the various groups involved in the conflict to reduce hostilities and promote empathy for the pain of others. Peace educators in areas free from collective physical violence teach about oppression within that society, explain the causes of domestic and civil violence, and seek to proffer solutions to the aforementioned while developing a respect for global issues, environmental sustainability, and the power of nonviolence.

In addition to providing knowledge about how to achieve peace, peace educators promote a pedagogy based upon modelling peaceful democratic classroom practices. They share a hope that through education people can develop certain thoughts and dispositions that will lead to peaceful behaviour. Key aspects of this disposition include kindness, critical thinking, and cooperation. Developing such virtues is an important part of peace education. However, it is not the complete picture. The struggle to achieve peace takes place at both individual and social levels. Peace educators work with individuals to point how the root problems of violence lie in broader social forces and institutions that must be addressed in order to achieve peace. Peace activists use community education to alert people about the horrors of violence. Working through non-governmental organizations they use public relations techniques –guest speakers, press releases, media interviews, and newsletters – to provide awareness about nonviolent solutions to conflict. Educators from many different academic disciplines also practice peace education. Sociologists in college classrooms talk about violence in civil society. Political scientists describe world order models meant to manage global conflicts. Psychologists explain the structures in the human psyche that lead to violent behaviour.

Anthropologists debate about violent and peaceful tendencies of collective human behaviour. Historians write about the history of peace movements. Literature professors review works of art devoted to peace. Professional teachers in primary and secondary schools teach about peace in many settings, from early childhood to high school. Most infuse peace themes into their curriculum while some organize peace studies programs that provide a more comprehensive overview of peace strategies. Peace education has taken different shapes as it

has developed around the world. At the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States and Europe people concerned about the advent of mechanized warfare began to educate the population in those countries about ways that war could be outlawed through the League of Nations and other international agreements. Educators in countries in the South, being concerned about the structural violence and poverty, have promoted a variety of peace education known as development education to improve the quality of living in poor countries.

Towards the end of the twentieth century people throughout the world concerned about the suffering of minority groups began to see that human rights education could engender respect for principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Educators concerned about ecological catastrophe have developed a type of peace education known as environmental education that explains the principles of living sustainably on this planet. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, peace educators concerned about civil and domestic forms of violence have developed a new form of peace education known as conflict resolution education. Social violence and warfare can be described as a form of pathology, a disease. Peace education tries to inoculate students against the evil effects of violence by teaching skills to manage conflicts non-violently and by creating a desire to seek peaceful resolutions of conflicts. Societies spend money and resources training doctors to heal the ill. Why should not they also educate their citizens to conduct affairs non-violently? Peace educators use teaching skills to stop violence by developing a peace consciousness that can provide the basis for a just and sustainable future.

Peace educators use teaching skills to stop violence by developing a peace consciousness that can provide the basis for a just and sustainable future. Peace education can be defined as the process of delivering people threats of violence strategies for peace which can be done in both formal and informal setting (Peaceinsight.org.2021). With this broad definition, the history of peace education is arguably as old as human history, as cultures throughout the world have learned - and then taught the next generation - how to live peacefully with others. Diverse religious and philosophical traditions have been a rich and

influential source of peace learning, even though people have also promoted violence in the names of these religions and traditions. In the early years of peace studies, it was assumed that peace is the opposite of war; Peace was defined as the absence of war, partially because the early peace studies was strongly motivated by the reflection on the tragedies of the Second World War and by a sense of crisis of human survival caused by the danger of a total nuclear war between the two superpowers (International Journal of Humanities 2017).

The concept of peace terms, According to United Nations Declaration on Peace culture or Culture of Peace and Non-Violence, it has been defined by the Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace adopted in 1999; and the 1998 UN resolution on the culture of peace as “an integral approach to preventing violence and violent conflicts, and an alternative to the culture of war and violence based on education for peace, the promotion of sustainable economic and social development, respect for human rights, equality between women and men, democratic participation, tolerance, the free flow of information and disarmament.”

In abstract terms, a culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life based on the following:

- i. Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation;
- ii. Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;
- iii. Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- iv. Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- v. Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations;
- vi. Respect for and promotion of the right to development.

Goals of Peace-Education in Nigeria

Generally, the Goals of Peace Education are highlighted to include; educating the students, in both primary and secondary schools, on the issues of peace, non-violence and tolerance in order to enable them to develop skills of active listening and critical thinking; usage of Peace Education curriculum to motivate students to change from violent conflict resolution to nonviolent settlement; development of students skills in resolving issues; using programmes to build students' confidence and development of constructive attitude towards peace, and etc. Generally speaking, peace is both a means to an end and an end in itself as Cortrigh (2016) describes it is a process involving activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within specific societies and in the wider international community.

Goals of Peace-Education in Nigeria

From arrays of literatures, it has been discovered that the promotion of Peace Education is well focused and entrenched and just like observed generally above, the goals of Peace Education in Nigeria are stated to include; Educating the students, in both primary and secondary schools, on the issues of peace, non-violence and tolerance; enable them to develop skills of active listening and critical thinking; using the curriculum as a guide to teach students the issues related to peace and conflicts; developing the students' skills in resolving issues; building constructive attitude towards peace; encouraging the students to see themselves as citizens of one single nation rather than to divide themselves along ethnic lines; motivating the students to have respect for and project the promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men; have respect for and promote the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information; entrench the adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace (United Nations, 1998). Generally speaking, peace is both a means to an end and an end in itself as (McLaughlin, 2017) described

that it is a process involving activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within specific societies and in the wider international community.

The Impact of Peace Education in Nigeria

The impacts of peace education are stated as including but not limited to the following;

- i. Through Peace education programme, students will learn how to peacefully handle critical issues that can lead to conflict.
- ii. Through the activities of the curriculum, students will be empowered with the necessary skills to become agents of peace and change.
- iii. Through peace education, students will learn how they can create a peaceful environment by respecting the equality of human rights. The equality between individuals is crucial as inequality can generate structural violence. When structural violence is avoided, it will be possible to prevent direct violence from occurring. Students will be taught that equality is very important, not only in school but also in their daily lives.
- iv. The peace education classes will act as platforms for the expression of opinions regarding peace and will give occasions to practice non-violent approaches. They will also provide support for the students to bring about social change.
- v. During their classes, teachers will try to create a safe and unbiased environment where students can freely ask questions and discuss controversial public issues that often lead to violence. Through these discussions, the students will develop constructive elements that can contribute to positively impact on the development of the nation, as suggested by (Langer, 2015)).
- vi. Through peace education programme, students are expected to improve their knowledge, skills and attitudes by participating in activities and cooperate with others for the realization of projects. By creating an environment filled with care, tolerance and respect, teachers will encourage the students to explore and exchange ideas and

to respect others' opinions. As students are often asked to actively participate in the classes, they will be encouraged to take responsibility for their own learning process and personal achievement of peace.

- vii. The activities organized during the classes will allow the students to put in practice the acquired skills. Through mediation exercises, they will discover the benefits they can get when adopting a peaceful approach to resolve conflicts. Thus, students will enhance their skills, knowledge and attitudes.
- viii. During the peace education classes, the constructive elements required to achieve peace will be presented to the students, which will then be expected to put them in practice in their daily activities.
- ix. As the concepts will be gradually built on one another, this curriculum will be able to meet the specific needs of the students.
- x. The peace education programme will act as a tool to develop the capacities of the future leaders to have a positive impact on the development of the society. Peace Education is not meant to teach students what they should think but will rather encourage them to think critically in order to avoid repetition of past mistakes.

The Obstacles to Expect: the impact and benefits of Peace Education notwithstanding, it has been observed that it is being plagued with certain obstacles which includes;

- i. **Approval Issues:** The procedure required to obtain the necessary approval from the Ministry of Education might be quite long and time-consuming for the advocators of peace education.
- ii. **New Curriculum:** as peace education is a new tool, it might be difficult to integrate it into the national educational curriculum. Teachers used to the traditional curriculum might experience some problems in adapting to the peace education curriculum.
- iii. **Teacher behaviours:** unlike the teaching of other subjects, teaching of peace education requires the teacher to be unbiased and to possess all the skills, knowledge and attitude of a peacemaker. According to Vanbaren (2018), teachers can set the tone

of their classroom, build a positive learning environment, mentor and nurture students, become strong role models and listen and look for signs of trouble. Peace educators go through special training which enables them implement an open and flexible learning environment.

- iv. **Environment:** in situation where neither the school administration, nor the teachers are interested in peace education, it is highly probable that the curriculum will not have a very positive impact on the students. Environmental Education as a type of peace education is the key lever of sustainability and it is considered more and more frequently as necessary which requires that the entire environment must be involved in the learning process.
- v. **Cultural perspectives:** as Nigerian population is made of different ethnic groups; the peace education programme must take all their cultural perspectives into account. In case the curriculum focuses only on the needs and issues faced by one group, it will not be able to handle many of the challenges that lead to national conflicts and as a result the goals of peace education programme will not be achieved.
- vi. **Political interference:** some politicians might try to use peace education programme to advance their own political interests. As an association with any politician or political party might be seen as in favour to a specific ethnic group, it is important that peace education programme does not have any ties with the politic.
- vii. **Language:** since English is not the mother tongue of many Nigerians, the peace education programme might be more effective if the classes and activities are conducted in Nigerian language than English.

Data Presentation and Analysis

This research lasted for a maximum period of two months so as to have adequate data. The population of the study was comprised of the entire six categories of classes (6) including school community in Government Secondary School Tudun-Wada Zone 4 Wuse. The sample technique adopted for the purpose of this research work was stratified random sampling. The

research produces results that would be used as a measure to address the existing problem of The Relevance of Peace Education Curriculum Toward Attitudinal Change among students in the school. The study area is Government Secondary School, Tudun-Wada Zone 4 Wuse with the population of 500 students which comprises all class categories in the school and communities around the school.

Purposive sampling technique was used to select seven (7) classes within the school which comprises *thirty (30) students each from JSS 1 & 2, SS 1 & 2 and SS 3 including school community*. Daramola (2019) explained that purposive sampling technique is a procedure in which a researcher decisively selects certain groups as samples due to their relevance to the investigation under consideration. Finally, simple random sampling was employed by the researcher to select 210 respondents from the various areas. According to (Ofo, 2019), simple random sampling is a method of selecting a sample in such a way that members of the population have equal chances of being selected. The selection of one subject has no influence on the selection or non-selection of the other. However, only 205 questionnaires were retrieved.

Table 1: Gender Distribution of Respondents.

Gender	Frequency	Percentage %)
Male	141	44.1
Female	64	25.9
Total	205	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2021

Table 1 represents gender distribution of respondents; it was observed that, 141 respondents (44.1%) were male and 64 respondents (25.9%) were female. Majority of the respondents were male.

Table 2.1: Distribution of Questionnaire

Classes	Distribution of Questionnaire	Returned Questionnaire	Percentage of Questionnaire Returned
JSS 1 A	30	30	100
JSS 2 A	30	28	93
JSS 3 A	30	29	97
SS 1 A	30	29	97
SS 2 A	30	30	100
SS 3 A	30	29	97
STAFF	30	30	100
Total	210	205	98

Source: Field Survey, 2021

The table 2.1 shows the distribution of questionnaire to various classes in Government Secondary School Tudun-Wada Zone 4 Wuse. In all, 210 questionnaires were administered among the six (6) classes including staff while only 205 were completed.

Table 2.2: The linkage between relevance of peace education curriculum and attitudinal changes inculcating Moral values among students in Government Secondary School Tudun-Wada Zone 4 Wuse

S/N	Options	Responses	%
1.	Peace Education curriculum contribute greatly in changing behaviour	156	76.10
2.	Students believes that peace education add more value into their life.	202	98.54
3.	Peace Education inculcate peaceful coexistence among the students	200	97.56
4	Peace Education widen the knowledge of students	190	92.68
5	Peace Education curriculum improves good relationship between students and school community	199	97.07

Source: Field Survey, 2021

Table 2.2 shows the linkages between relevance of peace education curriculum and attitudinal changes inculcating Moral values among students in Government Secondary School Tudun-

Wada Zone 4 Wuse. As the responses show, it will be seen that majority of the respondents 156 (representing 76.10%) attributed Peace education curriculum to contribute greatly in changing behaviour of the students. Also confirmed that 202 respondents (98.54%) agree that some students believe that peace education add more value into their life; similarly, 200 of respondents (97.56%) declared that Peace Education inculcate peaceful coexistence among the students, and 199 respondents (97.07%) support that Peace Education curriculum add good relationship between students and school community. Conclusively, the table revealed that there is serious linkage between relevance of peace education curriculum and attitudinal changes inculcating Moral values among students in Government Secondary School Tudun-Wada Zone 4 Wuse.

Table 2.3: Assess the relevance of peace education curriculum and attitudinal changes in curbing violence conflict among students in Government Secondary School Tudun-Wada Zone 4 Wuse

S/N	Options	Responses	%
1.	Peace Education is a value change in learning process	190	92.68
2.	Peace Education increase attitude of understanding of reality	200	97.56
3.	Create good reasoning among students and Teachers	200	97.56
4	Developed Tolerance among students and staff in the school	190	92.68
5	Influence students' behaviours of violence to peace one	205	100.00
6	Influence student's resilience toward peace building within and outside school environment	198	96.59

Source: Field Survey, 2021

Table 2.3 shows the linkages between the relevance of peace education curriculum and attitudinal changes in curbing violent conflict among students in Government Secondary School Tudun-Wada Zone 4 Wuse. The table result shows that while 190 respondents representing 92.68% said Peace Education is a value change in learning process; 200 respondents representing 97.56% concurred that Peace Education increases attitude of understanding of reality; in the same vain, 200 respondents, representing 97.56% believe that it creates good reasoning among students and teachers; 190 respondents representing 92.68%

attached peace education to developing tolerance among students and staff in the school; similarly, 205 respondents representing 100% strictly believed that peace education Influence students behaviours towards peace and against violence; and 198 respondents representing 96.59% says peace education influence students resilience toward peace building within and outside the school environment.

Findings

From the analysis, the research came out with the finding which confirmed that 202 respondents (98.54%) agreed that peace education add more value into their life; similarly, 200 of respondents, representing 97.56% declared that Peace Education inculcate peaceful coexistence among the students, and 199 respondents representing 97.07% support that Peace Education curriculum improve good relationship between students and school community. However, 200 respondents representing 97.56% concurred that Peace Education increase attitude of understanding of reality; similarly, 200 respondents, representing 97.56% believe that peace education curriculum creates good reasoning among students and teachers. It will be seen that majority of the respondents 156 representing 76.10% percent attributed Peace Education curriculum to contribute greatly in changing behaviour of the students.

Conclusion

Generally, the relevance of peace education curriculum has a great effect on students' attitude toward value change. It also inculcates peaceful coexistence and good relationship between students and school community. Peace education curriculum not only adds knowledge but also widens the scope of the learning process. It fine-tunes the educational objectives of creating an enabling environment for peaceful learning society in general. There is no doubt that sensitization, orientation and campaigns are all meant for creating and building peaceful society. Young ones are the future generation; therefore, they need to understand the desirability of building an egalitarian society free from violence but belief in culture of peace.

Recommendations

Be that as it may this study recommends the following;

- Government should provide more avenues for which all and sundry will participate in the learning process in relation to peace education curriculum.
- Government should encourage creation of peace clubs in all various schools around the city of Abuja for more sensitization.
- Communities should also be part of the stakeholders, hence the presence of Parent-Teacher Association in every school within the city.

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HERDSMEN AND CONFLICT IN SOUTH WEST NIGERIA: A PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

This paper sought to put in perspective some current issues regarding the farmers/herdsmen conflict such as decimation of lives and properties, the issues of Government's attitude towards the crises etc. Some clarifications on the concepts of restructuring, as well as the concept of herdsmen as it applies to specific groups rather than generalizations we are given. The paper zooms in on whether or not restructuring-especially as it will impact on security and curb the conflict- is a plausible way out given the claims that the conflicts have political, economic, religious and ethnic undertones and claims towards it. Being descriptive in nature, this research has drawn most contemporary documents in the field of politics both local and international communities and used secondary data as its main source. For the purpose of this study, the conflict theory is adopted to explain herders-farmers conflicts in South-west Nigeria. The submissions and review for restructuring was given. The paper concludes with recommendations of what type of restructuring is needed, where necessary.

KEYWORDS: Crop-farmers, Herdsmen, Conflict, Tribal Conflict, Restructuring

INTRODUCTION

The conflict between farmers and herders is one of the social problems that bestow serious security challenges with severe threat to entrepreneurship practice and the unity of the Nigerian State, particularly in Southwestern states. Since the outbreak of farmers and herders' deadly clashes, the relationship that had existed with cordiality and report seems to be suffering with untold setback with several attending apprehensions that beckons for address. Therefore, the unity of the South Western states can only be enjoyed by all when the peaceful coexistence of the sub regions and their means of livelihood, upkeep and sustainability become a success with the presence and existence of reasonable security of lives and property. This is the phenomenological expectation of every sound -minded citizens of South Western Nigeria (Mufutau, Brimah, and Shittu, 2020).

In the Nigerian State, burgeoning security challenges in the six geopolitical zones of the country have in time past and in recent years left tens of thousands of unarmed civilians dead and property worth millions of naira, destroyed. Beginning from 2009, North East Nigeria has been the epicenter of Boko Haram insurgency and the attendant humanitarian crisis in the region. In North Central, herders and farmers clash were occasionally reported in Benue and Plateau State. North West of the country is not any better, as armed banditry is well pronounced in Zamfara State while infrequent clashes with tribal and religious coloration, do rear its ugly head in Kaduna State where the Muslims are the majority in Northern Kaduna and in Southern Kaduna, a preponderant Christian population. In the oil-rich South South region, militancy is still very much alive, while kidnapping, cultism, armed robbery, secessionist movement, and farmer-herdsmen clash are common incidents in South East Nigeria (Olubade and Ogunnoiki, 2020).

In the face of the abovementioned insecurity situations in parts of the country, and kidnappings, armed robbery, farmers-herders clash, and ritual killings in the South West region, is the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) which is underfunded, understaffed and overstretched in the discharge of their core mandate of maintaining law and order, and

protecting lives and property. Thus, state governors and groups within the Nigerian Federation began to float regional security initiatives to complement the efforts of the police and other conventional security agencies (Olubade and Ogunnoiki, 2020). The violent conflicts since 2000 caused thousands of deaths, the total number of casualties is unknown as often many bodies were not found in bushes after violent clashes. According to George A. Genyi (2007), herdsmen started their attacks on villages with weapons in the beginning of 2000s. This is also one of the main reasons that the traditional negotiations mechanism would not work anymore. The armed attacks leave no room for peaceful talks and agreements (Genyi, 2017) cited in (Gülşah, 2019).

Amnesty International researched the situation in Nigeria and created an extensive report with the information they have collected directly from the field. The interviews that the Amnesty have conducted with the victims of the attacks reveal the level of escalation in violent conflict. The farmer communities started retaliatory attacks against herdsmen as well. Both sides suffer from the attacks and the government response is just not enough. The report states: “Amnesty International has documented 312 incidents of attacks and reprisal attacks in 22 states and Abuja between January 2016 and October 2018. As a result of these attacks Amnesty International estimates that at least 3,641 people may have been killed, 406 injured, 5,000 houses burnt down and 182,530 people displaced.” (Amnesty International, 2018) cited in (Gülşah, 2019: 14) The conflict between herders and farmers killed more people than the attacks of the terrorist group Boko Haram in recent years (International Crisis Group, 2017 cited in (Gülşah, 2019). Also, 57% of people died in year 2018 in clashes between January 2016 and October 2018, 21% in 2017 and 22 % in 2016 (Amnesty International, 2018 cited (Gülşah, 2019). A very striking side of this conflict is several witnesses reported in the interviews that some attacks were heard by villagers a few hours or days before they happened, and villagers called the security forces and asked for help. However, the police and military forces did not prevent the attacks. The reluctance and inefficiency of the state mechanism to prevent and step in on time caused the deadly clashes. The common impunity is also among

the factors that encourages the attackers (Amnesty International, 2018). The conflict only lost some density in 2012 thanks to the peace initiatives and then efforts of military observations, however, the attempts were not sustainable and the conflict arose again (Genyi, 2017 cited in (Gülşah, 2019: 15).

Conceptual Analysis

Conflict Theory

The contemporary society is characterized by different schools of thought, each analyzing social phenomenon from its own orientation. For the purpose of this study, the conflict theory is adopted to explain herders-farmers conflicts in South-west Nigeria. In its general application, the word or term conflict connotes view of difference and disagreement, strife and struggle. In essence, conflict theory was derived from the ideas of Karl Marx (1818-1883) the great German sociologist, theorist and political activist who believed that society is a dynamic entity constantly undergoing change driven by inter- conflicting principles and phenomena. According to Marx, men, in the social production of their existence, inevitably enter into definite relations which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production the totality of which constitutes the economic structure of society. The fact that the dominant or ruling class (the bourgeoisie) controls the social relations of production, the dominant ideology in capitalist society is that of the ruling class. Ideology and social institutions, in turn, serve to reproduce and perpetuate the economic class structure. According to Marx, the real foundation upon which the superstructure of social, political and intellectual consciousness was built, has been the exploitative economic arrangements of capitalism. Marx believes that any social setting based on exploitative economic arrangement generated within it the seed of its own destruction (Marx, 1971).

In general, conflict perspective view Society as made up of individuals competing for limited resources. Competition over scarce resources is at the heart of all social relationships. Competition, rather than consensus, is characteristic of human relationships. Broader social

structures and organizations reflect the competition for resources and the inherent inequality competition entails, some people and organizations have more resources (i.e., power and influence), and use those resources to maintain their positions of power in the society (Marx, 1971), in conflict over resources, and that conflict drives social change. For example, conflict theorists might explain the civil rights movements of the 1960s by studying how activists challenged the racially unequal distribution of political power and economic resources. As in this example, conflict theorists generally see social change as abrupt, even revolutionary, rather than incremental. In the conflict perspective, change comes about through conflict between competing interests, not consensus or adaptation. Conflict theory, therefore, gives sociologists a framework for explaining social change. All conflicts share common qualities. The first is that there is a kind of contact between the parties that are involved, secondly, the parties in conflict perceive conflicting views and finally, one of the parties always wants to redress existing contradictions (Ofuoku and Isife, 2009) cited in (Mufutau, Brimah, and Shittu, 2020).

Tribal Conflict is a social division of people, especially of the preliterate people defined in terms of common descent, territory, culture, and so on. It refers to a group or groups who are divided or conflicted as a result of tribal, cultural, or sentiments brought about by differences in descent.

Crop-Farmers are farmers and managers responsible for all steps of plant growth, which include planting, fertilizing, watering and harvesting crops. These farmers can grow grain, fruits, vegetables and other crops. (<https://www.raiseme/career/management>).

Herdsmen/Herders. Herdsmen or pastoralists are nomadic or semi-nomadic people by nature. They are people whose primary occupation is raising livestock in Nigeria (Africa) and it is prevalent among a particular tribe called the “Fulani”.

Restructuring. According to Investopedia, restructuring is a type of corporate action taken that involves significantly modifying the debt, operations or structure of a company as a way of limiting financial harm and improving the business. (<https://www.investopedia.com>).

An Overview of the Insecurity Situation in South West Nigeria

The South West region of Nigeria comprises of six states – Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo State which are geographically contiguous and share similar culture, beliefs, values and language. From 2015 to date, the insecurity in South West Nigeria has gone from bad to worse. Operating on several major highways in the region are suspected herdsmen, armed robbers, kidnappers and ritualists. The Akure-Owo-Oba Akoko-Akungba, Ondo-Ore, Ilesha-Oshogbo, IpeleIdo Ani, Ife-Ibadan, Ilaro-Owode-Idi-Iroko, Ijebu Igbo-Oru-Awa, Abeokuta-Lagos roads to mention a few have become unsafe for commuters to ply on owing to the rising criminal activities that take place there on a regular basis (Amaize et al., 2019) cited in (Olubade and Ogunnoiki, 2020). On Monday, 21st of September, 2015, Chief Olu Falae, a former Finance Minister and presidential aspirant, farmland in Ilado village, Akure, Ondo State, was not only attacked but he was abducted, on his 77th birthday.

Many of his workers including the farm manager were macheted while others were reportedly wounded and admitted in different hospitals (Johnson, 2015) cited in (Olubade and Ogunnoiki, 2020). He (Chief Falae) was released three days after a 5-million-naira ransom was paid (Johnson, 2017a). Again, his farm was attacked in April 2016. This time around, his security guard, Ayodele Ige, was killed in the process (Baiyewu and Akinloye, 2016). It was not until April 2017, that the Ondo State High Court sentenced seven of the apprehended herdsmen who abducted the elder statesman in 2015, to life imprisonment (Johnson, 2017a) cited in (Olubade and Ogunnoiki, 2020) Ningxin, (2018) cited in Mufutau, Brimah and Shittu (2020, 75), assessed the conflict between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria and gave explanations for the causes of the conflict by using the Wehr's Conflict Model, and provided alternative resolutions for sustainable development. According to Popoola, (2019) cited in Mufutau, Brimah and Shittu (2020, 75), viewed that "the strength of a tendency to act in a certain way depends on the strength of expectancy that the act will be followed by a given consequence or output", meaning that if the issue of the factors that caused conflicts between farmers and herders was addressed previously might have resolute the conflicts.

Ningxin, (2018) cited in Mufutau, Brimah and Shittu (2020, 75), in his paper and explained that herders-farmer conflict was caused by different factors, such as ideological, history and cultural influences. For example, the usages of land and water resources caused enormous pressure, prior to existence of farmers and herders in South western Nigeria, in the far north, the impact of desertification has resulted in deforestation and migration of herders. A major stakeholder in this effort, the umbrella body in the cattle rearing business, the Mayetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), agreed that the effect of climate change and desertification was a major causal factor leading to trans-human movement from Northern part to the South annually Ugwumba,(2018) cited in Mufutau, Brimah and Shittu (2020, 75), asserted. For instance, Christopher, (2018) cited in Mufutau, Brimah and Shittu (2020, 75), observes that in January 2013, it was reported that herders attacked some villages, killed 10 people, and displacing over 4000 people, therefore, researcher considered the under-listed causative factors that led to farmers and herders' conflict in Ondo and Oyo state, South Western Nigeria. The above explanation has serious negative effect on income generation and employment creation among people in selected state.

Causes of Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria

Sa'adu, (2016) outlined seven likely causes of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria as identified below;

- i. The fight for the capacity of land and the wealth accessible.
- ii. Disagreement over leadership of definite customary rulers and chiefs, where a King of one ethnic or Sub-ethnic group processes power over people owned to another ethnic group.
- iii. Establishment of new local government councils and the site of their headquarters
- iv. Economic wealth and politically insufficient entrance from subdivisions, competition or ethnic and individual.
- v. The small and large social formations in Nigeria.
- vi. Population increases and economic expansion, propensity to maintain ethnic leap, profession of a kind of clashes famous within the users of land wealth.

- vii. The awareness or over look of cultural symbol and the contamination of cultural application.
- viii. A major dominant and perhaps most powerful cause of conflict is poverty, which is manifested in unemployment and deterioration of infrastructure. Both unemployment and deterioration of infrastructure provide the bedrock for ethnic conflicts Sa'adu, (2016) cited (Osakwe, 2017).

The Issue of a framework that 'seemingly' encourage and favour one of the conflicting parties over the other is also relevant. Another issue is the proposal and policy framework underway to establish grazing fields for the herdsmen. The purpose of which is to prevent clashes between the herdsmen and farmers and possibly, serve as a lasting solution. Two of these are the concept of Grazing reserves and the 'Ruga' Settlement (Aluwong and Alhamdu, 2019):

a. **Grazing Reserves:** The concept of grazing reserves has been endorsed both by the regime of Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari. These grazing reserves were to serve as short and mid-term plans until ranching is adopted. However, this move has been perceived as a tacit endorsement favoured towards the herders especially by the central and Southern states. However, establishing grazing reserves in consenting states will improve livestock production and management as well as minimize contacts and friction between herders and farmers.

b. **The RUGA Settlement:** In addition, the issue of the RUGA settlement policy recently surfaced and sparked controversy alongside. The Ruga Settlement is a proposed rural settlement scheme of federal government, intended to provide a designated place with basic amenities such as schools, hospitals, road networks, veterinary clinics, markets among others. The aim is to curb the incessant clashes between herdsmen and host communities. It was initiated by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture in preference for the National Economic Council (NEC)'s National Livestock Transformation Plan (NLTP). The stiff resistance this policy met by its opponents was fueled by at least, the following factors:

a. Firstly, the term 'Ruga' is a tribal word, making it unsuitable for a national ranching policy.

b. Secondly, the policy was conceived and its legal framework drawn up in secrecy, which further aroused suspicions of ethno-regional groups already agitated by perceived imperialist inclinations.

c. Thirdly, since the cattle business is currently dominated by an ethnic group, those opposed to the Ruga settlement scheme naturally see it as nothing but a disguised attempt at expansionism.

d. This perception of expansionism has been reinforced by the fact that the President is alleged to be of the same ethnic group.

e. Also, the Ruga policy and the intense opposition to it is partly a function of the crisis of federalism in Nigeria. There is no reason why it should be a federal government project.

The state governments who legally control all the land within their jurisdiction should have been left alone to enact ranching laws if they so desire as a state like Benue has done (Ayobolu, 2019).

Implication of Farmers and Herdsmen Conflict in South West Nigeria

Both farmers and herders involved in entrepreneurship practice and activities in Ondo and Oyo state, Western region and Nigeria at large. Factually, the two parties in conflict contribute significant percentage to the economic activities in the Nigerian states, but the hazardous conflict between the farmers and herders caused serious damages and continued destruction of lives and properties, a lot of economic activities were hindered. Tens of thousands of Nigerians also have been displaced. Women and girls were particularly affected, they experienced poverty and lack of access to resources, and their husbands were killed in series of violence between farmers and herders in the region. Violent conflicts between herders and farmers from Nigeria have escalated in recent years and swiftly spread to other parts of the country, which threatens the people's lives and the country's stability. According to Leme, (2017) cited in Mufutau, Brimah and Shittu (2020, p. 75), the conflicts between herdsmen and farmers have resulted in a humanitarian crisis. Both groups are currently being provided with the basic necessities of life. However, the recurrent clashes pose hardship and jeopardizes

entrepreneurship practice (economic activities) in the region, particularly Ondo and Oyo state, Nigeria.

Conclusion

Protracted conflict between pastoralist herdsmen and sedentary farmers in Nigeria cost the country thousands of lives and incredible economic losses. The clashes between the groups do not stop, since the root causes are still there. The climate change which affects the whole world affects the Nigerian people badly as well and exacerbates the conflict. The different governance systems, which remained from colonial times, in the north and south started to create difficulties for the Nigerian state right after the independence. Political powers of local community leaders, religious leaders and power inequalities between northern and southern counties paved the way for an unstable and fragile state structure. An already existing problem, disagreements on sharing the land, got bigger by time under that ineffective state authority. It hinders the economic activities of the people and causes a lot of poverty among people in our dear country Nigeria.

Recommendations

- i. There should be freedom of expression, especially with regards to issues of personal wellbeing. When there are conflicts in a particular area of the nation, the people involved in the conflicts should be allowed to come to a round table to discuss the issues before them. There should be a mediator that will mediate with understanding and neutrality in resolving the issues between the two parties involved. People should be ready to resolve conflicts, keeping in mind that peace is the only solution and as a result there must be give and take, because there is no win-win situation for a particular ethnic group.
- ii. Government should be responsible with the wealth of the nation, the manner by which the sharing of the resources of the country should be done fairly and transparently. Government should hold people responsible when there are conflicts, people who instigate the conflicts should be brought to justice irrespective of their social, religious

and traditional position the society. They should create an enabling environment for all the citizens of the country for people to operate properly with good code of conduct.

- iii. Nigeria should stop the practice of federalism and embrace confederation, which will give states and people the autonomy to rule and manage their resources competitively. Nigeria should decentralize the form of governance and allow people to govern themselves the way that will really help them to develop and actualize their full potential as a people. This will really solve the issue of poverty, under development, unemployment, ethnic conflicts and religious conflicts that lead to ethno-religious clashes.

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COMMUNITY MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING CONFLICTS BETWEEN FARMING AND HERDING COMMUNITIES IN YOBE STATE

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ABSTRACT

Seven Local Government Areas in Yobe were covered in this study which aimed at community level mechanisms for managing conflicts around land and water use by the pastoralist and herding communities. They are: Damaturu, Fika, Fune, Geidam, Gujba, Jakusko and Tarmuwa were studied to discern the. It employed qualitative research design with the application of both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data were sourced through interview with key informants and Focus group discussions, while the secondary data were sourced from literature relevant to the study and Researcher Observation was also used. The study reveals that traditional institutions at the various strata in Yobe State have played significant role in the management of conflict relating to access to land and water between farming and herding communities in their localities. Recommendations include that with the changing nature of conflicts, key stakeholders at the local, state and national levels should equally invest and place emphasis on prevention to compliment efforts by the state.

KEYWORDS: Community, Mechanism, Natural resources, Pastoralist, Farmers and conflict Management

INTRODUCTION

The linkage between environment, natural resources and outbreak of violent conflict has been established by scholars (Malthus, 1798). Land and water, to a large extent, the two may not need to be separated as they can be grouped as one. This is because water itself is one of the constituents of land, and some of the most important resources needed by mankind for daily existence. This is because all human livelihoods are directly or indirectly dependent on these two important resources. Very important is the fact that these resources can be put into different uses by different group of users. In spite of the significance of land and water to human existence and multiple uses they can be put to; they are limited in supply and somewhat scarce. Furthermore, their access and usage by mankind are severely constrained by artificial and natural barriers (Adisa, 2012).

These factors of multifarious uses and limitedness in supply of or access to land and water always necessitate various forms and dimensions of competition among different groups of users. Most times, competitions for these resources usually result in violence that brings about immense loss of lives and properties. There are two types of competitions for these resources. On the one hand is inter-user group competition which involves competition between two or more groups of users. For instance, competition between agricultural users and non-agricultural users is a typical example of inter-user group competition. The other is intra-user group competition, such as the manifestation of competition between pastoralists and farmers over the use of these resources. Competition between these two agricultural groups over the use of land and water resources has always resulted in fierce conflicts and outbreak of violence largely due to increase in human and animal populations while these resources are limited in supply (Gefu and Kolawole, 2002).

In Nigeria, farmer-pastoralist conflict is one of the most prominent conflicts resulting from use of resources (especially water and land) between two agricultural user groups. Although, the competition between the two users of resource has been on for a long period of time, it has assumed a violent dimension in recent times and has become very rampant in

contemporary Nigerian society. The relationship between the two groups was more of cooperation than frequent conflict. Michael Baca (2015) noted that in many areas, farmers and pastoralists usually formed a symbiotic relationship on the use of resources. Pastoralists offered goods such as milk, meat and fertilisers to farmers while farmers provided them with grains and other agricultural products in exchange.

Therefore, there was mutual understanding between the two users of the resources. However, this mutual understanding between these two groups has declined considerably leading to the widespread and protracted violence between them. In North East Nigeria where the country is currently combating insurgency, farmer-pastoralist conflicts have displayed potential of worsening insecurity of the region and the entire Nigerian state. The combination of several factors driving the conflict in the region is one of the reasons the conflict has become very difficult to manage. Governments' response and management of these conflicts is usually very poor. Instead of stemming the tide of violence, it rather exacerbates it (Agbegbedia, 2013). Community level mechanisms are strong and dependable alternative because they promote inclusion, foster reconciliation and confidence-building and respect the norms and values of the people.

Most time, attacks and reprisal attacks usually result in cycle of violence that often led to massive loss of live and displacement of people at the local level. It is important therefore to critically examine the community-based mechanisms usually adopted by the traditional rulers at the local level in the management of farmer-pastoralist conflicts in their domains as well as understanding their strengths and weaknesses in addressing the prevalent conflict. Thus, this study therefore examines the historical and current community initiatives employed to manage crisis emanating from the use of water and land between farmers and pastoralist communities in Yobe State.

In other to carry out this research, primary and secondary sources are used. The primary source of data for the study included interviews and focus group discussion with relevant stakeholders. Secondary data were elicited from books, journal articles, official

government documents, dailies and periodicals, online materials among others. Similarly, data were also collected from observations of the researchers while in the field.

Past Community Level Management Mechanisms for Conflict Management Between Pastoralists and Farmers in Yobe State

Pastoralism and farming are two occupations that can be dated back to antiquity. They developed out of human interaction with their environment and the need for them to domesticate wild plants and animal (Smith, 1984). Moran (2006) observed quite appositely that human beings from time immemorial did not only passively adapt to their environment but that where it matters, they have had to modify their environment to facilitate their quest for food security and survival. Pastoralism and farming are two of the occupations developed by man to enhance their survival on the earth (Ellen, 2002). In virtually all parts of the world, farmers and pastoralists coexist interdependently with little competition and without any recourse to rancour and outbreak of violence between them. A typical example of this in historical past was the coexistence and interdependence between the Pathans (basically sedentary agriculturalists), Kohistanis (practicing farming and transhumant herding) and Gujars (basically nomadic herders) in the same locality around Swat in Northern Pakistan (Barth, 1959).

Animals are kept well away from crops thereby reducing the chances that they would destroy the cultivated fields. The above illustration given is to buttress the fact that the two agricultural groups can co-exist without rancour. In fact, the coexistence of the two occupational groups offered many advantages to both groups. Crop farmers often require products of the pastoralists for a significant part of their protein needs. Similarly, the nomad's community depend on farmers for certain needs for themselves and their animals. As Monod (1975) observed that no nomad people can exist for long without contact with sedentary people. This however does not suggest that little skirmishes were usually not recorded among the two groups. Blench (2003: 1) observed that "the conflict between nomad and the settled farmers goes back to the earliest written records...". Spate (1953) in his account of human

geography also noted that the conflict between farmers and herdsmen was one of the fiercest conflicts that have attracted the attention of classical historians.

In Nigeria, farmers and pastoralists who are now at loggerhead over use of resources have enjoyed splendid co-existence and interdependence in time past. Awogbade (1983) and Blench (2000) have buttressed this fact in their various studies in Nigeria. These scholars explained that although there were emerging competitions for resources between farmers and pastoralists, the latter were usually welcomed in communities they go. They explained that a wide network of exchange existed between the pastoralists and farmers such that pastoralists usually kept animals especially cattle for “landlords”; most of whom were farmers interested in investing on cattle rearing but did not have time or possess the technical knowhow for tending to them. Also, milk, cattle and cow dung (manure) were used in trade-by-barter exchange for farmers’ agricultural produce especially grains. This was also the case in Yobe State. Farmers and herdsmen had enjoyed peaceful co-existence and interdependence before outbreak of incessant violence the two groups are currently experiencing.

Respondents interviewed in a focus group discussion session at Jakusko LGA lend credence to the nature of peaceful coexistence between community members and farmers on the one hand and pastoralists on the other one in the time past: A participant in FGD session with farmers in Jakusko LGA explained succinctly that:

In the olden days when Fulani herdsmen used to come to our communities, they normally first visit our king and inform him that they would come and graze on the land of the community after people had finished farming and harvesting their crops. The king would then use the community town crier to announce the arrival of the Fulani herders into the community and inform them that they had taken permission from the king to graze their cattle on the land of the community. The king would then instruct the community through the town crier that farmers should harvest all their crops within a particular timeframe to enable the Fulani herdsmen graze their cattle. Once the timeframe elapsed, the Fulani herdsmen and their cattle would be given access to all the community land to graze their cattle because it is expected that the community would have finished harvesting. They would then graze the land between one to three months and go back. In return, the Fulani

herdsmen pay some money to the king in appreciation (FGD session with rural farmers on 12 November, 2021 at Jakusko Community).

The above narrative of the rural farmers are a vivid portrayal of the peaceful coexistence and cordial relationship between community and their farming population on one hand and the pastoralist who are mostly nomadic on the other hand with regards to the use of land resources in Yobe State. This fact, although in other various dimensions, also existed in all of the communities where the researcher conducted interviews and focus group discussion sessions with farming communities in Damaturu, Fika, Fune, Geidam, Gujba and Tarmuwa LGAs. Respondent pastoralists in FGD and KII sessions in Jakusko, Tarmuwa, Fune and Geidam LGAs confirmed the earlier peaceful co-existence between them and farmers on one hand and between them and the communities where they inhabit on the other hand. They went ahead to say that the warmth embracement they always received whenever they come and the peaceful co-existence that existed between them before led to the decision of their father and forefathers to settle among them many decades ago.

While this practice is pointing at the peaceful coexistence and interdependence that existed between the two groups in the time past, it also has shown how they have been able to rotate the use of land for the benefit of both. Higazi and Yousuf (2017) buttressed this fact and its significance to maintaining peaceful coexistence between the two groups in Northern Nigeria in time past. They observed that rotating the land was a long-established pattern in the Northern Nigeria.

Under such a system, pastoralists would avoid farms before crops are harvested, but after the harvest they would be encouraged to take their cattle onto farmland to eat crop residues and manure the land, leaving the farm before the next planting season. The manure left behind increases crop yields the following year. Fallow land is given over to pastoralists for an agreed upon period, after which it is cultivated again and the farmers benefit from the manure. Another portion of land is then allocated for the pastoralists to graze their livestock on.

As a result of this, clash between the two groups was minimal. However, this is not to say that minor skirmishes did not always ensue between the two groups. As social conflict theorists have adequately informed us, conflict is a necessary occurrence from the social interactions among people within a community. However, extensive network of relationship constructed by interdependent and cooperative relationship between the two groups helped to build a robust social capital such as reciprocity, trust, inclusivity, harmony and promotion of a sense of community which usually made conflict management between them a very easy task. Added to the social capital created by the extensive network of relationship between these groups is the presence of effective informal mechanism for addressing conflicts at the community level. Respondents expressed that although some issues of conflict with regards to the use of land and water usually emerged between farmers and pastoralists, they were usually peacefully resolved because of the cordial relationship between them. A respondent farmer in Gujba LGA affirmed this:

In the olden days, if by mistake cattle entered into a farmers' farmland and ate up the crops of the farmer and the herder notice on time before the farmers notice, he would look for the owner of the farmland and report. In the process of reporting, he might plead for forgiveness or even offer to pay compensation for the destruction. However, where the owner is not known, he would report to the village head who would then look for the farmers.

The highest demand of the farmers for the encroachment of cattle into their farmland was compensation. However, because of the cordial relationship between the two communities and in the case where the level of destruction was not massive, and for the fact that the pastoralists came to report the situation to the farmers, the pastoralists were usually pardoned by the farmers. Most times, this settlement usually would take place between the two communities without the involvement of the village/community traditional rulers. In the word of the traditional ruler of Geidam, Ngazargamu Emirate:

...in the olden days when conflict occurred between farmers and herders, they were usually resolved between themselves. It was very hard to see such conflict going to the village head or come to the king's palace.

Current Community Level Conflict Management Mechanisms for Addressing Pastoralist-Farmer Conflicts in Yobe State

All the respondents interacted with in interview or focus group discussion sessions expressed that the good relationship between farmers and herdsmen in their communities began to decline from 1990s. 1990s is a notorious period in the history of international peace and security. It is a period of the emergence of the intra-state conflict in which forces within the state rise in arms against the state or other forces within the state. There are many factors propelling current outbreak of conflict between farmers and pastoralists in Yobe State. While some of the factors caused more and more southward movement of pastoralists into Yobe State, other factors make land and water critical issues of conflict between the two groups. These factors are:

Desertification of the Sahel: Sahel zone which covers Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Ethiopia is a region characterized by intense heat and very high duration of sunshine around the year. Most of the inhabitants of the region are semi-nomads. Since around 4000BC, the climate conditions of the Sahel started becoming drier at a very fast pace therefore causing lakes and rivers around the zone to shrink and cause desertification (O'Brien, 2005). Regular drought and mega drought especially those of from 1450 to 1700 lasting 250 years and 1914, 1951-2004, 1968-1974 and 2010 has significantly decreased land conducive to settlement. This is causing migration of farming and pastoralist communities to humid climates region in West Africa with Yobe State in Nigeria as one of the preferred areas because of its proximity.

Desiccation of the Lake Chad: The Lake Chad is a strategically important lake to the Lake Chad Region. It sustains the sources of livelihood of over 30 million people in Central and West African regions large chunk of which are pastoralists. However, since 1960 till date, the water body has shrunk by 90 percent (Gao, et al., 2011). There are many reasons for the desiccation of the water body. They are: global climate change and extreme weather conditions, desertification of the Sahel, unsustainable exploitation of the water by riparian states and local inhabitants and demographic pressure on the water body (Odada et. al., 2004;

UNESCO, 2007). As a result of this, the land and water available are usually unable to support the livelihood of the people. This has propelled pastoralists to move with their cattle down south with Yobe State as one of their preferred places of settlement.

Rural Banditry in the Chad Basin Region: The Lake Chad region is a highly unstable region in West and Central African region. Apart from the threat of insurgency, the region is notorious for several forms of banditry one of which is cattle rustling. Part of the factors in the prevalence of banditry in the area is the desiccation of Lake Chad which has disrupted the means of livelihood of the inhabitants who have now taken up a new livelihood in banditry. The predominance of this threat and its inability to frontally address it by riparian states is also driving inhabitants of the area especially pastoralists to safer areas depending on their perception. Again, one of their most preferred places is Yobe State.

Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency: Boko Haram insurgency in Lake Chad region and in North East Nigeria is also a significant factor in the preponderance of farmer-pastoralist conflicts in Yobe State. Places where pastoralists have been grazing their cattle have now become hideout of insurgents.

For instance, Sambisa Forest used to be a large expanse of land where cattle used to graze before the outbreak of insurgency (Interview with Ibrahim Wadaima of Damaturu Emirate who doubles as Zanna Sulhu, 1 December, 2021). This place has not been vacated by pastoralists and they have now taken refuge in areas far away from the forest. As more and more pastoralists and their cattle are forced by circumstances in the Sahel to move down south, many factors continue to contribute to increase in the use of land for farming activities in the state. Some of these factors are:

Population explosion: Population explosion within the Nigerian state contributes significantly to the farmer-pastoralist conflict in Yobe State. According to the National Population Commission, current population of the Nigerian state is estimated to be 206,139,589 million for the year 2020, which is about 2.58% increase from that of the previous year. Percentage of the population living in urban areas within the state is put at 48.9% of the

population. This means that more of the Nigerian population is within rural areas where a large chunk of them are involved in farming than urban centres where white collar jobs are mostly done. As the population of the Nigerian state is increasing, so also is the population of Yobe State which is one of the constituent states of the region. While accurate population of Yobe State does not exist due to lack of records, the 2006 National census put the population of the state at 2,321,339 million (<http://population.city/nigeria/adm/Yobe/>. Accessed on 30 December 2021). This significant increase is further complicated by the fact that fertility and rate of procreation in rural areas in Northern Nigeria where Yobe State is located is one of the highest in the world (Hamza and Yousuf, 2017). The implication of this is that it put pressure natural resources in rural communities especially land and water.

Government Policy of Economic Diversification: Another factor contributing to farmer-pastoralist conflicts in Yobe State is federal government policy on diversification of the economy from predominantly oil-based economy to other sectors. The need for diversification is made more pungent consistent fall in the price of oil in international market and unabated militancy in the Niger Delta region where the oil is exclusively extracted and gradual reduction in oil deposit available in Nigeria. Among the non-oil sector, agriculture stands out as the greatest priority area. This has encouraged more people to be interested in agriculture especially farming.

As a result of combination of all these factors, population of farmers within the state continues to increase exponentially and the demand for land and water for farming activities has increased. Meanwhile uncertainty, climate change and extreme weather continue to propel southward movement of pastoralists and their cattle to the state and other flashpoint areas in search of pasture and water. The resultant effect is increasing population of farmers and livestock in areas around Yobe State while land is fixed in supply and in fact its quality continues to decline on daily basis due to pressure of use. This usually results into competition between the two agricultural groups.

Thus, it is very common to find farmers encroaching into grazing reserves and cattle routes (Burtali) while cattle also stray into farmlands. During the researcher's fieldwork from Damaturu to Tarmuwa, Jakusko and Geidam on November 10, 2021, we observed three cases of farmers encroaching into burtali. The three cases revealed two dimensions of encroachment - complete and partial encroachments. Complete encroachment is when the whole burtali becomes a farmland. This was particularly seen at the outskirts of Fune enroute to Fika. Partial encroachment is when a part of the burtali is used for farming; in which case the route is shrunk significantly. This was seen in Gujba and Damaturu areas. Therefore, instead of cattle walking on their routes, they were seen walking by the roadside to prevent destroying crops.

Although farmers interviewed claimed that lack of clear demarcation of Burtali from farmland is responsible for their encroachment, we observed from the three cases seen along the way that even where the Burtali had been clearly demarcated with pillars, farmers have still had to encroach. On the other hand, herders and their cattle also encroach into the farmlands. The reasons for encroachment of cattle of herders into farmers' farmlands vary from the perception of respondents. The reason farmers gave for cattle encroachment into their farms is that pastoralists always deliberately allow their cattle to encroach into farms to eat up their crops because it fattens and also make their cattle increase in quantity and quality. Most of the pastoralists interviewed agreed that their cattle sometimes stray into farmland however, they disagree with the position of farmers that they deliberately allowed such to happen. They explained that this mostly happened when farmers encroach into Burtali. Interview with a leader of pastoralist community in Fika aptly captured this fact. He said:

It is very difficult for our cattle not to encroach into farms. We do not just lead our cattle into farms to eat crops. The cattle routes have become very narrow as a result of farmers encroaching into cattle routes and our cattle are now much more than what we use to have before. With this, our cattle easily stray into farms.

Much more important factor in the encroachment of cattle into farmland is the use of minors (children) to lead cattle into grazing. Largely due to inexperience of the minors in herding; playfulness during grazing; lack of adequate capacity to control the cattle from

encroaching into farm; tiredness and many other factors, cattle led by minors often result in encroachment especially where farmlands are located very close to the grazing areas. Apart from these factors, there is also an emerging opinion that the minors and young pastoralists are vulnerable to drug abuse thereby facilitating the frequency at which cattle stray into farmlands. Although, in some communities, cattle herding by minors have been interdicted, it is still prevalent. Interview with leadership of pastoralist community in Tarmuwa affirmed this as a fact and explained why the act of leading cattle with minors is very prevalent thus:

Before there were no many cattle as we have now but now our cattle are many. Therefore, we have to divide our cattle into smaller groups to be led by our children. We have also observed that these children usually leave the cattle in the field to roam around without control while they play with themselves or even sleeping. As a result, cattle will stray into nearby farms. Apart from the fact that our cattle are now much, we also have the responsibility to train the junior ones (referring to the children) how to lead and care for our cattle so that before they grow, they would have got the experience and then we can have someone to inherit our heads of cattle.

To understand current community level mechanisms for addressing herdsmen and farmers conflict in Yobe State, conflict between farmers and pastoralists in Yobe State should be understood from two different dimensions. These dimensions of the conflict can also be understood from the two different types of pastoralists that exist. The first type is the transhumance (nomadic) pastoralists. These are pastoralists that consistently move several kilometres, sometimes crossing international boundaries basically in search of greener pasture and water for their cattle. The second type is the sedentary pastoralist. These are herdsmen that now reside with farmers in the same community. All the farmers and community leaders interviewed said that they often manage conflict between them and sedentary pastoralists very well but usually have problem dealing with the transhumance pastoralists. This is because the transhumance pastoralists were usually expected to come to their communities in January after planting had been concluded and harvesting made.

However, they would come in the mid of planting season especially between June and September. Farmers interviewed said this usually happened in the night and when day breaks,

nobody is seen but when it happens within the day yan banga (community vigilante group) is often used. The use of yan banga, community people explained, is contingent on the fact that the transhumance pastoralists are usually aggressive and even sometimes attempt to attack farmers with weapons when their attention is called to the destruction their cattle has caused. On the other hand, conflict between local farmers and sedentary herdsman are usually resolved using community level mediation mechanism usually midwifed by the various strata of community leadership ranging from the village head to the district head and emirate council. These community leaders are: Jauro, Ardo (head of Fulani community), Lawani or Lamba (village head), Bulama or Maiangwa (ward head), Sarkin shanu (leader of owners of cattle) and Hakimi or Ajiya (district head). The mode and pattern of the community level mediation mechanism varies from place to places with high level of decentralization. There are at least two kinds of community level mechanisms for addressing conflict between farmers and herdsman in areas of research.

Setting up of Permanent Community Committee: One of the ways communities have responded to conflict between herdsman and farmers is the formation of permanent community level committee to address, among other issues, conflict between farmers and herdsman as well as allocation of resources - land and water- between the two communities. These community level committees usually compose of community level traditional leadership and it is usually decentralised from the grassroot to the district head.

Infusion of Representatives of Herdsman in the Traditional Community Leadership Structure: This approach involves putting representative of pastoralists usually Fulbe in the traditional community governance of the people. This is done to give a sense of belonging and inclusivity to the pastoralists. For instance, in almost all the emirate councils in Yobe State, representatives of the Fulani community usually called Ardo are infused into the traditional council of the people. This person is not only expected to serve as the representative of the herding community at the various strata of community leadership but to serve as their

mouthpiece and also report issues emanating from their interaction with members of their community to the palace for quick settlement.

Effectiveness of Current Community Level Mechanisms for Managing Farmer-Pastoralist Conflicts

These various community level mechanisms have produced a mixed result. One of the areas that the community level mechanisms have demonstrated effectiveness is the administration and supervision of compensation regime in pastoralist and farmer conflicts. People interviews explained that whenever their farm produce or animals are destroyed or harmed, the first point of call is the nearest community leader especially village or ward head. Compensation is normally agreed on after an assessment of the damage has been carried out through a collegiate system and in the case of encroachment into farm; the rightness of the planting area is ascertained. Where the planting area is not right for the farmer, s/he bears the brunt of the destruction and no compensation will be given. However, where the farmer has rightly planted and the pastoralist's cattle strayed into the farm, payment of compensation may be due. However, in most cases the farmer may be under-compensated as a result of comprising. On the other hand, the farmer may outrightly pardon the pastoralist whose cattle strayed into a person's farm. As a result of the involvement of the various strata of community leadership, many cases of conflict have been resolved between farmers and pastoralists and this has helped to promote social cohesion and harmony.

However, the use of the traditional system is now gradually collapsing. More cases of conflict between the two groups are now taking out of the intervention of community leaders to the police and courts where the two groups will come back to the society more divided and polarized because of the winner-takes-all principle of the state institutions. Some of the weaknesses of the approach fuelling collapse are explained below:

Overestimated Compensation Claims: one of the reasons for the continuous collapse of the traditional institution in the management of conflict is the overestimation of compensation usually by the farmers to the herdsman. This is so because decision on the estimate of compensation to be paid is usually through approximation. As a result of this, herdsman who

are usually the payers of the compensation find it difficult to accept the compensation and often go for settlement outside the community. Farmers interviewed in FGD session in Geidam also added that sometimes, herdsmen are forced to pay compensation against their wish. This usually brings serious backlash to the farmers. They complained that:

sometimes herdsmen are forced to pay compensation for the destruction carried out by their cattle but when they finally pay, you may wake up the following day and find out that your farms have been completely eaten up without knowing who did it and the herder will leave the community immediately. Even when the herder is around, there may not be evidence to prove that his cattle did the new destruction (FGD in Fika, 2021).

Politicisation of Issues and Decisions: another reason for the gradual waning of the strength of the community level mechanism is the real or perceived politicization of issues and major decisions. There are allegations from herdsmen that community leaders always refuse to take critical decisions or implement them when it involves farmers because they often consider farmers as their kits and kin.

Breakdown of Process of Dialogue: Another reason for the failure of the community level mechanisms is breakdown in the process of dialogue at the local level. This is usually brought about by heady positional negotiation and the inability to shift ground and accommodate the other parties in the process of dialogue. This always produces a stalemate that always necessitated use of police or court as the final resort.

Lack of transparency and accountability in community governance: Another very important point is lack of transparency and accountability in the governance of local community by traditional rulers. Most times, traditional rulers sell/allocate community land to the farmers and herdsmen without the knowledge of the community. Some farmers complained that they did not just decide to plant on Burtali or grazing reserves but that the land was allocated to them by traditional rulers after the have paid a sum of money.

Conclusion

Traditional institutions at the various strata in Yobe State have played significant role in the management of conflict relating to access to land and water between farming and herding communities in their localities. In times past, involvement of the traditional rulers in the management of conflict between the two groups was limited. This is because crises between the two groups relating to access to land and water were minimal. Furthermore, existence of peaceful coexistence and harmony between the two groups enabled them to jointly resolve their crises before they get to the doorstep of traditional leaders.

These community-level mechanisms have also proven to be inadequate to manage the conflict between the two agricultural groups. Some of the challenges preventing the effectiveness of these mechanism are: overestimate compensation claims, politicisation of issues and decisions reached, breakdown of the process of dialogue, lack of transparency and accountability in community governance and identity polarisation. Furthermore, very significant in the failure of community-level mechanisms is the perception by herdsman those traditional rulers are kits and kins of farmers and usually take side with them in conflict issues involving the two agricultural groups. In spite of the utility of this approach and its ability to ensure comprehensive resolution of conflict, its credibility and use has continued to decline as more and more local pastoralists preferred to take their cases to police or courts. This explains the cycle of violence that usually trails the relationship between the two groups in Yobe State. The following recommendations are thus suggested:

1. In spite of the challenges confronting the traditional/community leaders in the management of conflict related to access to land and water use between farmers and pastoralists, they are still the best to effectively manage the conflict. There is therefore the need to train community leadership for capacity building establishment of Community Accountability forum.

2. Establishment of Community Accountability Forum. This will contribute significantly to the prevalence of farmer-pastoralist conflict in the state. Efforts should therefore be made to promote democracy and civic culture in at the local level.
3. Strict operational system of land use rotation that basically stick to seasons should be strictly operated by farmers and pastoralist. Farmers should plant and harvest their plants between April and December while pastoralists should be given access to the land between January and May.
4. Governments of the Lake Chad States and the international community should address climate change and extreme weather conditions affecting river bodies including the Lake Chad. Lake Chad region government should also collectively address the desiccation of Lake Chad as this will reduce the southward movement of pastoralists significantly.

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RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the effects of conflicts induced by religious beliefs on economic development in Nigeria. It highlights the fact that faiths or religion is a major influence in Nigeria and Christianity and Islam are the dominant religions in the country. It reasons that while each of these religions professes peace, conflicts arising from disagreement over practice by members remain a constant feature of life in the nation and this has affected peace and progress and denied Nigeria the necessary economic development. The paper adopted descriptive analysis and the library research method. It notes that Nigeria is a secular state and the strong influence of religion is unnecessary. It observes that secularism deemphasized has made religion to have overbearing influence on the nation therefore, it recommends less emphases on religion so as to curtail conflicts. It also recommends religious harmony through dialogue as well as emphasis on human rights and the rights to freedom of worship enshrined in the constitution to minimize conflicts.

KEYWORDS: Religion, Conflict, Development, Constitution, Economy

INTRODUCTION

The entire African continent is engulfed in conflicts and Nigeria is not an exception. The laudable goal of ‘silencing the guns’ initiatives of the African Union was aimed at ending all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts and genocide prevention on the continent by 2020 but this was not achieved due to the prevailing trend (Alison, 2020). Wherever people with different attitudes, personalities and belief system gather together, their diversity will eventually surface or create discord (Afolabi, 2018). People are diverse and their belief systems differ with each belief system satisfying the needs of individuals who operate it and the divergent views they promote can create incompatible goals which can less or promote peace and harmony or results to conflict depending on how it is managed.

Social and political conflicts are common in Africa while conflicts influenced by religion are prevalent in Nigeria. Religious conflicts manifest as inter-faith and intra-faith disturbances and violence and the aim is to get new converts, claim superiority or serve a political and ethnic interest which may be positive or negative. Conflict is inherent in nature and there is no human relationship that is devoid of it. The diversity of Nigeria reflects a conglomeration of people of different cultural and religious backgrounds bound by a constitution and in a relationship that meets their goals and protects their religious interests therefore, leaving them prone to conflicts.

In every society, a conflict can either be in the form of disagreements or violence which can either build or destroy. Religious conflicts help to promote harmony among members as well as influence disagreement between members of opposing faiths thereby causing mayhem, insecurity and destruction which is unhealthy for economic development. In Nigeria, religion plays a major role in fuelling and perpetrating violence (Oduma-Aboh). Religious harmony from conflicts seeks a stronger economy while a disharmony between faiths tends to result to chaos and confusion which promotes insecurity and discourage investments.

In order to adequately study this phenomenon, descriptive research method was used. Primary data was gathered through questionnaires were administered to 373 selected members of Local Baptist Convention's using stratified random sampling. secondary sources of information and data was used. Journal articles, newspapers, magazines, textbooks and internet sources were used and the data generated were also analysed.

Conceptual Clarifications

The Concept of Conflict

Conflict stems from incongruity or incompatibility of rivaling goals (Shehu, 2021). It exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent (Amakiri, 2007). Conflict arises when there is misunderstanding between two or more people or group. (Fodang, and Mmegwa, 2016). It is an inherent phenomenon that has come to stay with man, it is inevitable and resolving or managing it is essential (Aliede, 2004). Conflicts can either be constructive or destructive and every conflict has its own effect on both conflicting parties depending on what form of conflict it is (Afolabi, 2018). Conflicts induced by religious beliefs are common in Nigeria and this is because religion is a double-edged sword and can create social order, harmony, cohesion and stability while it can be used by wealthy and powerful people to exploit and oppress the people therefore, becoming a veritable source of violent conflicts and social dislocation (Ogbeide, 2012).

Religion

Religion pertains to God and belief and it is the belief in religion that serves as mechanism engineering the prominent attacks against the other religion (Owutu, 2013). It is a human experience of and belief in the supernatural and an attempt to live, be guided by that experience and belief, to worship and relate with the supernatural and with his fellow men (Okweze, 2005). It is against this background that Iyer, (2010) observes that religion is the rational choice of individuals and the forces are important as they change the environment in which individuals operate, directly affecting individuals' choices and behaviour by changing the

utilities of goods. The change through religion affects the society and the economy with growth and development either hampered or enhanced depending on the pattern of change.

Religion affects the society in various ways and a serious devotion to it leads to fanatical choices that can affect development. Development is the collective activities by any human society, irrespective of its size, directed at reducing the totality of both perceived and actual obstacles to a higher standard of living thereby maximizing the quality of life of the citizens (Shamija, 2016). It is both a physical process involving the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, and railways. It is a state of mind involving a change of attitude for good; it implies a reduction or eradication of poverty, illiteracy, disease, malnutrition, and joblessness. It also means the provision of basic necessities of life such as food, shelter, water, good roads, electricity, education, affordable and accessible health care, among others (Enyi, 2020).

Economic Development

Economic development is the creation of wealth from which community benefits are realized. It is more than a jobs program, and is an investment in growing your economy and enhancing the prosperity and quality of life for all residents and is not community development which is basically the process of making a community a better place to live and work (California Association for Local Economic Development, CALED. <https://www.caled.org>). However, economic growth is a sustained increase in the output of the economy often termed the Gross Domestic Product (Obute, and Koko, 2014). It refers to the increment in amount of goods and services produced by an economy...economic growth means an increase in real national income/national output while economic development means an improvement in the quality of life and living standards such as measures of literacy, life expectancy and health-care.

Lack of economic growth and development can induce poverty. Dauda (2016) argues that poverty is a threat to every economy and is a potential source of political and social instability and is capable of igniting internal security problem and crime. He portrays poverty as lack and observes a religious perception of poverty as an act of God. Poverty,

unemployment and terrorist activities have undermined sectors of the Nigerian economy while policy instability and somersault have discouraged foreign investment despite the huge domestic market and Nigeria's strategic location regionally and worldwide (Bature, 2016). According to Bature, (2016), terrorism in Nigeria is a result of collective discontent caused by poverty. Zamba (2016) posits that genuine grievances against terrorism in Nigeria have been adulterated with banditry, insurgency, kidnapping, trafficking in drugs and humans to transform the Northeast and other northern parts of the country into an insecure zone.

Terrorism in Nigeria is mostly linked to Boko Haram, a self-proclaimed Islamic sect. The Boko Haram terrorist organization is locked in a deadly conflict with government over western education and the imposition of Sharia laws and outright criminality (Zamba, 2016). The activities of the Boko Haram sect impacted heavily on the Nigerian economy and its Foreign Direct Investment. In 2013, FDI flow into Nigeria dropped by 21%. The activities of Boko Haram have resulted to loss of over 17,000 lives, destruction of properties, business premises and closure of formal education in places affected. Boko Haram activities have seen the emergence of shadow economy which is an instrument used by terrorists to finance their activities and involved underground, covert or illegal trading in stolen goods, prostitution, gambling, smuggling and so on.

Empirical Review of Literature

Pluralism is a primordial reality consistent with nature and the society is affected by it. Oduma-Aboh (2020) considers man as a political and religious being regulated by ideas and beliefs of a supersensible being responsible for his creation and the awareness of God in the society leads to many pathways to reach him. He therefore explored threats of interreligious crisis to national security and development in Nigeria and devoted attention on religious conflicts and ways to attain a peaceful, tranquil and harmonious society where national security and Nigerian development is guaranteed. Using Marxist Theory of religion, Oduma-Aboh (2020), noted that Karl Marx attributes the origin and continued existence of religion to economic exploitation of the masses by capitalist exploiters. "the rich exploiters encourage religion and

use it as an opium with which they sedate the masses and prevent them from protesting or revolting against their exploitation.”

According to the researcher, Marx believes that the rich exploiters used religion as a weapon to calm the nerves of the exploited, prevent them from rebellion and revolution by assuring them of a reward to enjoy in heaven after their sufferings and reasoned that elite across the different religious divides in Nigeria have used Islam and Christianity for inordinate and ulterior motives to serve political, cultural, social and economic interests that are basically selfish thereby contradicting the gains and benefits of religious diversity in other countries. He further observed that religion is being manipulated in Nigeria and elite across religious divides always agree on the collective plundering of the wealth of the nation and when they disagree, whip up religious sentiments leading to interreligious conflicts which threatens the peace and stability of the country and affects the national security with implications on development. The researcher recommended an enforcement of the constitutional provision for freedom of worship across religious divides as well as emphasized needs of the citizenry across religious divides to shun ideas and acts likely to influence interreligious conflicts which poses a threat to national security and development among others,

In a study on Church conflicts in Nigeria, the researcher, Oluwasegun (2018) investigated strategies adopted in managing conflicts in local Baptist Convention with a view to identifying their effectiveness. The researcher relied on historical and survey research design to understudy 15 Baptist conventions that had witnessed conflicts in Ibadan, Oyo state, Nigeria purposively selected. He conducted in-depth interviews among members across the selected Local Baptist Conventions and officials of National Baptist Convention.

Overview of Religious Conflicts in Nigeria

Nigeria as a corporate entity was the creation of British colonial authority (Musa, 2017). Before the arrival of the British, it existed as kingdoms, emirates and communities with different religious practices such as Christianity and paganism in the south and Islam in the north but despite this disparity, the British colonial government merged them together as one

country (Ogenyi, 2021). The Hausa-Fulani and other smaller ethnic groups that inhabit the north of the country are Muslims while the Igbo and other smaller groups residing in the south are primarily Christians and groups lying in the middle comprise a mixture of Christians and Muslims while the Yoruba found in the Southwest are almost half Muslim and Christians (Canci and Odukoya, 2016).

Nigeria has experienced series of violent and bloody confrontations between religious groups, especially between Christians and Muslims, causing the death of thousands of people and scholars argue that religion is the bane of Nigeria's drive to attain unity and cohesion (Oduma-Aboh, 2017). Human beings struggle to survive within their environment especially in a multicultural society and are bound to have cultural overlaps whereby some groups may view their own ways of life as the best whereas the others are bad (Chikada, 2020). This is so with Nigeria where the diversity of faiths has led to different belief systems that often result to disagreement on issues such as politics and economy with Islam as the most religion that has caused conflict while fear from the propaganda of a conspiracy to Islamize Nigeria tend to mobilize Christians to react and to cause confusion (Ogbeide, 2012).

According to (Okweze, 2005), human existence is about relations and relationships and it is impossible to exist at the human level without relating or having relations of some sorts therefore, Nigerians, despite their diversity have continued to relate with one another on the basis of their faiths and ethnicity. Indeed, no religious conflict in Nigeria is without an ethnic influence and the struggle between rival ethnic groups is often to maintain or gain control of state power and resources with the 1953 Kano riots between Hausa and Igbo as the beginning of conflicts influenced by ethnic and religious differences in the country (Ogenyi, 2021). Intra-faiths conflicts manifest as disagreements among members of the same faith or religion. Afolabi (2018) enumerates causes of Church conflicts as follows: disagreement about values and beliefs, conflicting roles and responsibilities of the pastors, organizational structure, leadership styles, inadequate communication, dependence on the financially-well-to-do church members for welfare, mismanagement of church funds, intolerance of other

people's views, doctrinal issues, a visionless church, misuse of the autonomy of the local church, unclear organizational structure, new pastor rushes into changes.

Interfaith conflicts result from violence and aggression among members of different religions and is prevalent in Nigeria with violence and destruction resulting from them and mainly in conflicts involving members of the Islamic faith with a typical situation as the outbreak of conflicts in Zaria in May, 1990 which led to destruction of property belonging to mainly Christians while December of that year witnessed the Maitatsine riot in Kano which resulted to the death of more than 4,000 people with large scale destruction of properties. Stewart (2004) captures the Nigerian situation with the following submission:

Some development costs are obvious as people who join the fighting forces, who are killed or flee, can no longer work productively; schools, power stations and/or roads that are destroyed reduce the productive capacity of the economy (Stewart, 2004: 4).

Over the past few years, Nigeria has witnessed series of violent attacks occasioned by the insurgent group popularly known as Boko Haram, the group has been operating in Nigeria since the early 2000, becoming increasingly active and violent since 2009 (Auwal, 2017). The sect exploited the poverty facing small business owners such as tailors, butchers, beauticians, traders in the northeast in 2016 and got them to accept loans through their microfinance in exchange for joining the group which has links with Al Qaeda and ISIS and in 2019, six Nigerian nationals were convicted in UAE for funding Boko Haram.

On April 25, 2018 the CNN reported that two priests and 17 worshippers were killed when armed men believed to be cattle herders stormed a Catholic church during early mass in a village in Benue State and razed over fifty houses while BBC reported that Boko Haram killed villagers in Christmas Eve attacks in 2020 in northeast Nigeria. At least 37 people died and 57 others were injured in an attack at St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Abuja in 2011 with the Islamist militant group, Boko Haram claiming responsibility (Reuters, 2013). In Zamfara State, the Police command alerted the public of a letter by a Fulani Association warning Christians against public worship in churches lest they be attacked, abducted and their

places of worship torched. In a letter to the Zamfara Police command on November 19, 2021, the group claimed:

All these mirrors the security situation in Nigeria. Security is important in the life of a nation especially with potential hazards from terrorism, insurgency, banditry, computer hacking and viruses coupled with the emerging concern over Job security, income security, health security, environmental security and security from crime world-wide.

Ethnic and religious groups such as Boko Haram and armed Fulani pastoralists have wreaked havoc in Nigeria and scared investors away and the implications of a lack of investment in the country is that the GDP reduces, unemployment increases, risk is high and only when people are able to sleep with two eyes, can investment confidence be restored (Nwabughio, 2021). The Nigerian Economic Summit Group warned that insecurity is the biggest threat to investment in Nigeria. At the 27th Nigerian Economic Summit on October, 25-26, 2021 it was stated:

The Nigerian economy is a middle-income, mixed economy with emerging markets and is projected to grow by 1.5% in 2021 and 2.9% in 2022 based on expected recovery of crude oil prices and production (Wikipedia) but insecurity, especially from religious conflicts masterminded by religious terror groups are obstacles (Nigerian Economic Summit Group, 2021).

Discussions

Issue of identity and choice of religion is a source of tense atmosphere among followers of different religions but people of Mambilla Plateau with a predominance of traditional worship inherited from their ancestors, Christianity and Islam have risen above this to sustain harmony and peaceful coexistence among themselves. Located in conflict-prone Northeast in Taraba State, the researcher wrote that Mambilla Plateau is a contradistinction to Jos and Kaduna States which are ridden with religious and ethnic crisis because they live peacefully without unnecessary religious clashes despite the religious climate which hovered over them with the presence of Islam, Christianity and African traditional religion.

He explored the geographical location of Mambilla Plateau, its historical development and religions of the people as well as discussed, the factors influencing peace on the Plateau.

Nasidi (2016) considered religious tolerance as contributive factors to peace and harmony on the Plateau and observed that a lack of youth redundancy, the active involvement of traditional rulers in the prevention of violence and feuds in the area and the choice of a single social habitation without discrimination and divisions for Christians and Muslims as exist in Kaduna and Jos are critical stimulants for peace and harmony on the Plateau.

Other measures for peaceful coexistence he argued were the establishment of the *Jugulde*, as a secret society charged with policing and patrolling the borders of the area for a necessary assistance to the Police and other security operatives of government and the high level of literacy with more than 80% of the population literate. Religion is a consciousness that helps to regulate the society. It shapes how individuals react to the environment in which they live (Akinfenwa, Fagbamila and Abdulganiyu, 2014). For this reason, therefore, the Nigerian society with multiple religions is influenced by practices and acts that are at variance and tend to create an environment of discord among the populace with ethnic interests as a major cause of conflicts.

The social and political space in Nigeria is influenced by a strong sense of religion with the church and mosque as a major influence and hardly is a decision taken by government, individuals or corporate organizations without a recourse to their dictates, requirements and public perception of their impacts in society. For this reason, democratic practices reflect a divergence in religion and major political offices in Nigeria are considered with religion as a strong determinant of beneficiaries. This gives the chance for competition and corruption with each religion claiming superiority and the environment is conflicts prone due to suspicion and discord among the religious adherents.

In some parts of the country, especially the north, settlement patterns are affected by religion and adherents of dissimilar religions do not mix socially. This leaves a sense of discrimination and contradicts the constitution and religious difference compounds the wide spread conflict between indigenes and settlers in Nigeria (Ostien, 2009). While peace and harmony preoccupy religious expressions in Nigeria, extremity has led to violence with

economic implications. Activities of religious sects in Nigeria provoke conflicts and leave the country in a state of insecurity which discourages investments required to nurture a healthy economy in Nigeria.

Aside from killings, conflicts arising from religious extremism have led to hostage taking of individuals and destruction of property with each as an indication of an environment which cannot accommodate investors and economic development is therefore, negatively affected. Agada-Mba (2017) appraised economic development as an activity concerned with quality improvements, the introduction of new goods and services, risk management and the dynamics of innovation and entrepreneurship. Economic development is enhanced by peace and security with conflicts and violence as deterrents. Religious conflict in Nigeria is a source of violence and insecurity and it discourages investment and economic development.

Conclusion

Conflicts arising from religious extremism are prominent in Nigeria and they discourage investment and economic development. Aside from this is suspicion and discord arising from disparity in religion leading which lead to competition and corruption with negative implications on the economy. Religious conflicts leading to violence, corruption and insecurity have discouraged investments in Nigeria and have affected economic development.

Recommendations

- 1) The rights of the citizenry to freedom of worship should be enforced to check excesses that might cause religious upheavals and crisis.
- 2) Emphasis on economic development should dominate the focus of the citizenry
- 3) Dialogue should be a priority. Dialogue is speaking and another listens and responds and vice versa and living together inspite of religious differences peacefully should be upheld.
- 4) Political and social discontents should be addressed without the choice of terrorism and violence.

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A STUDY OF EFFECTS OF FARMER-HERDER CONFLICT ON WOMEN IN DEMSA LGA OF ADAMAWA STATE

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ABSTRACT

The persistent farmer-herder conflicts in Demsa local government area of Adamawa State have had very debilitating negative consequences on the pastoralist and farming communities in the area. Many lives and property have been destroyed, many people displaced and farming activities disrupted. Most troublesome is that negative impact that the protracted conflict has had and continues to have on women who are the engine room of the economy of the area. Women have been killed, raped, beaten, displaced from their farms and places of abode by the militias operating in the area. This study therefore, investigated the effect of the conflict on women in Demsa local government area. The study is descriptive in nature and employed purposive sampling technique to select 29 key informants interviewed (KII), among who were also selected the 25 persons that were part of the five-focus group discussion (FGD) sessions held. Five persons each were interviewed in each of the FGD sessions. Data obtained were subjected to content analysis. Based on the analysis carried out, the following findings were revealed: the various effects of the farmer-herder conflicts on women in Demsa LGA of Adamawa State include, the killing of women, rape, their livelihoods are destroyed (crops, animals and other items), they experience posttraumatic stress disorders (PTSDs), they are socially dislocation and separation from their children, husbands and other relations and their economic activities such as farming, trading are destroyed among others. It was also found that the responses of state and non-state responses to alleviate protect.

KEYWORDS: Herders, Farmers, Conflict, Women, Land, Government

INTRODUCTION

One major problem confronting world peace today is the manifestation of conflicts in different dimensions across the globe. From Europe to America, Africa to Asia, conflicts are common phenomena. Conflict has been defined in different ways by different scholars. For instance, Ekong (2003) defined conflict as that form of social interaction in which the actors seek to obtain scarce reward by eliminating or weakening their contenders. Folger *et al.* (2009) defined conflict as the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals.

Nigeria has experienced and is still experiencing conflicts of grave proportions among several ethnic and religious communities across the country. In recent times, resource induced conflicts have been occurring between farmers and pastoralists in the country, with the North Central and North East of Nigeria suffering more of such conflicts. Adisa (2012) has argued that the farmers-herdsmen conflict has remained the most preponderant resource-use conflict in Nigeria. But tensions have grown over the past decade, with increasingly violent flare-ups spreading throughout central and southern states; incidents have occurred in at least 22 of the country's 36 states (International Crisis Group, 2017). According to one report, in 2016 over 2,000 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in Benue and Kaduna states alone. According to Abbas (2009) rightly observed that the major sources of conflicts between the Fulani pastoralists (to be used interchangeably with "herders" or "herdsmen") and farmers shows that land related issues, especially on grazing fields, account for the highest percentage of the conflicts. In other words, struggles over the control of economically viable lands cause more tensions and violent conflicts between farmers and the Fulani pastoralists.

Social and economic factors continue to provoke violent conflicts among the Fulani pastoralists and farmers. These changes have increased confrontations between farmers and herders, leading to violent conflict, deaths, forced displacement and migration, erosion of inter-communal relationships, as well as the destruction of agricultural and livestock outputs (c, Abuja, 2015). These conflicts have constituted serious threats to the means of survival and

livelihoods of both the farmers and pastoralists and what both groups are tenaciously protecting. For instance, in the process of the violent conflict against women do not often report as Eze-Anaba (2010) observes that most forms of violence directed specifically against women in Nigeria seem to be met with silence not only by the state but also by much of the human rights community. Amnesty International (2005) thus observes that where a victim summons the courage to report to law enforcement agents, the issue is trivialized and termed a “private matter”. This research therefore makes a bold step to bring to the fore the effects of the farmer-herder conflict to the fore. Women are the most affected in the protracted conflicts between the farming and pastoralists communities, with many of them displaced, widowed, and generally suffering economic, social and psychological violence in several communities in Demsa local government area of Adamawa State, which is the focal point of this study. This study, therefore investigated the effects of farmer-herder conflict on women in Demsa local government area of Adamawa State.

Historical, tensions between Nigeria's pastoralist Fulani and settled indigenous farmers have intensified in recent years, with dwindling natural resources and land availability greatly contributing to the ongoing, escalating conflict in the country (Okello, *et. al.*, 2014.). The intermittent conflict between the farmers and pastoralists often results in devastating consequences on the affected communities, as life and property are usually destroyed and massive displacement of persons from their communities also occur. Women are by far the highest category of persons affected by conflicts. According to International Organisation for Migrants (2002), while women and girls endure the same trauma as the rest of the population – bombings, famines, epidemics, mass executions, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, forced migration, ethnic cleansing, threats and intimidation -- they are also targets of specific forms of violence and abuse in conflict situations. Why women are mostly affected during violent crisis? What steps are usually taken by state and non-state actors to either prevent or alleviate the suffering of women during or after conflicts?

Most research works on women in conflict situations are those that affected in theaters of civil wars, violent religious, ethnic and community conflicts. However, it is believed that gender-based violence is of “epidemic proportion (Convention on the Eradication of all forms of Discriminations against Women, 1997). There appears to a dearth of literature on the effect of violent conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Adamawa State. This study, therefore, investigated the effect of farmer-herder conflict on women in Demsa local government area of Adamawa State.

The increasing number of reports of violence at this occupational boundary makes understanding herders-farmers conflict on women and its effect to their social, psychological and economically need an urgent task. The study examined the effect on women on two different groups on land usage and access to natural resources which were basically the main cause of the conflict, so as to enable further understanding of the issue from the viewpoint of the conflict actors. This will complement the efforts of the other researchers. This being the case, it is hoped that the study has provided the Government, Non-governmental organizations and the general public with relevant and up-to-date information on effect of farmer-herder conflict on women and efforts of various institutions towards the resolutions of conflicts between them.

From the foregoing, the study is to investigate the effects of violent farmer-herder conflicts on women in Demsa Local Government Area of Adamawa State using the following specific objectives:

- Examine the effects of farmer-herder conflicts on women in Demsa LGA of Adamawa State.
- Investigate the responses of state and non-state responses to alleviate the effects of violent farmer-herder conflict on women in Demsa LGA.
- Assess the effectiveness of the responses of state and non-state in alleviating the sufferings of women affected in farmer-herder conflict in the study area.

Ethnographic Background to Pastoralism in Nigeria

The Fulbe origin also known as Fulani are a mass inhabitant widely dispersed in all of Africa, but most predominant in West Africa. The Fulani people are descendants from Middle East and North Africa. However, the history of the Fulani origin began with the Berbers of North Africa around the 8th or 11th century AD (Anter, 2015). Over a millennium ago from AD 900 - 1900, they spread to most parts of West Africa and to some areas of Central Africa (Anter, 2015). Although, these uprisings began as holy wars (jihad), after their triumph they followed the basic standard of Fulani ethnic dominance in most West African States. Most of the Fulani people are nomadic in nature, herding sheep, goats and cattle across the dry grass lands of their environs and making them the main pastoral nomadic group in the world. The main Fulani sub groups in Nigeria are: Fulbe Gombe, Fulbe Adamawa, Fulbe Sokoto, Fulbe Mbororo, and Fulbe Borgu (Kasarachi, 2016).

Antonio and Silvia (2009) described Pastoralists as people who live mostly in dry, remote areas. Their livelihoods depend on their intimate knowledge of the surrounding ecosystem and on the well-being of their livestock. According to them, pastoral systems take many forms and are adapted to particular natural, political and economic environment, and the key feature qualifying pastoralism is Mobility. The Fulbe (another name for the Fulani) and the arable farmers among whom they move, have an interdependent relationship based on the exchange of dairy products for grain, and a market for the animals that must be periodically sold to provide cash for domestic purposes, such as cloth or marriage payments. Moreover, in many regions, Fulbe management strategies depend on access to cereal crop residues - something arable farmers permit because of the perceived advantages of manure as fertilizer. If Fulbe herders are unable to build up exchange relations with the farming communities, they can only survive by becoming sedentary, by flexible movement patterns that involve exploiting new arable communities every year, or by intimidation of the farmers. The major source of animal protein is the cattle which are in the hands of Pastoral Fulani's (Ajala, 2000). The fact that the Savannah zones of Nigeria have abundance of grasses and forages and also

the absence of the deadly cattle disease called Trypanosomiasis make the zone conducive for rearing cattle (Ibrahim *et. al.*, 2014).

Cattle Herding System

Having raised livestock for centuries, the Fulani have evolved a herding system that withstands time, weather, social change, and government intervention. The movement of the Fulani over the years has led to a pastoral calendar in which the location and the grazing habits of the Fulani can be predicted (Iro, 1994). The name Fulani has become synonymous with grazing and cattle ownership. The *Fulbeness, pulaaku*, is determined by the extent of Fulani involvement in herding. The primary occupation of the Fulani is herding, followed by farming. Less than a tenth of the Fulani have jobs other than herding or farming.

Land Use and Migration

Accounts of Fulani pastoralists moving southwards into Nigeria's sub-humid „Middle Belt“ zone appear as early as the 1820s; however, tsetse flies and the associated trypanosomiasis disease necessitated return northwards into the semi-arid zone during the rainy season. This gradual southern movement has been attributed to the creation of dairy markets by Hausa traders and the relative security of the British colonial period, when violence related to the trans-Saharan slave trade was curtailed (Migration was also seen as a way to avoid the hated *jangali* (cattle tax) imposed by the British with the introduction of trypanocidal drugs further enabling pastoralist cattle herds to access the high-quality grazing land in the southern sub-humid zone (Blench, 1994).

Nigeria's Grazing Reserve Act of 1964.

The Nigerian Grazing Reserve Act of 1964 was passed as an initial attempt to improve Fulani access to grazing land for their cattle, simultaneously encouraging sedentarisation in order to address existing conflicts between farming and grazing communities and improve provision of essential amenities to pastoralist families. In a broader sense, it was expected that the policy would help address some of the wider constraints facing livestock development in Nigeria at the time, such as disease control and market supply (Ingawa *et al.*, 1989).

Some Causes of Cattle Herder-Crop Farmer Conflicts

Conflicts between cattle herders and farmers have existed since the beginning of agriculture and increased or decreased in intensity and frequency depending on economic, environmental and other factors. For example, increases in the herd sizes, due to improved conditions of the cattle, compelled the cattle herders to seek for more pastures beyond their limited range. Climate change has constituted a great threat by putting great pressures on the land and thus provoking conflicts between them. However, improvements in human health and population have enhanced a much greater pressure on land. Since the 1980s therefore, there has been a marked expansion of cultivation of the *fadama* (riverine and valley-bottom) areas. This means that both the farmers and cattle herders have engaged in fierce struggles for access to such valuable lands which, more often than not, result in increased conflicts and violence (Abbas, 2009).

Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

The sampling techniques that were used in this study are the purposive sampling technique and stratified random sampling technique. According to Nworgu, (1991:26), purposive sampling technique involves a process of selecting specific elements which satisfy some pre-determined criteria. Similarly, Kothari (2003) opines that purposive sampling is applied where the researcher intends to pick subjects that satisfy a given criterion. It is also based entirely on the judgment of the researcher in that a sample is composed of elements that contain the most characteristic, representative or typical attributes of any given population. A total of 29 people were selected for the study using krejcie and morgan (1970) technique. This will serve as a reasonable representation of the population and such outcome can be generalised on the population. The first stage involved the purposive selection of three Districts in the Local Government Areas, one from each of the three Districts. This selection was based on the frequency of occurrence of farmer-herder conflict and its effects on Women. These District selected has recorded frequent clashes between herders and farmers. They are: Borrong, Bille and Bali in Demsa Local Government Area.

Methodology

The main sources of data for this study were primary and secondary. The secondary and primary sources and were streamlined to meet the information requirements of this study. According to Francis (1976:288) primary data are those data obtained for the solution of the specific problem at hand. It is also the data that is obtained directly from persons or subjects. This source of data is very useful because the data arising there from are usually target-tailored. Since certain kinds of information can be obtained only by direct contact with the persons who possess the desired information, this source of data is indispensable to any original research. Hence, the primary source of data for this study was field survey using questionnaires and interviews as the main sources of data gathering.

Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

In-depth interviews (IDIs) are sometimes called life history interviews. This is because they are the favoured approach for any life history research. In this type of interview, the researcher attempts to achieve a holistic understanding of the interviewees' points of view or situation (Dawson, 2002). Both IDIs and FGDs were conducted for identified persons by the researcher and two research assistants hired by the researcher from Demsa Local Government Area. Those interviewed were people who were familiar with the subject-matter under investigation. The interviewees' assisted in providing data on their personal experiences. Major stakeholders in the in the farmer-herder conflict were also interacted with and they offered very insightful data on the issue being investigated. These interviews stimulated discussions on how the "interviewee frames and understands issues and they also assisted in explaining events, patterns, and forms of behaviour" (Seidman 2005: 314).

In all, twenty-nine KIIs were held with the selected interviewees, which are presented below:

Table 1: KII Sample Group

S/no	Group	Sample Number
1	Representative of Farmers	5
2	Representatives of Fulani pastoralists	7
3	Religious leaders	2
4	Community leaders	2
5	Officials of non-governmental organizations	3
6	Women leaders	4
7	Local government officials	3
8	Security personnel	3
	Total:	20

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2022

A total of 5 FGDs were also held for women, farmers, pastoralists, community and religious leaders.

Table 2: FGD Sample Group

S/No	Group	Sample Number
1	Representative of Farmers	5
2	Representatives of Fulani pastoralists	5
3	Religious leaders	5
4	Community leaders	5
5	Women	5
	Total:	25

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2022

Discussion of Findings

Data sourced from the field was analyzed through the use of tables based on simple percentages. Rate of focus group discussion is 500 selected in 3 District Borong, Bili and Bille

related to 9 villages in the district where interview was taken for 500 respondents across the nine different Villages 370 of them were retrieved for analysis. From the FGD it was found that 90.4% (250) were female's farmers and 9.6% (70) 370, who responded to the questions respectively. However, these socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents have no negative effect on the responses given since the research has nothing to do with gender inequality as presented on table 4 below.

Age distributions were in four categories. 51 respondents representing 20% were between the ages of 20 and 30 years, (150) were between the ages of 31 and 40 years, 45% (120) were between the ages of 41 and 50 years and 25% (49) were between the ages of 51 and 60 years. It should be observed from the table below that the larger percentage of the respondents are youths between the ages of 31-40 years and 41-50 years which are actively involved in farming activities. It means that if farming activities are stable and vibrant, our youths will be preoccupied in activities that will enhance the economy.

Qualification is not a yardstick per se for engaging in a farming activity except for those working in the government establishment. All the same, one needs a requisite knowledge so as to enhance his business. That is why only a fraction of the respondents 4.2% did not have any of the conventional qualification. The table below shows that the respondents with school certificate are 47% (170), those with NCE/OND/Diploma are 23% (100), those with first degree are 21% (40), those with MSc 10.2% (25), those with PhD 2.8% (6), while those that do not have any qualification or have qualifications that are not conventional are 4.2% (29).

In sum, it was found that farmer-herder conflicts on women in Demsa LGA of Adamawa State had significant negative impact on women, girl child and young male adult. These impacts include, the killing, rape, their livelihoods are destroyed (crops, animals and other items). Additionally, these vulnerable group experience post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSDs) and are also socially dislocation and separation from their children, husbands and other relations and their economic activities such as farming, trading are destroyed among others. It was also found that the responses of state and non-state responses to alleviate protect.

Conclusion

From the above, it can be seen that the clashes between farmers and herdsmen result in harm (both mentally and psychologically for not only women and the more vulnerable in the society. In view of this, the underlisted are recommended to mitigate this ugly situation.

Recommendation

In view of the reviews, surveys and findings gotten, the following are the recommendations:

- i. Government and its security agencies should develop a multi-dimensional approach in mediating the Herders and Farmers Conflict such as the lethal approach i.e attacks on the farmers, and developmental approach such as deliberate efforts to enhance the quality of lives of the people and the environment. Meaning that as the security agency mediates or settles the conflict; developmental programmes should be put in place to eradicate poverty and illiteracy from the populace. They should be efforts to intensify civic education at grass root levels so that people will have high sense of patriotism and they will not turn their back to fight their government.
- ii. Settling Herders and Farmers Conflict of whatever type should be from its infancy. Herders and Farmers Conflict started so little such that if it was addressed or fought earlier, the issue would have been conquered early. There should be improvement in emergency responses. The Conflict conquered several villages before coming to Demsa. If there was a vibrant emergency response mechanism in place, those villages and Demsa would have been secured.
- iii. The security personnel and their operations should as a matter of urgency be technologically inclined and equipped. This will help track the bad elements among the populace and in their hideouts and farming activities in Demsa who suffered losses should be assisted in form of compensations or interest-free loans so that they can have a better footing in their farming.

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COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND PEACE-BUILDING CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA: ISSUES FOR POLICY CONSIDERATION

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to examine Nigeria's security governance dilemmas and peace-building challenges during the enforcement of COVID-19 lockdown which was aimed at curbing the spread of pandemic. This is intended to bring to fore very fundamental lessons from the government's approach to peace-building and security governance during and after the lockdown in Nigeria and make policy recommendations. This was carried out using secondary sources such as print and electronic media reports, journal articles, and textbooks. The study finds that outbreak of the novel coronavirus pandemic heralded a turning point in the entire gamut of Nigeria's socio-economic and political life thus creating unwholesome uncertainties and fear across the country especially during the nationwide lockdown. It surmised that peace-building and security governance are veritable components of peace and stability in every known human society. However, challenges such as law enforcement lapses, and policy implementation usually arise and impede the peace-building process if not properly and promptly addressed. Recommendations include effective monitoring, evaluation mechanism and feedback mechanism, training and retraining of law enforcement agents in the art of modern-day policing, with emphasis on peace and conflict resolution techniques and effective palliative administration in times of crises.

KEYWORD: Covid-19 Pandemic, Peace-Building Challenges, Policy

INTRODUCTION

With the outbreak of the deadly corona virus, code-named: COVID-19, came the imposition of compulsory lockdown which entails restriction of human activities in many parts of the world by the government of the affected countries (Okolie-Osemene, 2021). This state of affairs led to the constitution of COVID-19 lockdown and safety measure enforcement taskforce by the various states (Wright, 2020). States were compelled by the ravaging effects of the pandemic to declare state of emergency in the health sector in a bid to solve one of the worst health challenges that have befallen man. In agreement with this, the Peace Research Institute Oslo Report (2020) posited that 'states are responding to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic by invoking the state of emergency – generally characterized by an expansion of the state power, allowing it to perform actions that it could not carry in times of normal politics'. The high rate of casualties or infections and deaths arising from the novel corona virus especially in countries adjudged to be medically and economically advanced exposed the main weaknesses of most world capitalist economies (Manderson and Levine 2020; van der Ploeg 2020). The pandemic has changed the entire gamut of the world such that lifestyle, working patterns as well as migration are now subjected to protocols, with home settings, relationships, institutions and governments adjusting from old norms to new normal.

COVID-19 outbreak heralded a turning-point in twenty-first century history such that there as new additions to popular lexicons/ vocabulary words like quarantine, contact tracing, social distancing, physical distancing, isolation, panic buying, emergency flights, evacuation, stock up, lockdown, community transmission, new normal, and staying safe, and so on. (Okolie-Osemene, 2021). However, lockdown stands out among these words due to its concomitant security governance issues. Survival became a major slogan as people had reasons to worry about the possibility of living a normal life without disruption of livelihoods as the world panicked about the safety of mankind based on health anxiety. This is reinforced by the fact that the pandemic is an invisible health issues that cannot be combated by the use

of security forces (Ookeditse, 2020). Thus, there was no much positive outcomes in preventing human fatalities especially in vulnerable areas given the inability of the healthcare sector in Africa to provide immediate and adequate control of the ravaging virus. According to Ayanlade and Radeny (2020), what started with the shutting down of schools and the hospitality industry quickly graduated to locking down major cities and towns across states especially in Nigeria (Emphasis added). This state of affairs resulted in high inflation rate and increasing cost of living affecting every class, segments and strata of the society, loss of jobs and increased poverty rate among both rural and urban dwellers (Okolie-Osemene, 2021).

In the words of Wright (2020), the weakness of governments in the era responsiveness to health emergencies was exposed by the centralization of state response to the virus as the pandemic stalled the operations of institutions, economic activities, recreational centres, businesses, and government programmes. According to Okolie-Osemene (2021), city dwellers faced enormous survival challenges when juxtaposed with those in rural communities because of the inconveniences that were engendered by the lockdown measures. As jobs were lost, businesses lost customers and the closure of hundreds of thousands of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) many urban dwellers were exposed to unexpected depreciation of economic buoyancy (Maritz et al. 2020).

The domestic effect of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria is still being felt by Nigerians. On 27th February 2020, when the nation's index case was reported, most Nigerians were oblivious of what the country was to face not until the Presidential Taskforce issued guidelines on COVID-19 prevention and management did they come to terms with the situation of things. The whole scenario portrayed a people caught in the web of impromptu change of lifestyle as the compulsory lockdowns changed the pattern of daily life. Hitherto normal lifestyle of waking up and going out in the early hours of the day to hustle became a thing of the past as people faced the new normal of working from home, observing the various safety protocols in areas of relationship, hygiene, communication, feeding, health, etc. Okolie-Osemene (2021) observed albeit sadly that the lockdown in Nigeria did not only take Nigeria

off the streets but also restricted them to their homes and neighborhoods with little to do in public spaces. With the impact of the pandemic on socio-economic activities which also changed life on the street across the country, it became clear that people needed to protect themselves.

Expectedly, the pandemic engendered some security concerns, however, there is dearth of adequate studies examining the security governance initiatives during lockdowns in Nigeria. This study therefore examines the COVID-19 pandemic and peace-building challenges in Nigeria with a view to proffer issues for policy consideration. Hence, it examines Nigeria's security governance dilemmas occasioned by the enforcement of lockdown aimed at curbing the spread of the COVID-19 in many parts of Nigeria with emphasis on the actors, challenges, resilience and threats of incidents and practical lessons. Nigeria's security governance problems manifested as a result of the rare nature of happenings that led to lockdown in times of counterinsurgency and other stability operations caused by the activities of non-state armed groups in some parts of the country.

Conceptualization and Literature Review

Security Governance

Like other concepts in the field of social sciences, peacebuilding is subject to variegated definitions and opinions about what it entails and involves. Johan Galtung who is the major proponent, called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the "root causes" of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution (Galtung, 1976). Thus, the concept of peacebuilding became a popular and accepted within internal organizational, regional, sub-regional and bi-national organizations as well as states following Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report, titled 'An Agenda for Peace'. The report portrays peacebuilding as action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict. The Brahimi Report (2000) laid credence to the above definition when it stated that peacebuilding refers to "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations

something that is more than just the absence of war.” That is to say that peacebuilding encompasses activities aimed at engendering and sustaining peace. To the United Nations (1992) “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Therefore, peacebuilding involves strategies that must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the affected country, hinged on national ownership, and should consist of a set of prudently prioritized, sequenced, as well as a set of action-plan targeted at attaining the set goals.

On the political context, the initial post-conflict period (immediately after violent conflicts) in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainties that require adequate attention to control. According to the United Nation (1992) peace processes can advance, but they also often suffer periods of regression and deterioration. In West Africa, several countries have at one time or the other been governed by transitional political arrangements (Military or Interim National Government) until after the first post-conflict elections, when the executive and legislative arms of government are properly constituted through competitive elections.

However, it is assessed, peacebuilding is primarily a national challenge and responsibility that calls for the full attention of every national government. It goes beyond the government to include the support and efforts of the citizens to achieve peacebuilding across the world. Hence, the citizens of the affected countries where peacebuilding is underway have a duty to lead the process, with support from the governments (expected to lay the foundations of lasting peace in the society). Therefore, for the peacebuilding efforts to yield results, national ownership is critical. National capacity development must be central to all international peacebuilding efforts from the very start, as part of the entry strategy, not the exit (UN, 1992). Indeed, a core objective for peacebuilding is to reach as soon as possible the point when external assistance is no longer required, by ensuring that all initiatives support the development of national peacebuilding capacities. This is a challenge, especially in the early

days when peace is fragile and national capacity is often displaced and severely limited. Nevertheless, peacebuilding must focus proactively on (re)building national capacity, otherwise peace will not be sustainable. To support this effort, a collective assessment of existing capacities should be conducted early on.

The strategic peacebuilding paths consists of three main components are further broken down into paths. They include:

Structural and Institutional Change and Development;

- a. Law; Advocacy and solidarity;
- b. Dealing with trans-national and global threats;
- c. Development; and
- d. Education.

Justices and Healing

- a. Restorative justice; and
- b. Transitional justice.

Violence Prevention, Conflict Response and Transformation

- a. Dialogue/conflict resolution strategies;
- b. Non-violent social change;
- c. Humanitarian action;
- d. Government and multi-lateral efforts; and
- e. Trauma healing

An inclusive peacebuilding process involves many actors. The key to effective peacebuilding lies in some common strategies such as nationally owned strategies, with clear priorities against which the international community and national partners can allocate resources. A common strategy should be:

- i. Nationally owned, derived from an inclusive planning process, with many and diverse stakeholders consulted as the strategy is developed; and

- ii. Based on an assessment of the country's situation (e.g. through a Post-Conflict Needs Assessment or Strategic Assessment) including analysis of conflict drivers and risk.

Security Governance

Security governance states that the safety needs of the people in every human society must receive adequate attention (Okolie-Osemene, 2021). Issues relating to security have been shown to receive a large chunk of attention from both government and the citizens in all known human society irrespective of the existing security situation because no one is safe in a state of insecurity (Veen, 2014). Security provisioning and budgeting has continued to top government priorities in both developed and developing countries of the world (Okolie-Osemene, 2021; Veen, 2014). This is reinforced by the fact that no government and society thrive under war or escalating insecurity. Therefore, security and defense policy makers and executors have continued to emerge and evolve with the legal mandate to safeguard the society through agencies such as the police, military, and para-military agents whose duty focuses on human/national security (Okolie-Osemene, 2021; Ashkenazi 2013). According to Donais (2017), accountability inherent in security provision emphasizes not only the effectiveness of security forces but how accountable they are to the state and its citizens, usually reinforced by security governance within the rule of law framework. Ehrhart, Hegemann, and Kahl (2014) in consonance with Webber et al refer to security governance as “coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes”.

Security governance refers to the comprehensive management in which the government of a country in synergy with government of the components of the state as well as other actors to ensure peace and security in the state. Okolie-Osemene (2021) sees it as a “combination of formal and informal structures among interdependent but autonomous actors

operating beyond formal hierarchies; and a tendency toward cooperative bottom-up implementation rather than top-down command and control". This involves more of government agents and action than the involvement of non-state actors such as the civil society organizations (CSOs). The ultimate objective of security governance is to curb insecurity (which includes criminal violence, political violence and any situation that inhibits government's quest to ensure an equitable and just society through a strict adherence to the rule of law.

The weakness of security governance in the society manifests in armed violence and the proliferation of small and light weapons as well non-state armed groups. However, when the security governance is effective, it dismantles the structures grease the wheel of crime and criminality and also discourage the formation of criminal groups. Therefore, it is by effective security governance system that the state guarantees safety by preventing and punishing the activities of criminals and troublemakers. When government is pro-people in its developmental policy and plans, crime is reduced to its barest minimum especially through education and vocational skills.

COVID-19

Otherwise known as coronavirus, the COVID-19 pandemic is a contemporary and an ongoing global pandemic which emerged in 2019 and is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). It was first identified in Wuhan, Hubei province of China in December 2019. However, every effort at containing the virus within Wuhan and other cities in around Hubei province proved abortive as it quickly spread to other parts of mainland China and around the world (Zoumpourlis, et al, October, 2020). On January 30th 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a Public Health Emergency of International Concern and a pandemic on 11th March 2020. The outbreak was worsened as multiple and dominant variants (such as Alpha, Beta, and Delta) of the virus emerged spread to several countries since 2021 (Ma, 2020). Following the emergence of these virulent variants, more than 245 million

cases and 4.97 million deaths were confirmed as at 28th October 2021, making it one of the deadliest pandemics that have confronted humanity.

The deadly COVID-19 symptoms range from none to life-threatening. Severe illness is more likely in elderly patients and those with certain underlying medical conditions. Transmission of COVID-19 occurs when people breathe in air contaminated by droplets and small airborne particles. The risk of breathing these in is highest when people are in close proximity, but the virus can transmit over longer distances, particularly indoors and in poorly ventilated areas. Transmission can also occur, rarely, via contaminated surfaces or fluids. People remain contagious for up to 20 days, and can spread the virus even if they do not develop symptoms.

COVID-19, Peacebuilding and Security Governance in Nigeria

Nigeria was already overwhelmed with security challenges such the book haram terrorism, banditry, militancy, armed robbers, and kidnapping prior to the outbreak of the dreaded COVID-19 virus. However, the security situation was worsened as the pandemic created economic instability and the living standards of the people plummeted. According to Okolie-Osemene (2021), the security governance system prior to the pandemic created relative peace across the country with the exception of the states affected by insurgency and banditry. Therefore, peacebuilding efforts and security governance is not responsible for the imposition of lockdowns or restriction as people enjoyed the freedom of movement until the outbreak of the corona-virus and its concomitant lockdowns. With the outbreak of the pandemic and the resultant lockdown, came the involvement of the Police and other paramilitary agencies in the enforcement of the lockdown and contact tracking to check or contain the spread of the virus by identified persons who have come in contact with those who have tested positive to the virus (Ibrahim, Ajide, and Julius 2020; Wong 2020). They were also involved in ensuring a reduction in social and religious gatherings in schools and Churches and Mosques as well as other social programmes in the six geo-political zones and thirty-six states of the federation and the FCT (Okolie-Osemene, 2021).

The virus started spreading in Nigeria following the report of the index case in Lagos on 27 February 2020. Hence the need to adopt preventive measures and contain the spread of the COVID-19. This led to the imposition and implementation of lockdown in two separate ways viz. Intra-city and inter-city enforcement phases. The President of Nigeria with powers under the Quarantine Act 1926 which enacted to quarantine people and areas with infectious diseases, issued the COVID-19 Regulation 2020. The government further directed security agencies to be cautious and tactful in the lockdown enforcement (Oseghale 2020). This is based on the need to protect human rights during law enforcement. The two phases of COVID-19 lockdown enforcements by the police and other security agencies are discussed below:

- i. Intra-city Restrictions Enforcements:** - The phase of enforcement restricted people to their streets and within few kilometers from their homes. The federal government declared the first phase of the lockdown on 27 April 2020 with effect from May 4 to 17 for a two-week period, it was however extended from 18 May to 1 June 2020, and by 15 July 2020 (Okolie-Osemene, 2021; Ibrahim, Ajide, and Julius, 2020).
- ii. Inter-city Enforcement:** - Under this phase of the lockdown prevented people from travelling from one city to another or other states. At the expiration of the first phase of the lockdown, the rate of infection was abating but the government in its wisdom decided on the second phase of gradual easing of the COVID-19 lockdown and edged towards ending the lockdown. This phase was quickly followed by the imposition of a nationwide curfew between 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.

Federal government policy decision on the lockdown was hinged mainly on the restriction on inter-state commuters' movements as well as the shutting down of both public and privately-owned institutions. It saddled law enforcement agencies with the mandate to monitor compliance and enforce physical distancing and border closure across the country (Okolie-Osemene, 2021; Falaye, 2020). Thus, only security agents, health personnel, media professionals and other essential service providers were permitted to operate within the

COVID-19 protocols. The military, paramilitary, the police, civil defence, task forces in different states are the major stakeholders/security actors involved in the security governance during lockdown enforcements. According to Okolie-Osemene (2021), the use of road blocks and increased stop and search in many cities created an atmosphere of negative peace, which is the type of peace that generates the perception of problem and the peace guaranteed by coercive instrument of the state. Such security measures rather increased stop and searches, thus portraying a state of emergency and limiting the exercise of peoples' rights. This created a scenario of excessive use of force by security forces at the various road blocks and the implementation of restrictive measures to contain COVID-19 spread and community infections (Iweze, 2020).

This state of things was further intensified apprehension among the citizens by the Regular Street and community patrol by policemen during the lockdown.

Irrespective of the actual or perceived threats to peoples' rights and peace and security in the society, the security governance system during the COVID-19 lockdown significantly reduced infection rate and saved lives of many Nigerians. Aside saving people from the deadly COVID-19, the enforcement system saved people from road accident-related deaths due to the inter-state travel restriction. This is true considering the number of accidents that occur on Nigerian roads especially along the ever-busy highways like Lagos-Ibadan, Lagos-Sagamu-Benin-Asaba, Enugu-Aba-PH highway, Lokoja-Abuja-Kaduna etc. (Okolie-Osemene, 2021). The enforcement of lockdown especially through mounting road blocks by the security agents further reduced criminal activities especially on highways as every vehicle spotted on the highways were subjected to stop and search. Everyone on any form of assignment of journey was expected to present their identity cards to prove that they are either on essential duty, security agent or needs medical attention.

This continued until the mother of all protests in Nigeria's recent history – the End-SARS Protest that lasted for close two months and saw security agents as the prime targets of the mass revolt against alleged police brutality and perversion of justice in the country. There

were allegations of violent enforcement of the COVID-19 lockdown restrictions by security agents in major cities of the country such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Enugu and Ibadan. It was alleged that wanton extortion of motorists, violation of human rights, etc. in these cities.

Challenges of Peacebuilding and Security Governance in the COVID-19 Lockdown Era

The negative effects of the pandemic on urban dwellers was and remained enormous as people especially those living slums had to grapple with lack or scarcity of basic needs such as food, water, etc. healthcare services became the exclusive reserve of the rich (Okolie-Osemene, 2021; Wright 2020). In Abuja and Lagos for instance, it took the benevolence of some economically comfortable Nigerians to sustain most poor families during the lockdown. Realities on ground revealed the weakness of government to adequately cater for the food, pipe-borne water and sanitation need of Nigerian as the little that were made available could not go round in their small quantity. This informed the assertion made by Omigbodun (2020) that strict lockdown is inimical to poor people in crowded settlements as it is capable of engendering a conducive environment for civil disorder to thrive. This is reinforced by the growing class inequality and in the face of job loss and declining living condition of people as was experienced in Nigeria. While the rich prepared for the lockdown because of their enormous financial strength, the poor were unable to stock adequate food stuff, drugs, sanitary materials, etc. as a result of their meager resources. Artisans and daily earners were the worst hit by the lockdown as their daily survival depended on their daily earnings that were stopped once government imposed the lockdown.

Sequel to this state of affairs, the urban and rural poor could no longer cope with the attendant economic hardship that came with the lockdown and rebelled against the government order restricting movement and started moving out in search for means of survival. Robberies, burglary, and theft were reported across Nigeria, especially in some parts of Lagos State, Rivers, Ogun, Abuja and Enugu state. There were several cases of rape, sexual harassments and defilement of minors in major cities of Nigeria (Okolie-Osemene, 2021).

There were also reported cases of compromise against security agents as they extorted money from motorists or citizens were either on essential duty, seeking medical attention or businessmen who continued to ply their trade unabated during the lockdown. According to Ogu-nyemi, (2020), security forces that were always collecting bribe from motorists on federal highways, the lockdown inhibited their business and pushed them into demanding higher settlement from the few vehicles that plied the highways. It was also alleged that while movements from south to northern Nigeria were restricted, there was an influx of Northerners into southern Nigeria. This was seen by the people as a deliberate move by security agents in connivance with some people in government to move insurgents and bandits down south (Okolie-Osemene, 2021).

The enforcement of the imposed lockdown recorded violation and abuse of human rights and violence in some parts of the country as some security agents asserted their authority to restrict peoples' movements. Some fatalities were recorded in some states of the federation. For instance, about five persons were reportedly by law enforcement agents and the youths rioted and burnt down a police station at Ebem Ohafia in the process (Ugwu, 2020). It was alleged that a young man was also killed in Enugu by the police during the enforcement of the lockdown. The period before the #EndSARS protest that locked saw security agents being subjected to threat to their lives.

Lessons learned on COVID-19 and security governance/ Recommendations

The COVID-19 lockdown security administration and peacebuilding process presented a number of decipherable lessons. From the Nigerian experience, the following lessons offer themselves:

- i. There was little or no mechanism to monitor the activities of security agents on the field during the enforcement of the lockdown. Therefore, these agents were free to enforce the lockdown in their own terms and conditions as the attention of the government placed premium on the restricting movement and oblivious of human right and security implications of the security forces on the field. Hence, there is the

need for effective mechanism to be instituted by a joint-task force of the security forces in Nigeria to monitor and evaluate the activities of security officials on the field in future engagements to forestall right abuses and a relapse of the fragile peace of the nation.

- ii. The End-SARS protest that shoot the nation in the last quarter of 2020 was bolstered by the negative effects of the COVID-19 lockdown which saw people losing their jobs and means of livelihood. At the time the protest commenced were already hungry and angry and were just looking for outlets to let out their frustration on the government. The alleged conducts of some security officers during the enforcement of the lockdown made matter worst. Therefore, there is the need for a functional early warning and response system to be developed to gauge public feeling (whether the public is happy or angry with the system). This will help to avoid public revolt against agents of government and inhibit unexpected circumstances that would warrant the restriction of movement of the people or confinement of law-abiding citizens within their homes.
- iii. The alleged compromise of security officials who were saddled with patrol and stop-and-search on the roads to avoid inter-state movement sabotaged the main purposed which the lockdown sought to achieve. The poor enforcement of travel restrictions jeopardized the desired expectations of preventing the spread of the COVID-19 which greatly undermined the efforts of the Federal Government to contain the virus. This situation resulted in inter-state transmission of the virus as those with the wherewithal moved about freely with the aid of compromised security agents.
- iv. The palliative distribution was poorly administered by both the federal government and the various state governments. The concentration at city-centres to the detriment of urban and rural poor who dwell in slums and satellite communities generated so much bitterness and disappointments among the masses who were confined without adequate provisions for their basic needs. This heightened the temptation of people

- engaging in criminality or flouting stay-at-home orders, especially with the excuses of going to purchase foodstuffs and other items for family consumption. Rumors of the lockdown came with serious inflation as the cost of food items skyrocketed and robbed the mass of citizens the opportunity of enjoying three-square meal per-day.
- v. The lockdown was the first of its kind in Nigeria and appeared strange to many who did not see reasons why they should be restricted to their homes and streets. Furthermore, there was a very poor management of the sensitization programme prior to and within the lockdown. Rural dwellers were almost left behind in the sensitization programme as most of these programmes were in English language which most rural dwellers are not acquainted with. Thus, sensitization programmes for such important national issues should broadcast in both English and indigenous languages of the people to enable them have a grasp of the issue.
 - vi. Finally, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution has enormous duty to in partnership with relevant government security agencies and institutions run regular training programmes on peace and conflict resolution as well as security administration to improve policing in Nigeria as reduce abuse of power.
 - vii. The impact of COVID-19 in Nigeria is both good and bad. Good in the sense that everybody, from government to the people on the streets, realized the importance of health. A lot of private sector people also recognized that there is need for the nation's health system to work. However, the nation's health sector continues to suffer neglect in all ramifications, ranging from inadequate funding, dearth of eminently qualified experts, brain-drain in the sector, poor condition of service for medical experts, to incessant strikes by medical personnel. One would have expected that the Federal and State Governments to take the sectors after the COVID-19 experience which exposed the weaknesses and the unpreparedness of the sector in Nigeria. But that is yet to be seen and felt across the length and breadth of the country.

Conclusion

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic took the world by storm and changes the way and manner countries and individual view and think about their socio-economic and political life thus creating unwholesome uncertainties and fear across the world forcing countries to close their borders and impose lockdowns. This study examined the peace-building and security governance as veritable components of peace and stability in every known human society especially during the COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria. There were reported cases of challenges such as law enforcement lapses, compromise, abuse of peoples' rights, etc. during the enforcement of the lockdown. These challenges impeded the peace-building process during the period under review. Nigeria's security governance dilemmas and peace-building challenges during the enforcement of COVID-19 lockdown were not peculiar to Nigeria but similar to other Third-World countries during the peak of the pandemic. It also brought to the fore fundamental lessons from the government's approach to peace-building and security governance during and after the lockdown in Nigeria and made the following recommendations:

- i. Effective Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism (and feedback mechanism) should be put in place to ensure that the activities of security agents in field operations during periods of emergency and restrictions of movement are adequately monitored to avoid a relapse of security;
- ii. Effective training and retraining of law enforcement agents in the art of modern-day policing and on peace and conflict resolution techniques. This will enable them bring professionalism and finesse to police service and reduce cases of harassments, extortions, right abuses, etc. regularly levelled against security agents in Nigeria;
- iii. The need for the National Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution and similar institutions to collaborate with the National Orientation Agency to carry out regular sensitization programmes to educate Nigerians (security forces inclusive)

on their rights, conflict resolution strategies, and to disabuse the minds of Nigerian on the erroneous notion that *security agents are bad and should be resisted at all times*. This will help reduce the number of attacked on security agents as witnessed in 2020 before, during and after the End-SARS protest.

- iv. There is also the need for effective palliative administration to avoid a repeat of what happened across Nigeria in 2020 when hungry masses took laws into their own hands to attack warehouses (private and public) and looted goods to assuage their hunger. The federal ministry of humanitarian affairs whose responsibility should learn this scenario and ensure direct and timely distribution of palliatives in future.

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PUBLIC PERCEPTION, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF COMMUNITY POLICING ON ARMED ROBBERY CONTROL IN ENUGU STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The community policing programme was designed so that the public in collaboration with members of the police will fight crime. However, the spate of armed robbery attack in Enugu State seems to suggest that the security system in the area is ineffective. This study therefore investigated public perception and challenges of community-policing on armed robbery control in Enugu State. The area of the study was Enugu State in South-East, Nigeria. Data collected through the in-depth interview were analysed using content analysis. The hypotheses were tested using Chi-square test of significance. The study found that the public perceive community-policing as being ineffective for the control of armed robbery. The study equally found that the police present brutal attitude on the public and this account for poor public compliance to the community policing programme. The study also found that the greatest challenge to community policing is that the police are too rough to the public and this explains why the public is not friendly with the police. The study recommended that there should be police reorientation on the need to involve the public in the security arrangement. The study also recommended the establishment of state police and the sensitization of some of the operations of the police.

Keywords: Community Policing, Armed Robbery, Public Perception

INTRODUCTION

The placement of security need as the second priority of man suggests that security of life and property is one of the greatest challenges of mankind throughout the ages. Karl Marx (1818-1883), a social thinker, philosopher and sociologist noted that inequality in society tends to put very few numbers of individuals in a state of affluence against the greater number of individuals in abject poverty and lack. The former tends to use their economic power to secure political and economic powers to lord over the greater number of the masses. Implicit from this disposition is that the those found at the poverty level appear to deviate from the norms in order to meet the unavoidable socio-economic challenges of life.

Armed robbery is one of such economic crimes that cut across all societies. Okolo (2002) affirmed that armed robbery involves stealing, during which force and violence or threats of violence are employed. It is an endemic crime that is as old as human kind and cuts across human societies. Thomton (2019) conceptualised armed robbery from the criminal law view point. He noted that armed robbery is an aggregated form of theft that involves the use of lethal weapon to perpetuate violence or the threat of violence (intimidation) against a victim. He further affirmed that armed robbery is a serious crime and can permanently traumatise its victims both physically and psychologically. Yecho (2010) stressed that a successful robbery entails the direct loss of property on an individual.

In view of the fact that armed robbery occurs in all human societies, individuals have always been desirous to make their societies crime free. This is carried out by adopting policing system that would cater for their security needs. One of such measures is the community policing system. Prior the incursion of colonial rule in Nigeria, various ethnic groups had methods of checkmating deviant behaviour including armed robbery and other violent crimes. Igbo (2006), Ugwuoke (2010), Dambazau (2008) affirmed that prior the colonial rule in Nigeria, law enforcement challenges were handled through intermediate process of various informed policing institutions such as use of secret societies, oracles, priests and priestesses of various shrines, diviners and organizers of trial by the use of traditional

chiefs and village elders of guards, messengers and age grades. However, the advent of colonialism in Nigeria brought about the departure from this traditional policing system and heartened the bureaucratic and formalised policing system.

Igbo (2006) maintained that the introduction of formal policing system in Nigeria was not in the interest of Nigerians but rather, for Britain to actualise their master plans of economic exploitation, political subjugation and cultural alienation. At the end of colonial rule, the ruling political class adopted the colonial policing system undiluted. The consequence is that the negative attitude of the police seems to be accentuated in their relationship with the public who should not only be the best friend to the police but partners in the fight of crime in society. The expected relationship is borne out of Robert Peel's disposition in the newly created London Police District during the early 19th century that "police are the public and the public are the police. This was however not the case in Nigeria. The Nigeria public's displeasure on formal police operations and attitude impacted on their views and relationships with the police, leading to seeming unabated criminal activities, most prominent among them is financial crimes of which armed robbery seems to be a daily occurrence.

Community policing has been exercised enthusiastically by police forces across the developed countries. Most notably the United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia as a response to crime and disorder in the city with a view of re-establishing the relationship between the police and the community. Community policing was launched in Nigeria on the 27th day of April 2004 by the then inspector general of police and Enugu state was used as the pilot state (Ikuteji 2009). It is against the backdrop that the study aims at investigating the influence of community Policing on the control of armed robbery in Enugu state.

Orngy Tormuba, Luman, and Bauchi (2013) affirm that there is an increase in the incidence of robbery than for any other index offence. Robbery takes place on the average of once in every seventy-five seconds. The author further noted that half of the robberies known to the police are committed on the street, the remainder occur within households and business

establishment. Ugwuoke, (2010) stressed that the manner with which armed robbery attack citizens in Nigeria is quite alarming Ugwuoke, (2010) noted that a situation whereby armed robbers could barge into the house to the mother of the then president of Federal Republic of Nigeria seems not to conjure hope of security of life and property.

In view of the foregoing, it therefore becomes necessary to investigate the What is the public perception of community policing in the control of armed robbery in Enugu state and to understand challenges militating against the same community policing. This was carried out using mixed method, which involved interviews (primary data source) and elaborate secondary materials.

The Concept of Community Policing

Kpae and Adishi (2017) conceptualized community policing and an organization – wide philosophy and management approach that promotes community government and police partnership, proactive problem solving and community engagement to address the cases of crime and other community issues. It is a security process that has the essence of returning to the day when safety and security are participatory in nature for the general health of the community not just to select a few but, not just the safety of a few but absolutely everyone in the community. Community-policing is anchored on a systematic relationship between the police and the entire citizenry. Police roles and functions are not simply law enforcement but also include tackling a huge range of community problem. It is a philosophy and practice, a veritable vehicle for police reforms (Okiro, 2007).

Okeshola and Mudiare (2013) noted that community-policing is a paradigm shift that seeks to focus on constructive engagement with peoples who are the end users of the police service and re-negotiate the contract between the people and the police, thereby making the community co-producers of justice and quality police service. The maintenance of law and order in any security has usually been the exclusive role of conventional police and other law enforcement agents in the absence of active participation of the wider members of the community. During those days the police not only faced difficulty in tackling crime but also

criticized for unfriendly nature of the relationships with members of the public (Mulugeta and Mekuriaw, 2007).

Armed Robbery

Armed robbery is one of such crimes that seem to cut across all societies especially in the contemporary times. Somaha (2008) affirmed that armed robbery consists of two crimes namely theft and assault. The author noted that theft is accomplished under circumstances calculated to terrorise the victim. The negative effect of armed robbery seems not to underscore the reason why protection of life and property of the citizens is one of the fundamental functions of the police in all societies. Ugwuoke (2010) observed that armed robbery is one of the worst criminal activities. It is the most dreaded, violent and prevalent criminal act. Armed robbery is a form of robbery which involved theft of property and carrying (or pretence) of a weapon. It is considered a higher category of offenders relating to thefts and the use of force (Johnson, 2012).

Theft is taking personal property that belongs to another with intent to deprive them of the property (as opposed to) just borrowing the item. The second element of an armed robbery charge is the use of force. The use of force is not limited to a physical touch. It can also be through other actions or words. Actions could include destruction of other property, such as throwing coin or breaking objects to get a victim intimidated or frightened enough to comply with a theft. The third and most crucial element of armed robbery charge is the use of pretense or display of weapon. Thus, a robbery is committed while in possession of a weapon, the crime will be labeled as an armed robbery. The weapon or deadly weapon is what sets a theft allegation apart from a robbery without a weapon.

Theoretical Framework

Theory used to adequately situate this study to its social linkages is the Functionalist Theory. The theory was propounded by a French Sociologist; Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). The theory is one of the grand theories in social sciences. Durkheim in his study of the society theorized that the society is like a biological organism which has parts and these parts are

interrelated. When one part is affected, it will affect the other component units that make up the whole. Functionalists believe that the society functions by maintaining an equilibrium balance among the institutions that make up the society. For them, social changes should not be allowed to destabilise the existing order within the society, rather when changes occur, the internal mechanisms through the principles of homeostasis should be allowed to absorb the changes.

Community-policing is a security system which believes that the community cannot be effectively policed without involving members of the community. Thus, for the police to function as it were, members of the community who know the nooks and crannies should be fully involved in the security process of the land. Implicitly, where members of the community are not functionally involved, certainly, crime will be on the high side which not only brings about social disorder but equally lay bare the weakness or the dysfunction of the traditional police whose statutory function it is to fight crime. Functionalist theory has been criticized on a number of ways. It tends to view the society as static. Social change can be both exogenous and endogenous and absorbing the changes cannot be the function of the internal mechanisms of the society alone. However, in spite of the criticism raised against the theory, the researcher finds it very relevant to the study.

It is expected that members of the neighbourhood watch would be the 'eye' through which the police 'see' the community. Implicitly actions taken by this group is acceptable by the police whose duty it is to maintain peace and order. However, what appears disturbing in Nigeria is that community-policing seems to be existing on papers. The rate at which crime and criminal activities plays in the country is unimaginable; a situation whereby armed robbers could barge into the house of the mother to the former President of Nigeria speaks volume of the enormity of such dastardly act in Nigeria (Ugwuoke, 2010). On the other hand, the establishment of community-policing should make the security network function effectively. Members of the community are recognized to be a functional element in the security of life and property.

Public Perception of Community Policing and Implication on Armed Robbery Control

Crossyleon (2019) affirmed that community policing is a philosophy and practice that treats police-community interaction and communication as basis for reductions in crime and fear of crime. It is generally believed that crime exist within a social circle and the community is in a position to tease out the personality of individuals that live within their areas. Community policing efforts include hiring and training of local manpower with the aim of preventing crime in the bid to solve community problems. The use of excessive force to deter criminals without fully involving the community do not field positive result hence community-policing (Adinde, 2019). Through community-based crime prevention or what some have called practice problem-solving, police officers dedicate attention to the roots of perceived problem instead of solely focusing on incidents themselves trained to gather pertinent information about criminal events, police seek to find the likely source of social problems to avoid further criminal incidents. (Crossyleon, 2019).

Community policing strategy has been incorporated into modern policing so that the police will respond to democratic system of governance. The system should be welcomed not only because traditional policing has been failing because it is reactive rather than proactive, but also the police personnel are part and parcels of the community policing quite distinct from traditional policing community partnership, organizational transformation and problem-solving. Ibrahim, Saleh and Mukhtar (2016), Presidents Tasks Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) noted that community policing is a process of bringing police and citizens together to prevent crime and solve problems, emphasizing the prevention of crime rather than responding to crime after it happens.

In the United Kingdom, it is often noted with some justifications that the British are obsessed with their police. The very notion that the public own the police and the police also own the public conveys the relevance of people as an integral point of policing in London (Bradford and Jackson, 2009). Thus, whether formally defined or otherwise, the British policing system recognises the efficacy of citizens in the security land. As aptly noted by

Tylehe and Huo (2002), in a democratic society, police authority rests on public consent. Without this consent, policing cannot be effective. Public, perception and consent of policing is evidenced in a number of ways. Including compliance with the law, reporting crime events, the supply of voluntary information about suspicious behavior and participation in community meetings and activities like the Neighbourhood Watch.

Indeed, Okeshola and Mudare (2013), observed that in spite numerous efforts by various police administration to curtail crime and criminal activities in Nigeria, crime and social disorder still persist in the country. The duo further-emphasized that the wide spread of corruption in the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is fueling abuses against ordinary citizens and severally undermining the rule of law in Nigeria on daily basis. Implicit from thus disposition is that the Nigeria Police Force is yet to understand and accept members of the Nigeria society as veritable force in the fight against crime and criminal behavior.

Interviews support the above assertions as respondents noted that community police will help control armed robbery as community policemen and women will do all within their power to prevent crime in localities entrusted to them, which are also likely to be their homes. In the words of a respondents:

If I am employed and equipped to police my village, I will ensure that I drive away any armed robber that will come to destroy and steal from my people. Another thing is that local police also know all the criminal and bad ones within our community. So, they cannot escape when we start community police (Field Survey, 2021).

Another respondents was also excited about the prospect of community policing, relating it to the currently banditry, robbery and kidnapping, insisting that there will be nowhere to hide as all and sundry in the community will be involved proactively in information gathering and actual policing. According to her;

We do not trust these policemen they bring for us. They do not care whether we live or die. They collect money from armed robbers and free them. Afterall, it does not concern them because it is not their village or community. When we have our own children policing us or people we can reach, people who have something at stake in our communities, like family or property, then they

will care what happens to us. Only then can they properly police us (Field Survey, 2021).

Police Attitude to the Public and Community-Policing Procedure

Tyler and Huo (2002) observed that the police represent and embody a social group most people want to, need to and indeed do feel part of. The duo noted that the attitude of the police can influence the policed in more consensual and less confrontational ways particularly in an environment where the character of the state upholds the fundamental rights of persons. Under such circumstance, the people submit their loyalty, cooperation and support which are the basic elements needed in the structure, formation and effective functioning of the community policing.

In addition to community acceptance is police leveraging them by corroborating with them, expunge the abysmal abuse of the fundamental rights of individuals Tyler (2008) stated that; to be effective in lowering crime and creating secure communities, the police must be able to elicit cooperation from community residents. Brogden and Nijihar (2005) have argued that in most countries, the impact of introducing community-policing have been harmful mainly because they take no account either of local community conditions (in particular how communities' police themselves or the state of the local police forces who are frequently corrupt, violent, feared, hated and or despised).

Challenges and Prospects of Community Policing in the Control of Armed Robbery

Major challenge of policing in general includes manpower shortage, inadequate funding, inadequate logistic support and infrastructure lack of serviceable information and technological equipment to cover all the areas of the state (Mamnus, 2010). Expectedly, these same challenges will extend to community policing. However, we expect that some of these challenges (such as logistics) will be adequately taken care of through community policing as it would be easier to recruit and post from the locality, rather than the current posting of federal policemen and women, which is laced with personnel and logistics problems.

Also, the federal might is opposed to it as it believes it will undermine or rather diminish the absolute power enjoyed at the centre. This is not only based on security concerns

but also on political matters. There is also the fear that powerful members of the community will use community police to intimidate and harass other locals in the event of conflicts that may arise which may include family conflict, land dispute, chieftaincy tussle, inheritance and so on. Traditional police resistance to community-policing is attributed to the perception, it is a move away from traditional law enforcement practices to a softer style of policing the community can be disempowered when offering solutions if police dominate as the crime and disorder expects. Police are still reluctant to share information with the community (Mekuriwa, 2017).

In Enugu state and elsewhere in Nigeria, Okeshola and Mudiare (2013) affirmed that police and indeed institutional corruption pose challenge to the realization of community-policing objectives. The duo noted that countless ordinary Nigerians are accosted by armed police officers who demand bribes and commit human right abuses. These abuses range from ordinary arrest and unlawful detention to threats and acts of violence including sexual assault, torture, extra-judicial killings among other inhuman treatments (Human Right Watch, 2021). Consequent upon this, the public is unwilling to cooperate with the police in community-policing programme. Even when the Nigeria Police Force tried to boycott the entire community members and make use of Police-Community Relation Committee, the process is still challenges by the non-supportive attitude of the public. Marenin (2008) observed that the sense of personal and communal insecurity is pervasive. This will certainly be taken care of through community policing.

It is also found that in Enugu State, the operations of the *neighbourhood watch* have an established laws guiding them. If the operation was to mean a cultural oriented programme, some of which could be mystical or spiritual, the idea to bring to laws to guide the operations would not be relevant. This implies that community-policing programme in order to have full control of the state. The state in its nature would always protect the police. This perhaps may not be out of the reasons why the police unleash violence to the public in spite of the acclaimed community-policing and democracy in Nigeria and indeed African countries in general.

Ozomaro (2008) also observed that one of the challenges of community-policing effort is that it had little or no financial gratification. As such, the very few who opt to be used by the police seem to engage in financial crimes in collaboration with members of the police. This to a large extent leads to withdrawal attitude by members in giving desired security information to either the police or their collaborators. Cosgrove and Ramshaw (2015) affirmed that more time and energy may have to be invested with vulnerable people or people who lack trust in police to improve their perceptions. Historical mistrust can prevent some groups from wanting to engage with the police (Myhill, 2012) but officers and staff may be able to break down barriers by demonstrating procedural justice and or better understanding of different social groups (Bullock and Johnson, 2017).

In spite of the above outlined challenges and associated prospects, a number of other direct benefits can be garnered from community policing. As Abolition Research Group (2017) noted, community police are used in the United States to bolster the legitimacy of the police when they are undermined by protest and crisis. Community policing is used to bolster the legitimacy of the police when they are undermined by protest and crisis. Community-policing can also extend police presence and surveillance into everyday life and turns social problems into police problems. This no doubt will help control armed robbery in every locality.

Conclusion

This study surmises that the community policing programme was designed so that the public in collaboration with members of the police will combat crime from the perspective of the grassroots. One of the greatest areas of need in crime fighting in Enugu State in particular is armed robbery, which has steadily been on the increase. Although there have been challenges associated with community policing in this regard, prospects are accruable. In view of the foregoing, it can be deduced that community police is a viable compliment to the every increasing spade of armed robbery in the community. It should be noted that (as was deduced),

it aims to serve as complimentary services to the community and mankind and not to replace Federal and possibly state police.

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***ISUUM-NGI* WORLDVIEW: AN INDIGENOUS MODEL OF PEACE-BUILDING IN NIGERIA**

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ABSTRACT

Peace has become the most urgent need and commodity in Nigeria. Gone are the days when Nigerians used to cry only against poverty but the prevailing circumstances in the country in the recent years have shown that poverty is no longer the only basic challenge but safety of life. Peace-making and peace-keeping models of restoring peace used by the Nigerian Government have failed to yield the desired result because they constitute effort in futility. The perpetual threats to life in the country are worsening by the day because they have not been adequately and properly addressed. The aim of this paper is to postulate an alternative model of peace-building. This paper examines and critiques the peace-keeping effort of the Nigerian Government as not being effective means of building positive peace in the country. The research problem stems from why all the resources pumped in restoring peace yet, nothing seems to be happening. The researcher embarks on systematic review of related literature (documentary) for data collection and philosophical tool to analyze the data in addressing the research problem. It argues that exploring an alternative indigenous peace-building model is imperative and the paper, therefore, proposes *Isuum-ngi*, an indigenous model, for more effective peace-building in the country. Postulating an indigenous model as alternative is premised on the fact that every important project needs relevant and contextual tools in order to be effective. This argument finds justification in the fact that people are more at home with cultures which they conceptualize and understand better in addressing their challenges.

Key words: Peace-building, *Isuum-ngi*, worldview, indigenous, Nigerian society

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria as a country is passing through crises of an unimaginable magnitude. Lives are lost in their hundreds on a daily basis to religious fundamentalists, kidnappers, armed robbers and armed bandits who have no regard for the sanctity of human life. Deadly threats to life have characterized every sphere of life in the country in such a manner that freedom of movement is no longer safe (pokol, 2021). In this entire life-denying situation, the Nigerian government seems to have failed in restoring enduring peace because all that it has been doing is peacekeeping and making, which fail to address the real issues at the grassroots and context of the people. This paper strongly argues that, all this while, the Nigerian Government has failed to utilize the relevant strategy that speaks contextual message of peace to Nigerians. What has Nigerian Government done to restore positive peace among citizens? Could there be more relevant strategies of restoring positive apart from the peace-making and peacekeeping that have pulled out the Nigerian army from their barracks? Why not try contextual peace-building models that Nigerians understand better? In view of the above scenario, indigenous peace-building model is not just an important intervention, but an emergency.

This paper, thus, postulates a more contextual alternative model for peace-building like *Isuum-ngi*, focusing on *sameness* of humanity as a natural basis for mutual respect and peaceful co-existence irrespective of social constructs like religion, tribe, race and political affiliation. By postulating *Isuum-ngi* model of peace-building, it points to the fact that there are African indigenous resources that could be used to build peace without necessarily resorting to peacekeeping or peacemaking through diplomacy or the gun.

Conceptual Clarification

For better clarity of the argument of this paper, clarifying the key words used in this paper becomes necessary in order to avoid avoidable confusion in the minds of readers:

Peace-building

This is used in this paper to describe a deliberate effort by church, NGO or state to strengthen the prospects of internal peace by decreasing the likelihood of violent conflict (Tobias and Klein, 2002) in the society. Peace-building is geared towards enhancing indigenous capacities of a society to manage conflict without violence. It focuses on a wide range of activities which have bearing on the social, psychological, and economic environment at the grassroots (Raiser, 2013) up the social ladder. Without intensive involvement of ordinary people at the base of their society to build strong foundation for civil society, even if negotiation between conflicting parties takes place at the official level it may not result in positive peace-building at the base (Galtung, 2006).

Isuum-Ngi

Isuum-Ngi is a compound and native word from the *Kadung* ethnic group of Plateau State in Nigeria. The prefix *Isuum-ngi* refers to a human being generally regardless of sex, nationality, race, gender, class, or religious affiliation. When the suffix *ngi* is added, it means humanity, the essence of being human. It further refers to the essence of being *human*; that essential image of the creator that is found in every human being. *Isuum-Ngi* is the common denominator that underlies human beings and makes them equal in essence. *Isuum-ngi* puts all human beings at the same level without any discrimination on the basis of social constructs (Lusa, 2010). It serves therefore in this paper to advocate peaceful co-existence among people in religious plural and violence-prone contexts such as Nigeria. *Isuum-Ngi* is used as a tool for reconciliation and peace-building among the *Kadung* ethnic group and sets out to counter all those oppressive elements that encourage *unity* and *oneness* of all human beings thereby discouraging those elements that undermine what it means to be human. *Isuum-ngi* advocates that discrimination is life-denying as it disempowers, deprives, denies and dehumanizes, preventing human beings from reaching their full capacity of human life and breeding violence among citizens (Chunakara, 2013).

Worldview

Worldview is often defined as the complex of beliefs and attitudes of a group concerning their origins, organization, structures, nature, religion, and interaction in the universe with particular reference to human beings (Ikenga-Metuh, 1987). A worldview tries to answer questions about the origin and nature of humanity and its place in, and relationship with, the universe (Uchendu, 1965). Balcomb (2013) defines worldview as “the templates that govern the social construction of a symbolic universe or paradigms in which a certain kind of knowledge is allowed.” He goes on to note that “the worldviews of a culture often constitute the essential identity of that culture.”

Indigenous

This is used to refer to African indigenous and cultural values and norms not foreign embedded in worldviews that have potential to support peaceful co-existence in society. How people view the world determines how they relate to it and to each other. A worldview tries to answer questions about the *origin* and *nature of humanity* and its place in, and relationship with, the universe (Pokol, 2015, Metuh, 1987). Uchendu (cited in Balcomb, 2013) defines worldview as “the templates that govern the social construction of a symbolic universe or paradigms in which a certain kind of knowledge is allowed.” Uchendu goes on to note that “the worldviews of a culture often constitute the essential identity of that culture and provides the people with values that promote life.” A worldview can also be understood as the expression of an ethnic group’s understanding of itself in relation to its Creator, how it facilitates its corporate and harmonious existence with others in society, and how to keep it alive from generation to generation (Balcomb, 2013). African worldviews, whichever one is talking about, are rooted in *community* well-being resulting into determining the quality of human life and relationship (Mbiti, 1969). It is from the above understanding that indigenous serves model of peace-building serves as alternative to peace keeping and making in this paper.

Nigerian society


Nigerian society is used in this paper to refer to the different networks of relationships that bind Nigerian citizens together in time and space. This time and space include pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial existence in socio-economic, religious, political and cultural relationships that either promote life or destroy it.

***Isuum-ngi* as a worldview**

The *Kadung* ethnic group believes that human beings and all other creatures originated from one wild yam plant. From this plant, they share a common origin, common essence, and are moving forward toward a common destination (Lusa, 2010). This further demonstrates the inherency of community through which common ground can be found and defined. While woman and man originated from the tuber of the Yam plant, other creatures originated from its vine and leaves (2010). They believe that the yams grew so large that part of its tuber got exposed to the sun. The exposed part of the tuber eventually changed colour and taste and eventually metamorphosed into male and female human beings. That both of them emerged at the same time may imply that they inherently metamorphosed as a single community and not as an individual. This means that the community does not originate from the human being but is an undergirding principle of humanness. Consequently, human-ness does not exist without the community and the community does not exist without human-ness. Where there is conflict and injustice there is no human-ness; and where there is no human-ness there is no community.

The exposed part of the yam plant produced a male human being, while the covered part produced a female human being (Lusa, 2010). The two parts of the same yam tuber that are regarded as the origins of man and woman are also regarded as origins of strength and weakness: the male is identified by physical strength because the exposed part that produced him suffered from the heat of the sun and became stronger; while the female is identified with weakness because the part that produced her was always covered and did not suffer (2010). These differences do not matter because the one-ness of the yam plant and its tuber is what

constitutes every reason for harmony and peaceful living among the creatures. The male and female have responsibilities that reflect their physical qualities. These distinct responsibilities are meant to facilitate their mutual relationship (2010) for peaceful living. See below is a sketched diagram illustrating the wild yam according to the ethnic group (Pokol and Kaunda, 2015, Kaunda and Poko, 2019):



A tuber of a wild Yam illustrating *Kadung's* creation worldview (adopted from Pokol and Kaunda, 2015, Kaunda and Poko, 2019).

According to the *Kadung* ethnic group, the difference between male and female is for complementarity and not competition, otherwise critics would find this worldview as a fertile ground for upholding patriarchy and gender inequality.

***Isuum-ngias* a peacebuilding model among the *Kadung* ethnic group**

Isuum-Ngi emerges as a creation worldview of the *Kadung* minority ethnic group in Plateau State, Nigeria. The ethnic group is located in Pankshin Local Government Area of the State. Etymologically, '*Kadung*' means a better place to settle (Lusa, 2010). *Isuum-Ngi* serves to affirm that African wisdom and philosophy offers worldviews and mythologies that may constructively promote living in harmony, togetherness and peace. Paradoxically, this demonstrates that Nigerian ethnic groups and communities have in their cultures what it takes

to promote living in peace but they may not know or may not want to use them because they have been brainwashed by colonial tutelage to believe that nothing indigenous can work for peaceful co-existence.

The relevance of postulating *Isuum-ngi* as indigenous peace-building model

The author is arguing and advocating for *Isuum-ngi* as an alternative indigenous model of peace-building in Nigeria as an insider or participant-observer; therefore, he is aware of how this worldview has helped in reconciling warring factions during intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic clashes, and also building structures of peaceful living within the ethnic group (Joubert & Alfred, 2007). The argument for this model is premised on the fact that foreign models of peace-building like peace-making and peace-keeping have not helped matters in Nigeria because the processes end up destroying more lives than saving them. This is clear from the activities of some military personnel who have been brought out of their barracks to keep or enforce peace. Many of them have turned more deadly than peace-builders. Maltreatment and extortion of money from innocent citizens is also a form of violence unleashed on citizens by these so-called peace-keepers. *Isuum-Ngi* as an indigenous worldview is postulated in this paper in line with David Bosch's notion of *missio-Dei*, which sees every sphere of human life as integral mission of God. He describes this as wholistic mission of God in the world, aimed at promoting well-being and peaceful co-existence in the society (Bosch, 1991). It seeks to uphold and promote the well-being of the human society through the recognition of the common *humanity* that binds people together. Even religion and politics do not bind people together as *humanity*.

As a creation worldview that has potential for that promoting reconciliation, peaceful living and co-existence, *Isuum-ngi* is always sung as a reconciliation poem by the *Kadung* ethnic group whenever there is break of law and order resulting into violence:

Suum-ngi shan gama, ip-boh gong-gong maghi piagha wor kap mora. I-yan bbaghaka magha ko yaba sogha rami dhalla dha kap mora, I-kop diag-diag magha mu kopsora na mu dara sogha rami shembella; Adimori yighi lishem ni'm; I sha dusa bbeh, adusa shiri, a dusa kaal, a dusa yallagha, a dusa

gallura, a dusa wondon; wo wari araghat, wo kena dha araghat; ko gha wo yah a mujana, kogha wo yah dhak, suum shiri yighi didam ni'm; anak-mori ghat; adimori ghat; arama dhalla mora ghat; tom mori ghat, dhaksara mori ghat. Awamaghi dhalla miwomi sha dhak ni; nungvya nikapsana shadhak.

[*Humanity* is more than a joke; it is so deep that it can cover all of us; it is wide enough to provide space for each one of us; it is high enough to accommodate every one of us regardless of our different sizes. Our origin is like a chameleon; some of us are red, some as black, some are white, some are yellow, some are blue, some are green, some are mixed, but all from the same origin, and rushing to the same destination. As human race, we are like termites, coming from one mother and one father. We have the same space to occupy, common responsibilities to accomplish, and common challenges to face. What peaceful relationship cannot do for us, violent conflict and division cannot do for us either] (Lusa, 2010).

The poem above is always used to remind warring factions of their common *humanity*, origin, essence and destiny. Whenever this poem is sung, warriors sheath their weapons because it reminds them of their brotherhood and sisterhood as human beings.

Isum-ngi emphasizes the 'one-ness' and 'same-ness' of the plant, regardless of its separate parts, as a basis for 'one-ness' and 'same-ness' of human beings (Pokol and Kaunda, 2015). This seeks to facilitate promotion of peaceful living across all divides. The fact that the male, female, and other creatures originated from distinct parts of the yams only explains diversity in creation and not differences (Lusa, 2010). *Isum-ngi* provides that if everyone plays their essential roles and respects the other's role because of their essential oneness, peace reigns. Impotent and destructive hierarchy comes in only when people forget their essential unity and begin to use their essential quality and responsibility selfishly and disregard others. The idea is that peace-building ought to start from treating each other on the basis of our common *humanity* as contained in *Isum-ngi*. If we recognize our essential one-ness and respect that one-ness, social constructs such as religion, politics, and indigene/settler identities will never lead us into taking arms against each other.

***Isuum-ngi* and promotion of a beloved community**

In a beloved community, discrimination, exploitation, oppression and marginalization are removed from social relationships (King Jr., 2013). There is always the recognition that people are called to love their neighbours, that is all others, so that each individual becomes someone who both loves and is loved by others (Gamwell, 2005). In the beloved community, war, marginalization, oppression and strife are excluded (King Jr., 2013). Here, human beings live together as an organic community. In this community, we are reminded that our call to common love is an expression of the creator's love for us because we are made in his image and likeness (Genesis 1:26 NIV). The command to love is not imposed in order to exploit or debase humans but is, rather, given by God who wills us good; who wills all the good life (Gamwell, 2005). *Isuum-ngi* advocates that the individual is related to the community in such a way that the highest reaches of his individuality are dependent on the social substance out of which they arise and they must find their end and fulfilment in the community (Niebhur, 1994). The principle of *Isuum-ngi* also implies that in this world, the principal source and end of good life is human mutuality (Gamwell, 2005). It is only the realization of the community of love as human mutuality that is the principal source of inclusive worldly end of the good life and God wills for all. Calling this community, a source of our flourishing means that empowerment is a gift from our life together (Gamwell, 2005) as human beings.

The general nature of loving others is giving of oneself in a manner that seeks their own good; in mutual love, therefore, each receives creative opportunities from her or his relations to the others (Gamwell, 2005). Human peace and flourishing require a kind of mutuality between the human community and the orders and creatures of its natural habitat. For this reason, we can say in summary that human mutuality is to be maximized and is, in this sense, our inclusive world end. Such mutuality is the community of love in which all are both beneficiaries and benefactors, each empowered for the greatest possible achievement, and making the most of this opportunity and contributing to further creativity of all (Gamwell,

2005). *Isuum-ngi* also calls for maximizing love among all humans and in the longest possible run...to emancipate all through and for the sake of maximal human mutuality.

Another message of *Isuum-ngi* is a call to unity and celebration of mutuality through the promotion of survival opportunities and peaceful co-existence. Just as the God of Christianity calls all humans to direct their purpose towards the community of love and to maximize the creativity of all humans, *Isuum-ngi* does the same (Gamwell, 2005).

***Isuum-ngi* and the principle of justice in the community of love**

Stopping at human mutuality and community of love alone may sound too utopian or romantic because of the presence and persistence of sin in the world. Even Christians are still weak and susceptible to fall. Augustine of Hippo has warned, “Political rule will only greater evil without recognition that sin is an irrevocable feature of the human condition (Gamwell, 2005), this is partly why even the use of guns alone cannot restore peace in broken relationships. So far from mutuality from which all benefit and to which all contribute, our life together will always be profoundly invaded by overt or covert exploitation and strife. To avoid misunderstanding, then, it is well to stress that the community of love is an ideal to be pursued.

Critique of peace-keeping and peace-making strategies

It is to be argued that the Nigerian authorities will finish all resources on peace-keeping and peace-making and still fail to achieve positive peace in the country unless alternative indigenous models of peace-building like *Isuum-ngi* are explored with deliberate intention to instil consciousness about essential humanity and sanctity of human life as enshrined in the above model. Whatever that are causing break down of peace in Nigeria are social constructs or imported ideologies that prove irrelevant to Nigerians; hence, the need for indigenous model of peace-building. One could make bold to argue that all military officers brought out to the check-points should return to their barracks because they inflict violence and violence cannot quell violence. Violence is a symptom of some social injustice, which must be radically addressed through contextual indigenous approach. Modern nation states have always used peace-keeping and peace-making as models of peace-building thinking that peace will result

but to no avail (Pokol, 2021). Jacques Ellul (cited in Reeve, 1984) has described the uselessness of every modern state as “totalitarian recognizing no limit either factual or legal. This is why I maintain that no state in the modern world is legitimate. No present-day authority can claim to be instituted by God, for all authority is set in the framework of a totalitarian state. This is why I decide for anarchy” (1976).

This paper re-emphasizes that what Nigerian Government has been doing to build peace in the country is a fruitless effort. This argument is supported by the fact that peace is not just the absence of actual battle, but of known willingness to battle (Rouner, 2004). The nature of violence in the country is not in the actual terrorist acts, kidnapping, armed banditry and corruption, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary (Rouner, 2004). It is only a proper awareness of human essential unity and respect thereof for sanctity of life as created in the image of the make that can be effective in building peace in Nigeria.

***Issuum-ngi* worldview and gender discrimination**

Such a worldview and retrieval of culture tends to justify African patriarchal society and the exploitation of women. Care must therefore be taken otherwise instead of fostering peace-building, it may work the other way round. What happens to husbands who are protected by their wives? What about single parent-females who have their own houses, who protect them? It is even an over-statement to say that males are stronger than women. Therefore, while the *Issuum-Ngi* worldview offers an important analogy for peace-building and theology of peace, one ought to be careful about its implications on gender issues (Pokol, 2021).

***Issuum-ngi* and social constructs**

It is worth stressing here that Nigerians need to relate to each other based on *Issuum-Ngi* as a peacebuilding model that contributes to formulating a healthier model of essential oneness of humanity based on a common humanity above what human beings have constructed for themselves. The world is characterized by life-denying conflicts and this is rooted in humanity’s deviation from and denial of a common *Issuum-Ngi* (*lit*: humanity) (Adu, 2012).

Isuum-Ngi tends to call for the reconstruction of destructive social constructs by arguing for a return to the recognition of our common humanity.

Isuum-Ngi maintains that since all creation originated from the same origin, they share a common origin, common essence, and are moving towards a common destination (Lusa, 2010:20). These common grounds give creation equal standing, equal identity, and equal dignity (Adu, 2012). The basic implication of this is that every human being possesses a common *humanity*, a common origin, common identity, common dignity and equity, based on humanity or human-ness. It implies that what makes human beings what they are is not what they do, but what they are essentially. It also means that being a Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, or African Traditionalists does not matter because none of these can make anyone more or less human. Our basis of living in peace should therefore be our common origins, common essence, and common destination. The poor and the rich are all human; white and black people are all human; the indigenes and the settlers are all human; whatever we have chosen to be, can be changed; but our essential humanity cannot be changed or replaced. Hurting the fellow human being, therefore, means denying them humanity and hurting oneself (Lusa, 2010).

The concept of *Isuum-Ngi* is similar to what Martin Luther King Jnr. calls the “single garment of destiny” (King Jr., cited in Chunakara, 2013), focusing on mutual interdependency so that constructed fences are not making bad neighbours. These profound natural and organic common grounds call for peaceful living. This notion of peace speaks volumes against social constructs that divide us. Human beings are so tied together that whatever happens to one happens to all.

Although Nkrumah made this statement in a political context, it is true that there is more that unites human beings than there is that divides them. Selfishness, greed, and hatred are not primarily against social values but against a commonly shared humanity. When people take their eyes from their common origins, common essence, and common destination, they begin to value social constructs above their common natural and common origins, essence,

identity and dignity (Lusa, 2010). This deviation seems to be the source of all conflict and violence in society. Mother Teresa (cited in Wallis, 2014) once remarked that “if we have no peace, it is because we have forgotten that we belong to each other [and for each other].” *Isuum-Ngi* serves as a reminder that despite what human beings have made of themselves and constructed for themselves, they still have a common ground that binds them together, which is *Isuum-ngi* (Lusa, 2010).

Suum-ngi puts human beings in the same boat and at the same level. One can change religion, political association, cultural identity, and social status, but no one can change their humanity. The argument here is that if our understanding of what constitutes a neighbour does not transcend our ethnic, religious, and political boundaries, we debase our common humanity and we create a situation that will lead to life-denying crises. M. K. Gandhi (cited by Reeve, 1984) argues that:

All living creatures are of the same substance as all drops of water in the ocean are the same in substance. I believe that all of us, individual souls, living in this ocean of spirit are the same with one another with the closest bond among ourselves. A drop that separates soon dries up and any soul that believes itself separate from others is likely destroyed...In all situations of conflict, there is something in the opponent that can be appealed to—not only common humanity but... that of God in man...no one can be utterly and finally an enemy because no one is without that divine spark within them...people may consider themselves to be our enemies, but we should reject such a claim... it follows that in injuring others, we are injuring the whole world of which we are part, and injuring the ultimate truth or reality which we call God (Gandhi (cited by Reeve, 1984).

Gandhi is right because no matter how much we tend to hate one another, we cannot take them away from their Creator nor can we gain anything from it. Religion appears to be the worst enemy against our common *humanity* in this century, but the sooner we realize that no social construct should tear us from our natural oneness, the better for us. In a recent sermon entitled, “See if you can find a man among you,” (Scottsville Presbyterian Church Sermon, 21 June 2015), Roderick Hewitt observed that all religions are guilty of terror. He went on to argue that:

God is not the enemy of your enemies. He is not even the enemy of his enemies. When God hates all the same people that you hate, you can absolutely be certain that you have created him in your own image...All forms of dehumanization, demonizing those who differ from you, treating your neighbour as the other, and claiming that God is on your side alone...fanatical claims of absolute truth. Doubt-free, no question asked, an uncritical confidence that one understands such absolute truth absolutely...Blind obedience to totalitarian, charismatic, and authoritarian leaders or their views that undermine moral integrity [are responsible for violence].

^ If the understanding of neighbour does not transcend our ethnic, religious, and political boundaries, then it debases our common *humanity* and a situation is created that may threaten life itself. *Suum-Ngi* locates all human individuals in a position of caring for each other because of common origin, essence and destination. It aims to promote unity in diversity and the welfare of the community. It challenges all forms of discrimination and violence among human beings and it seeks to uphold the principles of the kingdom of God which are love, forgiveness, cooperation, equity, compassion and, because of their common heritage, the celebration of community. *Suum-Ngi* and other African wisdom tropes and philosophies may attest that peaceful living is inherent in the culture of Africans but because they have allowed in foreign social constructs many of which have been imported and forced upon them to determine how they treat each other; peaceful living has given way to life-denying violence.

Conclusion

This paper has argued for alternative indigenous model of peace-building to replace the peace-keeping and peace-making that the Nigerian Government has been using fruitlessly for many decades without much result. The paper has critiqued the above models because in the process, more lives have been lost and the root causes of violence left unaddressed. The author has postulated *Isuum-ngi*, an indigenous worldview as having more relevant potential for promoting peacebuilding without taking arms to quell violence. The author has argued that proper awareness of our common *humanity* originating from the same source and sharing common essence is able to create respect for sanctity of life, thereby causing us to treat each other on the basis of the Golden Rule (Matt. 7:12 NIV).

Recommendations

- i. It is incumbent on us all to return to our common *humanity* to see that any injury inflicted to others is also our own injury. We are caught in inescapable garment of destiny so that no one becomes anything until he or she allows other become what they want to become. Africans need to reinvent those life-giving philosophies that they allowed colonialism to wash away.
- ii. There is something about the Nigerian religious that is peculiar and dangerous to life. Mbiti's submission (1969) that "Africans are incurably religious" is valid but it is spitting death on the Nigerian citizens because religion has become dangerously divisive. Religion has promoted strife and division among Nigerians.
- iii. Every government's policy should be judged by its effects on the development of the multitude ordinary citizens. The grinding poverty and starvation with which our country is affected is such that it drives more and more men [and women] into the rank of beggars, whose desperate struggle for bread renders them insensible to all feelings of decency and self-respect.
- iv. Nigerian seems to have contributed to the destruction of peace in our society in many ways. For instance, during the recent Christmas celebration, most of the fuelling stations in the cities locked up their stations even when there was no official communication for price increase from the authorities concerned. Such business individuals did this just to overheat the already tight economic challenges in the country.

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ISLAMIC, POLYGYNY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Polygyny has been a long existing form of marriage among the nations of the world before it was popularised by Islam. Islam introduced it with limitation in the number of wives. This work aims at explaining Islamic views on polygynous system of marriage and domestic violence. It employs the qualitative research design, depending on secondary sources in gathering data. The study finds that Islamic polygynous system emanated from Allah's injunction as enshrined in the Qur'an. It puts it that polygynous system in Islam is not resorted to without reasons; some situations necessarily make a man marry more wives. Also revealed in the study are the principles of justice that are expected from the part of husband towards his wives. The study further reveals the act of domestic violence and its forms which include physical, emotional, forced marriage and economic. It provides Islamic solutions to these problems as to ensure a peaceful society. The study recommends that Muslim men should consider polygynous system in Islam as a problem-solving and not as a fashion. It further recommends that every member of the Muslim family including husband and wife should avoid domestic violence through adhering to what Islam dictates. It concludes that polygyny is an acceptable institution in Islam with laid down principles about how husband and wives should treat each other fairly.

KEYWORDS: Polygyny; Domestic Violence; Islam; Perception.

INTRODUCTION

Polygyny is not a new phenomenon. It has always been with mankind from time immemorial among different people in various parts of the world. The Arabians were polygynous even before the advent of Islam. The Arabs used to marry a large number of women and considered them as a chattel. The situations were so with people of other parts of the world (Doi, 2000: 144). With the introduction of Islam, polygynous system was restructured among the Muslims to a limited number and women were liberated from evil acts that are being perpetually committed against them. However, domestic violence was also common amongst the Arabs and other peoples of the world before the coming of Islam. The weak and the needy, orphans and widows, and slaves and servants had no defined rights. Islam then came to establish justice and mercy in the heart of a cruel world and prohibited any oppressive behaviour (Al-Wani, 2021: 1). Living in peace guarantees tranquility among people and especially within matrimonial homes where husband and wife or wives with other family members live. Husband and wife are considered as the originators of the family who must imbibe peace in their dealings in order to have a health society.

There are various existing studies on polygyny and domestic violence. Mwambene (2017: 2) submits that polygynous system of marriage has long been perceived to be in conflict with the ideas of gender equality, violating the dignity of women, increasing women's risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, damaging emotions, and is considered to be economically oppressive. Africa Regional Sexuality Resource Center (2005: 10) affirms that polygyny leads to abuse of wives as a result of economic hardship and desire of some Muslim men to marry more wives with the hope that such will be a panacea to their poverty. It is of this reason this research is conducted as to clear the misconceptions about the polygyny as relates to Islam religion. In Islam, polygyny is introduced to solve the societal problems and not as a contributing factor to the problems.

On domestic violence, Adeyemo and Bamidele (2016) explain that it is a regular part of most women's experience, especially in the homes where the expectation of every member

is the attainment of uplift and growth. They mention the cases of domestic violence in some of the world. They explain that it has become a significant problem in the United States, estimating that approximately 2 million women in the United States are severely assaulted by their partners each year. In South Africa, the Department of Justice estimates that one out of every four South African women is a survivor of domestic violence. In Nigeria, Women and girls are subjected to multiple forms of domestic violence. Due to a lack of official statistics, it is difficult to establish the extent of domestic violence as hundreds of cases go unreported and undocumented (178-179). In their own analysis, NOIPOLLS (2016) establish that there is an increasing prevalence of domestic violence in Nigeria of which causes are constant economic hardship, misunderstanding and impatience between couples, lack of trust, disrespect from the side of women and lack of moral values (7-8).

This therefore gives the researcher a great opportunity to present the views of Islam on domestic violence as to make people realize its effects on marriage and make corrections through the prescription of Islam.

Historical Background of Polygyny

Historically, Islam did not introduce polygyny. Polygyny was common among nations of antiquity. Among the Hindus, polygyny prevailed from earliest times. It was also common among the ancient Assyrians and Persians and no restriction as to the number of wives a man might have. Although Greece and Rome were not polygynous societies, having concubines was a norm in those societies (Islam House, 2020: 2).

Polygyny is as irresistibly fascinating in the American public as it is controversial. The moral issues relating to polygyny have been debated in the United States of America, where some states prohibit polygyny. In the Western countries, however, there are diverse cultures that participate in polygyny (Tsoaledi and Takayindisa, 2014). Polygyny continues to be widely practised among the Africans. This is so despite the bid by Western feminists to try to eradicate the practice in an effort to improve the status of American women (Tsoaledi and

Takayindisa 2014). This historical evidence proves that polygynous system was not first recognized in Islam. Thus, it should not be seen as a new development.

Definition of Polygyny

In the Oxford Dictionary, polygyny is described as the custom of having several wives at the same time (Hornby, 2000: 900). In Islam, polygyny is seen as an established marital practice sanctioned by the Qur'an, which allows a man to take up to four wives providing the cares for each equally (Wendy, 1998: 5). The first definition as given by Hornby makes it clear that polygynous system as understood by many has no limited number; one could take as many wives as he could since there is no legal ruling guiding it. In the second definition, it becomes obvious that Islamic polygynous system is rooted from the Qur'anic injunction with a limited number of wives one could have under him; minding the fact that equitable treatment must be maintained.

Undoubtedly, polygyny in Islam serves as a divine mechanism whose purview is social security and stability. It takes into account all the human variables and provides men and women with variable options. Islam permits a Muslim to marry up to four wives if he is sure of fair treatment among them (Ishiaku 2014). Therefore, before any criticism should take place, there is need to carefully study the concept of polygyny in Islam. The careful study will make the critics realize the goal of Islamic polygynous system as being different from what it was taken to be.

Polygyny in Islam

The practice of polygyny in Islam was originally from the authority of a verse in the Qur'an. The verse has been repeatedly read by Muslims in support of legality of polygyny in Islam. The verse reads:

And if you fear that you will not deal justly with the orphans, then marry those that please you of (other) women, two, or three or four. But if you fear that you will not be just, then (marry only) one or those your right hand possesses. That is more suitable that you may not incline (to injustice) (Q4: 3).

This verse was revealed after the battle of Uhud in which seventy Muslims were martyred. Suddenly, seventy homes in Madinah were bereft of all male members, and the question arose as to how all these widows and orphans were to be cared for. This was an acute social problem. It was solved by the revelation of this verse asking the people who could afford it to take care of the orphans, and marrying the widows and keeping their orphaned children under their guardianship. The principle of polygyny as enshrined in the above verses is designed, in actual sense, to save women from ignoble consequences. The permission to practice polygyny was not given in order to enable men to satisfy their sexual urges alone (Wahiduddin, 2021: 4, 17). The injunction in the verse specifically related to the above-mentioned incident but is applicable to all the time. It was designed as a practical strategy to solve problems as it will be revealed in this study. It could also be understood from the above verse that only men who are capable morally and financially can opt for polygynous marriage.

Here, it is important to consider the modernists' approach to the practice of polygyny in Islam. The modernists see Islamic polygamous system as an out-mode that does not conform to the western pattern of life. They tried to misinterpret the verses of the Qur'an that legalize polygyny; saying that polygyny is not allowed in Islam. They referred to the Qur'anic chapter where Allah says:

And you have it not in your power to do justice between wives, even though you may wish, but do not disincline (from one) with total disinclination, so that you leave her as it were in suspense (Q4: 129).

The modernists consider this verse as a clause and a legal condition attached to polygynous unions. They, therefore, argue that polygynous system is not allowed in Islam because a man who marries more than one wife puts himself in an impossible situation. When he fears justice, he must not marry more than one wife (Doi, 2000: 149). They, however, forget the fact that the justice referred to in the (Q4: 3) quoted earlier only relates to the humanly possible equitable treatment which includes residence, feeding, clothing and other conjugal rights. The justice referred to in the verse quoted by them as evidence for nullifying Islamic polygynous system is in the matter of love and sexual intercourse. It is an undisputable fact

that no one can control his heart since it is entirely in the hands of Allah; and one may satisfy one wife better as compares to the others (Ibn Abbas 99). Since this was not in the intention of man, it is not his fault and hence, he will not be held responsible.

In the west, Islamic polygynous system is seen as an act of gender-based violence that may result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats, such as, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life. It is a discriminatory practice which has very real consequences for men and children. In this kind of system of marriage as believed in the west, it is real for many Muslim women that their future husbands will likely take another wife thereby influences their perception and management of their relationship. The financial impact of polygyny leaves many women facing increasing financial hardships as their husbands fail to maintain multiple wives and children (Muslim Institute 1). It has to be realized that Islam does not make it obligatory upon Muslim to marry more than one wife. Also, it does not oblige woman to marry a man who has another wife; it is optional for her. Polygyny in Islam is not as presented in the west. It is a kind of institution that protects both husband and wives from placing themselves in potentially unlawful situations or abnormal sexual behaviours and protects women from the type of suffering that can occur from being without a husband (Tukur, 2018: 49).

It must be realized that the objective of marriage in Islam is to have a healthy family where man and his wife or wives and children live in peace, love and harmony as required in the following Qur'anic verse:

Among His signs is that He created mates for you from yourselves that you may find rest in them, and He puts between you love and compassion; most surely there are signs in this for a people who reflect (Q30: 21).

It is, therefore, expected of the Muslims to follow instructions of Allah and not to pay attention to what enemies of Islam put forward. Allah has strongly enjoined the Muslims to adhere to whatever His Messenger brought to them and abstain from whatever he prohibits them. The Qur'an reads:

And whatever the Messenger give you, accept it, and from whatever he forbids you, keep back (Q59: 7).

This means Islam is sufficient as a way of life. Whatever it brings is beneficial and should be practised by the Muslims and whatever it prohibits is harmful which must be refrained from.

Situations that allow Polygyny as Best Solution in Islam

In Islam, a man marries more wives if he has the capability. Yet, some conditions may warrant a man to take another wife in order to ease some difficulties. The conditions could be:

1. When the wife is suffering from a serious disease like paralysis, epilepsy or a contagious disease. In this circumstance, it will be better if there is another wife to look after the needs of the husband and children.
2. When the wife is proven barren and after the medical examination, the experts have given their opinion that she is not capable of bearing a child. The husband should then marry a second wife so that he may have children since a child is a joy of life.
3. When she is of unsound mind. In this kind of situation, the husband and children will suffer a great deal.
4. When the woman has reached the old age and has become weak and cannot look after the house and the property of the husband.
5. When the husband finds out that she has a bad character and she cannot be reformed. He should then have another wife.
6. When she has moved away from the husband's house and has become disobedient and the husband finds it difficult to reform her, he should then take another wife.
7. During the period of war when men are killed and women are left behind a very large number, polygyny can provide the best solution.
8. If the husband cannot do without a second wife in order to satisfy his natural desire which is very strong and when he has means to support her, he could take another wife (Doi, 2000: 146).

These situations are evidences to the fact that one results to polygyny based on reasons; considering oneself as being capable of taking care of the wives and children.

Marriage institution is not for fashion but to fulfil the divine injunctions with the aim of attaining multiple rewards.

Principles of Justice and Equality in Islamic Polygynous System

Islam strongly emphasizes the principles of justice and equality in polygynous practice. It is not just in a matter of material things or time sharing among wives but it also includes affection that becomes foundation in a household. Men and women are entitled to enjoyment of peace, comfort and happiness in marriage, especially if the relationships are established on the principles of truth and fairness. These can undoubtedly inspire mutual trust, love and mercy between husband and wife. Being fair in polygyny is nowadays considered to be challenging for husbands (Rahmin et. al., 99). Husband must try by all means to deal with his wives justly. This is emphasized in the Prophetic tradition that states:

One who has two wives and he is inclined to one of them, he will come on the Day of Resurrection with a side hanging down (Abu Dawud, 133).

Furthermore, the rights and honour of the Muslim woman have been made secure by Allah's directives concerning the treatment of women in the Qur'an where it reads:

And treat them kindly (Q4: 19).

Man has been instructed to care for his wives in an equitable fashion. The implication is straightforward and profound. Wives should be accorded the best equal treatment. Nor should a husband having more than one wife make his inclination so obvious as to kindle jealousy and ill-feeling which may lead to constant hostility among the wives. In terms of time division, this could be determined by night stay. A man may divide the nights by giving one to each wife according to the Prophet's (SAW) practice; however, he may also divide them on the basis of two each or three to each wife. If, however, a man has four wives, it would be preferable to divide his time on the basis of one night each, whereby, each wife would get a chance to be with her husband every three days (Bilal and Jones, 1999: 50 -57).

This implies that once a Muslim marries more than one wife, it is essential for him to treat them equally in the matter of food, residence, clothing and other conjugal rights as far as is possible. If one is a little doubtful of equal treatment in fulfilling his wives' rights, he must

not take more than one wife (Doi, 2000: 147). Surely, every wife has equal right with her husband regardless of whether she comes first or last. All must be taken care of on equitable basis.

Domestic Violence in the Practice of Polygyny

Domestic violence has been described in various scholastic works. United Nations Children's Fund (2000: 2) sees domestic violence as the violence perpetrated by intimate partners and other family members. Another definition states that domestic violence is seen as a threat or exercise of physical, psychological and emotional violence (Marianne, Elisabeth and Anita 2). This means any type of force against another person with the intent of inflicting harm or exercising power and control over them. The perpetrator is said to belong to the victim's domestic environment.

As studies established, in the practice of polygyny, women are subjected to injury or distress, thus depriving them of their human rights and fundamental freedom; which could invariably limit or put a barrier to their socio-economic, demographic and healthy performances and development (Ayotunde, Oludare and Martin, 2017: 539). Globally, approximately 30 percent of women aged 15 and older have experienced physical or sexual intimate partner violence. Polygyny, a marital structure common to rural sub-Saharan Africa is strongly associated with heightened rates of intimate partner violence (Natalie and Victor 2).

Violence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. Similarly, the United Nations Committees on the elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has vehemently condemned violation against women in whatever respect (Nancy, et. al., 534).

The above submissions try to protect women against domestic violence without looking at the fact that women as a key part of the family also need to fulfill some responsibilities and display honourable behaviour towards their husbands. In Islam, people

are treated equally without gender basis. No one must cheat another, and the responsibilities of every spouse, male or female, are clearly prescribed as to allow peace to reign in the families. This therefore gives the researcher the opportunity to explain, based on divine texts, how Islam provides solutions to domestic violence in the later analysis.

Forms of Domestic Violence in Polygynous System of Marriage

The following are forms of domestic violence that are common between husband and wives in a polygynous system of marriage:

- (a) Physical Violence: This is seen as the most common form of domestic violence in polygynous system of marriage which is usually experienced by women from men. This includes raising abusive words, kicking, slapping, chocking and pushing.
- (b) Emotional Violence: This is considered as the hardest form of domestic violence for it includes embarrassing the victim of abuse in the presence of family members or threatening to hit the victim with the object or a weapon.
- (c) Forced Marriage: This also leads to domestic violence since one of the couples has no interest in the contract, arguments tend to occur (Asere, 2019: 10-11).
- (d) Economic Violent: This has to do with economic abuse which may include denial of funds, refusal to contribute financially, denial of food and basic needs (Naseem et. al., 5440).

All these forms of domestic violence have a profound impact on the victim of abuse, especially women. Female victims are at risk of behavioural and psychological problems which may include suicidal behaviour, depression and anxiety (Asere, 2019: 13). Men, therefore, need to exercise patience regarding the imperfect habit of women.

Islamic Solutions to Domestic Violence

Islam plays a vital role in addressing issue of domestic violence and provides spiritual treatment to the victims. All family members in an Islamic home are expected to live in peace; father fulfilling the rights of children and vice versa, husband fulfilling his rights towards the

wife and vice versa. Everyone in the family needs to be respected (Sharifa, 2019). The Qur'an declares the relationship that is required of the believers, where it states:

The believing men and women are allies of one another (Q9: 71).

The Qur'an also emphasizes that all people are created equal in worth and value regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or class. They must, therefore, seek all the possible means to prevent any act of violence among themselves (Alwani 1). On the nature of their creation, Allah says:

O mankind! Fear your Lord, Who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah, through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed, Allah is ever, over you, an Observer (Q4: 1).

In the aspect of domestic violence that usually occurs between husband and wife, Islam provides procedural steps in addressing it and vehemently discourages it. This is because the relationship between a man and a woman is to be one of kindness, mutual respect and caring. Several Qur'anic verses enjoin kindness to women, among which is the following verse:

And treat them kindly; then if you hate them, it may be that you dislike a thing while Allah has placed abundant good in it (Q4: 19).

Islam has laid down the procedures to be followed by the husband if there is misunderstanding between him and his wife. This is to protect the violence that may result from such. These procedures are enshrined in the following verse:

Men are in charge of women by (right of) what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend (for maintenance) from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient, guarding in (the husband's absence) what Allah would have them guard. But those (wives) from whom you fear arrogance, advise them; (then if they persist), forsake them in bed; and (finally), strike them. But if they seek no means against them. Indeed, Allah is Ever Exalted and Grand (Q4: 34).

According to this Qur'anic verse, if a husband fears his wife's egregious or defiant behaviour, he should follow three-step procedures to solve the situation. First, he must verbally advise her against her actions and correct her mistakes. If this does not improve the

situation, he must then abandon her bed as a display of his disapproval. If that too does not prove effective, then the final measure has been translated as administering a symbolic gesture of physical discipline. The physical discipline does not refer to hitting at all; it is only to be a symbolic gesture that reflects one's anger. These procedures were arguably instituted as a means to regulate an initial surge of anger by requiring the husband to essentially cool down and not to inflict harm upon his wife (Tesneem et. al., 6).

On the part of wife, it is also expected of her to seek peaceful means with her husband. Islam has enjoined on her maintenance of full respect towards her husband, which implies obeying and submitting to him absolutely except in a case of disobeying Allah. This will surely obstruct all sorts of domestic violence (Abu Bakr, 2003: 344). The Prophet (SAW) said:

If I am to command anyone to prostrate before another, I would have commanded the wife to prostrate before her husband (Abu Dawud Vol. 2, No. 2,140).

The wife must always protect her husband's property and dignity and must not go out of the matrimonial home except with her husband's permission. She must submit herself to him whenever he needs her in bed except in the case of fulfilling religious obligation like Ramadan fasting. The Prophet (SAW) said:

If a man invites his wife to his bed and refuses, and so he spends the night angry with her, the angel will curse her until the morning (At-Tirmidhi Vol. 1, 285).

Both husband and wife must be ready to fulfil their rights. This will curb any violent act that may disrupt the peace of the family. It is sure that if both the father and the mother are at peace, their dependents will imbibe such from them.

Conclusion

On a final note, polygynous system of marriage is an acceptable institution in Islam which limits the number of wives to be taken by a man to four. Man must try by all means to maintain justice among his wives especially in cases of residence to be provided for them, feeding, clothing and other conjugal rights.

However, domestic violence that usually occurs among the family members including the husband and wife is a threat or exercise of physical, psychological, economic and emotional abuses. It usually has an impact on the victim, especially women. Islam enjoins people to live in peace as they come from the same source, and both husband and wife to seek peaceful means of living together in order to have a healthy society.

The study therefore recommends that Muslim men should see Islamic polygamous system as a problem-solving and not as a fashion. They should try possible means in upholding the laws of Allah regarding the marriage, especially on the issue of treating wives equally. Domestic violence should be avoided by all members of family including husband and wife through obeying what Islam prescribes.

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ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL APATHY IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the nexus between electoral violence and political apathy in Nigeria. Electoral violence is one of the factors that precipitate the contemporary political apathy that threaten democratic consolidation because; democracy cannot thrive without popular majority participation in electioneering process. It looks at some conceptual clarification after reviewing some literature on electoral violence. After a critical look at some of the various causes of electoral violence in the country, the writer discovers that a high level of uncontrollable electoral violence will lead to unmitigated level of political apathy. It is against this background that it recommends amid others: the strengthening of Electoral Act, 2000; political campaign should be based on issues and not on individual personality, condemnation of money politics, intra-party democracy and the creation of a level play-ground for all political contestants etc; that will prevent electoral violence and a panacea to mitigate the level of political apathy.

KEYWORDS: Governance, Democracy, Apathy, Violence, Voter

INTRODUCTION

Elections and votes are sacrosanct and indispensable for democracy and good governance to thrive in any political system; be it presidential or parliamentary system of government. However, elections and votes (electioneering) activities in Nigeria have always been characterized by pessimism, uncertainty and fear for the safety of people's lives and property due to electoral violence (Ihonvbere, 1994). It is a threat to the nation's quest for stable and consolidated democracy. Since the attainment of political independence, the incidence of electoral violence has often threatened the fabrics uniting the various ethnic groups as one single entity; known as Nigeria. The undesirable violence and loss of innocent lives after the 2011 Presidential election, made many doubtful of the ability of Nigerians to control the electioneering event in 2015 (Falana, 2015). Some pessimists doubted the existence of Nigeria as one country between the years of 2014 and 2015 (Adeleye, 2013).

Violence in Nigerian politics does not just happen spontaneously, but begins from political or electoral conflicts; which end up as political or electoral violence when not properly managed. The populace no longer has confidence in official election results whenever being announced by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) or states electoral commission as a result of the physical and psychological aspects of the violence that must have occurred before, during and after the election. In Nigeria, electoral violence is more entrenched because our political system is supportive of zero-sum game politics; where only the winner takes it all. This is why Otoghile, (2009) described electoral violence as the radioactive by-product of some structural and attitudinal dislocations in the society which affect the level of political participation of the citizenry.

Nigerian politicians usually rhapsodize their political campaign speeches with rhetoric of party slogans and speeches. Thus, most of the electorates and populace are often carried away without any recourse to political rationality; but often, other political opponents may see this rhetoric of party slogans and speeches as threat to their winning election. Hence, some populace that are politically naïve and myopic are often used by the political class as thugs

and assassins (political patsy) to perpetuate electoral violence. It is most worrisome that security agencies are always indifferent whenever violence takes place at different campaign ground, political rallies and polling centres during electioneering. Essentially, the availability of money has enormous influence on the conduct and nature of general elections in all democracies; whether consolidated or transitional (Eme and Okeke, 2011: 87). Money is legally needed by the state and political actors to legally finance political activities from time to time. It is legitimately needed by political parties and political actors to actualize their political ambitions. However, in Nigeria, politicians finance elections illegally and wrongly to influence the outcome of election results.

Violence has become part of the political culture in Nigeria such that all elections are virtually violent ridden (Olarinmoye, 2008). Violence has been prevalent in the nation's general election to the extent that before the 2015 General election, "a Non-Violence Accord" was signed in Abuja by the presidential candidates of the political parties that took part in the election. Mr. Kofi Anan and Chief Emeka Anyaoku, former Secretary General of the United Nations and Commonwealth respectively, jointly presided over the signing of the Non-Violence Accord (Falana, 2015). It is sad that political leaders dissociate themselves whenever an act of violence in electioneering takes place and condemning the perpetrators that they will surely be brought to justice. At the end of the day surprisingly, the perpetrators of the violence go unpunished; and in extreme case, the politicians go behind to engage the services of lawyers to defend the perpetrators. The people who then are at the receiving end are the ordinary people, whose hope in the democratic system as a medium of optimizing good governance is subverted.

Conceptual Framework

Governance

Governance basically refers to the activity, process or quality of governing (Nnamdi, 2009). It helps us to evaluate the activities and effectiveness of a particular government, rather than the machineries of the government being put in place to make a state move forward. This is

why every contemporary political system is concerned with good governance as a measure of evaluating a good or responsible government. Jega (2007:142) defined good governance in terms of transparency and accountability of public officials, responsible conduct, as well as their responsiveness to demands, needs and aspiration of the governed. Good governance therefore, is a positive and invaluable outcome of a good democratic system.

According to Obadan (1998), good governance consists of five fundamentals:

- accountability of Government (Political leaders and bureaucrats) for public funds and resources;
- transparency in government procedures, processes, investment decisions, contracts and appointments;
- predictability in government behavior;
- openness in government transactions and a reliable flow of the information necessary for development to take place;
- observance of the rule of law must be adhered to by government and its citizens.

Good governance refers to the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 1992). Hence, good governance is used to evaluate the socio-economic and political policies of government policies in terms of its impact on the societal values

Electoral Violence

Violence is a behaviour that is intended to hurt or kill somebody (Hornby, 2005). It could either be crimes, acts or threat of violence against any person; be it physical or emotional that hurts feelings. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual against oneself, another person or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood or resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation (WHO,2002). It is any act that causes or may cause any person physical, psychological, emotional, sexual, verbal or economic harm; whether, this occurs in private or public life, in peacetime or in conflict situations (Ladan,

2012). Electoral violence therefore, means any act of violence perpetuated in the course of political activities: including pre, during and post-election periods in any of the following forms:

- When dangerous weapons are used to scare voters leading to political apathy.
- Manipulation of electoral machinery; regulations and results.
- When dangerous weapons are used to cause bodily harm to any persons involved in electoral process.
- Arson and destruction of property.
- The use of thugs to disrupt political meetings; political campaign or political rallies.
- Any civil action against political opponents.

Fisher (2002) defines electoral violence (conflict) as any random or organized act that seek to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, destruction of property or assassination. Essentially, electoral violence has often been a stumbling block in the nation's (Nigeria) unity and progress.

The Concept of Political Apathy

Apathy is the feeling of not being interested in or enthusiastic about something or thing in general (Hornby, 2005). Politically, political apathy is the indifference on the part of any citizen of any country with regards to his/her attitude towards political activities (Harder, 2008). This could be generated through indifference feelings towards voting, political rally/campaign, electoral activities or any other political activities in a country.

Electoral Violence and Political Apathy Nexus in Nigeria

Electoral violence has in most often times polarized the electioneering process in Nigeria Polity. It could either be physical or psychological violence. A lot of lives and property are lost in electoral violence. For example, "it was revealed by the Ahmed Lemu Report in 2011 that 943 people were killed while 838 others were injured in the political violence which

greeted the announcement of the result of the presidential election in some States in the North and Akwa-Ibom in April 2011” (Falana, 2015).

It was unfortunate that the 626 suspects who were arrested in connection with arson culpable homicide and other grave offences perpetrated during the civil disturbances have been left off-the-hook on account of official impunity that has become the order of the day under the current political dispensation (Falana, 2015).

Hence, electoral violence has created threat to lives and property un-abated in the country during electioneering.

All these has created political apathy on the part of the electorates; where they are no longer showing interest in political activities; and most especially indifference in the electioneering process. Firstly, there is usually low turn-out of eligible voters to register and vote in an election. Irrespective of public enlightenment campaign by the government, some people now see public holidays given them by the government for voters’ registration as ample opportunity for them to go to farms or relax at their various homes while some adult male youths take advantage to play football openly on major streets. Even when few people are out to vote it creates poor legitimacy on the government that will eventually come into power; and exhibit poor governance. The populace makes jest of the period set aside for the registration of voters being declared and created by the government. These political attitudes of adult populace arise as a result of threat to lives and property during electioneering process or period in the country.

Secondly, political apathy is also exhibited by the electorates when a definite period of time is created for the revision of voters register by the Independence National Electoral Commission (INEC). This is the period when and where the eligible voters that have registered go back to authenticate their names, addresses etc. Most Nigerians are no longer interested in it because they often feel that their vote will not count at the end of the day due to electoral violence before, during and after election; that could take place physically or psychologically. Moreover, the registration of eligible voters were seen as exercise in futility because they hardly see the need to go and collect their permanent voters card (PVC). They are indifferent

about the electioneering process as their enthusiasm is brought down as a result of electoral violence which has remained prevalent. For example, prior to the 2019 General election as August 2018, it was reported by INEC that over five hundred thousand (500,000) PVC were yet to be collected from them by the electorates in Edo state. The electorates often complain that they no longer have confidence in any official electoral result in the polity. There is the usual belief that any official result announced by INEC must have been manipulated by the political elites through electoral violence; hence becoming indifference in the collection of their PVC.

In addition, electoral violence discourages substantive number of electorates from going out to vote in an election. With unprecedented political thuggery and uncontrolled violence characterized by wanton destruction of lives and property, election is then described as warfare (Ake, 2001). The electorates have become scared for the question of their lives and property safety. These electoral politics have signalled serious danger for the consolidation of democratic and partisan politics in the country. Essentially, any electoral violence in an election usually has a “ripple effect” in the number of electorates that will vote in an upcoming election. The electorates in the country are now seeing their voters’ card as means or medium for personal official identification and not for use in an electioneering to vote.

Again, electoral violence has made some citizens to be indifference as regards any political activities. Lack of confidence in the electoral system has resulted to the renting of crowds for political rallies and campaigns; because the populace now sees such as being violent ridden. Political campaign and rally grounds have been turned into places for thuggery and assassination. This is more worrisome because all these nefarious political activities are even optimized with the presence of security operatives at political campaign ground. In the campaign for the gubernatorial election in Ekiti State in July 14th, 2018, there was electoral violence as the governor was “tear-gas” by the police during a rally (Vanguard, July 12th, 2018). The election was more scaring to the extent that over 30,000 police personnel were drafted to control or prevent violence in the election. Other scaring aspect of electoral violence

is that it has led to the unwillingness of some good and zealous Nigerians to contest into elective political offices, due to lack of confidence in any incumbent government political attitude, etc.

Causes of Critical Electoral Violence in Nigeria

There are many causes of electoral violence in Nigeria. There has been a high cost of contesting election into political public offices via political parties in the country. Overtime, after the spending of huge amount of money by political office seekers, they then go at all cost to ensure that they do not lose; having the “zero-sum game” as their guiding principle. This high cost poses huge threat and constraint to the electoral process; the cardinal principle of democratic consolidation (Yagboyaju, 2012).

This cost is so high as to be prohibitive to all but the richest men, or those who have their hands on public fund (Ebohon and Obakhedo, 2010). In the 2015 General election, the fees for the collection of nomination form by the People Democratic Party (PDP) candidates and the All Progressive Congress (APC) candidates were quite shocking. This is shown in Table 1 and 2.

Table 1: Fees for nomination form for 2015 elections (PDP)

Position	Fee for Nomination form ₦ (Naira)	Fee for Expression Of Interest (EOI) form ₦ (Naira)
Presidential candidate	20 million	2 million
Governorship candidate	10 million	1 million
Senatorial candidate	4 million	500,000
House of Rep candidate	2 million	500,000
House of Assembly candidate	1 million	200,000

Source: Vanguard (2004: 4)

Table 2: Fees for nomination form for 2015 election (APC)

Position	Fees for nomination and EOI form ₦ (Naira)
Presidential candidate	27 million
Governorship (Incumbent governors)	10.5 million
Governorship (Fresh aspirants)	5.5 million
Senatorial candidate (Sitting senators)	5.3 million
Senatorial candidate (Fresh aspirant)	3.3 million
House of Rep. Candidate (Returning)	3.2 million
House of Rep. Candidate (Fresh aspirants)	2.2 million
House of Assembly (Sitting Law makers)	800 million
House of Assembly (Fresh aspirants)	550 million

Source: Adopted and modified from Odunsi, 2014

The fallout of these, account for the undemocratic attitude of most of the elected and appointed public officials since the commencement of the Fourth Republic (Yagboyaju, 2012). Some of them even go out to take loans from friends and financial institutions, which must be paid back; and even with interest. Hence, the political class and elite now see politics as investment where financial returns are expended and can go at any length and extent to use any means; mostly violence to win election. The mindset of investing high monetary cost in politics often leads to poor governance on the part of the political class.

There is buying of votes by some political parties; most especially by those in power or strong financial base. There has always been the intimidation of voters with “vote buying” by the political class in different polling stations and polling booths during electioneering in

the country. This act is often perpetuated directly with the use of political thugs; thereby exhibiting the act of thuggery at different polling station. This hinders the public and electorates confidence in the electoral process and a spontaneous civil unrest in most cases whenever election official is announced by the electoral empire, INEC. Financial fraudulent means are used to induce the political party-choice of electorates at different polling unit and polling booth. This offence is committed by anyone who by abduction, duress or any fraudulent devices or contrivance impedes or prevents the free use of vote by a voter or thereby compels, induces or prevails upon any voter either to give or refrain from giving his vote (Mohammed, 2014).

Vote buying was prevalent in the Edo State gubernatorial election in 2016 and that of Ekiti in 2018. No fewer than five persons were arrested by the Nigerian Police Force in Ado-Ekiti, the State capital for allegedly distributing money to voters during the election (Vanguard, 2018: 4). It was obviously seen and known that both the APC and PDP were involved in the vote buying. Consequently, any political party that feels it not being able to pull the upper financial muscle upon the other will result to multiple voting and ballot snatching. In order to recoup the huge money spent in electioneering by the buying of votes, The political class in power will never think of good governance, as they now see politics as money making venture. The incidence of rigging in election is another cause of electoral violence in the country. Election rigging is an act of influencing election process and its outcome in a dishonest way in order to get the result that is wanted. Election rigging could be before, during or after an election. It could be in any of the following forms:

- The use of fake ballot paper;
- Diversion or snatching of ballot boxes or paper;
- Through Jerry-mandering;
- By multiple voting;
- By obvious under-age voting;
- Voting by unregistered person;

- Ballot box stuffing;
- Creating artificial scarcity of ballot papers;
- The use of thugs to scare away voters;
- Manipulation and forgery of official election results etc.

Any of these forms of election rigging often makes official election result to be outside the expectations of the majority of the electorates. It usually leads to spontaneous negative reaction at the declaration of election results; leading to violence. This is possible according to Awowede (2003) “because elections are not won through hard-fought electioneering but through rigging,” Thus, those in political power will never think of probity and accountability. Following the political violence which greeted the announcement of the result of the Presidential election in some States in the North and Akwa-Ibom in April 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan setup the Ahmed Lemu Panel to investigate the crisis (Falana, 2015). The declaration of the election result in the election led to wanton destruction of property and loss of lives.

Another cause of electoral violence is the gale of defection from one political party to another. This is a cause of violence where politicians decamp (move) from one political party to another; most especially in a year penultimate to any general election. This act often brings hatred and the flexing of muscles between those that defect to another political party and those that are existing members of the political party on how to win election at all cost by getting involved in violence. The defector(s) to other political part are now seen as political enemies.

The lack of level playing ground for different political parties and political contestant. The same level of play-ground is never created for the political parties and contestant that contest in election in the country. A ruling party or incumbent political leaders in power use undue influence in power to subjugate the oppositions. Adequate official securities are never provided for the opposition party members because any party in power control security operatives in the country. A case in point is the Ekiti gubernatorial election, where the APC has the Federal might; the Nigerian Police did not approve the political campaign rally that

was done by a PDP gubernatorial candidate and party members. The police gave security reasons as the excuse for not permitting the political campaign rally. In an attempt by Governor Ayodele Fayose, a PDP member to forcefully organize the political campaign rally turned into political violence; where “the governor was said to have sustained a neck injury, following the melee that trailed the firing of tear-gas by the police” (Vanguard, 2018).

There are so many abuses of electoral practices in the country; most especially during electioneering and the perpetrators go unpunished. Political office seekers and supporters do not operate within “the rules of engagement”. They are exhibited in most ways: as deliberate false campaign propaganda, where top political leaders make inciting statements by dissemination of calumny rumors about political opponents, total disregard of electoral outcome by incumbent office holders, the illegal use of official vehicles by public officers for political campaigns, the use of private vehicles to carry electoral materials. A case in point was the use of Edo City Transport Service, (ECTS) buses by the Action Congress for political campaign in the Edo State 2012 gubernatorial election. The crisis of impunity is compounded during electioneering by the partisan involvement of the authorities of the police, the armed forces and other security agencies in the electoral process. These acts of corruption have become a way of life in Nigeria which any government incumbency finds it difficult to ignore (Ejragbe, 1997). It is intriguing to note that members of the political class responsible for instigating the plethora of violence as well as their foot soldiers who undermine the electoral rules by perpetuating this impunity are always left the hook (Albert, 2011).

The incidence of Godfatherism is also an issue in electoral violence. A godfather is a father figure and mentor who guide a godson to the positive path due to his financial and political status. However, in Nigeria, “political godfather carries a pejorative connotation of a small band of willful individual who monopolizes power and use it for their own advantage” (Wilson, 1996). The godfathers often recruit unemployed youths as political thugs to perpetuate electoral violence. One of the problems of the Nigerian State today is the democratization of violence and since the state had lost its essential attribute of violence (a

process in which the godfathers themselves had been complicated), the godfathers' cash in on that to use their ill-gotten wealth to hire and equip unemployed youth with latest weapons which they use as political thugs to maim, terrorize and kill those who oppose them in the game of politics (Ogbonmwan, 2005).

The issue of "Winner Takes-all" syndrome in the Nigerian polity. This is another cause of violence in election in the country; where the system of government is inherent in where only the contestant that wins an election takes it all. These factors make political contest a "do-or die" affairs and most especially as a result of the lucrative nature of political offices. This winner takes-all syndrome is more heightened in the country as politicians see politics as a lucrative business to venture into; and apply Machiavelli in philosophy that; the end justifies the need.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This paper has attempted to show the relationship between electoral violence and political apathy. After the initial introduction, efforts were made to review the existing literature on the subject and made conceptual clarification. It is the position of this paper that there appears to be a robust relationship that exist between electoral violence and the increasing trend of political apathy in the country.

In the light of the above, it is necessary to recommend that the Electoral Act of 2010 in the country should be strengthened. Section 150 of the Electoral Act has empowered the INEC to deal with and prosecute electoral offenders, but it lacks the capacity to discharge the onerous statutory duty. Hence, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) should take up the task of prosecuting electoral offenders throughout the country. To tame the surge of electoral violence and offences, the punishment for electoral offenders should be firmer because it has been observed that the punishments are too weak. Any Politian or anybody found guilty of any electoral violence should be banned in active politics for ten years. This will help to deter would be offenders. Complementary, it is also recommended that political elites and their agents be banned from active politics for the years after serving the jail terms on conviction.

Besides, political campaign should be based on issues and not on individual personality. This should be implemented absolutely to curb campaign of calumny that most times precipitates electoral violence in the polity. Political parties in the country should be registered by INEC based on their parties' ideologies and discouragement of money politics. This is because an ideology supporter and sympathizer (in case of sympathy votes) religiously believe in an ideology which gives direction and form the basis for intra-party unity and cohesion (Epelle, 2006). This, according to scholars would lead to the discouragement of money politics and the encouragement of the politics of debate, ideas and competing programmes; the defense of the interest of the people and the accomplishment of the public purpose and the only way the people can be protected from the ravenous appetite of political godfathers and money-bags (Osagie, 2006). This will discourage the gale and inordinate defection of political elites from one political party to another; and reduce the "do-or-die" syndrome in election.

A level playing ground should be created for both those contestants in the ruling party and the non-ruling party. This should be equity in the provision of publicity and security to any ruling party contestant and constants in other political parties. When this is done, all the contestants will be able to campaign within the conferment of the Electoral Act. Still on the level play-ground, vote buying and other forms of electoral rigging should be condemned by all parties involved for the proper prosecution of those involved.

The suggestions may not be the magical ways or solution that can purify the society of political violence; and the contemporary trend in political apathy; but they are worth considering.

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THE LEGAL USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN A DIGITAL AGE.

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ABSTRACT

Artificial intelligence has the potential to revolutionise the way states and international organisations seek to manage international migration. It is gradually going to be used to perform tasks, including identity checks, border security and control, and analysis of data about visa and asylum applicants. To an extent, this is already a reality in some countries such as Canada, which uses algorithmic decision-making in immigration and asylum determination, and Germany, which has piloted projects using technologies such as face and dialect recognition for decision-making in asylum determination processes. The article's central hypothesis is that AI technology can affect international migration management in three different dimensions: by deepening the existing asymmetries between states on the international plane; by modernising states and international organizations traditional practices; and by reinforcing the contemporary calls for more evidence-based migration management and border security. The paper examines each of these three hypotheses and reflects on the main challenges of using AI solutions for international migration management. It draws on legal, political and technology-facing academic literature, examining the current trends in technological developments and investigating the consequences that these can have for international migration. Most particularly, the article contributes to the current debate about the future of international migration management, informing policymakers in this area of growing importance and fast development.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Migration, International Law, Management

INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence (AI) technology is increasingly used in public and private domains to perform tasks usually associated with human intelligence, such as the ability to learn from data, the capacity to recognise images and speech and process natural language (Nilsson 2014; Ertel 2018). The focus on such technologies is not recent though Alan Turing investigated the potential for machines to think already in 1950 (Turing 1950), and AI as a discipline was initiated in 1956 with the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence (Moor 2006). Since then, the exponential increase in computational power combined with the availability of large quantities of data ignited the contemporary surge in interest for AI (Russell and Novig 2010). To date, no machine has passed the Turing test, and it thus remains to be seen whether one day a computer will be able to think like a human being (Turing 1950). Still, references to AI, machine learning, and algorithms have progressively permeated the social sciences and humanities scholarship (Crawford and Calo 2016; Calo 2017; Kitchin 2017).

AI is understood here as a growing resource of interactive, autonomous, self-learning agency, which enables computational artifacts to perform tasks that otherwise would require human intelligence to be executed successfully' (Taddeo and Floridi 2018: 751). Simply put, AI is 'a set of techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines' (Calo 2017: 404). One of these techniques is machine learning or 'the systematic study of algorithms and systems that improve their algorithms' knowledge or performance with experience' (Flach 2012: 3). AI thus refers to technologies that perform tasks usually associated with humans and act intelligently by learning from data with the aid of algorithms sets of instructions used to solve problems. Algorithms have been used for millennia but have gained importance in our contemporary societies due to the power of computers to gather and analyse large quantities of data at a speed that is far superior to what a human being would be capable of doing.

Artificial Intelligence algorithms draw on vast amounts of data, including big data, to learn and make inferences about patterns and future behaviour. Big data, or the high velocity,

complex and variable data, has great potential to be used in forecasting and managing migratory flows. AI algorithms are said to increase efficiency by streamlining repetitive tasks, notably those that require the review of large amounts of paperwork (Chui et al. 2018). AI thus has the potential to revolutionize the way states and international organizations seek to manage international migration. AI is gradually going to be used to perform tasks, including identity checks, border security and control, and analysis of data about visa and asylum applicants (Chui et al. 2018). To an extent, this is already a reality in some countries such as Canada, which uses algorithmic decision-making in immigration and asylum determination (Molnar and Gill 2018), and Switzerland, which is currently testing an algorithm to improve refugee integration (Bansak et al. 2018). In the European Union, the revised Schengen Information System will be using facial recognition, DNA, and biometric data to facilitate the return of migrants in an irregular situation (Regulation 2018/1860). These examples illustrate well the current trend of increasing reliance on new technologies, including AI, for international migration management and border security.

Against this background, the article examines the role of AI technologies on international migration management. Migration management is understood as the different strategies, policies, processes, and procedures negotiated and adopted by relevant actors at the international level to provide a framework to manage migratory flows in an orderly and predictable manner. This notion thus directly relates to that of migration governance but has a narrower scope (Crépeau and Atak 2016). Migration management is a contested notion. As Castles notes, the political will and assumed capacity to manage migratory flows is often contradicted by reality, as migration is a complex phenomenon that cannot be easily managed (2004b: 214). Still, states and international organizations have made it clear that they wish to ‘manage large movements of people’ through the ‘implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies (New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 2016). Therefore, the article focuses specifically on the role of Artificial Intelligence in easing

international migration management. This choice is justified by the growing uses of AI technologies by states and international organizations in the field of international migration.

Concept of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence **is** the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience. Since the development of the digital computer in the 1940s, it has been demonstrated that computers can be programmed to carry out very complex tasks.

However, decades before this definition, the birth of the artificial intelligence conversation was denoted by Alan Turing's seminal work, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence, which was published in 1950. Turing, often referred to as the "father of computer science", asked the question, Can machines think? He came out with a test, famously known as the "Turing Test", where a human interrogator would try to distinguish between a computer and human text response. While this test has undergone much scrutiny since its publication, remains an important part of the history of AI. Since the term was first coined in 1956, AI has gone through different definitions. The term artificial intelligence was first used at the second Dartmouth conference organized by John McCarthy, one of the founding fathers of AI. Most definitions of AI revolve around simulation of intelligent behavior by computers.

According to Anand, Artificial Intelligence as a continuum consists of: Assisted intelligence — where AI has replaced many of the repetitive and standardized tasks done by humans. Augmented intelligence — where humans and machines learn from each other and redefine the breadth and depth of what they do together. Autonomous intelligence — where adaptive/continuous systems take over in some cases (Anand S Rao 2016). However, one of the most popular AI textbooks provided a more precise definition by Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig published a book, Artificial Intelligence, A Modern Approach, define AI as the designing and building of intelligent agents that receive percepts from the environment and

take actions that affect that environment. This view of AI brings together a number of distinct subfields of computer vision, speech processing, natural language understanding, reasoning, knowledge representation, learning, and robotics, with the aim of achieving an outcome by the machine (Stuat J Russell and Peter Norvig 1995).

Artificial Intelligence is increasingly used throughout the Migration Cycle, for example, to facilitate pre-departure identity checks, support online visa applications, manage administrative decision-making, enable smart border processing, and produce data analytics on travelers' compliance with legal frameworks. Systems that think like humans, systems that act like humans, systems that think rationally and systems that act rationally Alan Turing's definition would have fallen under the category of systems that act like humans.

Concept of Migration Management

It is important at this juncture to know the meaning of migration before delving into the concept of migration management. Migration is the movement of people from one place to another. Migration can be within a country or between countries. Migration can be permanent, temporary or seasonal. Migration happens for a range of reasons. These can be economic, social, political or environmental, religious. Push and pull factors drive migration. Migration impacts both the place left behind and the place where migrants settle. These impacts can be both positive and negative, however, it is not within the purview of this article to discuss the negative or positive aspects of migration but we focus on management of migration.

Migration management is a term used to encompass numerous governmental functions within a national system for the orderly and humane management of cross-border migration, particularly managing the entry and presence of foreigners within the borders of the State and the protection of refugees and others in need of protection. It refers to a planned approach to the development of policy, legislative and administrative responses to key migration issues (Eteri Rubinskaya 2020).

Migration occupies a very central place in the regional integration process. In order to realise the core objectives of the free, safe and orderly movement of persons - migration has

to be effectively managed. Migration is also intrinsically tied to migration challenges such as irregular migration, human smuggling and human trafficking and other cross border crimes like car theft, armed robberies and fugitives' migration. At the same time, migration across borders provides opportunities such as increased legal labour migration which has a positive impact on remittances, transfer of technology and increased cross-border trade, which benefit both the receiving and sending countries. To that extent, migration has to be managed in a manner that reduces the negative effects and maximises on the positive aspects.

As a process, therefore, migration comprises stages, actors, policy considerations, stakeholders' partnerships and several other post-migration elements. In order to maximise the development potential of migration, a planned, organised and coordinated approach to the management of migration is necessary. In the second half of the twentieth century, globalization processes combined with sweeping changes in global political and economic systems led to a drastic intensification of interstate territorial movements of people and the formation of fundamentally new global patterns of migration. For example, for the last half century, the total number of classical international migrants in the world increased by more than three times from 75.46 million people in 1960 to 232 million in 2013 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Report September 2013). If we add here other categories of migrants (migrant workers together with their family members, undocumented migrants, pendulum migrants, seasonal and border workers, forced migrants and economic tourists, *i.e.* migrants who are involved in the business connected with crossing of a border using a tourist visa), then the total number of inhabitants of the globe participating in international migration exceeds 1.2 billion people. Thus, international migration became one of the global phenomena affecting all aspects of the community life and world politics.

Thus, a logical question has arisen about whether this phenomenon can be managed? To answer this question, it is necessary to identify the management of social phenomena. In our opinion, this term can be described by a simple formula: forecast plus policy. And in reality to manage effectively a social phenomenon or process means both to understand clearly the

current developmental trends of the process and also to conceive its prospects. The latter also allows forecasting migratory processes which are often connected with demographic forecasting, especially when we talk about the analysis of the world population, and its regional and national distribution.

According to forecasts by UN experts, the world population will amount about 9.7 billion people by the year 2050 and by the end of this century 11 billion compared with 7.2 billion in 2014. By the same period of time, the number of classical migrants in the world will double and exceed 450 million people. If we speak about all categories of migrants, the number, by our estimates, will approximately triple and amount 3 billion people (UN Report 17th June 2019, New York)

The use of Artificial Intelligence to manage migration matters, with reflections on key strategic challenges and opportunities in this important area of new technology is necessary. While AI can certainly bring about a series of advantages for policy and practice, there are a range of risks to State and non-State actors including migrants that need to be carefully managed, especially from regulatory and human rights perspectives.

Experiments with new technologies in migration management are increasing. From big data predictions about population movements in the Mediterranean, to Canada's use of automated decision-making in immigration and refugee applications, to artificial-intelligence lie detectors deployed at European borders. States are keen to explore the use of new technologies, yet often fail to take into account profound human rights ramifications and real impacts on human lives. These technologies are largely unregulated, developed and deployed in opaque spaces with little oversight and accountability.

Technology is not inherently democratic and human rights impacts are particularly important to consider in humanitarian and forced migration contexts. An international human rights law framework is particularly useful for codifying and recognising potential harms, because technology and its development is inherently global and transnational. More oversight and issue-specific accountability mechanisms are needed to safeguard fundamental rights of

migrants such as freedom from discrimination, privacy rights and procedural justice safeguards such as the right to a fair decision-maker and the rights of appeal. Over-reliance by countries on artificial intelligence to tackle international migration and manage future migration crisis could lead to serious breaches of human rights. Artificial Intelligence can help states and international organisations prepare for large movements of people, and improve reception conditions. But it should not be used to reinforce unlawful practices, bar entry and discrimination.

The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Migration Management

The following are the roles of artificial intelligence in international migration management for ease of records and identification of migrants.

Processing migration visa applications: Using artificial intelligence for processing visa applications is faster than using human beings for manual processing. For instance, over a decade, Hong Kong's Immigration Department has been using eBrains, an award-winning AI technology that uses to process visa applications. AI technology provides decision support for millions of annual visa applications.

Preventing irregular migration: There is evidence of a growing capacity to use Artificial Intelligence in border control and border management as part of an expanding security market that in Europe alone is predicted to be worth \$146bn by 2020⁹⁹ (J Eager et al 2020 Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality life policies June 2020). In October 2018, the European Union announced it was funding a new automated border control system to be piloted in Hungary, Greece and Latvia. The system, called iBorderCtrl, uses smart lie-detecting avatars to question travelers seeking to cross borders.

Labour market polarisation: As automation replaces human labour across entire national economies, thereby impacting the international economy, the net displacement of workers by machines might exacerbate the gap between returns to capital and returns to labour. This will lead to an increasing segregation, or polarisation, of the job market into low-skill pay, and high-skill pay sectors, and a deeper hollowing out of middle-income jobs.

Use of Artificial Intelligence in border control and Security: *The use of artificial intelligence in border control has sparked a debate over ETIAS and the role AI will play in their processes: what screening technologies are involved when entering Europe and other countries.* Despite being widespread throughout the western world, the use of artificial intelligence continues to be a cause for debate, particularly when it comes to facial recognition and the monitoring of an individual's movement. Whilst some applaud the ability of AI to offer a level of security that humans alone cannot attain, others express concerns regarding the collection and use of personal data by robotics.

However, when used properly and for legitimate purposes, AI is extremely useful and is helping society make advances in important areas such as law enforcement in migration management. For instance, European Union has embraced machine intelligence as an unbeatable mechanism in tackling the ongoing global challenges of terrorism and human and drug trafficking whilst abiding by its own guidelines for trustworthy AI published by the Commission in April 2019.

AI in detecting criminals using facial recognition: Interpol, the organization that facilitates global police cooperation, has long used facial recognition to identify criminals. The effectiveness has been proven in a number of high-profile cases. In 2018 an internationally wanted murder suspect was caught after an image of the individual was compared against records held in Interpol's facial recognition database. Whilst the use of facial recognition for remote identification is currently only used in exceptional circumstances, the European Commission released a White Paper in February 2020 with a framework for more widespread use of trustworthy AI in the future. It is possible that facial recognition could be expanded and used as a highly effective tool for stopping dangerous foreigners from entering countries they are not wanted.

Biometrics, smart borders and machine intelligence: To meet world, travelers need a biometric passport should be use. A biometric passport contains all the biographical information found in a machine-readable document in addition to certain biometrics. This

biometric data will be used by the Entry-Exit System, a key component to prevent irregular migration and protect citizens. By registering the arrival and departure passengers, nationals, Entry and Exit System will employ biometrics to identify overstayers and prevent identity fraud.

Artificially intelligent lie detectors at borders: Artificial Intelligence guards provide a more secure solution to border control than human officers thanks to their ability to detect: Suspicious movement pattern and pick up on body language indicating deception

AI use in identifying unusual movement: Visiting the same country on many occasions, each time with different children, AI border guards can help apprehend people involved in organized crime such as human trafficking. Another interesting development is the ability of AI to spot non-verbal communication which suggests that someone is lying. AI technology has proven to be effective in detecting lies using cues such as facial expressions and shifting backward and forwards, something which may be difficult for humans to pick up on. For example, there is increased use of AI at Schengen Area exterior borders which will not only boost security but also reduce waiting times: smart gates are generally faster and more efficient than the manual alternative.

Keeping Travel Data Safe and Secure: European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) is managed by the agency eu-LISA, which is dedicated to keeping details safe. State-of-the-art technology will be used to encrypt personal data, protecting it from cyber-attacks and identity theft. In line with the EU's principle to protect the fundamental right to privacy, the information collected by ETIAS systems will only be accessed by authorized personnel, such as border authorities or police officers, when necessary. Travelers closely linked to developments in AI will be safe than compromising security. Digitalization will make the world safer than ever before for residents and visitors alike. This can apply to other countries of the world in the use of AI.

Use of Artificial Intelligence at Sea borders patrol: Sea borders tend to be more difficult to patrol than land borders, so the European Union is particularly interested in technologies to

monitor the Mediterranean Sea. The area has been an issue of prime concern following the refugee and migration crisis of 2015-16, and leaders have since repeatedly rallied around Member States' efforts to halt irregular crossings. Notably, Roboder was conceived to detect environmental threats in addition to irregular migration and smuggling. In its first real-world demonstration, the AI technology successfully detected a simulated oil spill off the coast of Portugal by using flying and submarine drones that combined imaging with fluorimeter technology.

Quest for Universal Legal Regime for Artificial Intelligence in Migration Management

It is important from the onset to note that technology OutSpace regulation. Despite the rapid expansion into border zones and fast uptake by border control agencies, regulations and guidelines for the deployment of AI have been slower to evolve. In April 2021, the European Union released the first ever legal framework for AI in an attempt to regulate the technology before it becomes even more mainstream. Crucially, the proposal for harmonized rules specifically mentions AI systems in migration, asylum, and border control, claiming these processes can affect particularly vulnerable people. International regime will ensure accuracy, non-discriminatory nature, and transparency of AI systems in ensuring that the rights of vulnerable populations are protected.

Lack of rules that would impact major technology companies and insufficient focus on people affected by AI systems. Human Rights Watch has called attention to significant exemptions for law enforcement and migration control authorities in requirements to disclose how technologies work. Although the legal framework was viewed by many as path-breaking, the European Union excludes migrants from protections afforded to European Union citizens, this is already discriminating and bias . Still, the proposed regulation was broadly lauded in many spheres as a welcome and necessary step that could become a model globally.

The United States is yet to release a similar comprehensive framework, though there are signals from the Biden administration that AI regulation is taking shape.

Legally speaking, travelers and migrants are often afforded very different rights than residents or citizens, civil liberties and privacy advocates have raised legitimate worries about possible creep of technologies from the border. Ambiguity about the limits of border zones and the expanding use of AI are matters of serious concern. As promising as advanced technologies may assist in speeding travel, halting smuggling, and identifying environmental disasters, they may also have serious unforeseen risks that cannot be ignored.

AI technologies may be used to perform tasks including identity checks, border security and control, and analysis of data about visa and asylum applicants in a way which can cut costs and increase efficiency. This requires uniform rules, regulation and Laws to be enforced. This will make the process quicker and easier for migrants and asylum seekers. AI could also help countries to spot potential gaps in their reception facilities, adapting them to comply with their legal obligations under international human rights law. This will assist targeted maritime interventions aiming at returning migrants and asylum-seekers to places where they may fear for their lives or freedom may be at risk.

Artificial Intelligence is at risk of becoming another political tool, used to reinforce old state practices, aiming to curb international migration and prevent asylum-seekers from reaching their territories. The technology may bring innovation, reduce costs, and build more effective systems for international migration management. However, it is important that such tools are developed and deployed within ethical and legal frameworks, in particular international human rights law.

Challenges in the use of Artificial Intelligence

Computing Power: The amount of power these power-hungry algorithms use is a factor keeping most developers away. Machine Learning and Deep Learning are the stepping stones of this Artificial Intelligence, and they demand an ever-increasing number of cores and GPUs to work efficiently. They require a supercomputer's computing power, and supercomputers are not cheap. Not everyone can afford that with an increase in the inflow of unprecedented amounts of data and rapidly increasing complex algorithms (Pavan Vandalpalli Jan.8, 2021)

Limited Knowledge: One of the most important factors that are a cause of worry for the AI is the unknown nature of how deep learning models predict the output. How a specific set of inputs can devise a solution for different kinds of problems is difficult to understand for a layman. Many people in the world don't even know the use or existence of Artificial Intelligence, and how it is integrated into everyday items they interact with such as smartphones, Smart TVs, Banking, and even cars at some level of automation. The real problem is the knowledge of Artificial Intelligence.

Human-level: This is one of the most important challenges in AI, one that has kept researchers on edge for AI services in companies and start-ups. These companies might be boasting of above 90% accuracy, but humans can do better in all of these scenarios. For example, model predict whether the image is of a dog or a cat. The human can predict the correct output nearly every time, mopping up a stunning accuracy of above 99%.

Data Privacy and Security: The main factor on which all the deep and machine learning models are based on is the availability of data and resources to train them. There is data, but as this data is generated from millions of users around the globe, there are chances this data can be used for bad purposes.

Problem of bias: The good or bad nature of an AI system really depends on the amount of data they are trained on. Hence, the ability to gain good data is the solution to good AI systems in the future. But, in reality, the everyday data the organizations collect is poor and holds no significance of its own. They are biased, and only somehow define the nature and specifications of a limited number of people with common interests based on religion, ethnicity, gender, community, and other racial bias.

Data Scarcity: With major companies such as Google, Facebook, and Apple facing charges regarding unethical use of user data generated, various countries such as India are using stringent IT rules to restrict the flow. Thus, these companies now face the problem of using local data for developing applications for the world, and that would result in bias.

Conclusion

Inevitably, mixed migration will be affected in different ways by the radical innovations brought about by AI. While some changes may benefit migrants and refugees, others might not. To date, it is hard to see any balance between the advantages and disadvantages; instead, as global and regional inequalities widen. The development of AI technologies will likely impact international migration management in its three substantive dimensions. The relationships between the key actors, their practices, and the discourses shaping international migration management.

Recommendations

- i. Comprehensive migration governance in the use of Artificial Intelligence This aspect has a strong practical character, since it goes through the standardization of procedures and migration processes, and the strengthening of border management. In addition, implementation of strategies to exchange information for the regional generation of data that allow an international treatment of the migratory phenomenon should be encouraged.
- ii. Labor migration: Through the implementation of regional and bilateral agreements it is possible to promote circular and orderly labor migration flows. International cooperation in this area also favors the creation of mechanisms that strengthen the protection of labor rights for migrants.
- iii. Social integration: The actions between States allow greater integration of migrants and their families in the countries of destination, as well as returnees. Promoting actions at a regional level that recognize the positive contributions of migrants helps reduce prejudice and xenophobic actions towards these groups of people.
- iv. Trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling: It is essential to combat these crimes in coordination with the relevant regional bodies, but it is also necessary to strengthen the information and statistics system for a deeper understanding of

how migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons work, their areas of action and main victims, among other characteristics. SICA also aims to promote the consolidation of the Regional Coalition's work against these crimes.

- v. Comprehensive management of migratory crises: Regardless of the migratory status of a person, it is necessary to provide humanitarian assistance when someone needs it. This includes food, water, sanitation, shelter, health and safety care, and psychosocial support. The strengthening of mechanisms that allow the temporary or permanent protection of migrants, especially the most vulnerable, is a job that requires international cooperation to be effective;
- vi. Accepting States should take measures to protect fundamental human rights of all immigrants in their territory and ensure the respect for their cultural identity and measures should be taken to provide integration of immigrants and population of accepting countries;
- vii. States should take into account not only economic and social interests of their own countries, but also the issues of the wellbeing of immigrants and their families, and also demographic implications of migration;
- viii. States and International Organizations should try to find long-term solutions to the problems connected with refugees and movement of refugees, and to work in the direction of elimination of the causes of these problems by using AI effectively.

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**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL OFFENCES
COMMISSION (NEOC): A PANACEA FOR ELECTORAL FRAUD AND
CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA?**

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ABSTRACT

This qualitative study examines the rationale for the establishment of a separate statutory body known as the National Electoral Offences Commission (NEOC) to undertake the investigation, arrest, arraignment, and prosecution of offences listed in the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended and further so proposed). This development is sequel to findings by the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) set up by President Yar'Adua in 2007 that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had no power to investigate cases of alleged electoral crimes, lacked skilled manpower, time, and resources to effectively undertake the responsibility, and further conflicted where its staff were the offenders. NEOC has received formal legislative action with the passage of the establishment bill in 2021 awaiting assent. The problem is that NEOC's prosecutorial powers are subject to the overriding constitutional powers of the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) in that regard. This study used the qualitative case methodology approach to examine the key issues involved, with primary data collected from information-rich participants, while secondary data came from documents. Using the Electoral Justice System (EJS) as our conceptual framework, the work found that NEOC faces some key challenges to its effectiveness of which executive interference in the appointment of its members and in the discharge of its functions are prominent.

KEYWORDS: Commission; Electoral; Offences, Prosecution, Fraud, Corruption.

INTRODUCTION

Following alleged reports that the 2007 General Election was flawed and below national and international standards; President Umaru Yar'Adua promised to effect remedial measures. The idea of establishing a separate body to investigate and prosecute electoral offences crystallised during the proceedings of the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) set up by President Umaru Yar'Adua in 2007 which recommended among other things the establishment of an Electoral Offences Commission. Before then, the 2006 Electoral Act under which the 2007 elections were conducted had empowered the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to prosecute offences listed in the Act through its Legal Officers or any Legal Practitioner appointed by it (S. 158, Electoral Act, 2006). The provision was retained in the Electoral Act 2010 under S.150. It has however, been noted that INEC was encumbered in its prosecutorial powers as it did not have the power to investigate nor skilled personnel to undertake the task (O. Uzzi, former Director of Legal Services, INEC, personal communication, August 29, 2021). It was argued that the provisions of the Act, the procedure for investigation of electoral offences by the police, and subsequent prosecution of offenders by INEC did not meet the expectations of generality of Nigerians hence the search for a more effective process.

This study assessed key benefits of establishing a separate body for investigating and prosecuting electoral offenders, as well as the major constraints that could lead to the ineffectiveness of such a body being established as the National Electoral Offences Commission (NEOC). This study significantly contributes to the knowledge of benefits and constraints of electoral offences prosecution and ultimately to the literature of peaceful electoral process. The perceived problem which gave rise to this study is that of the effectiveness of prosecuting the electoral offences provisions of the Electoral Act as part of the Electoral Justice System (EJS) of Nigeria which like the election petitions proceedings for addressing challenges to election outcomes are special in nature, occurrences, and general characterization. Neither the police nor INEC has been optimal in enforcing the electoral criminal law, hence the bill recently passed by the Senate for setting up a dedicated agency to

take up that duty and responsibility. Thus, in order to get a viable result, two research questions are posited and these are; What justifies the establishment of the National Electoral Offences Commission (NEOC) in Nigeria? And how does the constitutional powers of the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) impact on the prosecutorial powers of the NEOC?

This work adopted and utilized the qualitative case study descriptive methodological design approach which employs the inductive reasoning, “building from the particular to the general on social problems occurring in natural setting with data collected by the researcher from multiple triangulated sources of open-ended unstructured interviews, documents, and focused groups” (Creswell, 2009). According to Creswell (2013) qualitative approach is also most suitable for evidence-based research involving the study of a case within a real life, contemporary context or setting. Our work is a descriptive single case study of effective prosecution of electoral offences with in-depth descriptive and analytical approach. The Electoral Justice System (EJS) was adopted as the conceptual framework of the study for its relevance and connection with our method of inquiry, data collection, and data analytical methods employed in the study. The concept of electoral justice according to International involves the “means and mechanisms available in a specific country for securing compliance and enforcing the electoral legal framework” (IDEA, 2010: 5). Inherent in the EJS framework is the electoral criminal law and administrative regulatory infractions that are both investigated and punished in accordance with the law or resolved in accordance with the electoral dispute resolution (EDR) subsystem in place.

Background and Literature Review

Competitive electoral politics is inherently full of conflict. Sometimes, the struggle for political power through periodic elections can result in breaches of the electoral laws and processes. The Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) and even the preceding acts did not define “electoral offences” (Ubanyionwu, 2016, 100). For purposes of our work, electoral offences can be defined as breaches of the laws regulating the conduct of elections and related processes

and requiring punishments. Such breaches and prescribed punishments are often provided as part of the electoral legal framework of the country.

In Nigeria, various electoral legislations known as Electoral Acts have always provided for the electoral offences section. The Electoral Act 2006 provided for them in Part VIII, sections 124-139, while in the subsequent Electoral Act 2010, they are listed in Part VII, Sections 117 -132. According to INEC (2019) the Electoral Offences and Penalties as provided in the electoral legal framework are available and accessible from its website for public enlightenment and voter education purposes (retrieved August 23, 2021, from <https://www.inecnigeria.org>). The offences relate to registration of voters, nomination of candidates, voting process, bribery and conspiracy, undue influence, campaign and campaign finance, finances of political parties among many others. The power to prosecute these offences vests in INEC (S. 158, Electoral 2006; S.150, Electoral Act, 2010) which may do so through its Legal Officers, or any Legal Practitioner appointed by it. However, the breaches where they occur, are investigated by the Police as INEC lacks the investigative power and skills. This situation created challenges for both INEC which became overburdened by the prosecutorial responsibility and the Police which became overstretched and somewhat distracted from its regular policing functions in addition to providing security for the conduct of elections. The foregoing situation made the quest for the establishment of a separate agency to investigate and prosecute electoral offences inevitable.

The National Electoral Offences Commission (NEOC)

ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (2011) maintained that a breach of public trust and peace can result from illegal acts that subvert the electoral process and therefore, enforcing the legal framework is essential to maintain electoral integrity. The ERC recommended among other things, the expeditious prosecution of all offences committed within the electoral contest (Section 2.6, p. 56, Vol.1, ERC). The ERC had further observed that the “prevailing atmosphere of impunity with regard to election offences should be ended by prosecuting and holding accountable those responsible for electoral offences, including those of a criminal

nature” (p. 55). Consequently, it recommended in its 2008 report the establishment of a special prosecutorial body to be known as Electoral Offences Commission to work independently in the investigation, arraignment, and prosecution of electoral offenders (p. 57).

The above recommendation did not find a place in our electoral justice system and administration until 2021 when the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria passed the Senate Bill SB. 220 of July 15, 2021 for “An Act to Establish the National Electoral Offences Commission (NEOC) and for Related Matters, 2019”. Electoral offences can be classified as negative conflicts which if not addressed, can quickly spiral into violent conflicts that could undermine the conduct of free, fair, and credible elections necessary for political stability and economic development. Prosecution of federal criminal offences in Nigeria including electoral ones are constitutionally deemed to be done with the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) which vests the office in Section 174 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution with the power to “institute, undertake, takeover, and discontinue any criminal proceedings that may have been instituted by himself or any other authority or person at any stage before judgment is delivered. The Attorneys-General of the states have similar powers with respect to state criminal matters in Section 211 of the Constitution. The powers can be exercised personally or through officers of his department or any other person so delegated by him. This is the basis for the power to enter “*nolle prosequi*” in criminal proceedings which directly translates to “not to wish to prosecute” (Cornell Law School, Retrieved September 1, 2021, from www.law.cornell.edu).

Ubanyionu (2016: 111) noted the importance of prescribing, prosecuting, and enforcing punishment for electoral offences and submitted that the “reason electoral offences go unpunished in Nigeria is as a result of the failure of the respective Attorneys-General to prosecute offenders, especially if those involved are members of the ruling party or were acting in the interest of the ruling party”. Ubanyionu (2016) did not however, go beyond the observation to address the specific challenges posed by the unchallengeable power of the AGF in the case of prosecutions by the NEOC. Ogbeide (2010: 12) stated that malpractices

characterize the conduct of elections in Nigeria since the first republic with “high level of political indiscipline, and electoral illegalities leading to collapse of democratic civil rule and consequent emergence of military rule in Nigeria” (p. 45), a position also posited by Kurfi (2013).

International IDEA (2010: 12) maintained that using “corrective and/or punitive measures, the electoral dispute resolution system (EDRS) ensures that elections are conducted in accordance with the provisions of the legal framework”. According to Enugworie et. al. (2021), the “ruling political elite who drafted the Electoral Acts “deliberately incapacitated INEC from vigorous detection and prosecution of violators of electoral laws by lumping prosecution to the mandate of the agency already overburdened by the task of conducting elections” (p. 53). Enugworie et. al. (2021: 54) concluded that “weak prosecution advances electoral interests of the dominant class”. It can thus be seen that some of the electoral offences like negligence of duty, manipulation of results done by INEC field personnel will run against the principles of natural justice for INEC to be the complainant, and at the same time the prosecutor in its own cause. Under this arrangement, the investigation of the complaint even if by the Police and the prosecution by INEC will raise issues of conflict of interest that could undermine the electoral justice system. This development clearly underscores the need according to Enugworie et. al. (2021) to have a dedicated agency to professionally undertake the detection, investigation, and prosecution of electoral offences but professionally but failed to address the constraints facing such a body.

Ezeogueri-Oyewole and Momoh (2020) reviewed the challenges of INEC in conducting elections in the first two decades of the fourth republic and submitted that INEC was found to play the function of “political stockbroker” with a tale of mixed blessings. David et. al. (2013) recommended the full implementation of the ERC report with particular reference to the setting of the “Electoral Offences Court to punish offenders” (p.51) but failed in their work to address the challenges that such a body was bound to face in the light of past prosecutorial efforts by both the police and INEC. Olawole et. al. (2013: 22) submitted that

“electoral fraud had continued in African countries unabated despite several recommendations in that regard”. The authors did not address the specific challenge of prosecution as part of the recommended measures. Kurfi (2013), and Okoye (2013) endorsed the establishment of the NEOC as recommended by the ERC but like all the reviewed literatures failed to interrogate the challenges that will constrain the effectiveness of such a nascent body. O. Ndeche (Submission to the United States Institute of Peace Roundtable on Elections in Nigeria at Abuja, September 3, 2019) stated that as part of intervention to mitigate electoral violence and malpractices, “an independent investigative and prosecutorial body, excluded from the AGF’s power of *nolle prosequi* under S. 174 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution should be established”. This position marks a departure from previous works as it directly addresses a key constraint on the powers of the AGF in relation to the powers of NEOC.

Analysis and Discussion

Our primary data comes from responses to unstructured open-ended key informant research questionnaire in a standard sequence and form with sufficient spaces to write in answers mailed to the participants with an introductory letter. This approach enabled the respondents to “open up and talk freely” (Creswell, 2013: 165). The questions elicited information from the respondent-participants about knowledge and experience of the subject matter of the study.

The stratified purposeful sampling strategy was used to deliberately select the most appropriate individuals with deep knowledge and experience in the matter and are willing to participate and communicate reflectively on the study. The nature of our study does not require width but depth, hence relatively small samples, even single cases can be selected purposefully. According to Patton (2002: 230), “the logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information rich cases for study in depth”. The stratification strategy is to enable selection of participants of special interest that can answer the research questions. As further asserted by Patton (2002: 240) “stratified samples are samples with samples”. In this study, we have selected 10 research participants who were independently mailed the research questionnaire with an introductory note explaining the purpose of the study. The participants

met the spread characteristics of age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, and residence. A major factor that influenced the sampling size was the time frame available for the cork which was very tight.

Our sample size $n = 10$ as follows:

- | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|---|----|------------|
| 1. | INEC members | = | 2. | (R1, R2) |
| 2. | National Assembly members | = | 2 | (R3, R4) |
| 3. | Legal Practitioners | = | 2 | (R5, R6) |
| 4. | Judicial Officers | = | 2 | (R7, R8) |
| 5. | Political Party leaders | = | 2 | (R9, R10). |

Where R is assigned to respondents to the interview questionnaire who are anonymised, and confidentiality strictly maintained. Additional phone calls were made in some cases as follow up to clarify some responses. Secondary data from multiple sources, reports, journal articles were also analysed for corroboration and evidence.

Data Analytical Strategies

Responses to five unstructured open-ended key informant questions woven around the research questions were received, read, and collated in MS Word as datasets, and thereafter, hand-coded using highlighter to identify themes and nodes running through them. The result of this stage of data analysis provided us with responses with recurring themes, sub-themes, and categories in relation to the research questions. These identified broad categories were compared with data from documents from our literature review. A measurement scale of 1-5 was used to analyse each response for relevance and establish a point of value in search of systematic meaning and connection to the research questions. The assigned researcher codes to the responses were 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = average; 4 = good; and 5 = excellent. Thus, the qualitative data through this thematic analysis acquired quantitative values for ease of inductive decision making on the findings.

Discussion

Our qualitative data analysis demonstrated that the research participants had a clear knowledge and understanding of the reasons for the establishment of a separate body to address the issue of effective prosecution of offenders as well as the constraints on its effectiveness from the AGF. Our focus was on the categories that measure 3-5 on our code scale. Majority of the respondents firmly supported the establishment of NEOC as a matter of urgent priority.

From the above, it can be seen that a case for the establishment of NEOC has been well made from historical experiences, and from obvious challenges which both the Police and INEC were faced with in their respective prosecutorial efforts. Of note is the response from INEC members who submitted that it has been bad for the Legal Officers to prosecute their colleagues who are accused of committing electoral offences. They further averred that the non-availability of witnesses, particularly National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members and students who served as election officials, when required during trial created huge challenges to INEC effectiveness. Some respondents noted that the sponsors of electoral violence and malpractices who are often the main beneficiaries of fraudulent electoral victories, are hardly the ones arrested, investigated, and prosecuted for the offences. In some situations, investigating police officers were transferred out of station thereby delaying prompt action on cases and forwarding of case files to INEC for study and further action. INEC faced a serious “conflict of interest” when it was confronted with prosecuting its own staff for electoral offences.

Two Legal Practitioners who are experienced in electoral offences prosecution maintained that the establishment of NEOC will lead to skilful and professional investigation and speedy prosecution of offenders which will consequently reengage the citizens with the electoral process for more active participation. They are unanimous that NEOC should be to electoral corruption and fraud what the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is to financial corruption. This dominant position justifies the establishment of NEOC and accords with the recommendations of ERC, the concept of EJS, and the legislative action by

the National Assembly in establishing the body. Our first research question is answered in the affirmative with the overwhelming result of findings justifying the establishment of NEOC to address cases of electoral offences through independent investigation, arrest, arraignment, and trial of offenders.

The establishment of NEOC is not without evidence-based constraints as our second research question rightly posited. A key constraint is the absence of specialized courts to try offenders and reliance on the regular High Courts (Federal High Court, High Court of a State, or High Court of the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja) to commence criminal proceedings as provided under S.33 (3) of NEOC Bill 2019. It is worthy to note that the respective Chief Judge may designate a court(s) or a judge(s) to hear and determine matters brought pursuant to the Bill and the court or judge so designated is required to give such matters priority over all other matters (S. 33 (4), NEOC Bill 2019). The effectiveness of NEOC therefore depends on cooperation of the courts.

A much more serious constraint to the effectiveness of the prosecutorial powers of NEOC is the special constitutional power of the AGF under S.174 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) with regards to all non-martial criminal prosecutions in the country. The AGF is the Chief Law Officer of the federation and in whose deemed consent all such criminal prosecutions are undertaken. As stated by a senior Legal Practitioner who was a key informant respondent, “the powers of the AGF are capable of undermining the independence and effectiveness of the NEOC as the power of AGF is constitutional while the power of NEOC by statute which is inferior to the constitution”. There is no restraint on the power of AGF, not even by way of judicial review. It will require more than an activist judge to manage the enormous powers of intervention by the AGF in the prosecution of electoral offences which may further have underlying political considerations and consequences.

Another very senior member of the Bar and a research participant argued that there are no key benefits in establishing NEOC as it will amount to duplication of roles or functions of existing investigative powers of the police and prosecutorial powers of the police and the

AGF. It will further have implications for the budget. Beyond the constraining power of intervention by the AGF and political considerations by the Executive in the selection, appointment, and operations of NEOC, several respondents stated that lack of financial autonomy, and inadequate skilled manpower could seriously constrain the effectiveness of NEOC to fulfil its statutory mandate. This submission directly addressed our second research question by affirming the constraint imposed by the constitutional power of AGF on all criminal prosecution other than court-martials but further established additional constraints that impact the effectiveness of NEOC.

Conclusion

NEOC is expected to play a key role in promoting and strengthening electoral democratic governance through the filtration process that will lead to the emergence of quality leadership in public elective offices. Jeong (2017: 33) maintained that “the first priority for peace research is to pursue knowledge that will enhance ability to manage and prevent violent conflict”. This is fundamental and critical to our understanding of the nature of electoral offences as possible triggers of violent electoral conflicts. This study establishes that NEOC is needed as part of our electoral justice system but that more will have to be done to make it effective and prevent a relapse to pre-NEOC era. NEOC will unbundle INEC and relieve it of the fettering burden of prosecuting offenders that may be its own staff.

Recommendations

Flowing our evidence-based research findings, we make a number of recommendations that will strengthen NEOC and the integrity of the electoral process in general. It is recommended that Advocacy proposal to amend Sections 174 and 211 of the 1999 Constitution in relation to the power of AGF and that of the state respectively to exclude their application in cases of electoral offences as with courts-martial. Also, there is the need for the amendment to NEOC Establishment Bill to specifically direct and provide for the creation of dedicated Electoral Offences Courts by Chief Judges to hear and expeditiously determine electoral offences. It is also expected that full financial autonomy be granted to NEOC by placing their budget on the

first line charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the federation. Furthermore, amendment to the NEOC Bill which will make the selection, appointment, and disciplinary control of the Chairman, full time members, and Secretary on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council will be necessary. Finally, mandatory annual publication of Register of Electoral Offenders with statutory provision for restriction of electoral rights for a period must be mandated.

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CHRISTAIN MISSIONARY, HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND SOCIAL COHESION IN IGALA LAND: A STUDY ON HOLLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, OCHADAMU

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ABSTRACT

Igala land has been influenced by the activities of four major missionary bodies. They are the Church Missionary Society (CMS), Roman Catholic Mission (RCM), the Qua Iboe Mission (QIM) now United Evangelical Church of Nigeria (UEC) and the Christian Mission in Many Lands (CMML). Expectedly, these missionaries should have impacted on the socio-cultural and economic cohesion of the environment, in addition to spreading the gospel. This study therefore investigates the social cohesion of the Qua Iboe Mission (QIM) now United Evangelical Church of Nigeria (UEC) in Igala land especially in Ochadamu. In sum, Igalaland has been influenced by four major Christian Missionary groups: the Christian Missionary Society, the Roman Catholic Mission (RCM), the Christian Mission in Many Land and the Qua Iboe Mission. They had positive and cohesive influence on the socio-cultural, political, religious and economic impact on the people in the land. The study strongly recommended that religious bodies and other organisations should emulate missionary societies in Igala land and impact positively on their immediate environment.

KEYWORD: Church Missionary Society, Christian, Igala, Ochadamu, Qua Iboe Mission, Social Cohesion,

INTRODUCTION

The Qua Iboe Mission came into being as a result of the pioneering work of Samuel Bill, who came from Northern Ireland, and responded to a call for someone to take the gospel to people who had not heard the gospel of Jesus Christ. In 1887, he arrived at Ibeno at the mouth of the Qua Iboe River where the first Church was planted and fellowship commenced immediately. The church moved into Igala land in 1931 when Jim Wesgart and John Nelson were sent to explore the possibility of reaching Igalaland with the gospel of Christ. In 1932, a Church was planted at Ugwolawo by Reverend David H. O'Neil and Dickson with his wife Hilda. When they came, they discovered that despite the presence of the Catholic Mission and the Brethren Mission, over two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) people still practiced traditional religion (David, 1999).

After due consultation with the traditional ruler (the Attah of Igala), they moved to Idah (the headquarters of Igala kingdom). As a matter of fact, growth was slow but steady in spite of many hardships, illness, hazardous rivers and occasional hostility from the people. Different obstacles came in the cause of spreading the gospel. Fresh land was opened among the Igala and Bassa people and then to the stanching Muslim City of Kano in the extreme North. Today, the Mission had planted Churches in all parts of Igala communities. There are about 52 Qua Iboe Churches in the land, Chief Amana: 2009. It is evangelical in its outlook and holds firmly to the historic truth of the Christian faith. The Mission had succeeded in reaching to other tribes in Nigeria.

Ochadamu is located in the Eastern part of Kogi State. The population is about ten thousand (10,000) inhabitants and has about twelve villages. The major occupations of the people are farming and hunting. They cultivate farm produces like yam, cassava, corn, millet and so on. Ochadamu has a market located at the centre of the town, which is held every five days, involving the indigenes, neighbouring villages and traders from other neighbouring States.

The first Leprosy site was used as a prayer house, which later became Qua Iboe Church about 1952, Simon: 2008. Today, the Church has become a very big place of worship, accommodating about three hundred and fifty (350) worshippers. Apart from the Qua Iboe Church there are five other Churches that came later. These are: The New Testament Mission International, Salem Church, Salvation Gospel Church International, Deeper Life Bible Church and Evangelical Church International (Idoko, 2009).

Holley Memorial Hospital was founded in 1950 in response to the need of those suffering from Leprosy. Holley Memorial Hospital is recognized by the Nigerian government as a place of excellence in the treatment of Leprosy. The Leprosy department is run in partnership with Leprosy Mission International and it is used as a reference centre in Kogi State. Today, the Hospital has grown to a large general hospital, providing specialist services in Surgery, Maternity, Obstetric, Orthopedic, Ophthalmic, Record or Statistic department, theatre and caring for increasing number of patients suffering from Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. A large out patients department emerged as a result of large population of the indigenous people.

Most available literatures on Christian Missionary activities seem to focused on Education, Religion and Socio-Cultural aspect as the major activities of the Christian missionaries, neglecting the medical work of the missionaries. The Christian Missions are very important in the history of modern health care system in Igalaland. Despite this general consensus, writers have neglected this rich part of Igalala history. At present, there is no existing work on health care system generally especially in Igalaland. Obviously, the lack of concern to the study of the history of health care system in Igalaland, has equally led to the absence of works on Holley Memorial Hospital Ochadamu. Although, Holley Memorial Hospital has contributed significantly to the development of health care system in Igalaland, by treating dreaded diseases like leprosy and TB. In other to achieve the above, both primary and secondary sources of data will be used. For primary data, interview will be invaluable for this study.

Christian Mission and Health Care System in Igalaland

Church Missionary Society (CMS)

The Church Missionary Society was established at Idah in 1857 by Samuel Ajayi Crowther, Okwoli: 1973. The Attah of Igala and some of his kinsmen felt that, the Western education and religion brought by these missionaries had brought disrespect to their culture and thereby becoming an insult to the Igala kingdom. CMS was closed down in 1872 due to the cultural conflicts between Western civilization and Igala cultural practices (Okwoli: 1973). The CMS was moved to Lokoja where Bishop Crowther resided. In 1890, the CMS activities in Igalaland were concentrated in Bassa, close to Lokoja. While in 1895, Churches were opened at Akabe and Kpata. At this time, there were difficulties in converting the indigenous people of Bassa because they thought that CMS workers came to discredit their traditional beliefs and customs. Therefore, it became very uneasy for the CMS to communicate with the Bassa people since there was no body to teach them Bassa and none to interpret for the missionaries.

In trying to win more souls, the CMS made some efforts in 1920s by establishing Schools and Churches, but the elderly men and women could not cope with them because of their traditional beliefs and practices, except for the young ones. Churches were established at Ankpa and Bassa Nge in 1950. The CMS work spread to areas like Anyigba and Dekina townships (Okwoli, 1973). The medical work began with the coming of two medical missionaries who left Bida Emirate in 1932 for Bassa-Nge. They were Mrs. Mathews and Miss K.E. Ristster. They both stayed at Kpata and Akabe respectively. Miss Ristster of Akabe was a midwife and in 1934 built a health care centre which served all the villages in the Akabe area. Before the opening of this health centre, pregnant women suffered greatly due to lack of medical care. Today the health centre is still serving Akabe community to some extent (Okwoli: 1973).

The Roman Catholic Mission and Health Care System in Igala Land

The Roman Catholic Mission actually came to the confluence area of Rivers Niger and Benue in 1880s when a report reached Rome about the thick populated area, (Okwoli, 1973). The

information was given by some group of Catholic missionaries who came along with the Portuguese Merchants at the middle of the nineteen-century due to the influence of Slave Trade (David, 1999). In 1885, Rev. Father Joseph Luts and Horn accompanied by brother John and Hermas, landed at Onitsha. On July 15th 1889, the Onitsha Mission was officially established into prefecture, had its boundaries at the River Benue in the North, the Atlantic Ocean in the South, the Cameroon to the East and the River Niger in the West (Okwoli, 1973). According to Okwoli, the Rev. Fathers were “Holy Ghost Fathers”. In fact, the Rev. Fathers experienced initial difficulties in making converts in Igala land. Okwoli further said that, from their Station in Onitsha in the Eastern part of Nigeria, their missionaries made way to Dekina at about 1903.

By 1933, three Parishes had been established in Idah, Ankpa and Odoru. Their commitment to social work such as, education, medical and Agriculture including preaching the gospel, contributed to their great service in Igala land. Attention shall be given to the medical service in Igala land. Some of the RCM medical works include: Anyigba Catholic Hospital, Ankpa Medical Mobile Clinic, Egume Catholic Maternity, Odomomo Dispensary, Immaculate Heart Maternity, Awo-Akpali, and Sheria Health Centre.

Anyigba Catholic Hospital

Anyigba Catholic Hospital was opened on 11th Feb., 1964 by the Holy Rosary Sisters for the health and wellbeing of the Igalaland. The pioneering sisters were Sister Ailbe and Riona. At this time the hospital was a mobile clinic until 6th may 1978 when it was officially called Grimard Hospital by Leopold Grimard, under the Catholic Diocese of Idah. The Hospital began as a mobile Clinic in 1964 and gradually became a full-fledged Hospital in 1978 (Abdullahi: 2008).

The Hospital was established by the Holy Rosary Sister to assist and care for the sick ones (particularly those who suffer from sicknesses such as Chicken pox, Sore, Fever, Yellow and Fever Snake bites). After listening to the preaching of the gospel, those found with any of these illnesses were treated free of charge. According to Dr. Abdullahi, as the Clinic became

a full-fledged hospital, some departments such as Female Ward, Male Ward, Private Ward, Out Patients Department, Theatre, Laboratory Section, X-ray Department, Scanning Department, Pharmacy Department, Administrative Unit, Laundry Department, Maintenance Unit, Security Unit and Mortuary Unit were added. All these are the various departments that are still in operation today, and are headed by a Matron and closely monitored by the Bishop of Idah Diocese, through the Health Coordinator of the State. While the workers are paid by the little money derived from the Patients. Today, the Hospital has become a full-fledged one as well as a reference centre for all other Hospitals in Kogi East and the entire State. Also, patients come from different States in Nigeria such as, Benue State, Edo State, and Kwara State. The location of the Hospital makes it easy and suitable for quick access for medical attention in the Hospital.

Ankpa Medical Clinic

The Ankpa Medical Mobile Clinic was opened by the Holy Rosary Sisters, on May 13th 1971. These were Sisters Benedette and Anthanasius. While carrying out the gospel of Christ, they found out that there were some illnesses such as Chicken pox and Fever all over the community. In 1974, the sisters began a Mobile Clinic for the health of the people in Ankpa. According to Okwoli, the Towns and Villages on the programme were: Okura-Olafia, Akpanya, Abejukolo, Awo-Akpali, Ikanekpo, Adumu Agala/Eboyi Olafia and Emere. This programme worked from 1974 to 1979, but in 1981 due to an integrated program, Sister M. De Comfort introduced primary Child care programme which affected some areas like: Ofugo, Imane, Emanyi, Bagana, Okaba, Ogodu and Ibado-Akpacha, (Okwoli: 1973).

Egume Catholic Maternity

The prefect Apostolic of Idah Monsignor Leopald Grimard, with the co-operation of Egume Community, built a maternity in Egume in 1970. This Centre was of great help to Egume Community at this period. At the time the Centre was handed over to Dekina Local Government by the Catholic Church, with a large contribution and the expertise of Friday

Morenci, a Maternity dispensary was completed in line with recommendation of the State Ministry of Health (Okwoli: 1973).

Odomomo Dispensary

The Odomomo Dispensary was opened in 1960 by Bishop Delisle to serve the various Communities in the area. It was closed down in 1967 due to the Nigerian Civil War. In 1977, the dispensary was handed over to Idah Local Government Council.

Immaculate Heart Maternity, Awo-Akpali

In Awo-Akpali, there was a plan to establish a health care centre since 1970. The plan materialized in 1982 through the efforts of Bishop E.S.Obot, Okwoli: 1973. The first three Sisters to arrive at Awo were nurses posted there on 5th April 1982 and it began operation immediately.

Sharia Health Centre

The Holy Rosary Sisters started a Mobile Health Clinic in Sheria, Odugbo, Koriko and Shintaku in the early 1960s. Hundreds of people flocked to this Clinic which operated twice in a week. In September 1982, the Convent of the Holy Rosary Sisters at Sheria was opened. After this, the Clinic commenced work immediately in nutrition and health talks pertaining to hygiene and sanitation. These are very important components of health care services. This attempt was aimed at eliminating the causes of diseases and malnutrition, the crippling enemies that still held a large number of the population in bondage (Okwoli, 1973).

The Christian Mission in Many Land (CMML)

The history of the Christian Mission in Many Land in Igala land can be traced to the following people: Alfred Arthor Hewstone, Raymond Dibble, James Ramsden and Malcolm L.Gross. They did a serious work in Igala land of the present Kogi State, and Idoma and Agatu in Benue State (David, 1999). According to Ebikwo, Mr. Hewstone was the first CMML Missionary to arrive in Igala land, Ibikwo: 1982. That in 1919, Mr. Hewstone and his wife (Anne) and her sister (Miss. Gillet) left Liverpool, England for Nigeria on the 5th of March 1919. They went to Donga in Benue State and later moved to Bagana in November of the same year and later

settled at Odomukpo in Abejukolo in December 1919. He later moved to Akpacha, having suffered a fire disaster. From Akpacha he moved to Ejoka where he remained and died. But before his death he had labeled his Missionary Ministry, “Ejoka Bible Mission”. Beyond Church planting, he left the town with a viable health Clinic. Mr. James Ramsden (an Englishman later joined Hewstone at Abejukolo in late 1919. Ogane-aji in Anyigba became his first station, thus becoming the first CMML Mission in Anyigba. Thereafter, they opened other stations such as the ones in Ugwolawo in 1931, and Ika-Ankpa in 1949.

The CMML Hospital in Anyigba

The CMML hospital was first opened at Ojuwo-Anyigba at about 1926 (Ibikwo: 1982). The Medical work was extended to nearby and distance Villages up to Alloma, Ogugu and Ete in Anambra State. When he heard of the hardship of the people of Bassa Komo, he went there and even crossed the River Benue to Ogba. The Sobita injection was used to cure yaws. The other prevailing diseases like malaria fever, craw-craw, sore, chicken-pox, small pox were also cured.

The CMML Medical Centre in Anyigba was opened at about 1923. After the death of Hewstone, the medical work continued under the supervision of the late Gross, their son Mr P.D. Gross with a local untrained couples Mr. & Mrs. Omata Rebecca Akwu continued until 1982 when community health assistants came in the persons of Mr. Sunday Oboni, Joseph Musa, Gabriel Amedu and John Eko. The service of Dr. D.A. Iyaji an indigenous Igala son was sought in 1982 who said, it was too late but promised to give his service on part time bases. He kept his religious promises and had worked wholeheartedly. The Clinic grew to twenty-six bed hospital and Mr. P.I. Ibikwo was the Hospital administrator. But the hospital collapsed due to lack of finance to pay workers and staff, (Ibikwo: 2008).

The Qua Iboe Mission (QIM), Now United Evangelical Church of Nigeria (UEC)

The Qua Iboe Mission (now United Evangelical Church), has its Headquarters in Belfast Northern Ireland, which is of the Irish Presbyterian background. By the end of the 19th Century, the Qua Iboe Mission had started work in Nigeria. The Mission’s first bases were in

Calabar, Cross River State of Nigeria. The Qua Iboe Mission came to Idah with a delegate to see the Attah of Igala. After proper consultation, Rev David H. O’Neil, in August 1931, was sent to work among the Igala people. He had worked in Calabar from 1920. When He came to settle at Ugwolawo in February 1932, Mr. Herbert W. Dickson and his wife Hilda joined him, while permission was granted to open another Station at Odoru. In July 1932, Dickson moved to Odoru. Later in 1938, they moved their bases to Idah, the royal Town (Usman, 1999).

O’Neil and Dickson are well known and remembered for their pioneering work under the QIM. Both of them worked on the revision of the Igala Bible version of the New Testament, whose first translation work was done by Mr. R.T Debble. The finished work was printed by the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1848. The QIM legacy includes a Medical Centre at Ochadamu, two Secondary Schools at Ochaja and a Bible School at Ankpa (David, 1999).

The QIM Medical Work

The Medical work is centre on two Church Hospitals at Ekpene Obom and the Holley Memorial Hospital, Ochadamu. Both provide a range of medical services and are recognized for their expertise in treatment of Leprosy. These local Clinic provides opportunities to show love and compassion for needy people in the context of a Christian Hospital where many, over the years had heard, of the Saviour gospel and come to faith in Christ. The Holley Memorial Hospital actually began as a Leprosium Clinic. And gradually became a full-fledged Hospital with the following departments: Laboratory department, QIM Chapel, tuberculosis ward, eye Clinic, HIV and AIDS department, X-ray department, Records department, Maternity ward, New General Ward, Administrative Unit UEC had established a dispensary unit at Enweli in Ibaji area, while other places include, Itobe, Ogbulu, Onicha Igo, Ankpa, Inye, and Ochaja.

Historical Background of Leprosy and Holley Memorial Hospital

Holley Memorial Hospital was established in 1948 as a clinic meant for leprosy patients and some other minor illnesses (Simon: 2008). Before 1948, the Igala people affected with leprosy

usually go to as far as Itu leprosy Colony in Aqua Iboe State for treatment. For this reason, some delegates of Igala lepers came to Mr. Peter Simon Achimugu who was one of the early Christians as well as a Counselor in the Igala Native Authority (NA). They complained that, the food items given to them at Itu in Aqua Iboe was an abomination to the people of Igala, so they usually refused those foods thereby making them to starve.

P. S. Achimugu went to Itu in Aqua Iboe on a personal note to access the situation himself. He discovered that the meats offered to the Igala people were abominable to them. Arriving from Itu, P.S. Achimugu and other persons in Igala Native Authority applied to the Northern government of Nigeria for the establishment of Leprosy Colony in Igalaland. The Northern government approved the application. But they lacked personnel to manage the leprosy Clinic. Hence, the Northern Government directed that the leprosy clinic could be established in the name of any existing Christian Missionary who had such personnel abroad. P.S. Achimugu being a Qua Iboe Leader now consulted the Mission to establish a leprosy clinic in Igalaland.

Mr. Achimugu equally contacted evangelist Matthew Agbonika who was one of the early Christians at Ogbobo, they both joined other leaders of the Qua Iboe Mission to decide on how and where to establish the leprosy colony. After much survey, they decided to build it at Ochadamu, Apeh Ajeka who was the community leader of Agbabo led the Qua Iboe leaders to Onu Ojokogbe (Okame Omachi), the then Chief of Ochadamu for allocation of land. As soon as the land was acquired a house for leprosy clinic was built. One of the first dispensers of the clinic was Audu Ekele from Idah. At this time, lepers began to come from all over Igalaland and neighbouring states such as Edo, Kwara, and Benue for treatment. Within a year, the leprosy patients increased due to the large population. At this time, the clinic could no longer cope with the large numbers of leprosy patients. Therefore, the management of the clinic decided to build two domentries; one for male and the other for female.

Then, the Northern government of Nigeria was sending money through the Igala Native Authority for the feeding of the leper. Apeh Ajeka of Ogbobo and Maltew Agbonika

were picked as full contractors. They usually supplied food in basically three times in a day (morning, afternoon and evening) from Ogbobo to feed the lepers. The increasing number of the lepers led to the movement of the clinic to the third and permanent site where it became a full-fledged hospital. In fact, food vendors from Ogbobo were afraid of contacting leprosy directly, it was the fear that made Matthew to build a hut at Ochadamu where the food vendors usually rested after the food had been collected by a leper's prefect. The hut became the prayer house which metamorphosed into the Qua Iboe Church of Ochadamu.

When the population increased, the Native Authority gave the vast land between Umomi and Ochadamu to the lepers for farming purpose. A Primary School was equally built for the large number of the people in the community, i.e., for the lepers and the Children in the Community. This was financially assisted by the Northern Nigerian Government. Alongside the leprosy colony, out patient's clinic meant to service other illnesses was established. Equally, there was Maternity out patients ward for both male and female. Staff quarters for both European and African residents were built in the hospital premises. From the 1960's, the population of the lepers began to decrease or decline, and the Primary School was moved to Ochadamu town. Thereafter, the hospital added more departments such as Laboratory, Qua Iboe Chapel, TB Ward, Eye clinic, and HIV/Aids department, which had helped in the development and growth of the hospital.

At about 1985, the foreign Mission in the Qua Iboe Church handed over the hospital to Africans who took over the management of the hospital. Rev. R. O. Ogbona became the first indigenous manager of the hospital, while Rev. Achor Abraham is the present indigenous manager of the hospital. Dr. William Holley did so much for the hospital, and outside his medical calling; he established a very strong football team of which he was a member. He equally established about ten hectares of palm plantation, piggery and a cattle range that still exist today. All these were inherited by the hospital management. Under the Colonial foreign management, there was an outreach clinic at Onisha Ego Ogbolu, Ogugu, Ugwolawo, Eweli, and Ibaji. Out of all, it is only Eweli Clinic that is offering skeletal services presently.

Also at about 1990, a proposed School of Nursing for the hospital was initiated and for this purpose, there had been fund raising for two times by the Mission. However, this is yet to see the light of the day.

It also has an eye clinic started its activities in the year 1980 under Dr. Jones. The purpose of establishing the department in Holley Memorial Hospital was to give care to the leprosy patients with eye problems. Apart from the leprosy and tuberculosis departments that have been in existence since the era of the white missionaries, others departments now exist in the hospital. This development has earned it a status of a full-fledged hospital, providing specialist service in Surgery, Maternity and Obstetrics, Orthopedic, Ophthalmic and Caring for an increasing number of patients suffering from Tb and HIV/AIDS. Also, an Out-Patients Department to care for the growing local population was established. As a Mission Hospital, HMMH has a Chapel in the compound; this provides Pastoral care to meet the needs of both patients and staff.

According to Mr. Simon Agbonika, alongside the leprosy Colony, out Patients Clinic was established to service other illnesses (Simon: 2008). This is the Maternity out patient's ward of both male and female ward. Also, staff quarters for both European and African Doctors, permanent and visiting doctors, were built. The Mission also built primary school around 1960s, but as the population of lepers began to decline, the primary school was moved to Ochadamu town and some other departments such as laboratory, x-ray department, scanning department and so on, were also added.

Impacts of Holley Memorial Hospital on Igalaland

Qua Iboe Mission has contributed immensely in the following areas: education, economic, socio-cultural, religious and other wise, through the establishment of Holley Memorial Hospital at Ochadamu.

Education

The Qua Iboe Mission while co-coordinating the activities of Holley Memorial Hospital found it necessary to establish a school or a means to educate the people. This they did by

establishing a primary school for the healed lepers who could not afford money to pay their bill after complete treatment, and wished to work in the Hospital in place of the money they ought to pay. This Primary School served as the first means of educating the people on how to read and write and after which a School of Nursing was introduced where those leaving the Primary School will be able to get health education (Simon, 2008).

A new form of education was introduced in Igala-land for both children and adult. The missionaries taught the people a lot of valuable things and English became the major subject taught at that time. This was to enable them have good interpreters for the leprosy patients. At this time the people for the first time learnt a foreign language. With the new form of education, a new set of people emerged in Igala-land. This brought about new Igala elites. Consequently, most of them began to abandon their traditional ways of life, although the traditional ways of life were not totally wiped off. The Primary and Nursing Schools were of great benefit to the people of Ochadamu as a whole, as it brought about the emergence of new elites in the Communities.

Economy

When the population of the lepers and out-patients increased, the Igala Native Authority gave the vast land between Umomi and Ochadamu to the healed lepers for farming purposes, and the Northern government was still sending money for Agricultural purposes (Simon: 2008). There was an introduction of new farming systems such as, fertilizer, chemicals, and Pesticides, which enabled fast growth of Agricultural crops in the area and the entire Communities of Igalaland. These brought about large quantities of farm crops.

More so, there was introduction of new trading system, where the Igala people met to sell their farm produce at the centre of Ochadamu town. This market brought people from various Igala communities together, including neighbouring communities from other State such as Edo, Kwara, and Benue. Those that brought Patients from far place and had no means of income decided to partake in the farming and marketing system. The missionaries also introduced a means of exchange (money) which replaced the informal form of trade and barter

system. Also, many of the Igala people got involved in domestication of goats, sheep, and chicken. They also introduced piggery, which became another needed commodity in the market. This small market soon became a very large Market one for different types of trading activities, attracting different languages and town.

Socio-Cultural Impact

The missionaries did not come only to preach the gospel of Christ and take good care of the health of the people, they also went as far as discouraging every form of human sacrifice, the institution of polygamy, secrete society, killing of twins or any form of human sacrifices as well as other indigenous practices that did not give glory to God. They made them to understand that if they must practice Christianity the must abandon those bad ways of life (Idrisu: 2009).

The Christian missionaries also changed the life style of the Igala people. For instance, most of the dresses worn today were introduced to them by the missionaries who attempted to help the less privileged who put on old cloths. From there, the indigenes became used to foreign wears and found them suitable to put on, thereby neglecting their traditional dressing pattern. Missionaries also brought a new system of building houses in the land, for example the first leprosy colony was built with cement block and roof with zinc which was different from the mud house roofed with grasses known among the Igala people. With this, new system of building houses came up in the land changing the cultural ways of building in Igalaland.

Religion

On the religious sphere, the missionaries went a long way in affecting the lives of the people. Around 1952, Qua Iboe Church was established in Ochadamu, this Church became the first Church in the town and it went a long way in changing the barbaric and ungodly lives of the people such as idol worship and the likes. The hospital was a great avenue for the missionaries to win Souls to Christ as some non-Christians who came to the hospital due to one illness or the other were told, “man cure but Christ heals.” This made most of the patients to accept Christ and today about 80% of the people are Christians (Idrisu: 2009).

Health

On the health care system, the Qua Iboe Mission made remarkable contributions towards the improvement of the health standard of the Ochadamu people. The establishment of Holley Memorial Hospital had helped in reducing the high rate of maternal and infant mortality in Igalaland as a whole and even beyond. The missionaries also made Igala people to believe that certain diseases such as leprosy, chicken pox, small pox, TB were natural and not caused by any evil spirit.

Conclusion

Igalaland has been influenced by four major Christian Missionaries: the Christian Missionary Society, the Roman Catholic Mission (RCM), the Christian Mission in Many Land and the Qua Iboe Mission. These missionaries have influenced the socio-cultural, political, religious and economic lives in the land. The Qua Iboe Mission came to Igalaland in 1931 with the efforts of some Missionaries: Mr. Samuel Alexander Bill, Rev. D.H. O'Neill, Rev. H.W. Dickson, and so on. The Qua Iboe Mission could not advance much into the Ibo country because of the activities of the Anglican and Catholic Missions who already established their base at Onitsha in about 1885.

The Qua Iboe Medical work remains the most outstanding of the lost and carried out many numerous activities of the Christian Missions in Igalaland. The Qua Iboe Mission was the first body that embarked on this medical work in Igalaland. Rev. Dickson toured Igalaland, helping the sick and preaching the word of God. During his tours, he discovered that leprosy was very rampant. In 1940 he built a temporary settlement for lepers near Inachalo stream at Idah. The contributions of Dr. J. Kearney, Bill Holley and Belgreave, especially on leprosy is unparalleled. The disease, which in itself is capable of breaking down whole community and causing people and home to be ostracized was adequately managed, ensuing social cohesion. Holley Memorial Hospital is well known nation-wide for the treatment of leprosy and some other diseases such as tuberculosis and disease of the eyes. Additionally, the hospital has brought development to the people of Ochadamu in health care delivery, growth in population,

social amenities, education. It also impacted positively on social beliefs system. It is thus strongly recommended that religious bodies and other organisations should emulate missionary societies in Igala land and impact positively on their immediate environment.

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE MEDIUMS OF PEACE EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

Peace education has been accepted as both a philosophy and a social process concerned with empowering people with the awareness, knowledge, values, skills, attitudes, and behaviours necessary for nonviolent and sustainable human existence in our environment. Several mediums are available for delivering peace education, ranging from the informal to the formal, and from the traditional to the modern as independently identified from literature in the field. This study is an attempt to identify and categorise these mediums as a contribution to the gap in the literature using a medium of peace education conceptual framework derived from the integrative theory of peace education. It further assessed the forms of these media and their contribution to peace education, its processes, and practices. It was recommended that there should be strengthening the study and practice of peace education among scholars, students, practitioners, and policymakers as a global best practice.

KEYWORDS: Peace; Education; Mediums; Categories; Contributions.

INTRODUCTION

Peace education is a universally shared knowledge. It is sometimes referred to as peace learning and considered to be both a philosophy and a social process involving empowering people with the skills, attitudes, values, and knowledge for solving conflicts without violence and building a sustainable environment. It is the main process that engenders and promotes living harmoniously with one another and with our environment. According to the Preamble to the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 1945, which is the third most important organ of the UN system after the General Assembly, and the Security Council, “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”. This statute further emphasized the principal role of education in the development of peace and prevention of war.

The concepts of peace and peace education are closely connected and intricately linked. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (1999), peace education is an essential component of quality basic education. Various mediums have been adopted and deployed towards inculcating the values of peace over time and in many settings both formal and informal, and to adults and children alike. A medium according to Merriam-Webster (n.d.) dictionary is “a particular form or system of communication”; a “means of effecting or conveying something”. (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/medium>). For our study, a medium of peace education is conceptually defined as “the way, platform, or channel through which peace education is delivered and inculcated in the minds and behaviour of people”. The study is set out to identify the key mediums of promoting peace education from literature. establish a categorization methodological model for the mediums and summarise the contributions of the mediums of peace education. This work adopted interactive focused group discussions of the research team participants as our primary source of data while secondary data through literature review as its methodology based on the frame work of Harris (2007) who postulates that “peace education theory” is grounded on five different

methodological approaches of human rights education, environmental education, international education, conflict resolution education, and development education.

These five components in themselves according to the theory have different components and goals that are nevertheless, interconnected. The study also employed the theory propounded by Danesh (2006) which is known as “an integrative theory of peace education (ITP)” in response to the seeming diversity yet interrelated approaches.

Literature Review

Peace education according to Harris (2002) has come to symbolize different priority approaches to peace in different settings. For instance, to the Japanese, it is referred to as “A-Bomb Education” following the devastating effects of atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6, and 9, 1945 respectively during World War II. Harris (2002: 15) further stated that to Ireland, peace education is referred to as “Education for Mutual Understanding” as Catholics and Protestants try to use education strategies to undo centuries of enmity, while in Korea peninsular, it is referred to as “Unification Education”. These definitional thematic approaches hold true irrespective of the medium of peace education involved.

One of the earliest and historic mediums of peace education is through self-awareness that comes to an individual. The founders of world leading religions can be classified as pacifists and therefore, peace educators. According to Kopf (2015: 56), “peace between cultures, nations, and religions involves learning about one’s own history, as well as listening to the histories and narrations of others in a “problem-and-solution”, “give-and-take” dialogical understanding process”. These self-aware individuals grew to become early peacethinkers in traditional families and communities and whose experiences and ideas informally engaged with the rest of the people over time. As mediums of peace education, individuals, families, and communities reinforced peace learning through storytelling, role plays, and institutionalized socialization processes in the society. Religious observances, priests, oracles, and the like were the major means of propagating peace culture and existence which could sometimes be expressed in communal treaties of peace and friendship. Navarro-

Castro and Nario-Galace (2010) maintained that spiritual and faith traditions of indigenous communities show a profound reverence for nature and wisdom towards peace. According to Jarikre (2019), despite constitutional silence on the role of traditional institutions, they still provide the framework for social mobilization and peacebuilding in the communities. The modern-day peace thinkers are individuals and statespersons who have devoted time and energy to thinking and meditating about peace and propagating their beliefs in various forms, speeches, texts, and artworks among other mediums since the early 20th century. From amongst them, Peace Movements were inspired, berthed, and established rapid global presence as major enablers of peace education and culture. Galtung (1996) had conceptualized a duality of peace in terms of positive peace, and negative peace and this has remained definitional in the field of peace studies, and the development of peace education.

According to Navario-Castro and Nario-Galace (2010: 35), democracy “provides the environment with which people’s fundamental rights, interests, and wishes are respected”. Peace education is universal. So is democracy and democratic principles and governance. This position is supported by Iroye, S. [October 10, 2021, class lecture] that “democracy education is a core component of peace education”. Sports and sporting activities have also served as mediums of peace education of which the Olympic Games occupies a special pride of place since the modern version of the games was reinstated in Athens, 1896. The five differently coloured interlocking rings Olympic symbol represents the five participating continents of Africa, Asia, America, Europe, and Oceania. Both local, national, continental, and global periodic sports events and festivals have also served as mediums of promoting peace education in practical terms. Also, Peace research and conflict resolution studies as distinct academic disciplines in educational institutions of learning have become the foremost medium of peace education in modern era from primary to tertiary education levels. The curriculum of peace education has now been adopted as a global best practice since the founding of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (IPRIO) by Johan Galtung in 1966. According to Ndabula (2021: 33), “peace education is one of the ways to entrench peace culture in the

African child in order to promote the values, attitudes, and behaviours of peace”. Many countries now have institutes or similar governmental organizations officially designated for peace education matters.

Literary works constitute another major medium of peace education through art-based activities such as theatre, music, poetry, dance, paintings, and drawings among others. According to UNICEF, young people living in conflict use poetry to express their hopes for a more peaceful future. In furtherance of this, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) organizes annual “Poetry for Peace Contest” (www.un.org/disarmament/poetryforpeace/). Similarly, music, with its elements of sound, lyrics and nonverbal communication engage young people and adults alike and thus create opportunities for dialogue for peace as recently expressed by “Peace Through Music 2020 Global event for Social Justice” (<https://peacethroughmusic.live>). The 1980 hit track by Sonny Okosuns titled “Give Peace A Chance” remains like an anthem for peace in Nigeria. Artworks according to The Global Campaign for Peace Education (2019) have been used to promote peace (<https://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/promoting-peace-through-art/>). The Global Campaign further maintains that “carvings, paintings, drawings among other artworks have used to provide voice to a marginalized or oppressed group”. The UN “Art for Peace” is an international art contest for young people organized by UNODA and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) partner – Harmony for Peace Foundation.

Peace Museums exist in many countries as mediums for promoting peace education through documentation of historical peace initiatives and provide opportunities for peace advocacy programmes. As an example, the Peace Museum, Bradford is the only museum dedicated to the history and stories of peace, peacemakers, and peace movements in the United Kingdom (<https://www.peacemuseum.org.uk>). Peace Parks or Parks for Peace are “zones of peace” according to Navarro-Castro (2010) and inspire “belief in nonviolence and faith in secure future”.

Peace Communication provides platforms for disseminating peace education, awareness, information, programmes, skills, and knowledge. The Mass Media made up principally of the Print and Electronic components have proved to be veritable mediums and tools of peace education through education, information, and entertainment. Books, libraries, newspapers, journals, cartoons, among others are mediums that teach peace education. Electronic forms of communication made up of audio-visual impressions such as speeches, images, videos can elicit positive as well as negative behaviours about peace hence the increasing government desire to ensure them through regulatory frameworks in some jurisdictions.

The New Digital Media has deployed the internet and technological devices to new information processing and sharing at a speed hitherto unknown. According to Okolie-Osemene (2012), the application of technology such as digital satellite televisions, global satellite telephones, internet telephony, mobile devices, multimedia services among others have largely and radically improved the effectiveness of peace education, which need not always be formal, as the latter offer far greater opportunities for teaching and learning. The social media which developed with advances in the Internet has consequently become a major medium of peace education in the 21st century. Naseem et al. (2017) submitted that social media provides spaces for communities of different backgrounds, affiliations, and allegiances to break barriers of time and space, and mobilize for peace in participatory and inclusive manners. Social media is the new trend on the world wide web and has provided the fastest platform for online social learning and information sharing made more relevant since the COVID 19 global pandemic that defined year 2021 and has continued to impact health and socio-economic activities since then.

Global Perspectives of Peace Education

The United Nations: The United Nations and other International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations have been acknowledged as major and impactful mediums of peace education due largely to their rich resources and global outreach. The UN Peace

Operations, particularly Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Actions have helped countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace with over 70 years' experience in protecting civilians, preventing conflicts, building rule of law and security institutions, advancing political solutions to conflict, promoting human rights, promoting women and youth peace and security, and developing operational support (<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>). The Rule of Law is the bedrock of the UN and has been declared as fundamental to peace and stability (<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/>) as with its Human Rights programme (<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/Home.aspx>) both impacting peace education mediums.

The UN General Assembly has declared September 21 of every year as the International Day of Peace observed around the world as a day devoted to strengthening the ideals of peace, through observing 24 hours of non-violence and (<https://www.un.org/en/observances/international-day-peace>). The event affords opportunity for peace educators and peace actors the world over to engage with one another and political leaders on solving peace challenges. Several International Governmental Organizations have supported and propagated the course of Peace Education prominent among which is the United Nations whose outstanding commitment to peace education is reflected in the 1959 Declaration of the rights of the child which stated *inter alia* that a child has the right to an education that will develop a sense of moral and social responsibility (<https://archive.crin.org>), as well as the 1989 Convention on the Rights of a child. In addition to the above instruments, the United Nations through some of its agencies has always had a commitment to disarmament education, generally perceived to be an element within peace education.

In 1978, the Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly (SSOD-I) was devoted entirely as a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community for the attainment of international peace and security (<https://www.un.org/disarmament/conference-on-disarmament>). This Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in paragraphs 78-82 of the declaration accepts peace education as

forming part of human rights education and crucial for world peace (Vienna Declaration, 1993).

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):

According to Burns and Aspheslagh (1996), after the end of World War II, UNESCO provided the major focus for Peace Education. The goals of peace education cited frequently were Intercultural awareness among others. The UNESCO's Mission states, a commitment to promoting universal values of peace and nonviolence, human rights and social justice, intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding. Its approach to educating for peace is multidimensional, in that it links education with a range of activities that address the root causes of violence from human security to sustainable development. The UNESCO in its effort at promoting the culture of peace and nonviolence also developed what it tagged "The Manifesto 2000" which declares 'in recognising my share of responsibility for the future of humanity, especially for today's children and those of future generations, "I make commitment in my daily life, in my family, my work, my community, my country and my region: "to respect the life and dignity of every person without discrimination or prejudice, reject violence in all its forms, liberate my generosity, listen to understand, defend freedom of expression and cultural diversity, contribute to the development of my community and preserve the planet" (EI Manana 2000, <https://cpnn-world.org>). UNESCO also promotes the culture of peace through an intersectoral platform. This consist of five sectors namely, Education, natural science, social and human sciences, culture and communication and information

United Nations International Children Fund (UNICEF):

UNICEF in its contribution to Peace Education defined the concept as 'the process or promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence both overt and structural, to resolve conflict peacefully and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level. According to Fountain (1999: 1), it is UNICEF's position that peace education has a place in all "societies not only in countries

undergoing armed conflict or emergencies”, and that since 1990, several UNICEF documents have also confirmed this vision of basic education as a “process that encompasses the knowledge, skills, attitude and values needed to live peacefully in an interdependent world”.

The African Union: From August 1 to 2, 2019, the Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology of the African Union Commission in collaboration with the “Save the Children International” organized a workshop on the study of Peace Education and the state of protection of education from attacks in Africa. Participants were mandated to bring partner agencies together to support the formulation of national policies on Peace Education and conflict prevention, and on protection of education from attacks by generating and bringing to bear relevant evidence, promoting the implementation of such appropriate policies in member states, developing models for Peace Education and education protection, learning lessons and developing and disseminating materials on Peace education and protection of schools (AU 2019).

On the evolution of Peace Education, Harris (1988) stated that Peace Education has taken different shapes as it developed around the world. At the beginning of the 20th century in the United States and Europe, people concerned about the advent of mechanized warfare began to educate the population in those countries about ways that war could be outlawed through the League of Nations and other international agreements (<https://www.tc.columbia.edu>).

The Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS) - In its effort to encourage and propagate Peace Education in the West African subregion, the Economic Communities of West African States in 2016, outlined the following programmes:

Programme 1. Consultative meeting of the regional committee comprising relevant commissions, Directorates, focal points partners, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on education. Activity of the group- the publicity and institutionalization of the ECOWAS Peace Education Manual in each member state’s policy makers, curriculum developers, teachers, CSOs, and partners.

Programme 2. Capacity building of national experts on the ECOWAS Peace Education.

Programme 3. Internal Consultations. The Organization fully understand and takes responsibility for the capacity building and the popularization of manuals on Peace Education.

Programme 4. Coordination/Monitoring and Evaluation. Measurement and Evaluation network was formed for the modules.

Programme 5. Regular support to focal points to be achieved through regular support to the national focal point for internal coordination, public awareness, implementation of the modules of the manual and regular reporting (ECOWAS, 2016, <https://ecpf.ECOWAS>).

The Commonwealth: The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 independent nations, majority of which were former British colonies, working together for prosperity, democracy, and peace (<https://thecommonwealth.org/>). In addition to promoting sports for development and peace, the Commonwealth Youth Peace Ambassadors Network (CYPAN) brings together young people from across the member states in its policy advocacy for peace and combating violent extremism using the services of youth activists, artists, tech entrepreneurs, civil society leaders, film makers, cartoonists, students, innovators among several others (<https://thecommonwealth.org/commonwealth-youth-peace-ambassadors-network>).

Global Civil Societies and Events: According to Jeong (2017), the global civil societies as mediums of peace education have restructured boundaries of state system with “a new potential and opportunity for progressive forces to make transnational links...in a multilateral world order” (Jeong, 2017: 204-205).

The Nobel Peace Prize made every December 10 since 1901 for outstanding contribution to Peace is a coveted medium of peace education (<https://nobelpeaceprize.org>). Climate change and dangers of global warming constitute a major medium for promoting peace with our environment. The UN is committed to preserving a livable climate. Reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050 and build a sustainable world (<https://www.un.org/climate-change>). The 2021 UN Climate Change Conference of Parties

(COP 26) held in Glasgow, Scotland from October 31 to November 12, 2021, was attended by countries that signed the 1994 treaty on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (<https://unfccc.int/conference/glasgow-climate-change-conference-october-november-2021>). Greenpeace is a global network of organizations campaigning for environmental solutions essential to a green and peaceful future (<https://www.greenpeace.org>).

The Paris Peace Forum (PPF) is a French non-profit organization created in March 2018 and gathering every November 11-13, world leaders, heads of international organizations, as well as leaders from the civil society and the private sector, and individuals to deliberate on global governance issues based on its founding principle that “a badly governed world would quickly become a world at war” (<https://parispeaceforum.org/en>). The 4th edition of the PPF is scheduled for November 11-13, 2021 and will debate the topic: “Age of Unpeace: Preserving international cooperation for a more peaceful future” (<https://parispeaceforum.org/en/events/partner-session-carnegie-corporation/>).

Analysis and Discussion

The result of our textual analyses supported by our focused group discussion yielded evidence to the effect that there is hardly any documented classification or categorization of mediums of peace education. What has been established is that of individual medium of peace education such as the mass media, peace movements, individuals, literary works, peace research and peace studies institutions, peace operations and activities which can be informal, or formal and often treated independently.

The Table below shows a modest classification of the various mediums identified from our review of the literature and our interactive focused research group discussion.

Table 1: Summary of Mediums of Peace Education by Categories

	1. Traditional	2. Modern
A. Informal	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Individuals 2. Families 3. Communities 4. Traditions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peacethinkers and philosophers 2. Social Groups 3. Social Media 4. Religious Leaders 5. Literary works 6. Peace actions
B. Formal	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dispute resolution mechanisms 2. Spiritual and Faith traditions 3. Peace treaties and Accords 4. Games/Sports 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peace Research and Studies curriculum 2. Literary works 3. Peace Communication 4. Peace Operations and activities 5. The United Nations 6. International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations 7. Olympics, Commonwealth games 8. Global Peace Events and Celebrations. 9. Nobel Peace Prize 10. Paris Peace Forum

Source: Field Survey (2021)

Further analysis of our categories indicated that there is a no “one-cap-fits-all’ approach to the phenomenon of mediums of peace education. This position accords with our conceptual framework for the study and further reflected in the diversity of curriculum of peace education in institutions of learning. The most impactful mediums of peace education are found in the formal-modern categories where the application of digital media technology has created a social media revolution in communication in terms of space, speed, devices, storage, retrieval, relevance, and reuse for online learning and education. Informal peace learning takes place across social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, Telegram, Snapchat, LinkedIn among many others while formal ones take place through online learning resources of digital communication. The social media has capacity for spreading positive messages of peace as well as that for hate speech and conflict. The COVID 19 pandemic

experience and its aftermath has made remote learning the new normal, and peace education is no exception with its transformative behaviour modification agenda. The areas of contribution by formal, informal, traditional, and modern contemporary mediums to the promotion and advancement of peace to answer our research question three are as summarized in the Table below.

Table 2: Contributions of Mediums to Peace Education.

S/N	Medium	Contribution to promotion of Peace Education
1.	Individuals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Inspiration for creation civil, democracy, political, and human rights education, and movements ii. Establishment of Peace and anti-war movements iii. Establishment of Peace research and educational institutes iv. Established Religions, moral philosophy, teachings, writings, authored sacred works etc.
2.	Family	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Peace values, attitudes, norms, behaviour, socialization ii. Peacemaking, peace building, peace learning iii. Conflict prevention, management, and resolution strategies.
3.	Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Peace building, peace enforcement, conflict resolution, leadership ii. Socio-cultural events, peace festivals, festivities, occasions, ceremonies. iii. Inter-faith and intercultural understanding.
4.	Literary Works	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Arts, Drama, Artworks, Poetry etc. on peace ii. Music rhythms and lyrics extolling peace and deprecating violence and armed conflict. iii. Museums providing collection of artefacts, war relics, history. iv. Peace parks, gardens, and squares used for marking peace events.
5.	Sports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Competitive, and non-competitive sports events. ii. Peace walks, road shows, awareness campaigns. iii. Mandatory use of arbitration in sports disputes.
6.	Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Digital media contents in satellite television, tv, radio, online broadcasts etc. podcasts, blogs ii. Print media using books, newspapers, magazines

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> iii. Social media with unregulated time and space for positive and negative effects on information. Platforms include Facebook, TikTok, WhatsApp, Telegram, LinkedIn, Snapchat, Skype, YouTube, Blogs, Podcasts, search engines etc.
7.	Institutions of Learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Establishment of curriculum and academic departments of peace studies and conflict resolution in tertiary institutions for teaching and learning peace education. ii. Creation of bodies of Peace scholars and practitioners iii. Formulation of theories, abstracts, concepts, approaches, themes, strategies, guides etc. to peace education iv. Scholarly works and literatures on peace education.
8.	Political Parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Main instruments for political recruitment of electoral candidates to political offices. ii. Sources of negative peace characterized by direct violence. iii. Provide opportunity for stakeholders to sign peace accords for violence-free elections. iv. Advocacy programmes for peacebuilding at intra and inter-party levels.
9.	Non-Governmental Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Policy, and advocacy coalitions for civic and democracy education. ii. Public enlightenment campaigns and mobilization for social and ecological peace as typified by Greenpeace. iii. Civil society stakeholders' engagement and interface with public and governments. iv. Mandate and watchdog actions in support of peaceful coexistence and anti-war activities. v. Global education in Gender, Human Rights, Disarmament, Environmental components of peace education.
10.	Governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Providing conditions for positive peace. ii. Appointment and training of peace officers. iii. Domestic peace enforcement measures. iv. Regulatory policymaking for peace and peace education. v. Conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

		vi. Stakeholder engagements in peace process.
11.	Intergovernmental Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Bilateral and multilateral cooperative and collaborative mutual agreements, peace and friendship treaties, armistices, cessation of hostilities, ceasefire etc. ii. Trade, cultural exchanges etc. iii. International understanding, cooperation, collaboration, coordination for peace and conflict resolution processes.
12.	The United Nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. General Assembly declarations and resolutions on culture of peace, peacebuilding, non-violence. ii. Security Council global peace keeping operations, and enforcement actions. iii. UNESCO Plan of Action, networking, advocacy, research, publications etc. iv. UNICEF definition of peace education and content development. v. Conflict prevention, management, and resolution efforts.
13.	African Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Pan-Africanist collective peace and security arrangements. ii. Anti-colonial and anti-racial education. iii. Conflict prevention and management activities and actions. iv. African peer review mechanism for good governance best practices.
14.	ECOWAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Support for institutional capacity building for peace education. ii. Institutionalization of peace education manual in member states. iii. Programmes for performance measurement, monitoring, and evaluation of peace education in the sub-region.
15.	The Commonwealth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Democracy education ii. Support for conduct of peaceful elections in member states. iii. Promoting sport for development and peace. iv. Combating violent extremism.
16.	Global Events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Global education ii. Annual Nobel Prize for Peace

		iii. Annual Paris Peace Forum iv. Annual Climate Change Conference v. Periodic Global Games -Olympics, Commonwealth Games etc.
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Source: Field Survey (2021)

The mediums have impacted the development and delivery of peace education as a global best practice and in accordance with our integrative theory and conceptual framework for the study. The study has answered our three research questions formulated and further established that these mediums flourish best in an environment of democracy or democratization process. The comprehensive and universal nature of these identified, categorized, and contribution-profile approach of this study is expected to further promote an awareness, desire, ability, knowledge, skills, values, behaviours, and attitudes of peace among humankind for a sustainable existence. The in-depth evaluation of their respective effectiveness and impact can be best undertaken as a separate subject of academic inquiry by other scholars as they require specific knowledge base, skills, and value orientations for such a study.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This work no doubt represents an academic milestone in its attempt to identify and categorize the mediums of education which makes it easier for future evaluative work on their impact to be undertaken. We asserted and established that peace education is both a philosophy and a social process and needs to be fully integrated and mainstreamed into the curriculum of studies at all levels of education. This can only be made possible through policymaking either by legislation or by regulation or both and in a democratic setting. Peace education is a universal concept and practice.

Recommendations

Peace education scholars and practitioners need to work together to strengthen the positive outcomes that flow from the identified mediums leveraging the evolving technologies from the Internet of Things (IoT). It is therefore on this wise that the study recommends the following; the Establishment of Peace Parks, Museums, and Squares in every state capital and

urban centres through appropriate planning instruments, mandatory peace education programmes in the curriculum of all public and private educational institutions from primary level with in-built compulsory attendance and evaluation of all students and peace educators alike and the use of restorative and redemptive justice system that utilize alternative dispute system for peace offender as a way of promoting healing and conflict transformation.

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SECURITY THREAT IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA: FACTORS AND OPTIONS

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ABSTRACT

Since 2007, security situation in Nigeria has taken a turn for the worst, ranging from increasing spate of kidnapping in the South East Geopolitical zone and similar security challenges from the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB). There is also cult war and criminality in South West and herder-farmer conflicts across the country. The greatest contemporaneous challenges perhaps occur in the North East. They are exemplified by the spate of incessant killing occasioned by Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, farmers-herders clashes and so on. There is therefore the need to investigate the factors responsible for this with the view to determine options that may end the debacle. Findings include that bigotry, bad governance, infrastructural deficiencies, terrorism, unemployment, are factors responsible for security threat in North East Nigeria. It also poses serious threats to the unity and corporate existence of Nigeria as a sovereign state. The study surmises that the inability of the managers of Nigeria's security to address the country's security challenges during the above period raised yet another critical question on the preparedness of Nigeria to attain desired political, social and economic heights in the year 2025. Recommendations include the needs for value reorientation in terms of ethnic and religious tolerance, provision of infrastructure, quality education and rule of law.

KEYWORDS: Security, Threat, Terrorism, Governance, North East, Nigeria, Boko Haram

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary roles of the state is to provide peace and security for its citizens within the nation-state, to ensure their protection against threats from outside (Naidoo, 2000). Every responsible government will treat human security and peace building concerns with utmost priority. According to Chapter II, Section 14 (b) of the Nigerian Constitution, the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary duty of government. Within the framework of global social system, human security has become a contemporary social issue for understanding global dispositions. The supporters of human security and peace building initiative challenge the conventional notion of national security, thus, arguing that the focal point of security should be the individual. They submitted that a people centered security is quintessential for national, regional and global stability. Supporting the above, El-Baradei (2006) expressed the view that the quest of humanity for peace is not confined to one region as the search for security is still a major concern for people and nations. The current security picture on a global scale is not entirely free from violence as presumed, because the world has rarely been more peaceful or felt so secure.

In Nigeria, the importance of internal security has been carefully articulated by Gbanite (2001) that when the citizens' right to safety from all kinds of man-made threats are reduced considerably. It is imperative to note that the country has been facing severe security challenges over a long period of time, which resulted in the increasing spate of ethnic militia in Nigeria and their continuous attacks on both the government and the citizens.

Understandably, the security situation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria obviously took different dimensions. These periods, however, witnessed a consistent pressure on the government by Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB), increasing spate of kidnapping and banditry in the South - East Geo – Political Zone now in North east and north west,, incessant bombings in the northern parts of Nigeria by Boko Haram group, Mehem by the Islamic assailants in Jos

crisis, politically motivated killings by unscrupulous groups, herder-farmer conflicts among others (Ameh, 2008: 9).

Consequently, the inability of the managers of Nigeria's security to address the country's security challenges during the above period raised yet another critical question on the preparedness of Nigeria to attain desired political, social and economic heights in the year 2020. It further poses serious threats to the unity and corporate existence of Nigeria as a sovereign state. Blench, (2010)

One of the major consequences of the perennial conflict, attacks by boko haram terrorist, and counter-attacks between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria is massive death toll of many innocent lives and actors involved in the conflict. Olayoku (2012). noted that between the year 2006 and 2014, Nigerian Watch Database recorded 615 violent deaths related to terrorism, cattle in the year 2006, 22 deaths were recorded after the herdsmen farmers conflict in 2006, 54 in 2007, 31 in 2008, 83 in 2009, 39 fatalities in 2010 and a massive increase in death toll in 2011 which puts the figure at 116, 128 deaths in 2012, 115 deaths in 2013 and a total of 27 deaths was recorded in 2014. The latest security threat since 2016 in Nigeria is the rise of banditry, kidnapping which has become a big industry.

It is a known fact that natural or environmental resources are the bulk of renewable and non-renewable stocks of material resources that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically useful in production and consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing (WTO, 2010). These renewable resources serve as the main input in production process for both herdsmen and farmers in every climate and regions of the world. While farmers depend on land and usable water for the cultivation of arable and cash crops, and rearing of domestic animals for subsistence (personal consumption) or for commercial purposes, herdsmen heavily rely on water, safer climate and arable lands for the survival and productivity of their herds of cattle. In essence, land and water are prime renewable resources that play pivotal roles in the production process of both herdsmen and

farmers. Therefore, conflict between these two groups of resource users is always centered on the scarcity, deprivation and uneven allocation of these resources in history and recent times.

The increasing number of reports of violence at this stage makes understanding herder-farmer conflicts an urgent task. There is need to know not only the cause of the conflict, but also the nature of the conflict (religious, ethnic, and political undertones). Perhaps the most crucial question is why the conflict between herders and farmers has escalated into widespread violence. The implication of the conflict for Nigeria's national security cannot be over emphasized. The humanitarian, economic, and social consequences of the conflict have been manifold and telling. The attendant security and livelihood crises threaten the collective subsistence and survival of the affected populations. There are also other externalities, such as diminution of agricultural productivity and decline in household capital, all of which do not augur well for societal and national sustainability.

Conceptual clarification

Concept of security

Some scholars in conceptualizing security placed emphasis on the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion, political and socio-economic objectives of a country (Igbuzor, 2011; Oche, 2001; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Thus, there is a general consensus in the contemporary literature that security is vital for national cohesion, peace and sustainable development. It is therefore apparent that national security is a desideratum, sine qua non for economic growth and development of any country (Oladeji and Folorunso, 2007). In the intelligence community, there is a consensus that security is not the absence of threats or security issues, but the existence of a robust mechanism to respond proactively to the challenges posed by these threats with expediency, expertise, and in real time.

On the other hand, in the context of this article, insecurity is defined as a breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno-regional, civil, social, economic, and political that contributes to recurring conflicts, and leads to wanton destruction of lives and property. It connotes different meanings such as: absence of safety; danger; hazard;

uncertainty; lack of protection, and lack of safety. According to Beland (2005) insecurity is a state of fear or anxiety due to absence or lack of protection. Achumba (2013) defines insecurity from two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury. Secondly insecurity is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune. These definitions of insecurity underscore a major point that those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen, but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers when they occur.

Concept of Conflict

Conflict is a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals. According to Fasona and Omojola, (2005); the term conflict refers to misunderstanding, disagreement, or divergence of ideas, between two or more parties. Michel (2012); posited that conflict exists when two people are fixated on an inconsistent point of view. The common denominator in these definitions of conflict is the existent of conflict beyond single individual to two or more parties or group of people. Another significant element for conflict to exist is the divergence of goals or interest between two or more actors which may lead to the pursuit of various means to achieve their objectives. Conflict is thus dependent on people's differences in opinion, views.

Moreover, Folger (1997); defined conflict as the interaction of interdependent people who perceived incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals. In the broadest terms, Diez et al (2006) opined that conflict denotes the incompatibility of subject positions. These definitions emphasize the opposition or incompatibility at the root of conflicts, and initially leaves open the exact nature of these incompatibilities. This implies that the definitions failed to clarify whether the source of the conflicts are between individuals, groups or societal positions; whether they rest in different interests or beliefs or whether they have a material existence or come into being only through discourse.

Threat

This refers to a statement of an intention to inflict pains, injury, damage or other hostile actions on someone. It may also be the attempt for retribution for something done or not done. Security threat can be natural or man-made such as terrorism, banditry, fire disaster, accident, erosion, earthquakes, tsunami, earth tremor, drought, landslide and so on.

Concept of Management

Terry (1969), defines management as a process consisting of planning, organizing, actuating and controlling, performed to determine and accomplish the objectives by the use of people and other resources. According to this definition, management is a process and a systematic way of doing things. It is thus the sum-total of the following activities: (i) the determination of objectives, plans, policies and programmes; (ii) the provision of security for men, material and machinery (iii) the organization of resources into sequential and appropriate operational processes (iv) the art of directing, motivating, supervising and control workers and their performances, and (v) provision of maximum growth, prosperity and happiness for both employer and employees and the public at large. It is noteworthy to state that the various definitions and perspective of management do not run contrary to one another but are made up of diverse composite perspective of management that create an exhaustive meaning of the concept of management.

Furthermore, the four key concepts and nature of management, which include goal orientation, universality, integrative force and social process are essential tool in handling security threat. These concepts thus make the adoption of management principles in the handling of security in the north east very effective. Consequently, the concept of management brings about the achievement of goals, through its universal applicability and integration of collective efforts to the realignment of social objective through the resolution of this prevalence conflicts.

Security Management Strategies

Conflict management has been used interchangeably with conflict resolution. Essuman-Johnson (2009); contents that conflict resolution refers to the elimination of the causes of the underlying conflict with the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, conflict management refers to the elimination, neutralization or control of the means of pursuing either the conflict or the crisis. It is rarely accomplished by direct action and is more frequently achieved only over a long period of time. Globally, conflicts have become perhaps a permanent feature in human social relations. Conflict in resource use is not uncommon and perhaps not unnatural between living beings (Alfonso and Erik, 2001). Indeed, Driscoll (1994) opined that conflict management requires intervention to reduce conflict but when conflicts degenerate into violent and destructive clashes, they become unhealthy and counterproductive.

Theoretical Framework

Frustration and Aggression Theory

The origin of Frustration and Aggression theory can be linked to the publication of Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939) and Zillmann (1979) in which they presented what is now popularly called the frustration-aggression hypothesis (F-A) Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939). According to them, the central thesis of Frustration and aggression theory is that aggression is always a function of frustration and the occurrences of aggressive behavior always presuppose the existence of frustration. They further defined aggression as any behavior which is intended to injure, cause harm, pain to the individual to whom it is directed. According to Zillmann (1979), the major tenets of the theory are;

- a) frustration instigates behavior that may or may not be hostile or aggressive;
- b) And any hostile or aggressive behavior that occurs is caused by frustration.

The theoretical significance of this theory is its ability to concisely explain the reasons for security threat in the country. Environmental conflict from the perspective of this theory is a product of the frustration of bandit as a result of severe ecological changes and Boko Haram incessant attacks in their home state with the resultant effects such as the death of many cattle

which are their most treasured possession, cattle rustling and migration to the south. All of which makes people put on aggressive behavior which is a derivative of the previous frustration they have encountered as a result of grazing in the face of adverse weather condition, scarcity of environmental resources and security threats from Boko Haram attacks. Therefore, the destruction of lives and properties, houses and massive death toll that perpetually fill up the front-page of the national dailies are the product of aggression that evolves from frustration and sense of deep loss

Frustration Aggression Theory is adopted as part of my workable theories because it explains the reason for conflict.

Factors Responsible for Security Threat in the North East Nigeria

The primary reason for the insurgency ravaging the North East. Religious bigotry via misinterpretation of Islamic injunctions. There is wide range of ungoverned spaces in the North East which laid a foundation for insecurity in the region. The failure of the state become a significant factor causing security threats in the region. Lack of service delivery such as education, health, unemployment, infrastructure and other social amenities has made the people of the environment vulnerable to security threats.

Also, selfish politicians recruit fighters to work for them during elections to ensure ballot boxes are either snatched or destroyed in areas that they lack grip and to fight after elections in the event that they lose. The use of political thugs and the syndrome which perpetuates it is a creation of political leaders who use people for political thuggery during election and to deal with political adversaries. Post-election violence is mostly caused by political thugs hired by political leaders' other factors includes, environmental, population explosion, religion, desertification, terrorism, power and politics, ethnicity. poverty, unemployment. These form the major reasons for security threat in the north east Nigeria.

Primary factors implicated in security threats in North East include;

Motivating Causes: These are the actual grievances of injustice, oppression, frustration and hatred, deprivation, exclusion, discrimination that people experienced on personal level,

motivating the affected people to act negatively including, banditry and terrorism thereby constitute security threat.

Triggers of Conflicts: These are the direct perpetrators of security threat such terrorist acts, they may be momentous or provocative events, a political calamity an outrageous act committed by the enemy or other events that call for revenge or actions even peace talks may trigger opponents of political compromise to carry out terrorist action in order to undermine negotiations in bringing peace. This act constitutes security threat as witnessed in state like Borno and Adamawa state.

Structural Factors: These affect people who have been unfairly treated by either by Government or community which include aspect like demography imbalance globalization, rapid modernization, transitional society, class structure and so on.

Technological Factor

In addition to the cultural and religious motivations of terrorists and the political and organizational enabling factors, technology has evolved in ways that provide unprecedented opportunities for terrorists, advances in communications and information technology. This technology provides both assistance to the terrorists and an opportunity for targeting as industrialized societies place greater reliance on information infrastructures. Terrorists will likely avoid dismantling the internet because they need the technology for their own communication and propaganda activities.

Accordingly, terrorists may be more interested in systemic disruption rather than the total destruction of information networks. While the consequences of a major disruption of American or global information infrastructures could be catastrophic financially or socially, terrorists have not shown the inclination or capability to undertake massive strikes in this area like the case of north east Nigeria.

There have been limited attacks along these lines, but the major use of information technology has been as an aid for terrorists rather than as a target of their activity. The reported use of the internet and e-mail by al Qaeda to coordinate the strikes on the World Trade Center

and the Pentagon provides a dramatic example of this sort of coordination. Information technology's biggest impact on terrorists has involved the everyday tasks of organizing and communicating, rather than their methods of attack.

Secondary factors include

Environmental Factors: Security threat can occur as of environment such as climate change. Environmental security scholar Thomas Homer- Dixon emphasized the role of resource scarcity and competition as the primary, though not the only cause of the conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Blench, 2010). But resources scarcity is induced by many factors and is not without consequences. This type of scarcity is essentially a decline in the availability of or access to natural resources. It is usually induced by climatic and environmental factors such as climate change, acute drought, environmental degradation, fresh water depletion, desertification, erosion, extreme heat, loss of wetland which constitute serious security threat.

Scarcity of land, water and foliage which stems from unfavourable weather and climatic condition reduces the availability of these resources and usually changes the pattern of grazing by herders and their social relations with farmers. As growing pressure on natural resources caused by human population increase, growth in the population of herd, due to improved conditions of the cattle often compel the pastoralists to seek for more pastures beyond their limited range (Bello, 2013).

Population Explosion: Another major cause of the security threat is population explosion of both humans and livestock which is based on the hypothesis of Thomas Malthus (1798) on eco-scarcity and population pressure entitled 'an essay on the principle of population' in which he proposed that population and resources are initially in equilibrium, but while populations grow exponentially, food production increases only linearly. According to him, population grows exponentially, while food production grows in arithmetic progression. Moreso, population growth will reduce the availability of natural resources because population grows faster than food supply, and poor people will impoverish the soil and natural resources by overuse and this will induce competition and conflict over means of existence.

Unfavorable Ecological Changes: Scarcity of water, land and harsh weather in the North East and North West part of Nigeria is a major factor that necessitates the migration of people from one place to another, where the ecology is more favourable to their herding business because of a more favourable weather and access to water by existence of river Niger and Benue.

Land Ownership System: The mysticism and inclination to land ownership in Nigeria is also a major cause of security threat. The indigene settler syndrome is always a factor necessitating conflict over land use especially when there exists a deliberate deprivation or perceived marginalization of one group in the allocation and utility of land and access to water. As a result of transhumance, pastoralist from North East and North West part of Nigeria who migrate to the middle-belt in search of forage and water inevitably become host and settler and are often seen as strangers, settlers or foreigner. The attendant effects of this is that in case of any further deprivation of resources by the indigenes, the pastoralist often transfer aggression on the indigene for their previous losses and flee while the indigene respond by employing every means of evacuating them from their land. (Adisa, 2012).

Ethno-Religious Intolerance: Another major reason for the security threat is the ethno-religious dynamics of relations between people from different religious beliefs. The ethnic dimension comes to play in different part of the country such as TIV and Jukun in Taraba state, Herdsmen and Farmers in Benue and Plateau which constitute security threat in the country (Shetimma and Tar, 2008).

Boko Haram Attack and forced Migration: Incessant attacks and the conquest of some of the North East and North West part of Nigeria by the Boko-Haram sects, has forced people from the north east to migrate downwards to more peaceful and safer North- central for the safety of safety

Consequences of Security Threat

(a) **Loss of Life and Human Insecurity:** One of the major consequences of the perennial conflict, attacks and counter-attacks by Boko Haram, Bandit and kidnapers in Northern Nigeria is massive death toll of many innocent citizens. (Olayoku, 2012).

(b) **Loss of Cattle:** Another severe consequence is the loss of cattle to conflict and bandits as many herds are lost during the conflict to by bandits who take advantage of the conflicts to steal cattle from their owners. On the side of security forces, many lost their lives in the process protecting the citizens (Audu, 2014).

(c) **Destruction of Properties:** Another effect of this security treat arising from terrorist is destruction of farm properties and farm irrigation equipment, farming tools, houses and cars by who usually carry out organized violence as retaliatory act on the farming communities particularly in Borno and Adamawa state.

(d) **Threat to National Unity:** The persistent attack by the Terrorist and bandit has drawn the attention of Nigerians to the threat it poses to national unity. In line with this conception, the Honourable Speaker of the House of Representatives, now former Yakubu Dogara on the 26th of April, 2016 who clamoured for deliberate and proactive actions to end the incessant attacks and kidnapping across the country, noting that if not properly checked could divide Nigeria (Ovuakporie and Agbakwuru, 2016).

(e) **Displacement:** Another lethal effect of this conflict is the displacement of people from their homes and community for safety reasons. This has become the persistent effect of the clash between herdsmen and farmers in North Central Nigeria. Djadi (2016); reported that over 20,000 people have fled the wave of attacks since 2010.

Conclusion

Insecurity is obviously the most contemporary challenge in Nigeria is contemporary times, and the North East contributes is one of the most affected regions. Causes of insecurity in this region include that bigotry, bad governance, infrastructural deficiencies, terrorism, and unemployment. There is need to understand and mitigate these threats as they pose serious

threats to the unity and corporate existence of Nigeria as a sovereign state. In order to forestall this, the underlisted are recommendation.

Recommendations

1. There is need for value reorientation in terms of ethnic and religious tolerance. The National Orientation Agency should live up to its billings and increase advocacy visits to critical stakeholders and inter face with generality of the public on the necessities of tolerance. This will rid the society of ethno-religious intolerance.
2. The state should provide good governance to the people by reaching the unreached. So many areas and spaces have not yet been reached with governance.
3. Government should prosecute Politicians who incite violence before, during and after elections. No matter how highly placed a politician is, if found culpable, he or she should be prosecuted according to the dictates of the law.
4. Non- state actors in the provision of security (Vigilante group) should be motivated as their performance in safeguarding lives and property has been helpful in no small measure in stemming the tide of security threats in the region. Stipends should be given on a constant basis to keep them motivated.
5. Multi stakeholders meeting should be a routine programme as it greases the wheels of understanding in the community.
6. There should be sanction on any religious leaders that preaches inciting religious messages. Prohibition laws should be made to curb this excess.
7. Employment placements for the youth should be a priority for government. This will keep the youth off the streets and out of idleness. Skill acquisition has worked to reduce youth restiveness in the society thereby keeping them tendencies of being miscreants.

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